

a documentary history of communism

edited with an introduction and notes by

Robert V. Daniels

VOLUME 1

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The opportunities for
a rapid development of
new towns will be
numerous. Fulfillment
of the interests of the
existing structures leading to
the standardization
of design was not
achieved, - it is to be
reached by specialists -
but it can lead to cultural
advantage - if the arts
and crafts - will be joined
at the same - during
which, their responsibility
is to be assumed.

A Documentary History of COMMUNISM

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A Documentary History of COMMUNISM

*Edited, with introduction, notes
and new translations,
by ROBERT V. DANIELS*

Volume I



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Preface

It would naturally be impossible in one volume of documentary materials to cover a subject as broad and complex as communism from every point of view. The careful description of political institutions, events and everyday life as they have proceeded over the years under communism would require whole shelves of source materials. The present work has been deliberately focused on the subject of Communist thought and doctrine, for reason of its commanding importance, its relative uniformity within the Communist scheme of things, and the appropriateness of the documentary approach to its elucidation. We will be primarily concerned with the evolution of top-level guiding ideas, policies and intentions among the Communists. Statements of deviators of all sorts are included along with the official line of those in power—we may regard anyone who claims descent from Lenin as equally meriting the label “Communist.” Through the pronouncements of its leading figures, both those who have ruled and those who have fallen from grace, we may arrive at a reasonably approximate picture of what communism actually is, historically considered.

The problems of selecting materials for a purpose such as this never permit a fully satisfactory solution. I have attempted a fair digest and representative choice of statements expressing all the main concepts and currents in communism. Many readers, however, will find that their areas of interest are under-represented. This failing is the price that must be paid in an effort to survey the entire Communist movement in one documentary volume, and meet the needs of the student, the general reader, and the scholar who is not a specialist in this field.

The present work would never have materialized without

the assistance of the many people who helped in its preparation or who paved the way with their own studies. I am indebted to the many publishers who kindly permitted me to reprint selections of previously translated material (individually acknowledged under each item). Certain documentary collections which have been particularly helpful deserve special mention—the pioneering *Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, by Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank (Harvard University Press, 1952); the *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System*, by James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera (The George Wahr Publishing Co., Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1950), which brings together a wide selection of previously translated Soviet documents; the documentary compilations prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress; the various collections of Soviet documents published by the Stanford University Press; and the English editions of the selected works of Lenin and Stalin, published by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow. The Harvard University Library has kindly permitted me to include my translations from a number of hitherto unpublished documents in the Trotsky Archive. For their suggestions regarding documents on Far Eastern communism I am indebted to Professors Justus M. van der Kroef and George T. Little, and to Professor Little and Professor Lewis S. Feuer I am grateful for many helpful criticisms. To Mr. Nathan Glazer I wish to express my appreciation for initially encouraging me to undertake this project, and for his editorial assistance since that time. Mrs. Joyce McLaughlin of the Inter-Library Loan Department of the University of Vermont Library rendered me invaluable service in locating and obtaining many scarce but important publications. The vast work of transcribing and assembling the documentary materials was ably done by Mrs. Madeline Chaplin, Mrs. Jean Falls, Mrs. Phyllis Reservitz, Mrs. Roberta Stetson, and my wife, Alice Daniels.

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Introduction: The Evolution of the Communist Mind

The subject of this work is the world-wide movement which was initially brought into being by Vladimir Ilich Lenin when he organized his Bolshevik faction of Russian revolutionaries in the years 1902-1904. Earlier doctrines and movements going under the name "communism" are not of concern except as they were relevant to the thinking of the specific contemporary Communist movement founded by Lenin and developed in Russia after the revolution of 1917. This applies particularly to the philosophy of Marx and Engels, of which Russian communism was by no means a simple, uncomplicated application (nor the only school of followers, for that matter). Marxism is of interest here insofar as, and only so far as, it contributed to Communist thought, policies and problems. By itself, Marxism is wholly inadequate either to define or explain the Communist movement.

The Communist Movement and Communist Doctrine

There is one essential point on which the whole matter of the correct understanding of communism rests. Contrary to every assertion, the Communist movement is not truly described by its doctrine. Broadly speaking, the doctrine is a picture of history, past, present and future, which gives the present movement that definite place which was forecast by the original authors of the picture a century ago. Very strong doubts can be cast upon the present validity of the picture as a whole. But it can be shown beyond any reasonable question that within the terms of the Marxist picture itself, the present Communist movement does not occupy the place which its official spokesmen ascribe to it. As a picture of Communist society and a map of its intentions, Communist doctrine is not a free and honest ap-

proach to the apprehension of reality, but a forced political imposition.

It is accordingly necessary for anyone who wants to understand communism to look beneath the doctrine and to question all the assumptions which it casts in the way of a clear view. The lack of correspondence between theory and reality will then become readily apparent. This divergence of statement and fact is actually one of the basic features of the Communist movement as it now exists, and it dictates in turn another prime Communist characteristic—the institution of complete control of communication and expression, in order to sustain the irrelevant theoretical picture which it is in the nature of communism to demand. The Communist mentality can be described in essence as a compulsively self-justifying opportunism, where the leaders assume full freedom of action but insist on squaring every step with the holy verities of Marxism-Leninism.

Since Communist doctrine has been so far abstracted from reality, it can well be asked why the doctrinal statements of the movement are worth studying. What, indeed, can be the value of putting forth a collection of Communist ideological pronouncements like the present one, if the real nature of the movement is neither expressed nor governed by its doctrine? Taken at their face value these doctrinal statements can be quite misleading; the reader must bear in mind the context and learn the habit—essential to every student of communism—of reading between the lines. Doctrine has always been extremely important to the Communist movement, though for a long time not in its literal sense. An awareness of the evolving use and reinterpretation of doctrine is basic in appreciating how the movement has developed. The documents are thus primarily useful for the pursuit of historical understanding, which is the only way to comprehend how the movement acquired the paradoxical characteristics which it now displays.

Marx and the Russians

Communist thought cannot be understood apart from Marx, but neither can it be understood on a simple, unqualified

Marxist basis. The intellectual origins of the movement must be approached as an interaction of Marx's ideas and the political and intellectual setting of pre-revolutionary Russia in which they took root. The circumstances in which Marxism became popular in Russia in the 1890's belie the expectations of the theory itself. Russia was not a capitalistic country with a proletariat ripe for revolution; it was just beginning to experience the change and dislocation which accompany the initial stages of industrialization. For decades, however, Russia had possessed a class of energetic and articulate intellectuals who devotedly embraced each new radical or utopian idea that came to them from Europe. Marx himself recognized this fashion among the Russians, and commented sardonically that they "always run after the most extreme that the West can offer. . . . This does not prevent the same Russians, once they enter State service, from becoming rascals."^{*} Revolutionary elements among the Russian intelligentsia were primed to respond to any revolutionary doctrine from the West. When Marxism became known to them, they devotedly embraced it in large numbers.

The intellectual success of Marxism had nothing to do with its logical applicability to Russia. It was difficult to apply it at all, as Marx realized: "The 'historical necessity' of . . . capitalist production . . . is explicitly restricted to the *countries of Western Europe*."^{**} Rigorously construed—as Marx's Russian disciples construed it—Marxism could give scant hope for an early proletarian revolution in Russia. The expectation for a country at the Russian stage of development was a "bourgeois-democratic revolution" and an extended period of capitalistic industrial development, before Russia would follow the socialist course that her West-European neighbors were supposed to initiate. For the immediate future Marxism would serve more appropriately as an ideological justification of capitalism, and in fact the

* Marx to Kugelman, October 1, 1868, in *Letters to Dr. Kugelman* (New York, International Publishers, 1934), pp. 77-78.

** Marx to Vera Zasulich, March 8, 1881, in Blackstock and Hoselitz, eds., *The Russian Menace to Europe* (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1952), p. 278.

theory did have considerable appeal in Russia on just this basis, among the so-called "legal Marxists."

Among the revolutionaries in Russia, Marxism could not appeal on logical grounds. People did not become revolutionary after an intellectual conversion to the Marxian historical analysis. They became Marxists—in Russia as everywhere else—because they were revolutionary for prior emotional reasons and because Marxism appealed to them on emotional grounds as a pseudo-scientific rationale for revolution. Logical inconsistency was no obstacle. Marxism in Russia has from the very beginning neatly fit Marx's own definition of ideology as "false consciousness"—a set of ideas used without concern for truth or consistency to rationalize the interests and aims of a particular social group. Marxism became the "ideology" of a large part of the revolutionary Russian intelligentsia. Since the revolution it has fulfilled the same function for the ruling Communist Party.

Lenin, in this context, represents simply the clearest and most extreme example of emotional commitment to Marxism in disregard of its incongruence in Russia. Lenin had grown up with the burning revolutionary ardor so familiar among the scions of the educated gentry. He embraced Marxism with religious devotion, as the ultimate word in human affairs, almost as a supernatural prophecy which no mortal could dare question or modify without committing the sin of blasphemy. Despite this dogmatism, however, Lenin was quite capable of ignoring or violating Marxian principles when it came to the actual formulation of revolutionary programs and tactics. Lenin's program and tactics did not come from Marx at all, but from his own emotional make-up as a member of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia, and from the previous traditions of the revolutionary movement in Russia. Lenin's Marxism was superimposed upon his Russianism, to supply the terminology and conviction of righteous inevitability.

While we cannot understand Lenin as a Marxist, the study of his theoretical pronouncements and his tactical statements does contribute basic understanding about the Communist movement. What we have to deal with is in

reality a new doctrine—Leninism—which, while observing the Marxian language and professing spiritual continuity from Marx, actually contradicted him in many vital respects. Leninism as a system of belief has had a very profound effect in shaping the Communist movement, and so it is the natural starting point for any analysis of modern communism.

The Premises of Leninism

Lenin's political thinking rested on two cardinal assumptions, neither of which bore any logical relation to Marxism. One of these implicit beliefs was his conception of the overall nature of the historical process: that history is made in the last analysis not by classes or the forces of production, but by willful individual leaders and by ideas. This was an outlook he shared with practically all pre-Marxist Russian social thinkers. Lenin had assimilated it so deeply that he was scarcely conscious of its import, so that he could go right on resting his thought on such an assumption while he imagined himself to be a perfectly orthodox Marxist. Time and again Lenin railed against "spontaneity" and proclaimed the vital role of "consciousness." He made it abundantly clear that he never expected the working class to carry out a revolution by itself. Only the deliberate leadership of dedicated "professional revolutionaries" like himself could bring the event about.

In his emotional orientation toward revolution Lenin shared a trait with the unscientific aspect of Marx's outlook which did not follow logically from his theoretical system. This was what might be called the moral imperative of revolution. Lenin, like Marx, was dedicated to the anticipated revolution as a moral absolute, as a sort of purgative judgment day which would extirpate all the evil in the old way of life, and usher in the millenium. For both Marx and Lenin, all questions of good and evil hinged on the ultimate question of revolution. They differed, however, in the manner in which they sustained their hopes about revolution. Marx's solution was that of pseudo-scientific inevitability; having committed himself to the moral necessity for the revolutionary reconstruction of society, he proceeded

to work out an elaborate, sweeping, in many respects brilliant system of social analysis which purported to prove the inevitability of that prospective upheaval: the relentless dialectic of historical materialism would sooner or later raise the chosen class of proletarians to the seats of power.

Lenin followed all this verbally, but the actual foundation which he established for his revolutionary goal was in fact diametrically opposed to Marx's. For Lenin the revolution was not inevitable at all; it had to be brought about by the deliberate action of conscious revolutionaries, against the natural flow of history. If the spontaneous forces of history were not interfered with, Lenin implied, the moral imperative of revolution would never become a reality. Hence it was on willful revolutionaries, sustained by a sense of moral duty, that Lenin had to rest his hopes. How guarantee, however, that the revolutionaries would keep striving in the right direction against the frustrating spontaneity of the passive herd? Lenin's answer was the same on which any religious movement relies to assure individual rectitude: the proper doctrine, the true faith.

The proper doctrine was Marxism as read by Lenin. Any questioning of the doctrine or of Lenin's own interpretation of it—in fact, any independence of mind at all—not only disqualified a member of the revolutionary movement but classified him irretrievably with the enemies of the revolution, as far as Lenin was concerned. Lenin and his followers were sustained by an absolute faith in Marx's revolutionary prophecy, with all its pseudo-science of dialetical inevitability. It mattered not that the doctrine of inevitability contradicted the philosophy of will and idea which all of Lenin's political practice implied, for the Bolsheviks were revolutionaries before they were Marxists. They displayed the Calvinistic paradox of people who believed in a foreordained future but who, thanks to this belief, were all the more vigorously determined on individual action to make that future come true. The psychological truth here is that people with a strong emotional impulse toward a given goal are irrationally inclined to embrace a doctrine that says that that goal is inevitably going to be realized.

The emotional commitment to strive mightily for a revolution that was regarded as inevitable had significant moral implications for the Bolsheviks: it allowed them to conclude without qualms that the end justifies any means. Like the Russian extremists who preceded them, the Bolsheviks regarded the revolution as the all-decisive event, the leap from the kingdom of Evil to the kingdom of Good. Nothing had any value or made any sense except in relation to the revolution. But the revolution could not be passively awaited, according to the Bolshevik philosophy; it required a total commitment and the utmost exertion by those morally committed to it to make it a reality. Therefore, it was morally binding upon the adherents of revolution to employ every expedient means, not excepting violence, falsehood, robbery and treachery, to prepare and consummate the revolutionary victory. All such questionable tactics could be utilized with equanimity because the expected revolution would be all-decisive in governing the high moral level of the new society; it would wipe away any evil effects of evil means presently used.

The grave defect in this reasoning was the lack of assurance that the revolution—i.e., the right kind of revolution, the real revolution—would actually follow from the revolutionaries' action and offset the expedient evils employed by them. How know that the present evil means would assuredly procure the future good? For this foundation to their righteousness the Bolsheviks had to depend on the Marxian inevitability of the proletarian revolution and the classless society. However, it was precisely the lack of real conviction about such inevitability that required them to adopt evil expedients in the first place. Far from being corrected in the revolution which actually took place, the Bolsheviks' system of violent, authoritarian and deceitful expedients rapidly became an end in itself; it is now the basis of the Communist social order.

The Party as the Instrument of Revolution

The major contribution which Lenin made to the theory and practice of communism was by way of implementing his

belief in the moral imperative of a historically uncertain revolution. He had to have reliable means for accomplishing a problematical political goal, and he found them in a feature which had been a distinguishing trait of the earlier Russian revolutionary movements—the stress on conspiratorial organization, the revolutionary party. The party represents the essence of Leninism.

The function of the party, as Lenin conceived it, was to force the revolution to occur, against all the resistance of the old order. The party would overcome the impracticality of the intellectuals and the formless spontaneity of the masses, and drive for a victory which otherwise would never materialize. For this instrument of revolution Lenin had in mind forms of organization, dictated both by the circumstances of the political underground and by his own proclivities, from which he never deviated. First of all, the party was to be a narrow organization, not the mass of like-minded sympathizers, but the active and conscious minority, the professional revolutionaries. This was the specific issue over which the factional split of the Russian Social Democrats into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks began in 1903. For the accomplishment of its revolutionary objective Lenin required that this minority organization be constituted on military lines, with a hierarchy of command and binding discipline upon its members. The formula which he proposed to guide the party organization was "democratic centralism," meaning the democratic determination of policy and the centralized execution of it. In practice, however, Lenin could brook no expression of policy contrary to his own thinking; any one who differed with Lenin found himself attacked as "opportunist" or "petty bourgeois," an unreliable element if not a potential traitor to the revolutionary cause. Lenin recognized none as genuine proletarian Marxists save those who unreservedly followed his own leadership. Thus, while the notion of a one-party dictatorship was never explicitly formulated before the Bolsheviks came to power, the exclusion of all who differed had already been long implicit in the monopoly of revolutionary morality which in practice Lenin ascribed to himself.

There is irony in the fact that when the Bolsheviks took power in October, 1917, the Leninist rigor of their organization was at its lowest point, the party having been diluted with hundreds of thousands of new members and many new leaders like Trotsky who had never committed themselves to the principles of Bolshevik discipline. A spontaneous mass upheaval and the enthusiasm of the party members—forces which Lenin had distrusted or discounted—were responsible much more than organization and narrow discipline for the Bolshevik success. It was only through a step-by-step process in the years following the revolution that the organization of the party was tightened up to approximate Lenin's old ideal, with the major imposition of discipline coming in 1921, after the crisis of civil war had been weathered. The great difference now was in the function which the party had to play—not the underground conspiracy aiming to get the revolution started, but the exclusive association of people engaged in ruling the state. Never anticipated, this new role for the disciplined party was to constitute the backbone of Communist totalitarianism.

Whose Revolution?

After Lenin had worked out his plan for the "proletarian" party as the instrument of revolution, he had to find a place for it to operate in the Marxian scheme of things as applied to Russia. The dilemma, as we have seen, was how to hold strictly to the Marxian prognosis of bourgeois revolution and still envision an opportunity to lead an anticapitalist mass revolutionary movement. Among most of Lenin's rivals in the Menshevik faction of the Social Democrats, a weaker emotional attachment to revolution was attested by their acceptance of the prospect of a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution and of a long period of capitalism after that, during which the workers' party could be nothing more than a legal opposition. Lenin, however, took the bull very boldly by the horns at the time of the revolutionary ferment of 1905, to declare that the bourgeois revolution could be carried through to its conclusion only by the party of the proletariat, because the bourgeoisie was not revolutionary

enough. It did not occur to Lenin that this made mincemeat of the basic Marxian propositions governing the relationships of economic stages, class forces, and political movements. He blithely called for a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," which would hold power until the capitalists prepared the industrial conditions for their own demise, after which the real dictatorship of the proletariat would confiscate the means of production and effectuate the transition to the socialist society.

There was another approach to the dilemma of Marxist revolution in Russia which avoided Lenin's violence to the doctrine and at the same time preserved the prospect of immediate revolutionary action by the workers and their leaders. This was the "theory of permanent revolution" expounded by Trotsky, a set of ideas which proved to be very important later on—in 1917 as the rationale for the Bolshevik seizure of power, and during the 1920's as a major subject of factional controversy among the Communists. Trotsky's view proceeded from the observation that Russia's economic development had been uneven, with some modern industry and a politically conscious working class surrounded by a vast majority of impoverished peasants mainly interested in owning more land. It would be natural, he suggested, for the bourgeois revolution to swing without any break in continuity (hence "permanent") into a proletarian phase where the workers as an energetic minority could temporarily take power. They would soon be in danger of falling before the "petty-bourgeois" (mainly peasant) majority, were it not for the international repercussions which Trotsky expected their momentary success to have. Supposedly the exploits of the revolutionary workers in Russia would provide the stimulus for the ripening forces of proletarian revolution elsewhere in the world, and the socialist upheaval would therefore proceed without interruption (again "permanent") on the international plane. Brotherly socialist states would hasten to succor the embattled proletarians of Muscovy and help raise the whole population of Russia to the industrial level where the advantages of socialism would be apparent to all.

Trotsky's theory gradually gained adherents in the years before 1917, and then, after the fall of the Czar in February, 1917, was startlingly borne out by events. "Bourgeois" revolution did indeed open the way for the proletarians and the party they supported to surge toward power; recognizing this, Lenin and most of the other Bolshevik leaders accepted Trotsky's reasoning in all but name. The Bolsheviks prepared to seize power in the fall of 1917, assuming that their social backing as well as the underdeveloped economy in Russia were not sufficient to sustain their program of socialist revolution, but with the conviction that their success of the moment would evoke the instantaneous response of international revolution. Some Bolsheviks (led by Zinoviev and Kamenev) were skeptical about the latter, and on this ground opposed the October coup d'état as an irresponsible gamble. Lenin, in contrast, demanded insurrection as a Russian duty to give the European workers the signal they needed. Implicit in all this was the irrational faith, inherited from mid-nineteenth-century Russian thinkers, in the efficacy of Russia's revolutionary mission to the world. The fact remains, however, that the Bolsheviks took power with a theoretical outlook which told them that their aims could not possibly be achieved in Russia without the assistance of like-minded revolutionary regimes in those advanced countries where socialism, according to Marxism, was supposed to begin first. Such help never came, and in its absence a drastic reconstruction of theory was required if the most embarrassing implications were to be evaded.

The Paradox of Marxian Socialism in Russia

It has sometimes been suggested that the successful proletarian revolution in Russia proved Marx wrong by showing that socialism could win without previous industrial development under capitalism. But if Marx's predictions cannot be relied upon, with what assurance can the revolution be described as "proletarian"? Actually the Soviet system has developed in an entirely different direction. The Marxist labels of proletarian socialism and the "workers' state" have

been kept only for the sake of self-righteousness and propaganda—the “ideology” or “false consciousness” of the new post-revolutionary regime.

The step-by-step adaptations of Marxist theory after the establishment of the Soviet regime illustrate very clearly the impact of circumstances which forced the Communists to revamp their program. Within a matter of months after the October Revolution basic decisions had been made which fatally compromised the Marxian logic of the Communists’ position. They kept power, but only by shifts of policy which changed the whole direction of their revolution and brought it into line with what Russian conditions permitted.

The first of these major policy changes was the decision in February, 1918, to make peace with Germany instead of proclaiming an international civil war against all the capitalist powers. The Bolsheviks’ seizure of power had been predicated on the imminence of proletarian revolution in the West, which the Russian assault on the “imperialist” Provisional Government was supposed to evoke, and which in turn was presumably indispensable to sustain socialist hopes in Russia. Once in power, however, Lenin declined to gamble his position in the interests of world revolution; over the anguished protests of the left-wing utopians, he decided to make peace and buy time rather than risk losing power in Russia while attempting to set a fighting example for the European workers. In other words, his estimate of the revolutionary potential outside Russia had now dropped—but that estimate had been the only Marxist way of justifying his seizure of power in the first place. Lenin rejected the alleged possibility of immediately evoking international revolution, in the interest of holding power which could have no Marxian socialist meaning in the absence of that international revolution. This is how the Communists came to rule in a country where Marxism ruled out the success of the proletariat.

Following the peace of Brest Litovsk, during the period of civil strife and economic disruption which goes by the term “War Communism,” the ranks of the Communist Party were torn repeatedly with dissension over the implications of

holding power where conditions made the realization of the program of proletarian socialism, as theretofore conceived, entirely chimerical. Lenin had espoused the utopian program as firmly as anyone in the programmatic tract, "State and Revolution," which he wrote while hiding in Finland in 1917. The workers would seize power, subject the whole economy to their control, destroy the existing state machinery, and install new officials of their own choosing whose pay would be no higher than "workman's wages." The resistance of the former exploiting classes would be crushed, and the state—i.e., the organs of law-enforcement and repression—would commence to "wither away." The annihilation of authority and the apotheosis of equality were visions animating vast numbers of Russians, not excepting the Communists, during the revolutionary years.

By the spring of 1918, Lenin had turned emphatically against these attitudes on the ground of total impracticability for the foreseeable future (though the evidence of most of his career strongly suggests that he was emotionally set against anarchy and equality in any event). In the government, the army, the factories, the Communist Party, Lenin (joined by Trotsky) demanded an end to equalitarianism and collective decision-making, and called instead for the establishment of firm hierarchies of individual authority and responsibility with clear differentials of individual reward. Step by step the institutions of the new Soviet society were recast in the old mold. By 1921, with the elimination of the trade unions from industrial management, the abolition of factions within the Communist Party, and the enunciation of the "New Economic Policy" (NEP) with its concessions to the individual profit motive, the Communist leaders had completed their adaptation of a late-industrial program to early-industrial conditions.

The occasion for the introduction of the New Economic Policy was a growing state of economic crisis and mass dissatisfaction, coming to a head in armed rebellion against the Soviet regime. In the perspective of past revolutions this marked the point where the national convulsion of revolutionary emotion was subsiding in favor of growing demands

for normal living. Revolutionary emotion among large numbers of people in Russia had sustained for a time the illusion that the immediate socialistic transformation of the country was still possible, whether or not strong authority and stringent controls were necessary to accomplish this. By early 1921, however, it was clear to Lenin and the more practical-minded Communists that power and program could not both be held to at the same time; again, as with the world revolution in 1918, one of these desiderata would have to be sacrificed, and again it was the program. Lenin, thanks to his compelling leadership and the strength of the party organization, was able to command the Communists to go into retreat, postpone their socialistic objectives, and come to terms with the realities of an underdeveloped country. In effect, he carried out his own "Thermidorean reaction" (by analogy with the fall of the Jacobins in France in 1794), and by adapting his party's policies from the stage of violent revolutionary emotion to the stage of post-revolutionary convalescence he was able to keep power.

This change was not effected, however, without serious difficulties within the ranks of the Communist Party. The utopians demanded that the party hew to the strictly idealist course, and began to attack Lenin for betraying the workers. Lenin, for his part, was determined to claim full Marxist justification for his compromising policy, and as was his custom, to condemn as un-Marxist anyone who took issue with him. At the Tenth Party Congress in March, 1921, Lenin used his control of the party organization to have the leftists condemned as a "petty-bourgeois" deviation, and to ban any recurrence of factional criticism.

It is interesting to note that the political and social situation in Russia after the introduction of the NEP in 1921 comes remarkably close to Lenin's old notion of the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," with a self-styled party of the workers holding power but adapting its policies to the capitalistic necessities of industrial development. This arrangement, as we have seen, contradicts the basic Marxian proposition regarding the dependence of the political "superstructure" on the economic "base." The only

way to salvage the Marxian analysis is to dismiss the "proletarian" label and regard the Communist politico-economic structure as an expression of industrialism in its developmental phase—not the successor of capitalism but a parallel alternative.

The transition to the New Economic Policy meant a major change as regards the vitality of Marxist theory among the Communists. Prior to this time they could still imagine that a lucky conjunction of circumstances in Russia was enabling them to proceed with the Marxian plan of proletarian dictatorship. After the "Thermidor" of 1921, when revolutionary hopes had to be suspended, the basic perspective was one of adaptation to the wrong conditions. The function of Marxist doctrine then had to shift from direct inspiration to the justification of a regime which no longer fit the requirements of the theory. In the language of Karl Mannheim, Marxism was changed from a "utopia" to an "ideology," from an inspirational illusion to a rationalization of actuality.* The defense of the "ideology" demanded stringent suppression of anyone who would again take the doctrine seriously as a "utopia" and hold it up as a challenge to the status quo; hence the necessity of rooting out the left-wing Communists and making the party line—the official interpretation of doctrine—an obligatory canon of faith. We have here, in the picture of the revolutionary party trying to explain away its conversion to a post-revolutionary role, the key to the mentality of total thought-control which was soon to become a permanent feature of the Communist system.

Although the Communist Party leaders claimed exclusive doctrinal sanction for their compromises of 1921, they remained for the time being aware that their policies were indeed expedients that did not point directly toward the ultimate socialistic goal. Concessions in the capitalistic or bureaucratic direction were recognized as such; they were simply regarded as practical necessities for the preservation of the power of the Communist Party until the industrial development of the country had proceeded to the point

* See Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, n.d.), pp. 192 ff.

where the fully socialist ideal could be put into effect. The real fallacy here from the Marxist standpoint lay in the notion that there was value in the retention of power *per se* regardless of the social base with which the authorities had to operate. The concessions which the Communists had to make at the expense of their program bear out clearly the conditions which social circumstances can impose on a government. Furthermore, thanks to their habit of justifying each practical expedient in terms of basic Marxist doctrine, the Communists began to lose any clear notion of what the ultimate goal was, as opposed to the pattern of immediate expedients. As is so often the case in human affairs, it was the practical steps rather than the original intention or blueprint that determined the outcome: the means became ends in themselves.

Socialism in One Country

During the factional controversies in the Communist Party after Lenin's demise the most bitter debate raged around the theoretical implications of the anomaly of the self-styled proletarian socialist state in Russia. The Trotskyists, who had been forced out of their positions of influence in 1921-23, sought arguments to use against Stalin and the other more direct followers of Lenin who were endeavoring to follow the NEP compromise of economic leniency plus firm party control. It was easy for Trotsky and the Left Opposition to find lapses by the leadership from the strict proletarian path, and they stressed these with warnings that the isolation of the revolution in a backward country made it very difficult to sustain a socialist policy without great care and effort. They began to suggest that Stalin's leadership was the embodiment of a "Thermidorean reaction," yielding to the desires of the petty-bourgeois majority of the country.

Stalin's defense against this line of reasoning represents a major change in the intellectual status and political function of Communist doctrine, though its meaning has usually been misunderstood. To meet the challenge of the opposition Stalin looked to the scriptures for assurance that he could not possibly be in error and particularly that national back-

wardness was not a crippling embarrassment. He found what he sought in a statement made by Lenin in 1915, to the effect that the country first going over to socialism would stand alone and fight the others until the revolution spread. Taking this remark out of context, Stalin applied it to Russia and appealed to it as the authority for his contention that the socialist regime could stand alone in Russia whether or not it was sustained by international revolution. At the same time the party propaganda machine whipped up a storm over Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, on the grounds of its pessimistic "lack of faith" in Russia's own revolutionary potential. Neither faction, it must be understood, rejected the world revolution as a Communist desideratum, while on the other hand neither was prepared to take great risks to bring it about. The issue in this respect was only over the implications for Russia of a delay in the world revolution: Trotsky said they were dangerous and required careful scrutiny of the existing leadership, and Stalin denied this.

The major significance of "socialism in one country" lay not with the Communist International, for which it made no difference, nor with the factional struggle among the Russian Communists, which was decided by organizational pressure, but with the meaning and role of Communist ideology as a whole. While it is pointless to debate whether Marxian socialism was really feasible in Russia (the whole experience of modern industrialism makes it appear more and more utopian), Stalin's manner of asserting the possibility of socialism is highly significant. He did not inquire empirically as to how the conditions of Russian life might be shaped in order to promote the ideal. (Bukharin did attempt this in some of his statements about the anticapitalist bent of the peasantry around the world.) Stalin preferred the scholastic method of turning to the scriptures for an authoritative statement that would give doctrinal sanction for what he was determined to do anyway. He did not base his action on an honest effort to understand and follow the doctrine as such; as his opposition critics irrefutably pointed out, he had distorted Lenin's meaning completely. Lenin had in mind the most advanced country, and had no intention of

asserting the immediate possibility of socialism in an underdeveloped country. Stalin's maneuver was a purely casuistical trick, indicative of the determination which he and his like-minded associates felt to maintain absolute doctrinal justification of their rule. The new theory was a major step in the manipulation of doctrine to make it accord with action that was decided on pragmatically.

The immediate consequence of the doctrinal twisting represented by "socialism in one country" was the suppression of all criticism, political or otherwise, aimed at the leadership or its rationalizations. From the standpoint of any serious regard for the doctrine itself it was easy to expose the maneuvers of the party leadership, as the Trotskyist opposition clearly demonstrated. In fact the ideological embarrassment which the Trotskyists posed was a major reason why Stalin and Bukharin were led to the decision to expel them from the party and silence them altogether. Thenceforth, to uphold their suppression of criticism, the Soviet leaders had to assert the absolute right of the party to pass definitive judgment on any question whatsoever. In this manner the compulsive pursuit of self-justification led to the establishment of totalitarian thought-control soon after Stalin achieved personal rule in 1929.

The Industrialization Program and the Easternization of Communism

Simultaneously with the Stalin-Trotsky political struggle and the development of Communist dogmatism, the Russian leaders were beginning to face the implications of the actual conditions under which they ruled, i.e., the economic problems of an underdeveloped country. The problems were serious and acute, and the differences of opinion which they evoked added fuel to the flames of factional controversy. As it happened, however, it was the accidents of factional politics rather than any particularly convincing analysis that governed the response to the industrialization problem which Russia made under Stalin's direction.

After the introduction of the NEP, as we have seen, both the Stalin-Bukharin faction and the Trotsky faction were

nervously concerned about the weakness of Russian society as the base for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dominant group took the position of caution, relying on tight party controls together with a conciliatory policy toward the peasants to keep the Communists in power during the expected long period of gradual development of state-owned industry. This was the program for which "socialism in one country" was required as the doctrinal justification. On the other hand, Trotsky and his supporters, much less patient, were calling by 1923 for concerted economic planning and industrial development by the state, in order to rectify as quickly as possible the economic backwardness which, according to the earlier orthodoxy, made socialism in Russia a very insecure proposition. The Trotskyist position, however, made no more sense from the strictly Marxian point of view than did "socialism in one country"; in suggesting that the "workers' state" could rapidly create its own economic base of large-scale industry the Trotskyists turned Marx's conception of the relation of economics and politics completely upside down.

While the Trotskyist demand for deliberate, intensive industrialization defied the traditional preconceptions of Marxism, it was nonetheless of major significance for the future development of the Communist movement. Implied in the Trotsky approach was a fundamentally new conception of the historical role of the socialist organization of society. From the beginning of the socialist movement in the early nineteenth century socialist thinkers and parties had been almost exclusively concerned with the redistribution of existing wealth, the reapportionment on some more equitable basis of the proceeds from society's productive capacity. The productive capacity itself was taken for granted, either as a static quantity or (as Marx approached it) as the creature of capitalism prior to the establishment of socialism. The Trotskyists' great innovation was to apply the socialist system of a state-operated economy to the task of developing productive capacity. All previous schools of socialist thought, including Marx and Lenin, represented forms of what we might call "distributive" socialism. Trotsky's was the first

school of "productive" socialism—the essentially un-Marxist idea that the socialist state could and should be used to promote industrialization and overcome the poverty of low productivity.

Ironically, the actual shift in the Communist movement from the distributive to the productive orientation was not accomplished by Trotsky but by his principal enemy. Until 1927, the party leadership headed by Stalin and Bukharin had steadfastly resisted Trotsky's demand for rapid, planned, tax-supported industrial development, in favor of gradual development financed mainly out of the profits made by Soviet industry while catering to the needs of the consuming public. By the end of 1927, however, when the factional struggle within the Communist Party had reached its climax with the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev and their followers from the party's ranks, the party leadership had itself begun to move toward a somewhat more aggressive economic policy. Then, rapidly playing his hand with remarkable political finesse, Stalin commenced in 1928 to maneuver against his erstwhile colleagues in the party leadership, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. Knowing that these men were committed to economic caution, Stalin abruptly took over the Trotskyist approach to industrialization and with it the plan of wholesale collectivization of the peasants (a step necessary to squeeze from them the unrecompensed surplus necessary to support the industrialization effort). Carefully representing his ideas as the continuation of established party policies, Stalin was able to take the protests made by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky as the pretext for having them condemned as a "right deviation" secretly favoring capitalism. With this Right Opposition group out of the way in 1929, Stalin found himself all-powerful but also all-responsible, and committed to an irrationally extreme program of intensive industrial development. He apparently saw no alternative except to forge ahead under the scarcely Marxian slogan, "There are no fortresses which Bolsheviks cannot storm."

With the industrialization program launched by Stalin, paid for by national belt-tightening and enforced by totalitarian police controls, Soviet Russia had entered into the new

productive form of socialism. This was socialism not of the overripe industrial society but of a partially backward and preindustrial country, not the successor to capitalism but the alternative to it for accumulating the industrial plant to bring the country to a modern level of economic development. Soviet socialism served not to solve the problems of industrial life, but to accentuate them and to carry them afield into virgin territory.

The Soviet economic example has proved highly infectious, because it is such a logical and effective approach to the problem of developing a backward country. Even among non-Communist circles in Asia and Africa the notion of using the authority of the state to accelerate economic development has proved to one degree or another irresistible since World War II. Under Stalin's leadership, communism was converted from an essentially Western response to Western problems of industrial life under capitalism, to an essentially Eastern response of applying despotic state authority to the pursuit of rapid industrial development and equality with the West. By viewing Russia in the early part of this century as a hybrid society, part Western and part Eastern, partially industrialized yet substantially backward, we may understand why this transitional role of converting a Western revolutionary movement into an Eastern one fell to her. The product of this Russian alchemy was a unique system of oriental state capitalism.

Stalin and the Virtue of Necessity

The new productive emphasis on economic development had profound implications for other aspects of the Communist movement in Russia. It became necessary to make a wide variety of policy adjustments, converting the Western postcapitalist socialist ideal to the Eastern state-capitalist pattern. The many such adjustments already made, ostensibly as temporary concessions, had to be accepted as permanent.

Under Stalin's leadership the Communist Party adapted itself to the harsh realities of industrialization and of the industrial way of life—realities which made the social ideals professed by every Marxist up to 1917 completely utopian.

Contrary to Marx's egalitarian, anarchistic expectations, industrial society does not permit a diminution of hierarchical authority to the advantage of the democratic collective—it puts all the greater premium on the hierarchical division of labor and responsibility and on maintaining complex organizations in which everyone observes instructions with unflagging discipline. It was apparent by the 1930's that the real task for Russia was not the introduction of collectivist equality but the training of responsible leaders and responsible subordinates, to convert lackadaisical peasants into disciplined troops in an industrial army. The real Russian innovation was a new organizational basis for industrial development—the postcapitalistic institutions of the "managerial" society.

Discipline and authority in political and economic life, hateful as they had been from the standpoint of the Russian revolutionaries of 1917, had been substantially restored by the end of the Civil War period. Stalin's innovation was to declare them to be in effect on a practically permanent basis as positive aspects of the socialist ideal, and he further laid it down as the official line that socialism had never meant anything else. Similarly with the ideal of equality, which to some extent had continued to be observed up until 1929, Stalin declared it to be un-Marxist and un-Leninist, and justified inequality of economic rewards as a natural aspect of Soviet socialism. Between 1931 and 1937, for reasons of political practicality or personal preference, Stalin proceeded to reverse the party line on a wide range of policy matters, ranging from education and art to religion and the family. In every case the earlier revolutionary attitude was condemned as a "petty-bourgeois" deviation from Marxism, and what the outside world regarded as the conservative norm became the standard of official Communist belief and practice (except for religion, which enjoys toleration but is still officially disparaged). Together with these adjustments Stalin overhauled the basic political theory of Marxism by asserting the long-term positive role of the state in overcoming economic obstacles and developing the socialist society, instead of withering away. Stalin simply made his theory conform to what he had actually been doing, with

the characteristic twist that the new version was alleged to have been the only correct interpretation of Marxism all along.

Stalin's transformation of the aims and practices of communism, was directly responsible for fundamental changes in the realm of Communist thinking, not only with respect to what was thought but with respect to the basic function of doctrine in the Communist system. The Communists faced circumstances where either the theoretical prerequisites of the old ideal were lacking (the weakness of the Russian industrial base), or where it became evident that those presumed preconditions were themselves not conducive to the ideal (the bureaucratic requirements of industry itself). Under Lenin the party made expedient adaptations to these circumstances, while still imagining that these were temporary maneuvers. Machinery of control was meanwhile set up over the channels of thought and communication, and was used to justify the necessity of the expedients. Stalin's changes were to pursue such expedients more freely, intensify the controls over public communication, and then to proclaim that his policies were not temporarily necessary deviations but the direct implementation of the revolutionary program. Instead of guiding Soviet practice, the goals of communism were redefined to conform with the trend that expedient practice had taken.

Paradoxically, as doctrine ceased to operate as a basic motive and guide, the stress laid by the Soviet regime on rigorous orthodoxy became all the greater. This has made it difficult for outside observers to appreciate how little Marxist theory really shapes Communist behavior. Its function is to provide the sense of revolutionary legitimacy which the Communist leaders since Lenin have always insisted on maintaining, and also to serve as the vehicle for party control over every aspect of life. The thoroughgoing control which requires this orthodoxy is in turn necessitated by the difficulty of bridging the vast gulf between theory and practice and suppressing the innumerable opportunities for criticizing the doctrinal manipulations in which the Communist regime has indulged. The Soviet leaders have long been committed to a

self-enforcing false image of their system. In all probability they believe in this image, in a narrow-minded and defensive way, and will endeavor to sustain it at any cost, even though the real standards in their action are those of free-wheeling practicality rather than loyalty to the spirit of any theory. Communism has become wedded to a psychology of compulsively self-justifying opportunism, so dogmatically unscrupulous that it is not even faithful to its own principles.

The real meaning of communism is to be found in the pattern of evolution through expedients, in the course of which the movement was changed to deal with its circumstances. During the first two decades of the Soviet regime communism was systematically Easternized. It was converted into a system for solving the Eastern problems of rapid modernization and national self-assertion against the West, through the method of terror and compulsion wielded by an autocratic government. Subsequent replacement of leading personalities has made no fundamental difference in the system.

World Revolution or Imperialist Expansion

The commanding importance of the subject of communism is due to the international character of the movement. Up to this point we have dealt with the movement entirely as a Russian phenomenon, because its actual origins were Russian and the critical stages of its evolution were intimately shaped by Russian circumstances. From the time of its initial success in Russia, however, the movement has had an increasingly important impact on the rest of the world, in two principal ways: the power exercised by communism in Russia as the ruling movement in a large country, and the doctrinally-inspired, Russia-oriented Communist revolutionary movements which have appeared almost everywhere else in the world.

These two lines of influence suggest the basic duality which has characterized international communism. In part it is an international revolutionary movement ostensibly animated by Marx's vision of the world dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand, most of the time and in most places it has

been firmly under the control of the rulers of Soviet Russia, who have not hesitated to employ the movement, in the short run at least, as an instrument for promoting the power and security of that particular state. There has been a definite trend from the first of these aspects to the second—from primitive revolutionary enthusiasm to calculated manipulation, with the power of the Russian state as a primary criterion. However, the old doctrine still contributes the basic sense of hostility toward the non-Communist world, which sometimes approaches the intensity of religious war.

World revolution, according to Marxism, was not a deliberate policy or duty (as many anxious opponents of the Communists imagine it to be), but merely a prediction of what the development of international capitalism supposedly made inevitable. For a person who does not accept the Marxian philosophy of history there is no particular reason for regarding the world-wide success of communism as inevitable or even possible. For one brief moment—the time of the controversy in 1918 over peace with Germany or revolutionary war—the Russian Communists were at the point of direct action to help the inevitable along, but Lenin's cautious counsel of preserving power in one country prevailed. Had the Trotskyists been victorious in the 1920's, with their stress on the importance of world revolution for the realization of the socialist plan in Russia, it is conceivable that the issue could have arisen again, but Stalin's ideological tour de force of "socialism in one country" eliminated all theoretical grounds for risking the security of the regime in Russia in order to advance the fortunes of the revolution abroad.

From 1918 to 1935, insofar as Russian national security was not risked, the Soviet leaders encouraged and assisted various Communist revolutionary movements abroad—notably in Germany and China—without questioning the identity of interest between Soviet Russia and the foreign revolutionaries. However, with the change of line to collective security and the "popular front" in 1935, the Soviet leadership temporarily suspended the revolutionary drive in international communism. From 1935 to 1939 and from 1941 to 1946 or

1947 the Communists in most places coöperated with liberal and socialist groups, and made a highly successful appeal as a party aiming at democratic reform and resistance to fascism, rather than the one-party proletarian dictatorship. During this period the Communists were distinguished only by the typical Leninist party organization and the unquestioning subservience to Russia which had been implanted in the international movement during the 1920's. A particularly dramatic demonstration of Communist preoccupation with the security of the Soviet state came with the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939, which was concluded at the cost of a severe shock to Communist loyalties the world over.

The history of international communism since World War II has been governed by a complicated interaction between Communist-oriented revolutionary emotion in many countries and the aggressive and unscrupulous pursuit of power politics and national security by the Soviet Union, which has used the non-Russian Communist movements as much as possible as an instrument of this policy. Where communism has come to power outside Russia it has been through direct Russian imposition (as in most of Eastern Europe) or through guerilla warfare conducted by the Communists against both enemy occupation forces and domestic rivals (as in Yugoslavia and China). No purely internal and independent Communist revolution has ever been accomplished since the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919.

The vague Marxist conviction survives that eventually the Communist movement will inevitably triumph everywhere. Khrushchev plays this theme with great pride, but the very notion of inevitability absolves the Soviet leaders from the obligation to take any risks to which they do not feel emotionally inclined. The main theoretical source of their anxiety is the fear that the capitalist powers, seeing the ground slipping from under their feet, might resort to force in order to check the presumed historical trend toward communism. Non-Communists who do not believe this is the trend need have little to fear unless the Russians are provoked or tempted into preventive war by threats or weakness on the part of the anti-Communist powers.

The Export of Communism—Eastern Europe

The establishment of Communist governments in the Soviet Union's satellite states of Eastern Europe represents the outstanding Russian success in the employment of communism as an instrument of power politics. Everywhere that Soviet occupation regimes were in control Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany—Communist Party dictatorships were installed in power with direct Russian backing and pressure, under the cover of the ostensibly democratic coalition governments established in the region when the Nazis collapsed in 1944-45. In these cases there was no significant popular revolutionary movement, and the Communists did not use a revolutionary appeal in driving for power; they preferred to work behind the scenes, penetrating (with the aid of Soviet leverage) the police and military organizations of the respective countries, and gradually constricting the opportunity for genuine legal opposition to their rule. By the end of 1947 the process was complete, though the dummy forms of multi-party coalition have survived to the present.

In marked contrast to this pattern in East Central Europe, the Communists came to power in Yugoslavia and Albania and scored their near-victory in Greece as active revolutionaries, waging guerrilla war simultaneously against the German and Italian occupying forces and against the native representatives of the status quo. When World War II ended, Communist Party rule was firmly established in Yugoslavia and Albania, without any appreciable Russian help.

Czechoslovakia stands somewhat apart, as the case where the Communist assumption of power most nearly resembled the original Bolshevik revolution in Russia. A large popular minority, animated not so much by revolutionary feeling as by reform aims and pro-Russian, anti-Nazi sentiment, had backed the Communists since the end of World War II; the Communist leader Gottwald was prime minister of a democratically functioning government. At the opportune moment, in February, 1948, the Communists precipitated a cabinet crisis; wielding the revolutionary force of a workers'

militia and the threat of Russian intervention, they secured the support necessary for a parliamentary majority and overawed the opposition into nonresistance. Once they were in undisputed control of the government, it was an easy matter for the Communists to suppress the opposition altogether and proceed with the establishment of totalitarian controls.

The experience of communism in Eastern Europe has been particularly stressful because of the telescoped imposition of Soviet political development, under close Russian control and strictly subordinated to considerations of Russian national power. Within the short span of years from 1945 to 1950, Eastern Europe experienced military defeat or occupation, Communist maneuvering for power, the distribution of estates to the peasants, the nationalization of industry, the establishment of one-party dictatorship, the creation of totalitarian police controls and censorship, the beginnings of collectivization of the peasants, the establishment of Communist industrial discipline, the pursuit of heavy-industry construction programs at the expense of national belt-tightening, and purge trials within the Communist parties themselves—developments which were spread over two decades in Russia. These rapid changes were brought about mainly at Russian behest, to cement Communist control over the satellite countries and to facilitate Soviet economic exploitation of the region.

Despite the traditional Communist antagonism toward imperialism, Soviet Russia suffered neither moral nor economic impediments to the exploitation of regions under its control. Under the state capitalism of the USSR such exploitation of the "colonies" eased the problem of capital accumulation without constituting the threat to the level of employment which it would mean in an ordinary capitalist economy. The terms of "international proletarian solidarity" in which the Russians cloaked their operations might be regarded as a rationalization on a par with the "white man's burden."

The main problem in Eastern Europe, from the Russian standpoint, was to maintain control over the local Communists in the face of increasingly apparent divergence between Communist aims in each country and the economic and

strategic interests of the Russians. All of the Communist leaders in Eastern Europe had risen in the movement by accepting Russian authority and the disciplined duty of supporting the interests of the Soviet state. Most of them, moreover, owed their acquisition and tenure of political power to the backing which the Russians gave the Communist Party in each country. Yugoslavia is the outstanding exception, where Tito assumed power independently as the leader of a successful revolutionary and resistance movement. Outside of Yugoslavia it is certain that no Communist government could survive in Eastern Europe without Russian backing.

Despite their obligations to the Russians, most East-European Communist leaders found themselves in conflict between what their own ambitions or the interests of their respective countries called for, and the requirements of the Russians. The Russians, declining to rely solely on the doctrinal loyalty of their East-European comrades, moved swiftly to establish more reliable controls over the satellites by infiltrating Russian agents directly into their police and military organizations. With all the lines of influence at the Russians' disposal it was easy in most cases for them to shake up any satellite leadership which was too independent-minded, and assure an unquestioning response to Moscow's demands.

Under these circumstances of Russian control there could be no independent development of doctrine or policy by the East European Communists. They were compelled to conform to the Soviet model of forced industrialization and total organizational control, although in the more developed and sophisticated countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland less utility and more discontent were inherent in these steps. Communist doctrine in its finished Soviet form as an elaborately fraudulent but rigorously enforced rationalization of the modernizing dictatorship was made the rule. It remained only for Soviet propagandists to demonstrate scholastically how Eastern Europe remained at a lower level of the dictatorship of the proletariat than the Soviet Union, in the form of the so-called "People's Democracies."

All of the most important events in Eastern Europe since 1948 have centered around the understandable tendency of local Communist leaders to resist Russian domination—i.e., the movement of “national communism.” The basic consideration in national communism is simply the distribution of power within the Communist movement—shall the national regimes dictate in their own right or serve merely as agents of Moscow? The basic features of communism as developed in Russia—the party dictatorship, the quasi-capitalist economic function, and the rigid rationalizing doctrine—are for the most part carried over into national communism. However, the national Communists have characteristically tried to alleviate popular discontent by asserting national independence, suspending collectivization of the peasants, and scaling down industrial ambitions to permit a somewhat freer and more abundant economic life to the citizenry. In the economic caution which they combine with the party dictatorship the national Communist tendency in Eastern Europe is comparable to the Russian right-wing Communist faction led by Bukharin in the late 1920's. Beyond this, save for a modicum of uneasy cultural freedom, national communism has not yielded.

The initial success of national communism in Yugoslavia is easily understandable in terms of geography and the historical background. This was the satellite most defensible and most accessible to the non-Communist world, and at the same time one where the Communists had come to power without decisive Russian assistance. By inclination Tito was a thoroughly orthodox Communist, Stalin's most successful pupil in Eastern Europe, but his emulation of Stalin proceeded so far that he would brook no challenge to his own authority, not even from Stalin himself. When Russian efforts to penetrate the Yugoslav army and police assumed dangerous proportions by 1948, Tito undertook both protests and counter-measures. The Soviet reply was to expel Yugoslavia from the community of Communist states. This showed that in Stalin's eyes genuine communism could not exist without unquestioning subordination to Soviet Russia. Here was the

final step in the identification of the Communist movement and Russian national power.

The essence of Yugoslav communism since the break in 1948 has been the effort to justify national independence from Moscow while at the same time maintaining firm Communist rule at home. The direct justification for independence has been sought by asserting the necessity for every country to approach socialism in its own way and at its own time. In effect, the revolution is not regarded as an international process at all, but a strictly national one (the logical extension of "socialism in one country"). The Yugoslavs have also sought to defend themselves against Russian denunciations by pointing to the internal imperfections of communism in Russia, and correcting such defects in their own regime. The Soviet Union was especially criticized for allowing bureaucratic distortions of socialism, while the Yugoslavs, looking back in the Soviet past, rediscovered the old revolutionary ideal of decentralized administration carried out by the populace. This theory was then actually put into practice in Yugoslavia through administrative decentralization and workers' councils, although Tito and the Communist Party leaders keep firm political supervision over the country as a whole.

The Yugoslav antibureaucratic line has not been without danger to its users. Anyone following the argument consistently would find that in large measure the Yugoslav system conformed to the basically bureaucratic transformation of the Communist movement which had come about in the Soviet Union. One leading Yugoslav Communist—Milovan Djilas—actually did pursue this argument, which brought him to the rejection of the Communist dictatorship altogether (and to his prosecution and conviction by the Yugoslav government for treasonable activities).

Immediately after Tito's break with Moscow, signs of the national-Communist tendency appeared almost everywhere in Eastern Europe. It was a natural reaction against foreign domination and the rigors of the economic policies demanded by Soviet interests. Severe shake-ups were undertaken in

1948 and 1949 to eliminate national-Communist sentiment: in Poland, the Communist secretary-general Gomulka was ousted and then jailed, while in Hungary and Bulgaria deputy premiers Rajk and Kostov, respectively, were executed after show trials were staged. Similar purges characterized the other satellites, and the intensive development of heavy industry and agricultural collectivization were then pushed throughout the entire Soviet-dominated region.

The death of Stalin in 1953 opened the way for gestures of leniency in East European communism. By 1956 the East Europeans were pressing their opportunity ambitiously, and one of the most severe crises in the history of communism was the result. The Polish Communists brought Gomulka back to power despite Soviet threats, and under Gomulka's leadership the worst excesses of satellite economic policy and police controls were checked. The clock in Poland was turned back to a compromise similar to Russia's NEP, with the abandonment of collective farms, the restoration of considerable intellectual freedom outside the political sphere, and the end of arbitrary police terror, though the characteristic discipline of the Communist Party and its dominant position in the state were emphatically retained, together with subservience to Russia in matters of foreign policy. Poland has become the least totalitarian of any Communist country.

For a brief moment Hungary promised to outdo the Poles by far in the revision of communism. Popular agitation for reform in October, 1956, developed into a nation-wide insurrectionary movement so powerful that the Communist government saw its only course of survival in endorsing the revolution and acceding to its demands. The moderate-minded Communist ex-premier Imre Nagy was recalled to his post. In a rapid series of decrees Nagy in effect proclaimed the end of the Communist system in Hungary, abolishing its police controls and economic rigors, ending the political monopoly of the Communist Party, and renouncing ties with the Soviet bloc. The Nagy government was thus returning to the form of coalition regime which had prevailed in Eastern Europe between the end of World War II and the establish-

~~ment of the Communist dictatorships.~~ This course was rudely interrupted, however, by the intervention of Soviet troops (who were already present in Hungary under the terms of the Communist alliance and who had briefly fought the revolution in its initial stages). Early in November, 1956, Soviet forces overthrew the Nagy government and installed a new regime, headed by Janos Kadar, made up of those Hungarian Communists who preferred to serve as Soviet puppets and maintain the Communist Party dictatorship. Hungary was thus brought forcibly back into line with the majority of the satellites, though all of them henceforth enjoyed considerably more lenient economic conditions without any more direct Soviet exploitation.

National communism is now a reality, in different forms, in two countries (Poland with more internal freedom and Yugoslavia with unimpaired national sovereignty), while it is an ever-present potential in the rest of Eastern Europe. Discipline over the Communist bloc (not counting Yugoslavia) is still maintained by the Soviet Union under the theoretical guise of "proletarian internationalism." The Western threat to Communist rule as such is made the most of to keep the European Communists firmly committed to the Soviet alliance, whatever propensity for independent action they might have.

China and Asian Communism

In contrast to Eastern Europe, communism in Asia is to a far lesser degree a direct Russian imposition. The movement in China grew independently and came to power basically under its own power. Moreover, communism has proved to be more appropriate to the problems of the East; it conforms to conditions and traditions rather than defying them.

The Communist appeal in the East has nothing to do with the Marxian analysis of history or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Whereas communism has had its main appeal in the West under its old proletarian guise, the East has responded to the more straightforward attraction of actual Soviet aims and methods. Communism captures the imagina-

tion of many Eastern intellectuals and semi-intellectuals and appeals to them as a new way of life, a new discipline, that will enable their country to pursue the goals of industrialization and national power, and thus to compete with the hitherto dominant West on equal terms. Communism comes to the East as the ideology, program and instrument of anti-Western westernization.

One of the distinctive characteristics of communism in China was its complete divorce from the industrial working class during most of the years before its assumption of power. While the movement did have some worker participation just after its establishment in the early 1920's, it was primarily the expression of radically-minded intellectuals, and in alliance with Chiang Kai-shek helped bring the Nationalist Party to power. Then, hard-pressed by their erstwhile ally, the Communists at the initiative of Mao Tse-tung shifted the focus of their operations to the peasantry. The Communist Party became a major political force in China as a disciplined party of intellectuals mobilizing the peasants in order to wage war and revolution.

With respect to the strongly centralized party and its leading role in the revolution the Chinese Communists were following closely in the footsteps of Lenin. In their dogmatic adherence to Marxist doctrine and the rigorous enforcement of the official doctrinal justification of each policy measure, the Chinese were quick pupils of Stalin. But where the Russian Revolution could at least in part be described as a working-class affair, this presumed foundation of the Marxist dictatorship was quite lacking in China. The Chinese Communist revolution actually proceeded much more in conformity with the pre-Marxist doctrines of the Russian "populists," who called for a peasant revolution led by a determined party of intellectuals. Maoism, coming to terms with these circumstances, is the ultimate extension of the philosophical changes which Lenin had begun to introduce in Marx.

In the absence of working-class participation, the Chinese Communists could claim Marxist legitimacy only by insisting that the party was proletarian in "spirit," i.e., in its discipline

and revolutionary single-mindedness. Implicitly this reasoning transferred the essence of revolution from the realm of social classes to the realm of thought. In actuality, apart from the liquidation of landlords, there has been comparatively little clear-cut class struggle in the Chinese revolution. The choice was rather one between systems of moral authority; anyone accepting Communist authority and discipline could be absorbed into the movement, and from the very beginning of their rule the Communists have readily taken middle-class elements into collaboration with them if these conditions were met. The tasks of maintaining doctrinal discipline on the basis of Marxist orthodoxy, however, were all the more demanding—hence the unique Chinese development of indoctrination and “brain washing.”

In the nature of its policies once power was consolidated, Chinese communism represents the logical extension of Leninism-Stalinism in yet another respect—the use of totalitarian political controls to effect a cultural transformation and carry out the industrial revolution with the utmost rapidity. With the exception of a few areas developed by foreign capital, Chinese communism began with no industrial base at all, whereas Russia was appreciably industrialized at the time of the revolution (though very unevenly and to a low per capita degree). With the adoption of the military commune system China is striving toward the ultimate in the bureaucratic direction of individual energy toward the compelling national goal of industrial power.

Communism as both the goal and the instrument of building national power through industrialization naturally exercises a powerful fascination for the self-conscious minority of would-be revolutionary nationalist leaders throughout Asia and the underdeveloped regions of the world generally. As such it is the end-product of centuries of European political, economic and cultural domination of the world. Long stagnant or subservient peoples have been discovering new energies, thanks to the impact of Western influence upon them. Their emotional reaction is to bite the hand that has culturally fed them, and turn to a movement which emulates Western ways at the same time that it expresses the anti-Western resentment

of the former underdog. Communism is admirably suited to satisfy these desires, and its potential for expansion in this part of the world is by no means exhausted.

An alternative to communism can be observed in the one-party nationalist reform movements which have appeared at various times in China, the Near East, and at present in West Africa. These movements have the same political and emotional function as communism in such regions, though they have not ordinarily displayed the requisite drive and discipline. The main difference is that they are free of communism's two great burdens of irrelevance—doctrinaire commitment to Marxist ideology, and the obligations of loyalty to Moscow.

The Meaning of Communism

There are two important characteristics of the Communist movement which are rarely understood and are responsible for most of the widespread confusion on the subject (among both opponents and sympathizers). One of these is the relation between theory and practice. The other is the course of evolution which the practice itself has followed.

It is rare indeed that a doctrinaire movement, whether of religion or politics or whatever, has kept strictly to the literal dictates of its principles. Life never turns out as the founder of a doctrine expects. Historically speaking, the function of a doctrine is to give reinforcement and cohesiveness to a social emotion, which emotion may or may not be logically consistent with the doctrine to which it becomes attached. The outcome of the movement is the result of interaction between its central emotion and the circumstances of life in which it finds itself, with all the innumerable complications of chance. Such an interaction, as we have noted, underlay the basic changes which have taken place in communism over the years. This is natural, and it would be readily intelligible were it not for the unnatural stance which communism maintains toward its original doctrine. The doctrine is still invested with absolute validity, and made to square with the actual flow of life by a clumsy process of scholastic reinterpretation. The truth of the doctrine as

officially interpreted is then enjoined upon the faithful with all the force at the command of the Communist state. Thus refashioned according to the needs or preferences of the leader, the doctrine loses all long-term guiding significance. It serves two purposes only: to maintain mental discipline in the totalitarian state, and to perpetuate the sense of basic enmity between people and countries who subscribe to the doctrine, and those who do not.

In the evolving policies and institutions of Communism which the doctrine is made to justify there is much more than the chaos of zigs and zags which some observers see. To be sure, Communist decision-making is highly pragmatic—tactical rather than philosophical—but the contours of social reality confer a definite shape upon the movement as it maneuvers from one turning point to the next. Essentially the history of the Communist movement has been one of progressive adaptation to the problems of modernization and national regeneration of underdeveloped countries whose traditional cultural equilibrium was upset by European influence. By the time the movement crystallized firmly, its essential meaning had changed so much that the propositions of its prophets had become quite irrelevant. The Western, international, post-industrial, anarchistic, proletarian revolution had become the Eastern, national, industrializing, totalitarian, middle-class-intellectual revolution. Two movements could scarcely be less similar, yet this is the situation in which the Communist faithful feel compelled to maintain the complete Marxist orthodoxy of their ideas and their system. The madness of this dogmatism is death to the free individual or the creative mind.

There are four basic attributes which define the Communist movement as it exists today. Its structural core is the Leninist concept of the party, a disciplined, hierarchical organization serving either to spearhead a revolutionary movement or to rule the Communist state. Its dynamic urge is the drive to industrialize, to overcome backwardness and fashion the sinews of national power by systematic exhortation and compulsion imposed on the population through the party. Its mentality is the ideology of Marxism as officially interpreted

—the obligatory rationalization of the party's policies enforced by totalitarian thought controls. Its international orientation is unquestioning loyalty to Soviet Russia as the initiator, sustainer, and doctrinal authority of the movement, together with uncompromising hostility toward the liberalism and capitalism associated with the "imperialism" of the major Western powers. (In the one case—Yugoslavia—where this no longer holds, it was nonetheless true at the time the Communist system took shape there.) Taken together, these four features necessarily indicate the Communist movement and nothing but the Communist movement. They are the necessary and sufficient counts in a definition of communism.

The Communist movement, thus defined, did not come into being because of some law of historical inevitability. It is the product of a complicated interaction of circumstances, human intentions and historical accidents (particularly the events of the Russian Revolution). It has spread and gained strength because it has adapted itself to the resolution of widespread and serious social problems and weaknesses. If it is not the only solution to these ills, it has often been the most vigorous alternative. It enjoys today the prospect of gaining still more ground, on more than one continent. One might wonder, however, about the implications which success itself might have for the communist movement. Will the solution of those problems which have contributed to the growth of the movement deprive it of any reason for further existence, and thus require it to change or collapse? Does communism, as it were, contain the seeds of its own destruction? Or will the strength of the totalitarian system enable it to outlive indefinitely the circumstances which called it into being, as so many despotic systems have in the past? Only the future can yield the answers to such questions.

Volume I

Chapter One: Leninism and the Bolshevik Party, to 1917

The pre-1917 background of the Communist movement is dominated by one powerful figure, that of Lenin. The Bolshevik Party was largely his personal creation, and its distinctive doctrines were his also. The disciplined organization, the revolutionary mission of the party, and the stern enforcement of Lenin's version of doctrinal orthodoxy, were all firmly established in the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social-Democratic Party long before 1917. The reactions of other Marxists testify eloquently to the unique impress which Lenin's personality made in the movement. When revolution came in 1917, Lenin was prepared to strike for power, not only in Russia but internationally, with the aid of the foreign socialist sympathizers whom he had gathered.

Lenin as a Marxist

As early as 1894, when he was twenty-four, Lenin (born Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov) had become a revolutionary agitator and a convinced Marxist. He exhibited his new faith and his polemical talents in a diatribe of that year against the peasant-oriented socialism of the Populists led by N. K. Mikhailovsky.

. . . Now—since the appearance of *Capital*—the materialist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically demonstrated proposition. And until some other attempt is made to give a scientific explanation of the functioning and development of any form of society—form of

FROM: Lenin, "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats" (April, 1894; in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950-52, Vol. I, book 1, pp. 110, 165-66).

society, mind you, and not the mode of life of any country or people, or even class, etc.—another attempt which would be just as capable as materialism of introducing order into the “pertinent facts” and of presenting a living picture of a definite formation and at the same time of explaining it in a strictly scientific way, until then the materialist conception of history will be synonymous with social science. Materialism is not “primarily a scientific conception of history,” as Mr. Mikhailovsky thinks, but the only scientific conception of history. . . .

. . . **R**ussian Marxists . . . began precisely with a criticism of the subjective methods of earlier Socialists. Not satisfied with merely stating the fact that exploitation exists and condemning it, they desired to *explain* it. Realizing that the whole post-Reform* history of Russia consisted in the impoverishment of the mass and the enrichment of a minority, observing the colossal expropriation of the small producers side by side with universal technical progress, noting that these opposite tendencies arose and became intensified wherever, and to the extent that, commodity production developed and became consolidated, they could not but conclude that they were confronted with a bourgeois (capitalist) organization of social economy, which *necessarily* gave rise to the expropriation and oppression of the masses. Their practical program was quite directly determined by this conviction; this program was, to join the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, the struggle of the propertyless classes against the propertied, which constitutes the principal content of economic reality in Russia, from the most out-of-the-way village to the most up-to-date and perfected factory. How were they to join it? The answer was again suggested by real life. Capitalism had brought the principal branches of industry to the stage of large-scale machine industry; by thus socializing production, it had created the material conditions for a new system and had at the same time created a new social force—the class of factory workers, the urban proletariat. Subjected to the same bourgeois exploitation—for such, in its economic essence, is the exploitation to which the whole toiling popula-

* I.e., since the emancipation of the serfs in 1861—Ed.

tion of Russia is subjected—this class, however, has been placed in a special, favourable position as far as its emancipation is concerned: it has no longer any ties with the old society, which is wholly based on exploitation; the very conditions of its labour and circumstances of life organize it, compel it to think and enable it to step into the arena of the political struggle. It was only natural that the Social-Democrats should direct all their attention to, and base all their hopes on, this class, that they should make the development of its class consciousness their program, that they should direct all their activities towards helping it to rise and wage a direct political struggle against the present regime and towards drawing the whole Russian proletariat into this struggle. . . .]

The Foundation of the Russian Marxist Party

While Marxism had been winning adherents among the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia for more than a decade previously, an avowedly Marxist party was not organized until 1898. In that year a “congress” of nine men met at Minsk to proclaim the establishment of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party. The manifesto issued in the name of the congress after the police broke it up was drawn up by the economist Peter Struve, a member of the moderate “legal Marxist” group who soon afterward left the Marxist movement altogether. The manifesto is indicative of the way Marxism was applied to Russian conditions, and of the special role for the proletariat which the Russian Marxists envisaged.

. . . Fifty years ago the invigorating storm of the Revolution of 1848 burst over Europe.

For the first time the modern working class appeared on the scene as a major historical force. With its forces the

FROM: Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party, issued by the First Congress of the party, Minsk, March, 1898 (in *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Resolutions and Decisions of its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenums of the Central Committee* [hereafter referred to as “CPSU in Resolutions”], 7th ed., Moscow, 1954, Vol. I, pp. 11-14; editor’s translation).

bourgeoisie succeeded in removing many antiquated feudal-monarchical systems. But the bourgeoisie quickly perceived in its new ally its most hostile foe, and betrayed both it and itself and the cause of freedom into the hands of reaction. However, it was already late: the working class, pacified for the time being, after ten or fifteen years appeared again on the stage of history with redoubled force, with matured consciousness, as a full-grown fighter for its own liberation.

All this time Russia apparently remained aside from the main road of the historical movement. The class struggle was not apparent there, but it was there, and the main thing was that it was steadily growing and maturing. The Russian government, with laudable zeal, itself planted the seeds of class struggle by cheating the peasants, patronizing the landlords, fattening up the big capitalists at the expense of the toiling population. But the bourgeois-capitalist order is unthinkable without a proletariat or working class. The latter is born together with capitalism, grows together with it, gets stronger, and in proportion to its growth is thrown more and more into conflict with the bourgeoisie.

The Russian factory worker, serf or free, has always carried on a hidden or open struggle with his exploiters. In proportion to the development of capitalism, the proportions of this struggle have grown, they have embraced more and more layers of the working class population. The awakening of the class self-consciousness of the Russian proletariat and the growth of the spontaneous workers' movement have coincided with the conclusive development of international Social Democracy as the bearer of the class struggle and the class ideal of the conscious workers of the whole world. . . . Vainly the government imagines that by concessions it can calm the workers. Everywhere the working class is becoming more demanding, the more they give it. It will be the same with the Russian proletariat. They have given in to it up to now only when it *demands*, and in the future will give it only what it *demands*.

And [what does the Russian working class not need? It is completely deprived of what its foreign comrades freely and

quietly enjoy: participation in the administration of the state, freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of organization and assembly—in a word, all those instruments and means with which the West-European and American proletariat improves its position and at the same time struggles for its final liberation, against private property and capitalism—for socialism. Political freedom is necessary for the Russian proletariat like fresh air is necessary for healthy breathing. It is the basic condition for its free development and the successful struggle for partial improvements and final liberation.

But the Russian proletariat can only win the political freedom which it needs *by itself*.

The farther east one goes in Europe, the more the bourgeoisie becomes in the political respect weaker, more cowardly, and meaner, and the larger are the cultural and political tasks which fall to the share of the proletariat. On its broad shoulders the Russian working class must bear and will bear the cause of the fight for political freedom. This is essential, but it is only the first step toward the realization of the great historical mission of the proletariat—towards the creation of that social order in which the exploitation of man by man will have no place. The Russian proletariat will throw off its burden of autocracy so that with all the more energy it will continue the struggle against capitalism and the bourgeoisie until the complete victory of socialism. . . .

As a socialist movement and inclination, the Russian Social-Democratic Party continues the cause and the traditions of all the preceding revolutionary movements in Russia; taking as the principal immediate task of the party the goal of conquering political freedom, Social Democracy moves toward the goal which has already been marked out by the glorious activists of the old "People's Will." But the means and the path which Social Democracy chooses are different. The choice of them is determined by its conscious desire to be and remain a class movement of the organized working masses. It is firmly convinced that "the liberation of the working class can only be its own business," and it will undeviat-

ingly make all its action conform to this fundamental basis of international Social Democracy.

Long live Russia, long live international Social Democracy!

Lenin on the Workers' Party

While exiled to Siberia from 1897 to 1900 for his revolutionary activity, Lenin wrote optimistically of the growing political weight of the working class and of the role of the Marxists as its leaders.

. . . [The socialist activities of Russian Social-Democrats consist in conducting *propaganda* in favour of the doctrines of scientific Socialism, of spreading among the workers a proper understanding of the present social and economic system, its foundations and its development, an understanding of the various *classes* in Russian society, of their mutual relations, of the struggle between these classes, of the role of the working class in this struggle, of the attitude of this class towards the declining and the developing classes, towards the past and the future of capitalism, of the historical task of international Social-Democracy and of the Russian working class. Inseparably connected with propaganda is *agitation* among the workers, which naturally comes to the forefront in the present political conditions in Russia and level of development of the masses of workers. Agitation among the workers consists in the Social-Democrats taking part in all the spontaneous manifestations of the struggle of the working class, in all the conflicts between the workers and the capitalists over the working day, wages, conditions of labour, etc., etc. Our task is to merge our activities with the practical, everyday questions of working-class life, to help the workers to understand these questions, to draw the attention of the workers to the most important abuses, to help them to formulate their demands to the employers more precisely and practically, to develop among the workers the consciousness of their solidarity, consciousness of the common interests and common cause of all the Russian workers as a

FROM: Lenin, "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats" (1898; *Selected Works*, Vol. I, book 1, pp. 179-80, 198-99).

united working class that constitutes a part of the international army of the proletariat. . . .

Our work is primarily and mainly concentrated on the factory, the urban workers. Russian Social-Democracy must not dissipate its forces; it must concentrate its activities on the industrial proletariat, which is most susceptible to Social-Democratic ideas, most developed intellectually and politically, and most important from the point of view of numbers and concentration in the large political centres of the country. The creation of a durable revolutionary organization among the factory, the urban workers, is, therefore, the first and most urgent task that confronts Social-Democracy, and it would be very unwise indeed to allow ourselves to be diverted from this task at the present time. But, while recognizing the necessity of concentrating our forces on the factory worker and decrying the dissipation of forces, we do not in the least wish to suggest that the Russian Social-Democrats should ignore other strata of the Russian proletariat and working class. . . .

Russian Social-Democracy has still an enormous, almost untouched field of work open before it. The awakening of the Russian working class, its spontaneous striving after knowledge, unity, Socialism, for the struggle against its exploiters and oppressors is manifesting itself more strikingly and widely every day. The enormous success which Russian capitalism has achieved in recent times serves as a guarantee that the working-class movement will grow uninterruptedly in breadth and depth. Apparently, we are now passing through the period in the capitalist cycle when industry is "flourishing," when business is brisk, when the factories are working at full capacity and when countless new factories, new enterprises, joint-stock companies, railway enterprises, etc., etc., are springing up like mushrooms. But one need not be a prophet to foretell the inevitable crash (more or less abrupt) that must succeed this period of industrial "prosperity." This crash will cause the ruin of masses of small masters, will throw masses of workers into the ranks of the unemployed, and will thus confront all the masses of the workers in an acute form with the questions of Socialism

and democracy which have already confronted every class-conscious and thinking worker long ago. Russian Social-Democrats must see to it that when this crash comes the Russian proletariat will be more class-conscious, more united, able to understand the tasks of the Russian working class, capable of putting up resistance to the capitalist class—which is now reaping huge profits and always strives to throw the burden of the losses upon the workers—and capable of taking the lead of Russian democracy in the resolute struggle against the police despotism which binds and fetters the Russian workers and the whole of the Russian people.

And so, to work, comrades! Let us not lose precious time! Russian Social-Democrats have much to do to meet the requirements of the awakening proletariat, to organize the working-class movement, to strengthen the revolutionary groups and their contacts with each other, to supply the workers with propaganda and agitational literature, and to unite the workers' circles and Social-Democratic groups scattered all over Russia into a single *Social-Democratic Labour Party!*

Lenin's Theory of the Party

Leaving Russia in 1900, Lenin went to Geneva to join Plekhanov's circle of older Russian Marxists in publishing a paper for the new Social-Democratic party—*Iskra*, "The Spark." In the course of this work he turned his attention to the organizational problems of the movement, and formulated what in retrospect have proven to be the fundamental ideas underlying the Communist movement—his theory of the tightly organized and disciplined party of "professional revolutionaries." This idea Lenin first developed in "What Is to Be Done?", a lengthy polemic against the "Economists"—those Marxists who preferred to stress the economic struggle of the workers rather than a separate revolutionary movement. The publication of "What Is to Be Done?" in 1902 marks the true beginning of Leninism as a distinctive political current.

. . . It is no secret that two trends have taken shape in the present-day international Social-Democracy. The fight

between these trends now flares up in a bright flame, and now dies down and smoulders under the ashes of imposing "truce resolutions." What this "new" trend, which adopts a "critical" attitude towards "obsolete dogmatic" Marxism, represents has with sufficient precision been *stated* by Bernstein, and *demonstrated* by Millerand.*

Social-Democracy must change from a party of the social revolution into a democratic party of social reforms. Bernstein has surrounded this political demand with a whole battery of symmetrically arranged "new" arguments and reasonings. The possibility of putting Socialism on a scientific basis and of proving from the point of view of the materialist conception of history that it is necessary and inevitable was denied, as was also the growing impoverishment, proletarianization and the intensification of capitalist contradictions. The very conception, "*ultimate aim*," was declared to be unsound, and the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was absolutely rejected. It was denied that there is any counterdistinction in principle between liberalism and Socialism. The theory of the class struggle was rejected on the grounds that it could not be applied to a strictly democratic society, governed according to the will of the majority, etc.

Thus, the demand for a resolute turn from revolutionary Social-Democracy to bourgeois Social-reformism was accompanied by a no less resolute turn towards bourgeois criticism of all the fundamental ideas of Marxism. . . .

He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new "critical" trend in Socialism is nothing more nor less than a new variety of opportunism. And if we judge people not by the brilliant uniforms they don, not by the high-sounding appellations they give themselves, but by their actions, and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear that "freedom of criticism" means freedom for an

FROM: Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?" (1902, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, book 1, pp. 207-8, 210, 227-28, 233-34, 242-44, 286-88, 322-25, 330, 336, 338-39, 347-48).

* Eduard Bernstein: leader of the "revisionist" or avowedly nonrevolutionary tendency in the German Social-Democratic Party; Alexandre Millerand: French socialist leader, the first to join a "bourgeois" cabinet (later President of France)—Ed.

opportunistic trend in Social-Democracy, the freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform, the freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into Socialism. . . .

Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. This thought cannot be insisted upon too strongly at a time when the fashionable preaching of opportunism goes hand in hand with an infatuation for the narrowest forms of practical activity. . . . Our Party is only in process of formation, its features are only just becoming outlined, and it is yet far from having settled accounts with other trends of revolutionary thought, which threaten to divert the movement from the correct path. . . . The national tasks of Russian Social-Democracy are such as have never confronted any other socialist party in the world. . . . The *role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory.* . . .

. . . The strikes of the nineties represented the class struggle in embryo, but only in embryo. Taken by themselves, these strikes were simply trade union struggles, but not yet Social-Democratic struggles. They testified to the awakening antagonisms between workers and employers, but the workers were not, and could not be, conscious of the irreconcilable antagonism of their interests to the whole of the modern political and social system, i.e., theirs was not yet Social-Democratic consciousness. In this sense, the strikes of the nineties, in spite of the enormous progress they represented as compared with the "riots," remained a purely spontaneous movement.

We have said that *there could not yet be* Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. It could only be brought to them from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness, i.e., the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc. The theory of Socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated repre-

sentatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals. According to their social status, the founders of modern scientific Socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose quite independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement, it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of ideas among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia. At the time of which we are speaking, i.e., the middle of the nineties, this doctrine not only represented the completely formulated program of the Emancipation of Labour group, but had already won over to its side the majority of the revolutionary youth in Russia.

Hence, we had both the spontaneous awakening of the masses of the workers, the awakening to conscious life and conscious struggle, and a revolutionary youth, armed with the Social-Democratic theory, eager to come into contact with the workers. In this connection it is particularly important to state the oft-forgotten (and comparatively little-known) fact that the *early* Social-Democrats of that period zealously carried on economic agitation (being guided in this by the really useful instructions contained in the pamphlet *On Agitation* that was still in manuscript), but they did not regard this as their sole task. On the contrary, right from the very beginning they advanced the widest historical tasks of Russian Social-Democracy in general, and the task of overthrowing the autocracy in particular. . . . The adherents of the "pure" working-class movement, the worshippers of the closest "organic" . . . contacts with the proletarian struggle, the opponents of any non-worker intelligentsia (even if it be a socialist intelligentsia) are compelled, in order to defend their positions, to resort to the arguments of the bourgeois "pure" trade unionists. . . . This shows . . . that all worship of the spontaneity of the working-class movement, all belittling of the role of "the conscious element," of the role of Social-Democracy, means, quite irrespective of whether the belittler wants to or not, strengthening the influence of the bourgeois ideology over the workers. All those who talk about "overrating the importance of ideology," about exaggerating

the role of the conscious element, etc., imagine that the pure working-class movement can work out, and will work out, an independent ideology for itself, if only the workers "wrest their fate from the hands of the leaders." But this is a profound mistake. . . .

Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology being developed by the masses of the workers themselves in the process of their movement the *only* choice is: either the bourgeois or the socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for humanity has not created a "third" ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology *in any way*, to *turn away from it in the slightest degree* means to strengthen bourgeois ideology. There is a lot of talk about spontaneity, but the *spontaneous* development of the working-class movement leads to its becoming subordinated to the bourgeois ideology, *leads to its developing according to the program of the Credo*,* for the spontaneous working-class movement is trade unionism, and trade unionism means the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie. Hence, our task, the task of Social-Democracy, is to *combat spontaneity*, to *divert the working-class movement from this spontaneous, trade-unionist striving to come under the wing of the bourgeoisie*, and to bring it under the wing of revolutionary Social-Democracy. The phrase employed by the authors of the "economic" letter in the *Iskra*, No. 12, about the efforts of the most inspired ideologists not being able to divert the working-class movement from the path that is determined by the interaction of the material elements and the material environment, *is absolutely tantamount therefore to the abandonment of Socialism*. . . .

We have seen that the conduct of the broadest political agitation, and consequently the organization of comprehensive political exposures, is an absolutely necessary, and the *most urgently* necessary, task of activity, that is, if that activity is to be truly Social-Democratic. . . . *However much*

* *The Credo*: a statement of the views of the "Economists," 1899—Ed.

we may try to "lend the economic struggle itself a political character" we shall never be able to develop the political consciousness of the workers (to the level of Social-Democratic political consciousness) by keeping within the framework of the economic struggle, for that framework is too narrow. . . .

Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers *only from without*, that is, only from outside of the economic struggle, from outside of the sphere of relations between workers and employers. The sphere from which alone it is possible to obtain this knowledge is the sphere of relationships between *all* the classes and strata and the state and the government, the sphere of the interrelations between *all* the classes. For that reason, the reply to the question: what must be done in order to bring political knowledge to the workers? cannot be merely the one which, in the majority of cases, the practical [party] workers, especially those who are inclined towards Economism, mostly content themselves with, i.e., "go among the workers." To bring political knowledge to the *workers* the Social-Democrats must *go among all classes of the population*, must dispatch units of their army *in all directions*. . . .

. . . The political struggle of Social-Democracy is far more extensive and complex than the economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government. Similarly (and indeed for that reason), the organization of a revolutionary Social-Democratic party must inevitably be of a *different* kind than the organizations of the workers designed for this struggle. A workers' organization must in the first place be a trade organization; secondly, it must be as broad as possible; and thirdly, it must be as little clandestine as possible (here, and further on, of course, I have only autocratic Russia in mind). On the other hand, the organizations of revolutionaries must consist first, foremost and mainly of people who make revolutionary activity their profession (that is why I speak of organizations of *revolutionaries*, meaning revolutionary Social-Democrats). In view of this common feature of the members of such an organization, *all distinctions as between workers and intellectuals*, and certainly distinctions of trade and profession, must be *utterly obliterated*.

Such an organization must of necessity be not too extensive and as secret as possible. . . .

The workers' organizations for the economic struggle should be trade union organizations. Every Social-Democratic worker should as far as possible assist and actively work in these organizations. That is true. But it is not at all to our interest to demand that only Social-Democrats should be eligible for membership in the "trade" unions: that would only narrow down our influence over the masses. Let every worker who understands the need to unite for the struggle against the employers and the government join the trade unions. The very aim of the trade unions would be unattainable if they failed to unite all who have attained at least this elementary degree of understanding, and if they were not very *wide* organizations. And the wider these organizations are, the wider our influence over them will be—an influence due not only to the "spontaneous" development of the economic struggle but also to the direct and conscious effort of the socialist trade union members to influence their comrades. . . .

. . . A small, compact core of the most reliable, experienced and hardened workers, with responsible representatives in the principal districts and connected by all the rules of strict secrecy with the organization of revolutionaries, can, with the widest support of the masses and without any formal organization, perform *all* the functions of a trade union organization, and perform them, moreover, in a manner desirable to Social-Democracy. Only in this way can we secure the *consolidation* and development of a *Social-Democratic* trade union movement, in spite of all the gendarmes.

. . . I assert: 1) that no revolutionary movement can endure without a stable organization of leaders that maintains continuity; 2) that the wider the masses spontaneously drawn into the struggle, forming the basis of the movement and participating in it, the more urgent the need of such an organization, and the more solid this organization must be (for it is much easier for demagogues to sidetrack the more backward sections of the masses); 3) that such an organiza-

tion must consist chiefly of people professionally engaged in revolutionary activity; 4) that in an autocratic state, the more we *confine* the membership of such an organization to people who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activity and who have been professionally trained in the art of combatting the political police, the more difficult will it be to wipe out such an organization, and 5) the *greater* will be the number of people of the working class and of the other classes of society who will be able to join the movement and perform active work in it.

. . . The centralization of the most secret functions in an organization of revolutionaries will not diminish, but rather increase the extent and quality of the activity of a large number of other organizations which are intended for a broad public and are therefore as loose and as non-secret as possible, such as workers' trade unions, workers' self-education circles and circles for reading illegal literature, socialist and also democratic circles among *all* other sections of the population, etc., etc. We must have such circles, trade unions and organizations everywhere in *as large a number as possible* and with the widest variety of functions; but it would be absurd and dangerous to *confuse* them with the organization of revolutionaries, to obliterate the border line between them, to dim still more the masses' already incredibly hazy appreciation of the fact that in order to "serve" the mass movement we must have people who will devote themselves exclusively to Social-Democratic activities, and that such people must *train* themselves patiently and steadfastly to be professional revolutionaries.

Yes, this appreciation has become incredibly dim. Our chief sin with regard to organization is that *by our amateurishness we have lowered the prestige of revolutionaries in Russia*. A person who is flabby and shaky in questions of theory, who has a narrow outlook, who pleads the spontaneity of the masses as an excuse for his own sluggishness, who resembles a trade union secretary more than a people's tribune, who is unable to conceive of a broad and bold plan that would command the respect even of opponents, and who

is inexperienced and clumsy in his own professional art—the art of combating the political police—why, such a man is not a revolutionary but a wretched amateur!

Let no active worker take offence at these frank remarks, for as far as insufficient training is concerned, I apply them first and foremost to myself. I used to work in a circle that set itself very wide, all-embracing tasks; and all of us, members of that circle, suffered painfully, acutely from the realization that we were proving ourselves to be amateurs at a moment in history when we might have been able to say, paraphrasing a well-known epigram: “Give us an organization of revolutionaries, and we shall overturn Russia!” And the more I recall the burning sense of shame I then experienced, the more bitter are my feelings towards those pseudo Social-Democrats whose teachings “bring disgrace on the calling of a revolutionary,” who fail to understand that our task is not to champion the degrading of the revolutionary to the level of an amateur, but to *raise* the amateurs to the level of revolutionaries. . . .

. . . The history of the revolutionary movement is so little known among us that the name “Narodnaya Volya” * is used to denote any idea of a militant centralized organization which declares determined war upon tsarism. But the magnificent organization that the revolutionaries had in the seventies, and which should serve us as a model, was not established by the Narodnaya Volya-ites, but by the *Zemlya i Volya*-ites, who split up into the Cherny Peredel and Narodnaya Volya. Consequently, to regard a militant revolutionary organization as something specifically Narodnaya Volya-ite is absurd both historically and logically, because no revolutionary tendency, if it seriously thinks of fighting, can dispense with such an organization. The mistake the Narodnaya Volya-ites committed was not that they strove

* “Narodnaya Volya”: The “People’s Will,” the terrorist organization which assassinated Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Its ancestor was the “Land and Liberty” party (*Zemlia i Volia*), which split in 1879 into the “People’s Will” and the “Black Repartition” (*Cherny Peredel*) party of those who favored mass agitation—Ed.

to enlist in their organization *all* the discontented, and to direct this organization to decisive battle against the autocracy; on the contrary, that was their great historical merit. Their mistake was that they relied on a theory which in substance was not a revolutionary theory at all, and they either did not know how, or were unable, inseparably to link up their movement with the class struggle within developing capitalist society. And only a gross failure to understand Marxism (or an "understanding" of it in the spirit of Struve-ism) could prompt the opinion that the rise of a mass, spontaneous working-class movement *relieves* us of the duty of creating as good an organization of revolutionaries as the *Zemlya i Volya* had, and even an incomparably better one. On the contrary, this movement *imposes* this duty upon us, because the spontaneous struggle of the proletariat will not become its genuine "class struggle" until this struggle is led by a strong organization of revolutionaries. . . .

a pessimist + realist

Lenin on the Party Split

The first true congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party was the Second. It convened in Brussels in the summer of 1903, but was forced by the interference of the Belgian authorities to move to London, where the proceedings were concluded. The Second Congress was the occasion for bitter wrangling among the representatives of various Russian Marxist factions, and ended in a deep cleavage that was mainly caused by Lenin—his personality, his drive for power in the movement, and his "hard" philosophy of the disciplined party organization. At the close of the congress Lenin commanded a temporary majority for his faction and seized upon the label "Bolshevik" (from the Russian *bolshinstvo*—majority), while his opponents (led by Y. O. Martov) who inclined to the "soft" or more democratic position became known as the "Mensheviks" or minority. The terms stuck despite the fact that for most of the time between 1903 and 1917 the Bolsheviks were the numerically weaker group.

Following the Second Congress Lenin prepared a polemical account of the issues, in which he argued that the weaknesses

shown by the "intellectuals" at the congress proved the need for the kind of organization which he advocated.

. . . It is quite natural . . . that the work of the *Iskra* and the entire work of organizing the Party, the entire work of *actually* restoring the Party, *could not* be regarded as finished until the whole Party had adopted and officially registered certain definite ideas of organization. This task was to be performed by the rules of organization of the Party.

The principal ideas which the *Iskra* strove to make the basis of the Party's organization amounted essentially to the following two: first, the idea of centralism, which defined in principle the method of deciding all particular and detail questions of organization; second, the special function of an organ, a newspaper, for ideological leadership, an idea which took into account the temporary and special requirements of the Russian Social-Democratic working-class movement amidst conditions of political slavery, on the understanding that the *initial* base of operations for the revolutionary assault would be set up abroad. . . .

. . . Martov, as is usually the case, forgot a good deal and, therefore, again muddled things up. . . .

I could not have "liked" the "idea" of paragraph one of Martov's draft, for that draft did not contain a *single idea* that came up at the Congress. His memory played him false. I have been fortunate enough to find Martov's draft among my papers, and in it "*paragraph one is not formulated in the way he proposed it at the Congress!*" So much for the "open vizor"!

§1 of Martov's draft: "A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who, accepting its program, works actively to carry out its aims under the control and direction of the organs (*sic!*) of the Party."

§1 of my draft: "A Party member is one who accepts its program and who supports the Party both financially and by personal participation in one of the Party organizations."

FROM: Lenin, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back" (May, 1904;
Selected Works, Vol. I, book 1, pp. 452, 454-56, 468, 470-72,
609, 613-16, 618-20, 632-34, 644-45).

§1 as formulated by Martov at the Congress and adopted by the Congress: "A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who accepts its program, supports the Party financially and renders it regular personal assistance under the direction of one of its organizations."

It is clearly evident from this comparison that there is no *idea* in Martov's draft but only *empty phrases*. It goes without saying that Party members must work under the control and direction of the *organs* of the Party; *it cannot be otherwise*, and it is talked about only by those who love to talk in order to say nothing, who love to flood "rules" with huge quantities of verbal water and bureaucratic formulas (i.e., formulas that are useless for the matter in hand and supposed to be useful for display). . . .

. . . Comrade Martov's three years' *Iskra* training has not imbued him with disdain for the anarchist phrasemongering by which the unstable mentality of the intellectual is capable of justifying the violation of rules adopted by common consent. . . . When I say that the Party should be a *sum* (and not a mere arithmetical sum, but a complex) of *organizations*, does that mean that I "confuse" the concepts Party and organization? Of course not. I thereby express clearly and precisely my wish, my demand, that the Party, as the vanguard of the class, should be as *organized* as possible, that the Party should admit to its ranks only such elements as lend themselves to at least a minimum of organization. My opponent, on the contrary, wants to *lump together* organized elements and unorganized elements in the Party, those who submit to direction and those who do not, the advanced and the incorrigibly backward—for the corrigibly backward may join the organization. . . .

. . . There can be no talk of throwing anybody overboard, in the sense of preventing them from working, from taking part in the movement. On the contrary, the stronger our Party organizations consisting of *real* Social-Democrats are, and the less wavering and instability there is *within* the Party, the broader, the more varied, the richer and more fertile will be the influence of the Party on the elements of the working-class *masses* surrounding it and guided by it. After

all, the Party, as the vanguard of the working class, must not be confused with the entire class. . . . To forget the distinction between the vanguard and the whole of the masses which gravitate towards it, to forget the constant duty of the vanguard to *raise* ever wider strata to this most advanced level, means merely to deceive oneself, to shut one's eyes to the immensity of our tasks, and to narrow down these tasks. And it is just such a shutting of one's eyes, it is just such forgetfulness, to obliterate the difference between those who associate and those who belong, between those who are conscious and active and those who only help. . . .

. . . A Jacobin who maintains an inseparable bond with the *organization* of the proletariat, a proletariat *conscious* of its class interests, is a *revolutionary Social-Democrat*. A Girondist* who yearns for professors and high-school students, who is afraid of the dictatorship of the proletariat and who sighs about the absolute value of democratic demands is an opportunist. It is only opportunists who can still detect a danger in conspiratorial organizations today, when the idea of narrowing down the political struggle to a conspiracy has been rejected thousands of times in written publications and has long been rejected and swept aside by the realities of life, and when the cardinal importance of mass political agitation has been elucidated and reiterated to the point of nausea. The real basis of this fear of conspiracy, of Blanquism,** is not any definite feature to be found in the practical movement (as Bernstein and Co. have long, and vainly, been trying to show), but the Girondist timidity of the bourgeois intellectual whose mentality is so often revealed among the Social-Democrats of today. . . .

. . . Unity on questions of program and tactics is an essential but by no means a sufficient condition for Party unity and for the centralization of Party work (good God, what rudimentary things one has to keep repeating nowadays, when all concepts have been confused!). The centralization of Party

* Referring to the moderate group of French revolutionaries, ousted by the Jacobins in 1793—Ed.

** Blanquism: the conspiratorial doctrine of the nineteenth-century French revolutionary L. A. Blanqui—Ed.

work requires, in addition, unity of organization, which, in a party that has grown to be anything more than a mere family circle, is inconceivable without formal rules, without the subordination of the minority to the majority, of the part to the whole. As long as we lack unity on the fundamental questions of program and tactics, we bluntly admitted that we were living in a period of disunity and the circle spirit; we bluntly declared that before we can unite, we must draw lines of demarcation; we did not even talk of the forms of a joint organization, but exclusively discussed the new (at that time they really were new) questions of how to fight opportunism on program and tactics. At present, as we all agree, this fight had already ensured a sufficient degree of unity, as formulated in the Party program and in the Party's resolution on tactics; we had to take the next step, and, by common consent, we did take it, working out the *forms* of a united organization that would merge all the circles together. We have been dragged back and half of these forms have been destroyed, we have been dragged back to anarchist conduct, to anarchist phrasemongering, to the revival of a circle in place of a Party editorial board. . . .

. . . The point at issue is whether our ideological struggle is to have forms of a *higher type* to clothe it, forms of Party organization binding on all, or the forms of the old disunity and the old circles. . . . The proletariat is trained by its whole life for organization far more radically than many an intellectual prig. Having gained some understanding of our program and our tactics, the proletariat will not start justifying backwardness in organization by arguing that the form is less important than the content. It is not the proletariat, but *certain intellectuals* in our Party who lack *self-training* in the spirit of organization and discipline, in the spirit of hostility and contempt for anarchist phrasemongering. . . . The proletarian who has become a conscious Social-Democrat and feels that he is a member of the Party will reject *khvostism* ["tail-endism," i.e., following the masses] in matters of organization with the same contempt as he rejected *khvostism* in matters of tactics.

. . . The factory, which seems only a bogey to some, rep-

resents that highest form of capitalist cooperation which has united and disciplined the proletariat, taught it to organize, and placed it at the head of all the other sections of the toiling and exploited population. And it is precisely Marxism, the ideology of the proletariat trained by capitalism, that has taught and is teaching unstable intellectuals to distinguish between the factory as a means of exploitation (discipline based on fear of starvation) and the factory as a means of organization (discipline based on collective work united by the conditions of a technically highly-developed form of production). The discipline and organization which come so hard to the bourgeois intellectual are especially easily acquired by the proletariat just because of this factory "schooling." Mortal fear of this school and utter failure to understand its importance as an organizing factor are characteristic of the ways of thinking which reflect the petty-bourgeois mode of life and which give rise to that species of anarchism which the German Social-Democrats call Edel-anarchismus, i.e., the anarchism of the "noble" gentleman, or aristocratic anarchism, as I would call it. This aristocratic anarchism is particularly characteristic of the Russian nihilist. He thinks of the Party organization as a monstrous "factory"; he regards the subordination of the part to the whole and of the minority to the majority as "serfdom" (see Axelrod's* articles); division of labour under the direction of a centre evokes from him a tragicomical outcry against people being transformed into "wheels and cogs" (to turn editors into contributors being considered a particularly atrocious species of such transformation); mention of the organizational rules of the Party calls forth a contemptuous grimace and the disdainful remark (intended for the "formalists") that one could very well dispense with rules altogether. . . .

. . . Aristocratic anarchism cannot understand that formal rules are needed precisely in order to replace the narrow circle ties by the broad Party tie. It was unnecessary and impossible to give formal shape to the internal ties of a circle or the ties between circles, for these ties rested on friendship

* P. B. Axelrod: a Menshevik leader who stressed democratic party organization—Ed.

or on a "confidence" for which no reason or motive had to be given. The Party tie cannot and must not rest on either of these; it must be founded on formal, "bureaucratically" worded rules (bureaucratic from the standpoint of the undisciplined intellectual), strict adherence to which can alone safeguard us from the wilfulness and caprices characteristic of the circles from the circle methods of scrapping that goes by the name of the free "process" of the ideological struggle. . . .

. . . The presence of large numbers of radical intellectuals in the ranks of our Marxists and our Social-Democrats has made, and is making, the existence of opportunism, produced by their mentality, inevitable in the most varied spheres and in the most varied forms. We fought opportunism on the fundamental problems of our world conception, on questions of our program, and a complete divergence of aims inevitably led to an irrevocable division between the liberals who had corrupted our legal Marxism and the Social-Democrats. . . .

When we speak of fighting opportunism, we must never forget a feature that is characteristic of present-day opportunism in every sphere, namely, its vagueness, diffuseness, elusiveness. An opportunist, by his very nature, will always evade formulating an issue clearly and decisively, he will always seek a middle course, he will always wriggle like a snake between two mutually exclusive points of view and try to "agree" with both and to reduce his differences of opinion to petty amendments, doubts, good and pious suggestions, and so on and so forth. . . . Their "principles" of organization therefore display all the colours of the rainbow: the predominant note is innocent and high-sounding declamations against autocracy and bureaucracy, against blind obedience and wheels and cogs—declamations that are so innocent that it is very, very difficult to discern in them what is really concerned with principle and what is really concerned with co-option. But the further you go, the worse it gets: attempts to analyze and precisely define this detestable "bureaucracy" inevitably lead to autonomism; attempts to "deepen" and justify inevitably lead to vindicating backwardness, to *khvostism*, to Girondist phrasemongering. At last there emerges the

principle of *anarchism*, as the sole really definite principle, which for that reason stands out in practice in particular relief (practice is always in advance of theory). Sneering at discipline—autonomism—anarchism—there you have the ladder by which our opportunism in the sphere of organization now climbs and now descends, skipping from rung to rung and skilfully evading any definite statement of its principles. Exactly the same stages are displayed by opportunism in questions of program and tactics: sneering at “orthodoxy,” narrowness and immobility—revisionist “criticism” and ministerialism*—bourgeois democracy. . . .

One step forward, two steps back — It happens in the lives of individuals, and it happens in the history of nations and in the development of parties. It would be the greatest criminal cowardice to doubt even for a moment the inevitable and complete triumph of the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy, of proletarian organization and Party discipline. We have already won a great deal, and we must go on fighting, without being discouraged by reverses, fighting steadfastly, scorning the philistine methods of circle scrapping, doing our very utmost to preserve the single Party tie among all the Russian Social-Democrats which has been established at the cost of so much effort, and striving by dint of stubborn and systematic work to make all Party members, and the workers in particular, fully and intelligently acquainted with the duties of Party members, with the struggle at the Second Party Congress, with all the causes and all the stages of our disagreements, and with the utter disastrousness of opportunism, which, in the sphere of organization, as in the sphere of our program and our tactics, helplessly surrenders to the bourgeois psychology, uncritically adopts the point of view of bourgeois democracy, and blunts the weapon of the class struggle of the proletariat.

In its struggle for power the proletariat has no other weapon but organization. Disunited by the rule of anarchic competition in the bourgeois world, ground down by forced labour for capital, constantly thrust back to the “lower

* Ministerialism: participation in a non-socialist government, abjured by extreme leftists—Ed.

depths" of utter destitution, savagery and degeneration, the proletariat can become, and inevitably will become, an invincible force only when its ideological unification by the principles of Marxism is consolidated by the material unity of an organization which will weld millions of toilers into an army of the working class. Neither the decrepit rule of Russian tsardom, nor the senile rule of international capital will be able to withstand this army. Its ranks will become more and more serried, in spite of all zigzags and backward steps, in spite of the opportunist phrasemongering of the Girondists of present-day Social-Democracy, in spite of the smug praise of the antiquated circle spirit, and in spite of the tinsel and fuss of *intellectual* anarchism.

too optimistic about the masses

Marxist Reactions to Lenin—Rosa Luxemburg

Rosa Luxemburg, born of a Jewish family in Russian Poland in 1870, became one of the most articulate representatives of idealistic radicalism in the Russian Marxist movement. After 1900, having acquired German nationality through marriage, she exerted her revolutionary efforts primarily in the German Social-Democratic Party, and helped found the Spartacus League which became the nucleus of the German Communist Party in 1919. She did not cease to concern herself with the revolutionary movement in Russia, and published a penetrating attack on Lenin's concept of the centralized party. Her position is significant as a Marxist stand equally as revolutionary as Lenin's, but emphatically repudiating his faith in discipline.

. . . The present book of Comrade Lenin, one of the prominent leaders and debaters of *Iskra* in its campaign preliminary to the Russian Party Congress (N. Lenin: "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward," Geneva, 1904), is the systematic exposition of the views of the ultra-centralist wing of the party. The conception which has here found expression in penetrating and exhaustive form is that of a thorough-going centralism of which the vital principle is, on

FROM: Luxemburg, *Leninism or Marxism* (1904; English translation, Glasgow, Anti-Parliamentary Communist Federation, 1935, pp. 6-7, 15, 17-20, 22-23).

the one hand, the sharp separation of the organized bodies of outspoken and active revolutionists from the unorganized though revolutionary active masses surrounding them, and on the other hand, strict discipline and direct, decisive and determining intervention of the central authorities in all expressions of life in the party's local organizations. It suffices to note, for example, that the central committee, according to this conception, is authorized to organize all sub-committees of the party, hence also has power to determine the personal composition of every single local organization, from Geneva and Liège to Tomsk and Irkutsk, to give it a set of self-made local statutes, to completely dissolve it by a decree and create it anew, and finally in this manner to influence the composition of the highest party authority, the Party Congress. According to this, the central committee appears as the real active nucleus of the party, and all other organizations merely as its executive organs. . . .

But to desire, as Lenin does, to deck out a party leadership with such absolute powers of a negative character would be only to multiply artificially and in a most dangerous measure the conservatism which is a necessary outgrowth of every such leadership. Just as the Social-Democratic tactic was formed, not by a central committee but by the whole party or, more correctly stated, by the whole movement, so the separate organizations of the party plainly require such elbow-room as alone enables complete utilization of all means offered by the situation of the moment, as well as the unfolding of revolutionary initiative. The ultra-centralism advocated by Lenin, however, appears to us as something which, in its whole essence, is not informed with the positive and creative spirit, but with the sterile spirit of the night-watchman. His thought is patterned mainly upon the control of party activity and not upon its promotion, upon narrowing and not upon unfolding, upon the hemming and not upon the drawing together of the movement. . . .

. . . Social-Democratic centralization cannot be based on blind obedience, on mechanical subordination of the party fighters to their central authority; and, furthermore, . . . no absolute partition can be erected between the nucleus of the

class-conscious proletariat already organized into fixed party cadres and the surrounding element engaged in the class struggle but still in process of class enlightenment. The setting up of the central organization on these two principles—on the blind subordination of all party organizations, with their activity, down to the least detail, under a central authority which alone thinks, acts and decides for all, and on a sharp separation of the organized nucleus of the party from the surrounding revolutionary milieu, as championed by Lenin—appears to us for that reason as a mechanical carrying-over of the organizational principles of the Blanquist movement of conspiratorial circles onto the social-democratic movement of the working masses. . . .

. . . It is not by adding on to the discipline impressed upon it by the capitalist State—with the mere transfer of the baton from the hand of the bourgeoisie into that of a social-democratic central committee—but by the breaking up and uprooting of this slavish spirit of discipline, that the proletariat can be prepared for the new discipline, the voluntary self-discipline of the Social Democracy. . . .]

Even from the standpoint of the fears entertained by Lenin, that is, the dangerous influence of the intellectuals upon the proletarian movement, his own conception of organization constitutes the greatest danger for the Russian Social Democracy.

As a matter of fact, there is nothing which so easily and so surely hands over a still youthful labour movement to the private ambitions of the intellectuals as forcing the movement into the strait jacket of a bureaucratic centralism, which debases the fighting workers into a pliable tool in the hands of a “committee.” And, inversely, nothing so surely preserves the labour movement from all opportunistic abuses on the part of an ambitious intelligentsia as the revolutionary self-activation of the working masses, the intensification of their feeling of political responsibility. . . .

In this frightened effort of a part of the Russian Social Democracy to preserve from false steps the aspiring labour movement of Russia, through the guardianship of an omniscient and omnipresent central committee, we seem to see

also the same subjectivism involved by which socialist thought in Russia has frequently been imposed upon in the past. . . .

. . . Now, however, the ego of the Russian revolutionary quickly stands on its head and declares itself once more to be an almighty ruler of history—this time, in the direction of the Social-Democratic working masses. In so doing, the bold acrobat overlooks the fact that the only subject to which this role has now fallen is the mass-ego of the working class, which everywhere insists on venturing to make its own mistakes and learning historical dialectic for itself. And by way of conclusion, let us say openly just to ourselves: Mistakes which a truly revolutionary labour movement commits are, in historical perspective, immeasurably more fruitful and valuable than the infallibility of the very best “central committee.” . . .

radical but overly scrupulous

Marxist Reactions to Lenin—Leon Trotsky

Though born only in 1879, Trotsky had gained a leading place among the Russian Social-Democrats by the time of the Second Party Congress in 1903. Like Rosa Luxemburg, he represented ultra-radical sentiment that could not reconcile itself to Lenin's stress on the party organization. Trotsky stayed with the Menshevik faction until he joined Lenin in 1917. From that point on he accommodated himself in large measure to Lenin's philosophy of party dictatorship, but his reservations came to the surface again in the years after his fall from power. His comments on Lenin in 1904 were truly prophetic.

. . . We wish that our comrades would not overlook the difference of principle between the two methods of work. . . . This difference, if we reduce it to its basis of principle, has decisive significance in determining the character of all the work of our party. In the one case we have the contriving of ideas for the proletariat, the political substitution for the

FROM: Trotsky, *Our Political Tasks* (Geneva, Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, 1904, pp. 50, 52, 54, 73-75, 105; editor's translation).

proletariat; in the other, political education of the proletariat, its political mobilization. . . .

The system of political substitution, point for point like the "Economists'" system of simplification, proceeds—consciously or unconsciously—from a false "sophisticated" understanding of the relation between the objective interests of the proletariat and its consciousness. . . .

In contrast to the "economists," the "politicians" take as their point of departure the *objective* class interests of the proletariat, established by the method of Marxism. But with the same fear that the "economists" have they turn away from the "distance" which lies between the objective and subjective interests of the class whom in principle they "represent." . . . Thus, if the "economists" do not lead the proletariat because they are dragged *behind it*, the "politicians" do not lead the proletariat because they themselves carry out its obligations. If the "economists" have saved themselves from the immensity of the task by assigning themselves a modest role—to march at the tail end of history—the "politicians" resolve the question by trying to transform history into their own tail. . . .

Poorly or well (more poorly) we are revolutionizing the masses, arousing in them the simplest political instincts. But to the extent that this involves complicated tasks—the transformation of these "instincts" into the conscious striving for the political self-determination of the working class—we resort in the broadest way to abbreviated and simplified methods of "contriving" and "substitution."

In the internal politics of the party these methods lead, as we shall yet see, to this: the party organization is substituted for the party, the Central Committee is substituted for the party organization, and finally a "dictator" is substituted for the Central Committee. . . .

According to Lenin's new philosophy . . . it is enough for the proletarian to go through the "school of the factory" in order to give lessons in *political discipline* to the intelligentsia, which has meanwhile been playing the leading role in the party. According to this new philosophy, anyone who

does not imagine the ideal party "as a vast factory," who thinks on the contrary that such a picture is "monstrous," anyone who does not believe in the unlimited power of a machine for political education, "immediately exhibits the psychology of the bourgeois intellectual." . . .

Without fear of exhibiting the "psychology of the bourgeois intellectual," we assert above all that the conditions which impel the proletariat to collectively agreed-upon methods of struggle lie not in the factory but in the general social conditions of the proletariat's existence. . . .

Of course, "production which is highly developed technologically" creates the material for the political development and political discipline of the proletariat, just as capitalism in general creates the *preconditions* of socialism. But just as it is unfounded to identify socialism with capitalism, so is it wrong to identify the *factory* discipline of the proletariat with *revolutionary-political* discipline.

The task of Social-Democracy consists of setting the proletariat against that discipline which replaces the work of human thought with the rhythm of physical movement, and against this dead, killing discipline to weld the proletariat into one militant army—all in step and shoulder to shoulder—united by a common political consciousness and revolutionary enthusiasm. *Such* discipline the Russian proletariat does not yet have; the factory and the machine do not provide it with this quality as spontaneously as they dispense occupational diseases.

The barrack regime cannot be the regime of our party, as the factory cannot be its model. . . .

The tasks of the new regime are so complicated that they cannot be solved in any way other than by competition between various methods of economic and political construction, by way of long "disputes," by way of systematic struggle—not only of the socialist world against the capitalist one, but also between various tendencies within socialism, tendencies which will inevitably appear as soon as the dictatorship of the proletariat throws up dozens, hundreds of new, hitherto unsolved problems. And no "strong, authoritative organization" can suppress these tendencies and disagreements in

order to hasten and simplify the process, for it is all too clear that a proletariat capable of dictatorship over society will not tolerate dictatorship over itself.

Organization of the Bolshevik Faction

In the months following the Second Congress of the Social-Democratic Party Lenin lost his slim majority and proceeded to organize an insurgent group in opposition to the dominant "Menshevik" leadership. A group of twenty-two Bolsheviks (counting Lenin himself) met in Geneva in August, 1904, to endorse the idea of the highly disciplined party and to urge the reorganization of the whole Social-Democratic movement on Leninist lines.

Recently a private meeting was held of twenty-two like-minded members of the RSDWP who take the point of view of the majority at the Second Party Congress; this conference considered the question of our party crisis and the means of emerging from it, and decided to turn to all Russian Social Democrats with the following proclamation:

Comrades! The severe crisis of party life is becoming more and more involved, and its end is not in sight. Confusion is growing, creating still newer conflicts, and the positive work of the party all along the line is strained by it to the utmost. The forces of the party, which is still young and not successfully stiffened, are fruitlessly wasted to a threatening extent.

Meanwhile, the historical moment presents to the party demands which are vaster than ever before. The revolutionary alertness of the working class is growing, the ferment is increasing, and in the other strata of society, war and crisis, hunger and unemployment are with elemental inevitability undermining the roots of the autocracy. The shameful end of a shameful war is already not far off: and it unavoidably multiplies revolutionary alertness ten-fold, unavoidably

FROM: Resolution of the "Twenty-two Like-minded Members of the RSDWP Who Take the Point of View of the Majority at the Second Party Congress" (August, 1904; CPSU in Resolutions, I, pp. 60-63, 65; editor's translation).

drives the working class face to face with its enemies and demands from Social Democracy colossal work, a terrific intensification of effort, in order to organize the final decisive struggle with the autocracy.

Can our party satisfy these demands in the condition in which it now finds itself? Any conscientious man must without hesitation answer no!

The unity of the party has been deeply undermined; the struggle inside has gone beyond the bounds of any party spirit. Organizational discipline has been shaken to its very foundation; the capacity of the party for harmonious unified action has turned into a dream.

Nevertheless, we consider this illness of the party to be an illness of growth. We see the basis of the crisis in the transition from the circle forms of the life of Social Democracy to party forms; the essence of the internal struggle is in the conflict between the circle spirit and party spirit. Therefore, only by putting an end to this illness can our party *really* become a party.

Under the name of the "minority" in the party [the Mensheviks], heterogeneous elements have gathered, which are linked by the conscious or unconscious effort to retain circle relationships, preparty forms of organization. . . . Their allies are all those elements which in theory or practice have fallen away from the principle of strict Social-Democratism, for only the circle spirit could preserve the individuality of ideas and the influence of these elements; while party spirit threatened to dissolve them or deprive them of any influence. . . . However, the chief cadres of the opposition consisted in general of all those elements in our party which by preference belong to the intelligentsia. In comparison with the proletariat, the intelligentsia is always more individualistic, due to the basic conditions of its life and work, which do not directly give it a broad unification of its forces or a direct education in organized joint labor. Therefore, it is more difficult for intellectual elements to adapt to the discipline of party life, and those of them who are not in a position to undertake this task naturally raise the banner of rebellion against the essential organizational limitations,

and elevate their elemental anarchy into a principle of struggle, incorrectly designating this anarchy as the striving for "autonomy," as the demand for "tolerance," etc.

The portion of the party which is abroad, where the circles are distinguished by their relative longevity, where theoreticians of various shades form groupings, where the intelligentsia definitely predominates—this portion of the party had to be the most inclined to the point of view of the "minority." Therefore, it quickly became an actual majority there. On the other hand, Russia, where the voice of the organized proletarians is heard more loudly, where in more vital and closer intercourse with them, the party intelligentsia is educated in a more proletarian spirit, where the gravity of the immediate struggle more strongly compels people to feel the necessity of the organized unity of work—Russia has come out determinedly against the circle spirit, against anarchist disorganizing tendencies. She has definitely expressed this attitude toward them in a whole series of manifestations on the part of the committees and the other party organizations. . . .

The majority of the party, striving however it can to preserve its unity and organizational bond, has struggled only by loyal party means and has not once made concessions for the sake of conciliation. The minority, carrying on the anarchistic tendency, has not bothered about party peace and unity. It has made each concession an instrument of further struggle. Of all the demands of the minority only one has up to this time not been satisfied—the introduction of diversity into the Central Committee of the party by way of co-opting members of the minority who are forcibly bound to it—and the attacks by the minority have become more embittered than ever. Having taken control of the Central Organ and the Party Council, the minority now does not desist from exploiting in its circle interests that very discipline against which in essence it struggles. . . .

Coming forth with this program of struggle for the unity of the party, we invite the representatives of all other shadings and all party organizations to express themselves on the question of their programs, in order to make it possible to

prepare for a congress, seriously and consistently, consciously and according to a plan. A question of life, a question of honor and worth is being decided for the party: does it exist as an ideological force and real force capable of rationally organizing itself enough to come forth as the actual leader of the revolutionary workers' movement of our country? In all its manner of action the minority abroad says no! And it continues to act surely and determinedly in this sense, relying on the remoteness of Russia, on the frequent replacement of party workers there, on the irreplaceability of its leaders, its literary figures. A party is being born to us, we say, seeing the growth of the political consciousness of the progressive workers, seeing the active initiative of the committees in the general life of the party. A party is being born to us, our young forces are multiplying, and they are able to replace and outlive the old literary collegia which are losing the confidence of the party; we are more and more getting to be revolutionaries who value the sustained direction of party life more than any circle of former leaders. A party is being born to us, and no tricks or delays will hold back its decisive and final judgment.

From these forces of our party we draw the assurance of victory.

Comrades! Print and distribute this proclamation.

Lenin on the Revolution of 1905

During the revolutionary disturbances of 1905 in Russia, Lenin endeavored to justify a major role for the workers' party, despite the Marxist consensus that Russia was ready only for the "bourgeois-democratic" revolution. Lenin solved the problem by denying the revolutionary capabilities of the bourgeoisie and insisting that the workers' party, so-called, would have to push the "bourgeois" revolution through to the end. The party would gather the land-hungry peasants under its wing, establish the "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," and hold power until the opportunity arrived to implement the program of socialism.

This type of reasoning has underlain Communist aspira-

tions to power not only in Russia but in the underdeveloped East in general: they insist on a leading role for the "proletarian" party no matter what social conditions must be faced or what strange alliances must be made.

. . . It is entirely absurd to think that a bourgeois revolution does not express the interests of the proletariat at all. This absurd idea boils down either to the hoary Narodnik [Populist] theory that a bourgeois revolution runs counter to the interests of the proletariat, and that therefore we do not need bourgeois political liberty; or to anarchism, which rejects all participation of the proletariat in bourgeois politics, in a bourgeois revolution and in bourgeois parliamentarism. From the standpoint of theory, this idea disregards the elementary propositions of Marxism concerning the inevitability of capitalist development where commodity production exists. Marxism teaches that a society which is based on commodity production, and which has commercial intercourse with civilized capitalist nations, at a certain stage of its development, itself inevitably takes the road of capitalism. Marxism has irrevocably broken with the ravings of the Narodniks and the anarchists to the effect that Russia, for instance, can avoid capitalist development, jump out of capitalism, or skip over it and proceed along some path other than the path of the class struggle on the basis and within the framework of this same capitalism.

All these principles of Marxism have been proved and explained over and over again in minute detail in general and with regard to Russia in particular. And from these principles it follows that the idea of seeking salvation for the working class in anything save the further development of capitalism is reactionary. In countries like Russia, the working class suffers not so much from capitalism as from the insufficient development of capitalism. The working class is therefore *decidedly interested* in the broadest, freest and most rapid development of capitalism. The removal of all the remnants of the old order which are hampering the

FROM: Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" (July, 1905; *Selected Works*, Vol. I, book 2, pp. 48-51, 86-90, 104-5, 107, 142).

broad, free and rapid development of capitalism is of decided *advantage* to the working class. The bourgeois revolution is precisely a revolution that most resolutely sweeps away the survivals of the past, the remnants of serfdom (which include not only autocracy but monarchy as well) and most fully guarantees the broadest, freest and most rapid development of capitalism.

That is why a *bourgeois* revolution is in the highest degree advantageous to the proletariat. A bourgeois revolution is absolutely necessary in the interests of the proletariat. The more complete and determined, the more consistent the bourgeois revolution, the more assured will be the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie for Socialism. Only those who are ignorant of the rudiments of scientific Socialism can regard this conclusion as new or strange, paradoxical. . . .

On the other hand, it is more advantageous for the working class if the necessary changes in the direction of bourgeois democracy take place by way of revolution and not by way of reform; for the way of reform is the way of delay, of procrastination, of the painfully slow decomposition of the putrid parts of the national organism. It is the proletariat and the peasantry that suffer first of all and most of all from their putrefaction. The revolutionary way is the way of quick amputation, which is the least painful to the proletariat, the way of the direct removal of the decomposing parts, the way of fewest concessions to and least consideration for the monarchy and the disgusting, vile, rotten and contaminating institutions which go with it. . . .

Marxism teaches the proletarian not to keep aloof from the bourgeois revolution, not to be indifferent to it, not to allow the leadership of the revolution to be assumed by the bourgeoisie but, on the contrary, to take a most energetic part in it, to fight most resolutely for consistent proletarian democracy, for carrying the revolution to its conclusion. We cannot jump out of the bourgeois-democratic boundaries of the Russian revolution, but we can vastly extend these boundaries, and within these boundaries we can and must fight for the interests of the proletariat, for its immediate

needs and for the conditions that will make it possible to prepare its forces for the future complete victory. . . .

The basic idea here is the one that the *Vperiod** has repeatedly formulated, stating that we must not be afraid of a complete victory for Social-Democracy in a democratic revolution, i.e., of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, for such a victory will enable us to rouse Europe, and the socialist proletariat of Europe, after throwing off the yoke of the bourgeoisie, will in its turn help us to accomplish the socialist revolution. . . .

The *Vperiod* quite definitely stated wherein lies the real "possibility of holding power"—namely, in the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, in their joint mass strength, which is capable of outweighing all the forces of counterrevolution, in the inevitable concurrence of their interests in *democratic* changes. . . . If in our fight for a republic and democracy we could not rely upon the peasantry as well as on the proletariat, the prospect of our "holding power" would be hopeless. But if it is not hopeless, if a "decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism" opens up such a possibility, then we must point to it, we must actively call for its transformation into reality and issue practical slogans not only *for the contingency* of the revolution being carried into Europe, but also *for the purpose* of carrying it there. . . . Beyond the bounds of democracy there can be no question of the proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie having a single will. Class struggle between them is inevitable; but it is in a democratic republic that this struggle will be the most thorough-going and widespread struggle of the people *for Socialism*. Like everything else in the world, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has a past and a future. Its past is autocracy, serfdom, monarchy and privilege. In the struggle against this past, in the struggle against counterrevolution, a "single will" of the proletariat and the peasantry is possible, for here there is unity of interests.

Its future is the struggle against private property, the

* "Forward": Lenin's paper, 1904-5—Ed.

struggle of the wage worker against the employer, the struggle for Socialism. Here singleness of will is impossible. Here our path lies not from autocracy to a republic but from a petty-bourgeois democratic republic to Socialism. . . .

A Social-Democrat must never for a moment forget that the proletariat will inevitably have to wage the class struggle for Socialism even against the most democratic and republican bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. This is beyond doubt. Hence the absolute necessity of a separate, independent, strictly class party of Social-Democracy. Hence the temporary nature of our tactics of "striking jointly" with the bourgeoisie and the duty of keeping a strict watch "over our ally, as over an enemy," etc. All this is also beyond the slightest doubt. But it would be ridiculous and reactionary to deduce from this that we must forget, ignore or neglect these tasks which, although transient and temporary, are vital at the present time. The fight against the autocracy is a temporary and transient task of the Socialists, but to ignore or neglect this task in any way would be tantamount to betraying Socialism and rendering a service to reaction. The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry is unquestionably only a transient, temporary aim of the Socialists, but to ignore this aim in the period of a democratic revolution would be downright reactionary. . . .

. . . We Marxists all know . . . that the bourgeoisie is inconsistent, self-seeking and cowardly in its support of the revolution. The bourgeoisie, in the mass, will inevitably turn towards counterrevolution, towards the autocracy, against the revolution and against the people, immediately its narrow, selfish interests are met, immediately it "recoils" from consistent democracy (*and it is already recoiling from it!*). There remains the "people," that is, the proletariat and the peasantry: the proletariat alone can be relied on to march to the end, for it is going far beyond the democratic revolution. That is why the proletariat fights in the front ranks for a republic and contemptuously rejects silly and unworthy advice to take care not to frighten away the bourgeoisie. The peasantry in-

cludes a great number of semiproletarian as well as petty-bourgeois elements. This causes it also to be unstable and compels the proletariat to unite in a strictly class party. But the instability of the peasantry differs radically from the instability of the bourgeoisie, for at the present time the peasantry is interested not so much in the absolute preservation of private property as in the confiscation of the landed estates, one of the principal forms of private property. While this does not make the peasantry become socialist or cease to be petty-bourgeois, it is capable of becoming a whole-hearted and most radical adherent of the democratic revolution. . . .

. . . The Russian revolution will begin to assume its real sweep, will really assume the widest revolutionary sweep possible in the epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolution, only when the bourgeoisie recoils from it and when the masses of the peasantry come out as active revolutionaries side by side with the proletariat. In order that it may be consistently carried to its conclusion, our democratic revolution must rely on such forces as are capable of paralyzing the inevitable inconsistency of the bourgeoisie (i.e., capable precisely of "causing it to recoil from the revolution," which the Caucasian adherents of *Iskra* fear so much because of their lack of judgment).

The proletariat must carry to completion the democratic revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyze the instability of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the semiproletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyze the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. . . .

Major questions in the life of nations are settled only by force. The reactionary classes themselves are usually the first to resort to violence, to civil war; they are the first to "place the bayonet on the agenda," as the Russian autocracy has been doing systematically and undeviatingly

everywhere ever since January 9.* And since such a situation has arisen, since the bayonet has really become the main point on the political agenda, since insurrection has proved to be imperative and urgent—constitutional illusions and school exercises in parliamentarism become only a screen for the bourgeois betrayal of the revolution, a screen to conceal the fact that the bourgeoisie is “recoiling” from the revolution. It is therefore the slogan of dictatorship that the genuinely revolutionary class must advance. . . .

Lenin on Insurrection

Following the abortive uprising of the workers in Moscow in December, 1905, Lenin expressed himself on the decisive importance of revolutionary violence.

. . . We must carry on the widest agitation among the masses in favour of an armed uprising and make no attempt to obscure this question by talk about “preliminary stages,” or to befog it in any way. We would be deceiving both ourselves and the people if we concealed from them the fact that the impending revolutionary action must take the form of a desperate, bloody war of extermination. . . .

December confirmed another of Marx’s profound propositions, which the opportunists have forgotten, namely, that insurrection is an art, and that the principal rule of this art is that a desperately bold and irrevocably determined offensive must be waged. We have not sufficiently assimilated this truth. We have not sufficiently learnt ourselves, nor have we taught the masses this art, this rule to attack, come what may. We must make up for this with all our energy. It is not enough to take sides on the question of political slogans; it is also necessary to take sides on the question of armed insurrection. Those who are opposed to it, those who do not prepare for it, must be ruthlessly dis-

FROM: Lenin, “The Lessons of the Moscow Uprising” (September, 1906; *Selected Works*, Vol. I, book 2, pp. 166, 168-69).

* January 9, 1905: “Bloody Sunday,” when troops fired on demonstrators in St. Petersburg—Ed.

missed from the ranks of the supporters of the revolution, sent packing to its enemies, to the traitors or cowards; for the day is approaching when the force of events and the conditions of the struggle will compel us to separate enemies from friends according to this principle. We must not preach passivity, not mere "waiting" until the troops "come over." No! We must proclaim from the housetops the need for a bold offensive and armed attack, the necessity at such times of exterminating the persons in command of the enemy, and of a most energetic fight for the wavering troops. . . .

Trotsky on "Permanent Revolution"

Trotsky's response to the revolution of 1905 and the problem of the workers' role in Russia was to predict a new upheaval in which the proletariat would temporarily find itself in power. It would depend on world revolution to sustain them, however, and rescue the Russian socialists from the backwardness of their country. Herein lay Trotsky's notion of continuous or "permanent" revolution, which reconciled the predominantly backward character of Russia with the Marxists' desire to justify a revolutionary role for themselves.

. . . The Russian working class of 1906 differs entirely from the Vienna working class of 1848. The best proof of it is the all-Russian practice of the Councils of Workmen's Deputies (Soviets). Those are no organizations of conspirators prepared beforehand to step forward in times of unrest and to seize command over the working class. They are organs consciously created by the masses themselves to coördinate their revolutionary struggle. The Soviets, elected by and responsible to the masses, are thoroughly democratic institutions following the most determined class policy in the spirit of revolutionary Socialism. . . .

Within the limits of a revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century, which is also a bourgeois revolution in

FROM: Trotsky, *Results and Prospects* (1906; translated as *Our Revolution* by M. J. Olgin, New York, Holt, 1918, pp. 80, 92, 95-96, 100-03, 109-10, 132, 136-37, 142-44; reprinted by permission of the publisher).

its immediate objective aims, there looms up a prospect of an inevitable, or at least possible, supremacy of the working class in the near future. . . .

To imagine a revolutionary democratic government without representatives of labor is to see the absurdity of such a situation. A refusal of labor to participate in a revolutionary government would make the very existence of that government impossible, and would be tantamount to a betrayal of the cause of the revolution. A participation of labor in a revolutionary government, however, is admissible, both from the viewpoint of objective probability and subjective desirability, *only in the role of a leading dominant power*. Of course, you can call such a government "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," "dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia," or "a revolutionary government of the workingmen and the lower middle class." This question will still remain: Who has the hegemony in the government and through it in the country? *When we speak of a labor government we mean that the hegemony belongs to the working class.* . . .

Our attitude towards the idea of a "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" is now quite clear. It is not a question whether we think it "admissible" or not, whether we "wish" or we "do not wish" this form of political co-operation. In our opinion, it simply cannot be realized, at least in its direct meaning. Such a coöperation presupposes that either the peasantry has identified itself with one of the existing bourgeois parties, or it has formed a powerful party of its own. Neither is possible, as we have tried to point out. . . .

The proletariat can get into power only at a moment of national upheaval, of sweeping national enthusiasm. The proletariat assumes power as a revolutionary representative of the people, as a recognized leader in the fight against absolutism and barbaric feudalism. Having assumed power, however, the proletariat will open a new era, an era of positive legislation, of revolutionary politics, and this is the point where its political supremacy as an avowed spokesman of the nation may become endangered.

The first measures of the proletariat—the cleansing of the Augean stables of the old regime and the driving away of their inhabitants—will find active support of the entire nation whatever the liberal castrators may tell us of the power of some prejudices among the masses. The work of political cleansing will be accompanied by democratic reorganization of all social and political relations. The labor government, impelled by immediate needs and requirements, will have to look into all kinds of relations and activities among the people. It will have to throw out of the army and the administration all those who had stained their hands with the blood of the people; it will have to disband all the regiments that had polluted themselves with crimes against the people. This work will have to be done immediately, long before the establishment of an elective responsible administration and before the organization of a popular militia. This, however, will be only a beginning. Labor democracy will soon be confronted by the problems of a normal workday, the agrarian relations and unemployment. The legislative solution of those problems will show the *class character* of the labor government. It will tend to weaken the revolutionary bond between the proletariat and the nation; it will give the economic differentiation among the peasants a political expression. Antagonism between the component parts of the nation will grow step by step as the policies of the labor government become more outspoken, lose their general democratic character and become *class policies*. . . .

Social-Democracy can never assume power under a double obligation: to put the *entire* minimum program into operation for the sake of the proletariat, and to keep strictly *within the limits* of this program, for the sake of the bourgeoisie. Such a double obligation could never be fulfilled. Participating in the government, not as powerless hostages, but as a leading force, the representatives of labor *eo ipso* break the line between the minimum and maximum program. *Collectivism becomes the order of the day.* At which point the proletariat will be stopped on its march in this direction, depends upon the constellation of forces, not upon the original purpose of the proletarian party. . . .

Political supremacy of the proletariat is incompatible with its economic slavery. Whatever may be the banner under which the proletariat will find itself in possession of power, it will be compelled to enter the road of Socialism. It is the greatest Utopia to think that the proletariat, brought to the top by the mechanics of a bourgeois revolution, would be able, even if it wanted, to limit its mission by creating a republican democratic environment for the social supremacy of the bourgeoisie. Political dominance of the proletariat, even if it were temporary, would extremely weaken the resistance of capital which is always in need of state aid, and would give momentous opportunities to the economic struggle of the proletariat. . . .

How far, however, can the Socialist policy of the working class advance in the economic environment of Russia? One thing we can say with perfect assurance: it will meet political obstacles long before it will be checked by the technical backwardness of the country. *Without direct political aid from the European proletariat the working class of Russia will not be able to retain its power and to turn its temporary supremacy into a permanent Socialist dictatorship.* We cannot doubt this for a moment. On the other hand, there is no doubt that a *Socialist revolution in the West would allow us to turn the temporary supremacy of the working class directly into a Socialist dictatorship.* . . .

The influence of the Russian revolution on the proletariat of Europe is immense. Not only does it destroy the Petersburg absolutism, that main power of European reaction; it also imbues the minds and the souls of the European proletariat with revolutionary daring. . . .

. . . The colossal influence of the Russian revolution manifests itself in killing party routine, in destroying Socialist conservatism, in making a clean contest of proletarian forces against capitalist reaction a question of the day. . . .

The Russian proletariat in power, even if this were only the result of a passing combination of forces in the Russian bourgeois revolution, would meet organized opposition on the part of the world's reaction, and readiness for organized support on the part of the world's proletariat. Left to its

own resources, the Russian working class must necessarily be crushed the moment it loses the aid of the peasants. Nothing remains for it but to link the fate of its political supremacy and the fate of the Russian revolution with the fate of a Socialist revolution in Europe. All that momentous authority and political power which is given to the proletariat by a combination of forces in the Russian bourgeois revolution, it will thrust on the scale of class struggle in the entire capitalistic world. Equipped with governmental power, having a counter-revolution behind his back, having the European reaction in front of him, the Russian workingman will issue to all his brothers the world over his old battle-cry which will now become the call for the last attack: *Proletarians of all the world, unite!*

Lenin on Democratic Centralism

Following the revolution of 1905 repeated attempts were made by the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks to restore the unity of the Social-Democratic Party. Lenin was criticized for indiscipline, and replied with a defense of the rights of minorities within the system of "democratic centralism." This formula became the official doctrine of the Communist organization, though freedom of factions disappeared very quickly.

The authors of the resolution are completely wrong in their understanding of the relation between *free criticism* within the party and the party's *unity of action*. Criticism within the limits of the foundations of the party program must be completely free . . . not only at party meetings, but also at broader ones. To suppress such criticism or such "agitation" (for criticism cannot be separated from agitation) is impossible. The political action of the party must be united. No "appeals" are permissible which violate the unity of actions which have already been decided upon, neither at open meetings, nor at party meetings, nor in the party press.

FROM: Lenin, "Freedom of Criticism and Unity of Action" (June, 1906; *Collected Works*, 3rd ed., Moscow, Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, 1928, Vol. IX, pp. 274-75; editor's translation).

Obviously the Central Committee has defined the freedom of criticism inaccurately and too narrowly, and the unity of action—inaccurately and too broadly. . . .

The Central Committee's resolution is incorrect in substance and *contradicts the statutes of the party*. The principle of democratic centralism and autonomy of local institutions means specifically freedom of criticism, complete and everywhere, as long as this does not disrupt the unity of action already decided upon—and the intolerability of any criticism undermining or obstructing the unity of action decided on by the party.

We consider it a great mistake on the part of the Central Committee to issue a resolution on this important question without any preliminary consideration of it by the party press and the party organizations; such consideration would have helped it avoid the mistakes indicated by us. . . .

Bogdanov's Philosophical Revision of Marxism

Lenin's outstanding lieutenant in the early years of the Bolshevik faction was Alexander A. Bogdanov—physician, economist, philosopher, sociologist, and exponent of romantic revolutionary extremism. After 1905, Bogdanov became the leader of the left-wing purists among the Bolsheviks who refused to make use of the Duma, the parliamentary body of limited power established in 1906. At the same time he attempted an original philosophical extension of Marxism by applying the philosophy of "empirio-criticism" of the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach and the German philosopher Richard Avenarius. This was of immediate significance because it provoked Lenin's ire and a drastic shake-up in the Bolshevik ranks to enforce Lenin's standards of ideological discipline. It also had implications much later, during the second decade of the Soviet regime, because of its suggestion that truth is conditioned by classes and the class struggle.

. . . The task of cognition, according to the views of Mach and Avenarius, consists of systematizing the content

FROM: Bogdanov, *Empiriomonism* (St. Petersburg, Dorovatovsky and Charushnikov, Book I, 2nd ed., 1905, pp. 9, 10, 25, 36, 40-41, and Book III, 1906, pp. iv-v, ix, xxiii-xxv, xxxiii, 83-84, 139-42, 149-50, 152, 159; editor's translation).

of experience, since experience is both the natural basis and the natural boundary of cognition. In its own objective significance this systematization is a powerful living adaptation, an instrument for preserving life and its development. . . .

But cognition in this picture is not merely adaptation in general; it is also *social* adaptation. The social genesis of cognition, its dependence on social experience, the principled difference of value in the thinking of different people, and its constant social interaction, clearly emerge and are consciously underscored by both thinkers. . . .

Where Mach sketches out the connection of cognition with the social process of labor, the correspondence of his views with the ideas of Marx occasionally becomes quite astonishing. . . .

We arrive at this conclusion: the characteristics of "objectivity" in general cannot have as their basis individual experience. . . . The basis of "objectivity" must lie in the sphere of *collective* experience. . . .

The agreement in collective experience which is expressed in this "objectivity" can only appear as the result of the progressive concordance of the experience of different people as they express themselves to each other. The objectivity of the physical bodies which we encounter in our experience is established in the last analysis on the basis of mutual verification and the concordance in what different people express. In general the physical world is this: socially agreed-upon, socially harmonized, in a word, *socially organized* experience. . . .

Laws do not belong at all to the sphere of immediate experience; laws are the result of conscious reworking of experience; they are not facts in themselves, but are created by thought, as a means of organizing experience, of harmoniously bringing it into agreement as an ordered unity. Laws are *abstract cognition*, and physical laws possess physical qualities just as little as psychological laws possess psychic qualities. . . . The antithesis between the physical and psychic aspects of experience reduces to the distinction between socially organized and individually organized experience. . . .

. . . The social materialism of Marx presented demands to my world view which the old materialism could not satisfy. . . . It was necessary to *know one's knowledge*, to explain one's world view, and according to the idea of Marxism this could and had to be done on the basis of research on its social genesis. It was obvious that the basic concepts of the old materialism—both "matter" and "immutable laws"—were worked out in the course of the *social* development of mankind, and inasmuch as they were "ideological forms," it was necessary to find their "material base." But since the "material base" has the property of changing as society develops, it becomes clear that any given ideological form can have only a historically transitory meaning, not an objectively supra-historical meaning, that it can be a "truth of the time" ("objective" truth, but only within the limits of a given epoch)—but in no case can it be a "truth for all time" ("objective" in the absolute meaning of the word). . . . For me Marxism includes the denial of the unconditional objectivity of any truth whatsoever, the denial of every eternal truth. . . .

Truth is an ideological form—the organizing form of human experience; and if we know this without doubt, and know that the material basis of ideology changes, that the content of experience expands—do we have any right whatsoever to assert that this given ideological form will never be transformed by the development of its social basis, that this given form of experience will not be burst apart by its growing contents? Consistent Marxism does not allow such dogmatic and static notions. . . .

Marxist philosophy must above all be one of natural science. Of course, natural science is the *ideology of the productive forces of society*, because it serves as the basis for technical experience and the technical sciences; in concordance with the basic idea of historical materialism, the productive forces of society represent the base of its development in general. But it is also clear that Marxist philosophy must reflect the *social form* of the productive forces, relying obviously on the "social" sciences proper. . . .

Ideological forms are the *organizational adaptation* of

social life, and in the last analysis (directly or indirectly), of the *technical process*. Therefore the development of ideology is determined by *necessities* in the organizational adaptations of the social process and by the *material present* for them. The viability of ideological forms depends, consequently, on the harmony and order with which they really organize the social content of labor. . . .

The world of experience has been crystallized and continues to be crystallized out of chaos. The force which determines the forms of this crystallization is the intercourse of people. Outside of these forms there is really no *experience*, because a disorganized mass of occurrences is not experience. Thus, experience is social in its very basis, and its progress is the *social-psychological process of organizing it*. The individual psychical organizing process is completely adapted to this. If, for the empiriocriticist, the experience of all humans is of equal value, which I have earlier designated as the familiar cognitive "democracy," then for the empiriomonist this experience is rather the result of the collective organizing work of all people—a sort of cognitive "socialism." . . .

Summarizing the connection and dependence between "ideology" and "technology" in the process of social development, we arrive at the following formulations:

1. The technical process is the area of the direct struggle of society with nature; ideology is the area of the organizing forms of social life. In the last analysis the technical process represents just that content which is organized by the ideological forms.

2. Corresponding to this relationship, the technical process represents the basic and ideology the derivative area of social life and social development. From the standpoint of energetics, ideology is conditioned by the technical process in the sense that it arises and develops according to that preponderance of assimilation over disassimilation which is characteristic of it. On the qualitative side the material of ideological forms also has its beginning in the technical area.

3. The development of technical forms is accomplished under the direct action of both "extra-social" selection (influences on the part of external nature) and social selection.

The development of ideology is directly subordinated to social selection alone.

4. The point of departure of any social development lies in the technical process. The basic line of development goes from the technical forms through the lower organizing forms of ideology to the higher. Corresponding to this, there proceeds in the same direction an increase in the conservatism of social forms.

5. The derivative line of social development, directed from the higher organizing forms toward the lower and from ideology toward technology, is always just the continuation and reflection of the basic line. Not only does it never change the relatively greater magnitude of the conservatism of the higher forms of ideology; it actually rests on this conservatism as its necessary condition.

6. Thus the dynamic conditions of social development and degradation, the motive forces of these processes, lie in the technical process; in ideology lie the static conditions, the limiting, regulating, and form-giving forces. . . .

We summarize the main conclusions concerning the group and class differentiation of society:

1. Both group and class divisions in society are the result of the quantitative and qualitative progress of technology. "Social groups" arise on the basis of specialization; classes, on the basis of the progressive isolation of the organizer and executive functions in society. Group and class dissociation essentially amounts to vitally important distinctions in the direction of social selection.

2. Social groups and classes acquire the definite and firm qualities of social complexes when they are provided with definitely distinct ideologies, which condition the firmly distinct direction of social selection within these collectivities. . . .

5. The ideology worked out by the organizer part of society retains full vital significance for both parts of society as long as the content which it organizes remains really common to them. When this condition is violated . . . the ideological dissociation of classes begins; the ideology of the upper class comes into contradiction with the actual experience and

urges of the lower, and this contradiction is then further intensified.

6. The organizer function of the "upper" class allows it to organize the life of the "lower" class by means of norms which do not correspond with the conditions of life of the latter. For the class subordinated to them, such norms acquire the significance of external forces, like the forces of extra-social nature—hostile forces to which one has to adapt. Such a primary and basic class contradiction is the starting point for the development of any class struggle. . . .

8. . . . The organizer class, progressively removing itself from the technical-production process, in the course of time loses its real organizer function, changes into a parasite class, inevitably degenerates, and at the same time loses its social strength. . . .

10. The capitalistic type of class development . . . leads to the progressive transformation of the mass of individual working operatives into a solid collectivity, adapted to the organizer role on a scale which expands without limit. The rapid technical progress which is characteristic of this type of development stimulates the rapid development of opposed class ideologies and the class struggle. This culminates in the downfall of the former organizer class and society's transition from class development through contradictions, to integral-harmonious development. Extrasocial and social spontaneity are both overcome by the planfully organized force of humanity, and its power over nature grows without limit. . . .

In a class society any world view is either the ideology of one definite class or a definite combination of different class ideologies. Even the most individual of them can only be a particular combination of elements of collective, class thinking. For the individual is created and defined by the social milieu—in a class society, by the class milieu.

Such being the case, the ideology of the technical process is inevitably the ideology of the class which stands in the closest relationship to the technical process, i.e., the class of "producers" in the *broad* sense of the word. . . . In the social-labor experience of the worker in machine production

there exists material with basic vital significance both for the recognition in principle of the homogeneity of the "psychic" and the "physical," and for the tendency cognitively to subordinate the "psychic" to the collectively elaborated forms of the cognition of the "physical." The philosophy which organizes this material into pure finished forms and makes these forms general must be regarded as the ideology of a given class—of course, just to the extent that it really accomplishes this and does not add alien tendencies which contradict the tendencies of the proletariat. . . .

We have arrived at this characterization of the philosophical world view we are considering: the cognitive ideology of the technical process, proletarian in its tendencies, which in its general scheme reproduces the basic features of the structure of contemporary society. . . .

Lenin's Philosophical Orthodoxy

Lenin wrote his main philosophical work, *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*, as a polemical reply to Bogdanov. Here Lenin revealed his intolerance of any critical attitude toward what he regarded as the absolute truth laid down by Marx and Engels. His dogmatic assertion of an oversimplified nineteenth-century materialism remains the official philosophy for the entire Communist movement.

A number of writers, would-be Marxists, have this year undertaken a veritable campaign against the philosophy of Marxism. . . .

All these people could not have been ignorant of the fact that Marx and Engels scores of times termed their philosophical views dialectical materialism. Yet all these people, who, despite the sharp divergence of their political views, are united in their hostility toward dialectical materialism, at the same time claim to be Marxists in philosophy! Engels'

FROM: Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism—Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy* (1908; English translation, New York, International Publishers, 1927, pp. 9-10, 38, 121, 127-29, 335-38, 370-71; reprinted by permission of the publisher).

dialectics is "mysticism," says Berman. Engels' views have become "antiquated," remarks Bazarov casually, as though it were a self-evident fact. Materialism thus appears to be refuted by our bold warriors, who proudly allude to the "modern theory of knowledge," "recent philosophy" (or "recent positivism"), the "philosophy of modern natural science," or even the "philosophy of natural science of the twentieth century." Supported by all these supposedly recent doctrines, our destroyers of dialectical materialism proceed fearlessly to downright fideism (in the case of Lunacharsky it is most evident, but by no means in his case alone!). Yet when it comes to an explicit definition of their attitude towards Marx and Engels, all their courage and all their respect for their own convictions at once disappear. In deed—a complete renunciation of dialectical materialism, i.e., of Marxism; in word—endless subterfuges, attempts to evade the essence of the question, to cover their retreat, to put some materialist or other in place of materialism in general, and a determined refusal to make a direct analysis of the innumerable materialist declarations of Marx and Engels. . . .

Materialism, in full agreement with natural science, takes matter as primary and regards consciousness, thought and sensation as secondary, because in its well-defined form sensation is associated only with the higher forms of matter (organic matter), while "in the foundation of the structure of matter" one can only surmise the existence of a faculty akin to sensation. Such, for example, is the supposition of the well-known German scientist Ernst Haeckel, the English biologist Lloyd Morgan and others. . . . Machism holds to the opposite, the idealist point of view, and at once lands into an absurdity: since, in the first place, sensation is taken as primary, in spite of the fact that it is associated only with definite processes in matter organised in a definite way; and, since, in the second place, the basic premise that bodies are complexes of sensations is violated by the assumption of the existence of other living beings in general, of other "complexes" beside the given great I. . . .

Bogdanov's denial of objective truth is agnosticism and subjectivism. . . . Natural science leaves no room for doubt

that its assertion that the earth existed prior to man is a truth. This is entirely compatible with the materialist theory of knowledge: the existence of the thing reflected independent of the reflector (the independence of the external world from the mind) is a fundamental tenet of materialism. The assertion made by science that the earth existed prior to man is an objective truth. This proposition of natural science is incompatible with the philosophy of the Machians and with their doctrine of truth: if truth is an organising form of human experience, then the assertion of the earth's existence *outside* human experience cannot be true. . . .

. . . The Machians are subjectivists and agnostics, for they *do not sufficiently trust* the evidence of our sense-organs and are inconsistent in their sensationalism. They do not recognise objective reality, independent of man, as the source of our sensations. They do not regard sensations as the true copy of this objective reality, thereby directly conflicting with natural science and throwing the door open for fideism. On the contrary, for the materialist the world is richer, livelier, more varied than it actually seems, for with each step in the development of science new aspects are discovered. For the materialist, sensations are images of the ultimate and sole objective reality, ultimate not in the sense that it has already been explored to the end, but in the sense that there is not and cannot be any other. This view irrevocably closes the door not only to every species of fideism, but also to that professorial scholasticism which, while not regarding objective reality as the source of our sensations, "deduces" the concept of the objective by means of such artificial verbal constructions as universal significance, socially-organised, and so on and so forth, and which is unable, and frequently unwilling, to separate objective truth from belief in sprites and hobgoblins. . . .

Matter is a philosophical category designating the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them. Therefore, to say that such a concept can become "antiquated" is *childish*

talk, a senseless repetition of the arguments of fashionable *reactionary* philosophy. . . .

Bogdanov's attempt imperceptibly to correct and develop Marx in the "spirit of his principles" is an obvious distortion of these materialist principles in the spirit of *idealism*. It would be ludicrous to deny it. . . . The immanentists, the empirio-critics and the empiriomonists all argue over particulars, over details, over the formulation of *idealism*, whereas we *from the very outset* reject all the principles of their philosophy common to this trinity. Let Bogdanov, accepting in the best sense and with the best of intentions *all the conclusions* of Marx, preach the "identity" of social being and social consciousness; we shall say: Bogdanov *minus* "empirio-monism" (or rather, *minus* Machism) is a Marxist. For this theory of the identity of social being and social consciousness is *sheer nonsense* and an *absolutely reactionary* theory. If certain people reconcile it with Marxism, with Marxist behaviour, we must admit that these people are better than their theory, but we cannot justify outrageous theoretical distortions of Marxism. . . .

Materialism in general recognises objectively real being (matter) as independent of the consciousness, sensation, experience, etc., of humanity. Historical materialism recognises social being as independent of the social consciousness of humanity. In both cases consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) reflection of it. From this Marxian philosophy, which is cast from a single piece of steel, you cannot eliminate one basic premise, one essential part, without departing from objective truth, without falling a prey to a bourgeois-reactionary falsehood. . . .

First and foremost, the theoretical foundations of this philosophy [empirio-criticism] must be compared with those of dialectical materialism. Such a comparison . . . reveals, along the whole line of epistemological problems, the thoroughly reactionary character of empirio-criticism, which uses new artifices, terms and subtleties to disguise the old errors of *idealism and agnosticism*. Only utter ignorance of

the nature of philosophical materialism generally and of the nature of Marx's and Engels' dialectical method can lead one to speak of a "union" of empirio-criticism and Marxism.

Secondly, the place of empirio-criticism, as one very small school of specialists in philosophy, in relation to the other modern schools of philosophy, must be determined. Both Mach and Avenarius started with Kant and, leaving him, proceeded not towards materialism, but in the opposite direction, towards Hume and Berkeley. Imagining that he was "purifying experience" generally, Avenarius was in fact only purifying agnosticism of Kantianism. The whole school of Mach and Avenarius is more and more definitely moving towards idealism, hand in hand with one of the most reactionary of the idealist schools, viz., the so-called immanentists.

Thirdly, the indubitable connection between Machism and one school in one branch of modern science must be borne in mind. The vast majority of scientists, both generally and in this special branch of science in question, viz., physics, are invariably on the side of materialism. A minority of new theories brought about by the great discoveries of recent years, influenced by the crisis in the new physics, which has very clearly revealed the relativity of our knowledge, have, owing to their ignorance of dialectics, slipped into idealism by way of relativism. The physical idealism in vogue today is as reactionary and transitory an infatuation as the fashionably physiological idealism of the recent past.

Fourthly, behind the epistemological scholasticism of empirio-criticism it is impossible not to see the struggle of parties in philosophy, a struggle which in the last analysis reflects the tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society. Recent philosophy is as partisan as was philosophy two thousand years ago. The contending parties are essentially, although it is concealed by a pseudo-erudite quackery of new terms or by a feeble-minded non-partisanship, materialism and idealism. The latter is merely a subtle, refined form of fideism, which stands fully armed, commands vast organisations and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses, turning the slightest vacillation in philosophical thought to its own advantage. The objective,

class role played by empirio-criticism entirely consists in rendering faithful service to the fideists in their struggle against materialism in general and historical materialism in particular. . . .

The 1909 Purge of the Bolshevik Left Wing

The differences between Lenin and the Bogdanov group of revolutionary romantics came to a head in 1909. Lenin condemned the latter—the “otzovists” [Russian for “recallists”] who wanted to recall the Bolshevik deputies in the Duma, and the “ultimatists” who demanded that the deputies take a more radical stand—both for their philosophical vagaries which he rejected as “idealism,” and for the utopian purism of their refusal to take tactical advantage of the Duma. The real issue was Lenin’s control of the faction and the enforcement of his brand of Marxist orthodoxy. Lenin demonstrated his grip on the Bolshevik faction at a meeting in Paris of the editors of the Bolsheviks’ factional paper, which had become the headquarters of the faction. Bogdanov and his followers were expelled from the Bolshevik faction, though they remained within the Social-Democratic fold.

a) *Communiqué on the Conference*

. . . The Conference declared in its resolutions that in the Bolshevik faction a tendency has been observed which in its definite tactical physiognomy contradicts Bolshevism. Bolshevism is represented for us by the Bolshevik *faction* of the party. A faction is not a party. A party can include a whole scale of shadings, in which the extremes may even sharply contradict each other. In the German party, together with the clearly revolutionary wing of Kautsky,* we see the arch-revisionist wing of Bernstein. This is not a faction.

FROM: The Conference of the Expanded Editorial Board of *The Proletarian*, Paris, June 21-30, 1909 (CPSU in Resolutions, I, 214-15, 220-21; editor’s translation).

* Karl Kautsky: leading theorist in the German Social-Democratic Party; later drew Lenin’s ire when he opposed violent means of revolution and criticized the Soviet dictatorship—Ed.

Within a party a faction is a group of *like-minded people* formed above all for the purpose of influencing the party in a definite direction, for the purpose of introducing its principles in as clear a form as possible into the party. For this real *unity of thought* is essential. . . .

b) Resolution on Otzovism and Ultimatism

. . . In the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution our party has been joined by a series of elements which were not purely attracted by its proletarian program, but which preferred its clear and energetic struggle for democracy and which adopted the revolutionary-democratic slogans of the proletarian party apart from its connection with the objective of the struggle of the socialist proletariat.

Such elements, insufficiently permeated with the proletarian point of view, appeared even in the ranks of our Bolshevik faction. Hard times cause these elements to reveal more and more their inadequate Social-Democratic endurance, and coming into sharper and sharper contradiction with the foundations of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics, they have created in the past year a tendency to try to form a theory of otzovism and ultimatism, which actually has led in principle only to an increasingly false picture of Social-Democratic parliamentarianism and Social-Democratic work in the Duma.

These attempts to create from the otzovist inclination a whole system of otzovist policy lead to a theory which essentially reflects the ideology of political indifferentism on the one hand and anarchistic roaming on the other. With all its revolutionary phraseology the theory of otzovism and ultimatism is in fact to a significant degree the reverse side of constitutional illusions which are connected with hopes that the State Duma itself can satisfy this or that substantial demand of the people, and in essence this replaces the proletarian ideology with petty-bourgeois tendencies. . . .

By their attempts to convert individual applications of the boycott of representative institutions at this or that moment of the revolution, into the line that the boycott is the distinguishing sign of the tactics of Bolshevism even in the

period of counter-revolution, ultimatism and otzovism show that these tendencies are in essence the reverse side of Menshevism, which undertakes wholesale participation in all representative institutions, independently of the given stage of development of the revolution, independently of the presence or absence of a revolutionary upsurge.

All the attempts made by otzovism and ultimatism up to now to give theory a foundation of principle inevitably lead them to the denial of the foundations of revolutionary Marxism. The tactics which they have in mind lead to a complete break with the tactics of the left wing of international Social Democracy as applied to contemporary Russian conditions; they lead to anarchist deviations.

Otzovist-ultimatist agitation has already begun to cause undoubted harm to the workers' movement and to Social-Democratic work. If continued further it can become a threat to the unity of the party, for this agitation has already led to such monstrous phenomena as the combination of otzovists and SR's* (in St. Petersburg) to carry out their refusal to help our party's representatives in the Duma, and also to certain public appearances before workers, jointly with confirmed syndicalists.

In view of all this the expanded editorial board of *The Proletarian* declares that Bolshevism as a definite tendency within the RSDWP has nothing in common with otzovism and ultimatism, and that the Bolshevik faction must conduct the most determined struggle against these deviations from the path of revolutionary Marxism.

The Ultra-Left on Lenin's Compromises

After the split of 1909 Lenin's left-wing Bolshevik opponents organized a new Social-Democratic faction, known as the "Forward" group from the name of their newspaper. These extremists denounced Lenin for opportunism in much the same terms that he applied to the Mensheviks, but also attacked his organizational centralism. The group never at-

* SR's: Socialist Revolutionary Party which stressed peasant revolution—Ed.

tracted much rank-and-file support, and most of them found their way back to the Bolshevik ranks after the revolution.

a) *Bogdanov, "Letter to All Comrades"*

Where are we going? What is the historical fate of our generation—a new revolutionary wave or an organic development? . . .

If we are holding a course toward ‘organic development,’ then revolutionary-military questions and tasks simply do not exist for our generation, and the tradition connected with them is a harmful survival from the past. . . . But we assert that the long ‘organic development’ of Russia is only an Octobrist* dream. . . .

[We must consider] sustaining the remaining militant elements in their party spirit and discipline, and accordingly educating those working-class youths who manifest an attraction in this direction; strengthening propaganda among the troops, and, if possible, re-creating the military organizations which have fallen apart. . . .

Some people among your representatives in the executive collegium—the Bolshevik Center—who live abroad, have come to the conclusion that we must radically change the previous Bolshevik evaluation of the present historical moment and hold a course not toward a new revolutionary wave, but toward a long period of peaceful, constitutional development. This brings them close to the right wing of our party, the Menshevik comrades who always, independently of any evaluation of the political situation, pull toward legal and constitutional forms of activity, toward ‘organic work’ and ‘organic development.’ But this is what has led to disagreements with those Bolsheviks who do not see in the reaction which they observe sufficient grounds for such a change of front. . . .

FROM: Declarations of the “Vperiod” (“Forward”) Group, 1910 (excerpts quoted in K. Ostroukhova, “The ‘Vperiod’ Group,” *Proletarian Revolution*, No. 1, 1925, pp. 200-01; editor’s translation).

* Octobrists: conservative party standing by the constitutional concessions of October, 1905—Ed.

Bolshevism continues to exist as before. It lives not in the circles abroad, not among politically sick people who are repressed and beaten by the harsh reaction; it lives in the steadfast and healthy proletarian movement, which organizes itself instead of splitting itself up. . . .

Comrades, a glorious cause—political, cultural, social—stands before us. It would be shameful for us if leaders who have outlived their times, overcome by adversity, should prevent us from fulfilling it. But this is an impossible, absurd suggestion. We will proceed on our way according to the old slogan—with our leaders, if they wish; without them, if they do not wish; against them, if they oppose us. Our cause is the cause of the collective, not of individual personalities. . . .

b) *"Letter to Our Bolshevik Comrades"*

. . . The Bolshevik Center has surrendered every Bolshevik position, one after another. . . . Accountable management by material means has changed into the uncontrolled freewheeling of irresponsible people; this group of people (the Bolshevik Center), which had already become ideologically Menshevik, has assumed the right of disbanding the Bolshevik faction. . . .

The Bolshevik Center, now altered in its composition—the majority were able to get rid of the “inconvenient” members who refused to abandon the position of Bolshevism—is completely cut off from Russia, has essentially become a private circle of former Bolsheviks, and has finally ceased to take account of the opinions and inclinations of the organizations in Russia. . . .

Only the organizations themselves have the right to decide their fate. Only the Russian Bolshevik comrades themselves, those worker socialists who struggle face to face with the enemy, can and must tell the party whether its revolutionary current has really died or whether in this period of blind reaction which is preparing a new outburst of the popular struggle, it has become more essential for the proletarian cause than ever before. . . .

We, the “Forward” group, suggest that the Russian Bolshevik

vik comrades organize in the immediate future Bolshevik conferences on as large a scale as possible, and at them consider the questions of the fundamental vital interests of Bolshevism. As opponents of the old factional forms, we will insist at these conferences on the reconstruction of the Bolshevik faction on new foundations so that its ideological solidarity will be achieved not through formal centralization, but through the living ideological link, and so that these *ideological* centers which are created for this will be under real control by the local organizations. This will prevent the possibility of such a political degeneration of the "higher-ups," of such abuses and corruption as we have witnessed. The ideological current must direct its leaders and representatives. Only the decision of the local Bolshevik organizations can be considered the real decision of a question. . . .

Lenin on Factionalism

In 1912 Lenin held a meeting of the Bolshevik faction which he represented as a congress for the whole party. He had the "liquidator" tendency, among Mensheviks who wished to de-emphasize the revolutionary underground, condemned as un-Marxist. This marked the complete split of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks into separate parties.

Meanwhile, Lenin and Trotsky had been exchanging polemics on the organizational issue. In 1914 Lenin expressed himself against Trotsky in particularly strong terms for defying the decisions of the "congress" and trying to stir up factionalism.

. . . Since 1912, for over two years, there has been *no* factionalism among the organized Marxists in Russia, no controversies over tactics in *united* organizations, at united *conferences* and congresses. There is a *complete* breach between the Party, which in January 1912 formally announced that the Liquidators *do not* belong to it, and the Liquidators.

FROM: Lenin, "Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity" (May, 1914; *Selected Works*, Vol. I, book 2, pp. 249, 251, 255-56).

Trotsky often calls this state of affairs a "split," and with this appellation we will deal separately later on. But it remains an undoubted fact that the term "factionalism" is *misleading*. . . .

Although he claims to be non-factional, Trotsky is known to everybody who is in the least familiar with the working-class movement in Russia as the representative of "Trotsky's faction." Here there is factionalism, for we see the two essential symptoms of it: (1) nominal recognition of unity and (2) group segregation in fact. Here there are remnants of factionalism, for there is no evidence whatever of any real connection with the mass working-class movement in Russia. . . .

The Party submitted the question of Liquidatorism, and of condemning it, to the "advanced workers" as far back as 1908, and the question of "splitting" from a very definite group of Liquidators, . . . i.e., that the only way to build up the Party was *without* this group and in opposition to it—this question it submitted in January 1912, over two years ago. The overwhelming majority of the advanced workers expressed themselves *in favour of* supporting the "January (1912) line." Trotsky himself admits this fact when he talks about "victories" and about "numerous advanced workers." But Trotsky wriggles out of this simply by hurling *abuse* at these advanced workers and calling them "schismatists" and "politically bewildered"!

Sane people will draw a different conclusion from these facts. Where the *majority* of the class-conscious workers have rallied around precise and definite decisions there is *unity* of opinion and action, there is the Party spirit, and the Party.

Where we see Liquidators who have been "dismissed from their posts" by the workers, or a half a dozen émigré groups who for two years have produced *no proof* whatever that they are connected with the mass working-class movement in Russia, there, indeed, bewilderment and *schism* reign. In trying, now, to persuade the workers *not to carry out the decisions* of that "body" which the Marxist *Pravda*-

ists [followers of the Bolshevik paper *Pravda*—"Truth"—1912-14] recognize, Trotsky is *trying* to disorganize the movement and to cause a split.

These efforts are vain, but we must expose the arrogantly conceited leaders of coteries of intellectuals who, while causing splits, are shouting about others causing splits, who, after suffering *utter defeat* at the hands of the "advanced workers" for the past two years or more, are with incredible insolence *spurning* the decisions and the will of these advanced workers and saying that *they* are "politically bewildered." . . .

Lenin on National Self-Determination

Early in 1914 Lenin turned his attention to the problem of the national minorities in Russia. His answer to "Great-Russian chauvinism" was the unconditional right of any minority to independent statehood, while those who remained would accept a thoroughly centralized revolutionary party and government. The actual Soviet solution was in form quite different, with the elaborate federal structure of republics embodied first in the Russian Republic in 1918 and then in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922. Centralism has of course been maintained in practice by virtue of the power of the highly centralized Communist Party.

. . . From the point of view of the theory of Marxism in general the question of the right of self-determination presents no difficulties. No one can seriously dispute the London resolution [of the Socialist International] of 1896, or the fact that self-determination implies only the right to secession, or the fact that the formation of independent national states is the tendency of all bourgeois-democratic revolutions.

The difficulty is created to a certain extent by the fact that in Russia the proletariat of both oppressed and oppressing nations are fighting and must fight side by side. The task is to preserve the unity of the class struggle of the pro-

FROM: Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (1914; *Selected Works*, Vol. I, book 2, pp. 382-86).

letariat for Socialism, to resist all the bourgeois and Black-Hundred* nationalist influences. Among the oppressed nations the separate organization of the proletariat as an independent party sometimes leads to such a bitter struggle against the nationalism of the respective nation that the perspective becomes distorted and the nationalism of the oppressing nation is forgotten.

But this distortion of the perspective cannot last long. The experience of the joint struggle of the proletarians of various nations has demonstrated only too plainly that we must formulate political questions not from the "Cracow," but from the all-Russian point of view. And in all-Russian politics it is the Purishkeviches and the Kokoshkins who rule.** Their ideas are predominant, their persecution of alien races for "separatism," for *thinking* about secession, are being preached and practiced in the Duma, in the schools, in the churches, in the barracks, and in hundreds and thousands of newspapers. It is this Great-Russian poison of nationalism that is contaminating the entire all-Russian political atmosphere. The misfortune of a nation, which, in subjugating other nations, is strengthening reaction throughout Russia. The memories of 1849 and 1863 form a living political tradition, which, unless great storms sweep the country, threatens to hamper every democratic and *especially* every Social-Democratic movement for many decades.

There can be no doubt that, however natural the point of view of certain Marxists of the oppressed nations (whose "misfortune" is sometimes that the masses of the population are blinded by the idea of "their" national liberation) may appear at times, *in reality* the objective alignment of class forces in Russia makes refusal to advocate the right of self-determination tantamount to the worst opportunism, to the contamination of the proletariat with the ideas of the Kokoshkins. And in substance, these ideas are the ideas and the policy of the Purishkeviches. . . .

* "Black Hundreds": armed bands of ultra-rightists—Ed.

** Purishkevich: an extreme right-wing leader in the Duma; Kokoshkin: a representative of the Constitutional Democratic Party in the Duma—Ed.

Even now, and probably for a fairly long time to come, proletarian democracy must reckon with the nationalism of the Great-Russian peasants (not in the sense of making concessions to it, but in the sense of combating it). The awakening of nationalism among the oppressed nations, which became so pronounced after 1905 (let us recall, say, the group of "Autonomists-Federalists" in the First Duma, the growth of the Ukrainian movement, of the Moslem movement, etc.), will inevitably cause the intensification of nationalism among the Great-Russian petty bourgeoisie in town and country. The slower the democratization of Russia, the more persistent, brutal and bitter will be national persecution and quarrelling among the bourgeoisie of the various nations. The particularly reactionary nature of the Russian Purishkeviches will at the same time engender (and strengthen) "separatist" tendencies among the various oppressed nationalities which sometimes enjoy far greater freedom in the neighbouring states.

This state of affairs confronts the proletariat of Russia with a twofold or, rather, a two-sided task: to combat all nationalism and, above all, Great-Russian nationalism; to recognize not only complete equality of rights for all nations in general but also equality of rights as regards statehood, i.e., the right of nations to self-determination, to secession. And at the same time, precisely in the interest of the successful struggle against the nationalism of all nations in any form, preserving the unity of the proletarian struggle and of the proletarian organizations, amalgamating these organizations into a close-knit international association, in spite of the bourgeois strivings for national segregation.

Complete equality of rights for all nations; the right of nations to self-determination; the amalgamation of the workers of all nations—this is the national program that Marxism, the experience of the whole world, and the experience of Russia, teaches the workers. . . .

Lenin on the "Imperialist War"

The outbreak of a general war in August, 1914, deeply shook the European socialist movement. The moderate wings

dominant in most of the socialist parties put national defense ahead of social change, and voted to support their respective governments. The Bolsheviks and many other Russian socialists, together with left-wing splinter groups in the rest of Europe, appealed to the antinationalist tradition of Marxism and tried to make revolutionary capital out of the war. Lenin frankly hoped for the defeat of the czarist government of Russia and urged revolutionaries everywhere to "turn the imperialist war into a civil war."

The European war, for which the governments and the bourgeois parties of all countries have been preparing for decades, has broken out. The growth of armaments, the extreme intensification of the struggle for markets in the epoch of the latest, the imperialist stage of capitalist development in the advanced countries, and the dynastic interests of the most backward East-European monarchies were inevitably bound to lead, and have led, to this war. Seizure of territory and subjugation of foreign nations, ruin of a competing nation and plunder of its wealth, diverting the attention of the working masses from the internal political crises in Russia, Germany, England and other countries, disuniting and nationalist doping of the workers and the extermination of their vanguard with the object of weakening the revolutionary movement of the proletariat—such is the only real meaning, substance and significance of the present war.

On Social-Democracy, primarily, rests the duty of disclosing this true meaning of the war and of ruthlessly exposing the falsehood, sophistry and "patriotic" phrasemongering spread by the ruling classes, the landlords and the bourgeoisie, in defence of the war. . . .

Under present conditions, it is impossible to determine, from the standpoint of the international proletariat, the defeat of which of the two groups of belligerent nations would be the lesser evil for Socialism. But for us, the Russian Social-Democrats, there cannot be the slightest doubt that from the standpoint of the working class and of the labouring masses of all the nations of Russia, the lesser evil would be

FROM: Lenin, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy" (November, 1914; Selected Works, Vol. I, book 2, pp. 397, 404-6).

the defeat of the tsarist monarchy, the most reactionary and barbarous of governments, which is oppressing the greatest number of nations and the largest mass of the population of Europe and Asia.

The immediate political slogan of the Social-Democrats of Europe must be the formation of a republican United States of Europe, but in contrast to the bourgeoisie, which is ready to "promise" anything in order to draw the proletariat into the general current of chauvinism, the Social-Democrats will explain that this slogan is utterly false and senseless without the revolutionary overthrow of the German, Austrian and Russian monarchies.

In Russia, in view of the fact that this country is the most backward and has not yet completed its bourgeois revolution, the task of the Social-Democrats is, as heretofore, to achieve the three fundamental conditions for consistent democratic reform, viz., a democratic republic (with complete equality and self-determination for all nations), confiscation of the landed estates, and an 8-hour day. But in all the advanced countries the war has placed on the order of the day the slogan of socialist revolution, and this slogan becomes the more urgent, the more the burdens of war press upon the shoulders of the proletariat, and the more active its role must become in the restoration of Europe after the horrors of the present "patriotic" barbarism amidst the gigantic technical progress of big capitalism. . . .

The transformation of the present imperialist war into a civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan; it was indicated by the experience of the [Paris] Commune and outlined by the Basle resolution [of the Socialist International] (1912), and it logically follows from all the conditions of an imperialist war among highly developed bourgeois countries. However difficult such a transformation may appear at any given moment, Socialists will never relinquish systematic, persistent and undeviating preparatory work in this direction once war has become a fact.

Only in this way can the proletariat shake off its dependence on the chauvinist bourgeoisie, and, in one form or

another, more or less rapidly, take decisive steps towards the real freedom of nations and towards Socialism.

Long live the international fraternity of the workers against the chauvinism and patriotism of the bourgeoisie of all countries!

Long live a proletarian International, freed from opportunism!

Lenin on the Uneven Prospects of Revolution

In reply to some of his radical associates who proposed an international socialist federation, Lenin pointed out the likelihood of the first socialist countries having to fight those which clung to capitalism. This idea was of major significance in the 1920's as the starting point for Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country."

. . . A United States of the World (not of Europe alone) is the state form of the union and freedom of nations which we associate with Socialism—until the complete victory of Communism brings about the total disappearance of the state, including the democratic state. As a separate slogan, however, the slogan of a United States of the World would hardly be a correct one, first, because it merges with Socialism; second, because it may be wrongly interpreted to mean that the victory of Socialism in a single country is impossible, and it may also create misconceptions as to the relations of such a country to the others.

Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of Socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country, taken singly. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized its own socialist production, would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with

FROM: Lenin, "The United States of Europe Slogan" (August, 1915; *Selected Works*, Vol. I, book 2, pp. 416-17).

armed force against the exploiting classes and their states. The political form of society in which the proletariat is victorious by overthrowing the bourgeoisie, will be a democratic republic, which will more and more centralize the forces of the proletariat of the given nation, or nations, in the struggle against the states that have not yet gone over to Socialism. The abolition of classes is impossible without the dictatorship of the oppressed class, the proletariat. The free union of nations in Socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states.

It is for these reasons and after repeated debates at the conference of the sections of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad, and after the conference, that the editors of the Central Organ have come to the conclusion that the United States of Europe slogan is incorrect.

Karl Liebknecht on International Revolution

Liebknecht was the son of one of the founders of the German Social-Democratic Party and an outstanding figure in the antiwar left wing of the party. Conscripted into the army and in effect a political prisoner, he wrote to express his fervent revolutionary hopes to the conference of antiwar socialists that met in the Swiss village of Zimmerwald (near Berne) in 1915.

Dear Comrades!

Forgive me for writing only a few hurried lines. I am imprisoned and fettered by militarism; therefore, I am unable to come to you. My heart, my head, my entire cause is nevertheless with you.

You have two serious tasks, a hard task of grim duty and a sacred one of enthusiasm and hope.

Settlement of accounts, inexorable settlement of accounts

FROM: Liebknecht, Letter to the Zimmerwald Conference, September, 1915 (English translation in O. H. Gankin and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolsheviks and The World War—The Origin of the Third International*, pp. 326-28; reprinted by permission of the publisher, Stanford University Press. Copyright 1940 by the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University.)

with the deserters and turncoats of the International in Germany, England, France, and elsewhere, is imperative.

It is our duty to promote mutual understanding, encouragement, and inspiration among those who remain true to the flag, who are determined not to give way one inch before international imperialism, even if they fall victims to it, and to create order in the ranks of those who are determined to hold out—to hold out and to fight, with their feet firmly planted on the basis of international socialism.

It is necessary to make clear, briefly, the principles of our attitude toward the capitalist order of society. Briefly—so I hope! For in this we are all unanimous and we must be unanimous!

It is above all a matter of drawing tactical consequences from these principles—ruthlessly for all countries!

Civil war, not civil peace! Exercise international solidarity for the proletariat against pseudo-national, pseudo-patriotic class harmony, and for international class war for peace, for the socialist revolution. How the fight is to be fought must be decided. Only in co-operation, in the mutual working of one land with another, by mutually strengthening each other, can the greatest possible forces and thus the attainable results be achieved.

The friends of every country hold in their hands the hopes and prospects of the friends of every other country. You French and you German socialists especially, have one and the same fate. You French friends, I implore you not to allow yourselves to be caught by the phrase of national truce—to this you are really immune—or by the equally dangerous phrase of the party truce! Every protest against this, every manifestation of your rejection of the semi-official government policy, every bold acknowledgment of the class struggle, of solidarity with us and of the proletarian will to peace, strengthens our fighting spirit, increases tenfold our force to work in Germany for the proletariat of the world, for its economic and political emancipation, for its emancipation from the fetters of capitalism, and also from the chains of Tsarism, Kaiserism, Junkerism, and militarism, which is no less international; to fight in Germany for the political and

social liberation of the German people against German imperialists' power and lust for territory; to fight for a speedy peace, which would also restore unhappy Belgium to freedom and independence and give back France to the French people.

French brothers, we know the peculiar difficulties of your tragic situation and bleed with you as with the tormented and stoned masses of all peoples! Your misfortune is our misfortune, as we know that our pain is your pain. Let our fight be your fight. Help us, as we swear to help you.

The new International will arise; it can arise on the ruins of the old, on a new and firmer foundation. Today, friends, socialists from all countries, you have to lay the foundation stone for the future structure. Pass irreconcilable judgment upon the false socialists! Ruthlessly urge on those who vacillate or hesitate in all countries, those in Germany as well! The greatness of the aim will raise you above the narrowness and littleness of the day, above the misery of these terrible days!

Long live the people's peace of the future! Long live anti-militarism! Long live international, people-emancipating, revolutionary socialism!

Proletarians of all countries—reunite! . . .

Karl Liebknecht

The "Zimmerwald Left"

Like most revolutionary groups the Zimmerwald conference split into factions, which differed over the revolutionary implications of the war. The left wing, which included Lenin and the Bolshevik representatives, vainly supported the uncompromising resolution written by Karl Radek, a Polish Jew who was high in the councils of the international Communist movement throughout the nineteen-twenties. Although the extremists were rebuffed at Zimmerwald, they had laid the organizational basis for the Third or Communist International which was formally launched in 1919.

The World War, which has been devastating Europe for the last year, is an imperialist war waged for the political and economic exploitation of the world, export markets,

sources of raw material, spheres of capital investment, etc. It is a product of capitalist development which connects the entire world in a world economy but at the same time permits the existence of national state capitalist groups with opposing interests.

If the bourgeoisie and the governments seek to conceal this character of the World War by asserting that it is a question of a forced struggle for *national independence*, it is only to mislead the *proletariat*, since the war is being waged for the oppression of foreign peoples and countries. Equally untruthful are the legends concerning the defence of democracy in this war, since imperialism signifies the most unscrupulous domination of big capital and political reaction.

Imperialism can only be overcome by overcoming the contradictions which produced it, that is, by the *Socialist organisation* of the sphere of capitalist civilisation for which the objective conditions are already ripe.

At the outbreak of the war, the majority of the labour leaders had not raised this only possible slogan in opposition to imperialism. Prejudiced by nationalism, rotten with opportunism, *they surrendered the proletariat to imperialism, and gave up the principles of Socialism and thereby the real struggle for the every-day interests of the proletariat.*

Social-patriotism and social-imperialism . . . is a more dangerous enemy to the proletariat than the bourgeois apostles of imperialism, since, misusing the banner of Socialism, it can mislead the unenlightened workers. *The ruthless struggle against social-imperialism constitutes the first condition for the revolutionary mobilisation of the proletariat and the reconstruction of the International.*

It is the task of the Socialist parties, as well as of the Socialist opposition in the now social-imperialist parties, to call and lead the labouring masses to the *revolutionary struggle* against the capitalist governments for the conquest of

FROM: Proposed Resolution of the Zimmerwald Left at the Zimmerwald Conference in September, 1915—"The World War and the Tasks of Social-Democracy" (English translation in *Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, Vol. XX, book 2, New York, International Publishers, 1929, pp. 386-87; reprinted by permission of the publisher).

political power for the Socialist organisation of society.

Without giving up the struggle for every foot of ground within the framework of capitalism, for every reform strengthening the proletariat, without renouncing any means of organisation and agitation, the revolutionary Social-Democrats, on the contrary, must utilise all the struggles, all the reforms demanded by our minimum programme for the purpose of sharpening this war crisis as well as every social and political crisis of capitalism, of extending them to an attack upon its very foundations. By waging this struggle *under the slogan of Socialism* it will render the labouring masses immune to the slogans of the oppression of one people by another as expressed in the maintenance of the domination of one nation over another, in the cry for new annexations; it will render them deaf to the temptation of national solidarity which has led the proletarians to the battlefields.

The signal for this struggle is the struggle against the World War, for the speedy termination of the slaughter of nations. This struggle demands the refusal of war credits, quitting the cabinets, the denunciation of the capitalist, anti-Socialist character of the war from the tribunes of the parliaments, in the columns of the legal, and where necessary illegal, press, the sharpest struggle caused by the results of the war (misery, great losses, etc.) for the organisation of street demonstrations against the governments, propaganda of international solidarity in the trenches, the encouragement of economic strikes, the effort to transform them into political strikes under favourable conditions. "Civil war, not civil peace"—that is the slogan!

As against all illusions that it is possible to bring about the basis of a lasting peace, the beginning of disarmament, by any decisions of diplomacy and the governments, the revolutionary Social-Democrats must repeatedly tell the masses of the people that only the social revolution can bring about a lasting peace as well as the emancipation of mankind.

Lenin on Imperialism

Like many of his Marxist colleagues, Lenin attempted to bring Marxism up to date to account for the World War

and contemporary economic trends. His product was the book, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, for which he drew heavily from the work of the English economist J. A. Hobson. The essence of the argument was that the capitalist search for markets and profits made colony-grabbing and imperialist war between capitalist states inevitable. Lenin's presentation remains the basis of the Communist view of the capitalist world.

. . . The principal feature of the latest stage of capitalism is the domination of monopolist combines of the big capitalists. These monopolies are most firmly established when *all* the sources of raw materials are captured by one group, and we have seen with what zeal the international capitalist combines exert every effort to make it impossible for their rivals to compete with them by buying up, for example, iron ore fields, oil fields, etc. Colonial possession alone gives the monopolies complete guarantee against all contingencies in the struggle with competitors, including the contingency that the latter will defend themselves by means of a law establishing a state monopoly. The more capitalism is developed, the more strongly the shortage of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition and the hunt for sources of raw materials throughout the whole world, the more desperate is the struggle for the acquisition of colonies. . . .

Finance capital is interested not only in the already discovered sources of raw materials but also in potential sources, because present-day technical development is extremely rapid, and land which is useless today may be made fertile tomorrow if new methods are applied (to devise these new methods a big bank can equip a special expedition of engineers, agricultural experts, etc.), and if large amounts of capital are invested. This also applies to prospecting for minerals, to new methods of working up and utilizing raw materials, etc., etc. Hence, the inevitable striving of finance capital to enlarge its economic territory and even its territory in general. In the same way that the trusts capitalize their property at two or three times its

FROM: Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism" (1916; *Selected Works*, Vol. I, book 2, pp. 517-20, 562-67).

value, taking into account its "potential" (and not present) profits, and the further results of monopoly, so finance capital strives in general to seize the largest possible amount of land of all kinds in all places, and by every means, taking into account potential sources of raw materials and fearing to be left behind in the fierce struggle for the last scraps of undivided territory, or for the repartition of those that have been already divided. . . .

The interests pursued in exporting capital also give an impetus to the conquest of colonies, for in the colonial market it is easier to employ monopolist methods (and sometimes they are the only methods that can be employed) to eliminate competition, to make sure of contracts, to secure the necessary "connections," etc.

The non-economic superstructure which grows up on the basis of finance capital, its politics and its ideology, stimulates the striving for colonial conquest. . . .

We have seen that in its economic essence imperialism is monopoly capitalism. This in itself determines its place in history, for monopoly that grows out of the soil of free competition, and precisely out of free competition, is the transition from the capitalist system to a higher social-economic order. We must take special note of the four principal types of monopoly, or principal manifestations of monopoly capitalism, which are characteristic of the epoch we are examining.

Firstly, monopoly arose out of a very high stage of development of the concentration of production. This refers to the monopolist capitalist combines, cartels, syndicates and trusts. We have seen the important part these play in present-day economic life. At the beginning of the twentieth century, monopolies had acquired complete supremacy in the advanced countries, and although the first steps towards the formation of the cartels were first taken by countries enjoying the protection of high tariffs (Germany, America), Great Britain, with her system of free trade, revealed the same basic phenomenon, only a little later, namely, the birth of monopoly out of the concentration of production.

Secondly, monopolies have stimulated the seizure of the

most important sources of raw materials, especially for the basic and most highly cartelized industries in capitalist society: the coal and iron industries. The monopoly of the most important sources of raw materials has enormously increased the power of big capital, and has sharpened the antagonism between cartelized and non-cartelized industry.

Thirdly, monopoly has sprung from the banks. The banks have developed from humble middlemen enterprises into the monopolists of finance capital. Some three to five of the biggest banks in each of the foremost capitalist countries have achieved the "personal union" of industrial and bank capital, and have concentrated in their hands the control of thousands upon thousands of millions which form the greater part of the capital and income of entire countries. A financial oligarchy, which throws a close network of dependence relationships over all the economic and political institutions of present-day bourgeois society without exception—such is the most striking manifestation of this monopoly.

Fourthly, monopoly has grown out of colonial policy. To the numerous "old" motives of colonial policy, finance capital has added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for "spheres of influence," i.e., for spheres for profitable deals, concessions, monopolist profits and so on, and finally, for economic territory in general. When the colonies of the European powers in Africa, for instance, comprised only one-tenth of that territory (as was the case in 1876), colonial policy was able to develop by methods other than those of monopoly—by the "free grabbing" of territories, so to speak. But when nine-tenths of Africa had been seized (by 1900), when the whole world had been divided up, there was inevitably ushered in the era of monopoly ownership of colonies and, consequently, of particularly intense struggle for the division and the redivision of the world.

The extent to which monopolist capital has intensified all the contradictions of capitalism is generally known. It is sufficient to mention the high cost of living and the tyranny of the cartels. This intensification of contradictions

constitutes the most powerful driving force of the transitional period of history, which began from the time of the final victory of world finance capital.

Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination instead of striving for liberty, the exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations by a handful of the richest or most powerful nations—all these have given birth to those distinctive characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying capitalism. More and more prominently there emerges, as one of the tendencies of imperialism, the creation of the "rentier state," the usurer state, in which the bourgeoisie to an ever increasing degree lives on the proceeds of capital exports and by "clipping coupons." It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the rapid growth of capitalism. It does not. In the epoch of imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie and certain countries betray, to a greater or lesser degree, now one and now another of these tendencies. On the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before; but this growth is not only becoming more and more uneven in general, its unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital (England). . . .

The receipt of high monopoly profits by the capitalists in one of the numerous branches of industry, in one of the numerous countries, etc., makes it economically possible for them to bribe certain sections of the workers, and for a time a fairly considerable minority of them, and win them to the side of the bourgeoisie of a given industry or given nation against all the others. The intensification of antagonisms between imperialist nations for the division of the world increases this striving. And so there is created that bond between imperialism and opportunism, which revealed itself first and most clearly in England, owing to the fact that certain features of imperialist development were observable there much earlier than in other countries. . . .

From all that has been said in this book on the economic essence of imperialism, it follows that we must define it as capitalism in transition, or, more precisely, as moribund

capitalism. It is very instructive in this respect to note that the bourgeois economists, in describing modern capitalism, frequently employ catchwords and phrases like "interlocking," "absence of isolation," etc.; "in conformity with their functions and course of development," banks are "not purely private business enterprises; they are more and more outgrowing the sphere of purely private business regulation." And this very Riesser,* who uttered the words just quoted, declares with all seriousness that the "prophecy" of the Marxists concerning "socialization" has "not come true"!

What then does this catchword "interlocking" express? It merely expresses the most striking feature of the process going on before our eyes. It shows that the observer counts the separate trees, but cannot see the wood. It slavishly copies the superficial, the fortuitous, the chaotic. It reveals the observer as one who is overwhelmed by the mass of raw material and is utterly incapable of appreciating its meaning and importance. Ownership of shares, the relations between owners of private property "interlock in a haphazard way." But underlying this interlocking, its very base, is the changing social relations of production. When a big enterprise assumes gigantic proportions, and, on the basis of an exact computation of mass data, organizes according to plan the supply of primary raw materials to the extent of two-thirds, or three-fourths of all that is necessary for tens of millions of people; when the raw materials are transported in a systematic and organized manner to the most suitable place of production, sometimes hundreds or thousands of miles, when a single centre directs all the consecutive stages of work right up to the manufacture of numerous varieties of finished articles; when these products are distributed according to a single plan among tens and hundreds of millions of consumers (the distribution of oil in America and Germany by the American "oil trust")—then it becomes evident that we have socialization of production, and not mere "interlocking"; that private economic and private property relations constitute a shell which no longer fits its contents, a shell which must inevitably

* Riesser: author of a study of German banking, cited by Lenin—Ed.

decay if its removal by artificial means be delayed; a shell which may continue in a state of decay for a fairly long period (if, at the worst, the cure of the opportunist abscess is protracted), but which will inevitably be removed. . . .

Bukharin on the Imperialist State

Nikolai Bukharin as a young Bolshevik theorist often criticized Lenin from the left until he became more conservative as a responsible Soviet leader after 1921. During the First World War Bukharin led a "left-Bolshevik" subfaction and wrote of the necessity for the total revolutionary destruction of the existing state. This, he warned, was necessary to forestall the development of a Leviathan of "state capitalism." Without realizing it, Bukharin prophesied the whole modern phenomenon of totalitarianism.

1. The General Theory of the State

. . . From the point of view of Marxism the state is nothing but *the most general organization of the dominant classes, the basic function of which is to maintain and extend the exploitation of the suppressed classes.* . . . Insofar as there is an organization of state power set up according to a plan and consciously regulated (and this appears only at a certain stage in the development of the state), to that extent one can speak of the posing of *goals*, but these goals are defined by the interests of the *dominant classes* and *only by them*. This is not in the least contradicted by the circumstance that the state performs and has performed a whole series of functions for the common good. The latter merely provides the necessary *condition*, the *conditio sine qua non*, for the existence of the state power. The state's "activities for the common good" are thus the *conditions for maximally protracted and maximally successful exploitation of the enslaved classes* in contemporary society, above all the proletariat. . . .

FROM: Bukharin, "On the Theory of the Imperialist State" (1916; published in *The Revolution of Law*, Collection I, Moscow, Communist Academy, 1925, pp. 7-8, 13-16, 21, 23, 26, 27, 29-32; editor's translation).

In this connection it is possible to distinguish two types of relationships: either the state organization is the *direct* organization of exploitation—in which case the state stands forth as the union of the capitalists, having its own enterprises (e.g., railroads, monopoly production of certain products, etc.); or the state organization participates in an *indirect* manner in the process of exploitation, as a service mechanism to sustain and extend the most profitable conditions for the process of exploitation. In the first case—insofar as we are speaking of productive labor—the state absorbs the surplus value which is created in the sphere of its direct activity; in the second—it appropriates part of the surplus value which is produced in the branches of production that lie outside the sphere of direct state control, by means of taxes, etc. Usually the state extracts not only a part of the surplus value, but also a certain part of wages (and where other categories of "labor income" exist, part of the latter as well). In concrete actuality both these types exist simultaneously, although their proportions are subject to change and depend on the stage of historical development which has been attained.

The support and extension of the process of exploitation proceed in two directions: externally, i.e., outside the boundaries of the state's territory, and internally, i.e., within these boundaries. The *foreign* policy of the state organization expresses its struggle to share the surplus value which is produced on a world-wide scale (insofar as there is a non-capitalist world, the struggle for the surplus product), the struggle which is enacted between the various politically organized groups of the dominant classes.

The *internal* policy of the state organization reflects the struggle of the dominant classes for a share of the value (i.e., product) created by way of the systematic suppression of all attempts at liberation on the part of the suppressed classes. . . .

2. The Imperialist State and Finance Capitalism

Even the most superficial glance at social-economic life shows us the colossal growth of the economic significance of the state. This is reflected above all in the growth of the

state budget. The complicated apparatus of the contemporary state organization requires enormous expenses, which increase with astonishing swiftness. . . .

A vast role in such an increase of the budget is undoubtedly played by militarism, one of the aspects of *imperialist* politics, which in turn stems necessarily from the structure of *finance capitalism*. But not only militarism in the narrow sense of the word. The cause of this is the growing interference of the state power in all branches of social life, beginning with the sphere of production and ending with the higher forms of ideological creation. If the pre-imperialist period—the period of liberalism, which was the political expression of industrial capitalism—was characterized by the noninterference of the state power, and the formula *laissez-faire* was a symbol of the faith of the ruling circles of the bourgeoisie, who all permitted the “free play of economic forces,” our time is characterized by a directly opposite tendency, which has as its logical conclusion *state capitalism*, sucking everything into the area of state regulation. . . .

The *state power thus sucks in almost all branches of production; it not only preserves the general conditions of the process of exploitation; the state becomes more and more a direct exploiter, which organizes and directs production as a collective, composite capitalist.* . . . The anarchistic commodity market is to a significant degree replaced by the organized distribution of the product, in which the supreme authority is again the state power. . . .

. . . In war socialism* class contradictions are not only not eliminated, but are brought to their maximum intensity. In the ideal type of the imperialist state the process of exploitation is not obscured by any secondary forms; the mask of a supraclass institution which treats everyone equally is thrown off from the state. This fact is a basic fact, and it completely refutes the argumentation of the renegades [i.e., the prowar Social Democrats]. For socialism is the regulation of production directed by *society*, not by the state (state socialism is like soft-boiled boots); it is the annihilation of class contra-

* “Kriegssozialismus”—the highly mobilized German economy in World War I—Ed.

dictions, not their intensification. The regulation of production by itself does not mean socialism at all; it exists in any sort of economy, in any slave-owning group with a natural economy. What awaits us in the immediate future is in fact *state capitalism*. . . .

3. The Organizational Process, State Power, and the Working Class . . .

The necessities of imperialist development compel bourgeois society to mobilize all its forces, to become organized on the broadest scale: the state draws into itself the whole series of bourgeois organizations.

Here war gives an enormous impetus. Philosophy and medicine, religion and ethics, chemistry and bacteriology—all are “mobilized” and “militarized” just like industry and finance. The whole grand-scale technical, economic, and ideological machine operates more planfully as soon as the conscious organized adaptation to the “whole” has appeared—i.e., when the state in one way or another has drawn these innumerable groups into its over-all organization. . . .

The general scheme of the state’s development is as follows: At first the state is the only organization of the dominant class. Then other organizations arise, whose numbers are especially increased in the epoch of finance capitalism. The state is transformed from the only organization of the dominant class into one of its organizations which exist simultaneously—an organization which is distinguished by its most general character. Finally the third stage arrives, *when the state absorbs these organizations and again becomes the only over-all organization of the dominant class, with a technical division of labor inside it*; the formerly independent organizational groupings are transformed into divisions of a gigantic state mechanism, which descends with crushing force upon the obvious and internal enemy. Thus arises the final type of the contemporary imperialist bandit state, the iron organization which with its grasping, prehensile paws seizes the living body of society. It is a new Leviathan, in the face of which the fantasy of Thomas Hobbes seems like child’s play. And all the more “*non est potestas super terram quae*

comparetur ei" ("there is no power on earth which can compare with it").*

We must now raise the fully natural question of the role of the workers, of proletarian organizations.

Theoretically there can be two possibilities here: *Either the workers' organizations, like all the organizations of the bourgeoisie, will grow into the state-wide organization and be transformed into a simple appendage of the state apparatus, or they will outgrow the framework of the state and burst it from within*, as they organize their own state power (the dictatorship). . . .

The immediate development of state organisms—as long as the socialist overturn does not occur—is possible only in the form of *militaristic state capitalism*. Centralization becomes barrack centralization; the intensification of the most hateful militarism among the upper groups, of bestial drilling of the proletariat, of bloody repressions, is inevitable. On the other hand, as we have already noted above, any move by the proletariat is inevitably transformed under these circumstances into a move against the state power. Hence the definite tactical demand—Social-Democracy must vigorously underscore its hostility in principle to the state power. . . . To support the contemporary state means to support militarism. The historical task of the day is not to worry about the further development of the forces of production (they are quite sufficient for the realization of socialism), but the preparation of a general attack on the ruling bandits. In the growing revolutionary struggle the proletariat destroys the state organization of the bourgeoisie. . . .

* Epigraph to "The Leviathan" [author's note].

Chapter Two: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1921

The Russian Revolution was not a simple matter of the conspiratorial seizure of power, but one of the most complex events in all history. As in the other great revolutions, in England and France, the unexpected collapse of the monarchy's authority initiated a sequence of political convulsions, as power passed through a succession of leading groups, with growing extremism and violence. Stable rule by the Communists (as the Bolsheviks renamed themselves in 1918) was not consolidated until 1921, by which time they had lost much of their revolutionary utopianism.

During the years of the revolution the Communist Party was by no means a single-minded force, though Lenin always exerted commanding influence. At every stage in the revolution deviant groups arose among the Communists to object to Lenin's course of action—some who found it too rash, others who protested its expedient compromises. The revolutionary period reveals the wide range of political and social alternatives which the general standpoint of radical Russian Marxism afforded.

The years 1917-1921, during which the Communists seized power, endured factional controversy, and fought their way to victory in a bitter civil war, were the critical, formative period of the Soviet regime and of the Communist movement as a whole. Communism is specifically the child of the Russian Revolution, and its basic character—the exclusive dictatorship of a bureaucratic party in a bureaucratic state—stems directly from the way in which the conditions of that era selected among the political alternatives offered by the revolutionary movement.

Lenin's Return to Russia

When Czar Nicholas II fell in February, 1917 (March, by the Western Gregorian calendar), Lenin and the Bolsheviks were taken by surprise. The moderate and hopefully democratic Provisional Government which was established under Prince Lvov seemed to refute Lenin's contention that the Russian middle class could not rule. The Bolsheviks in Russia were confused and divided about how to regard the Provisional Government, but most of them, including Stalin, were inclined to accept it for the time being on condition that it work for an end to the war. When Lenin reached Russia in April after his famous "sealed car" trip across Germany, he promptly denounced his Bolshevik colleagues for failing to take a sufficiently revolutionary stand.

1. In our attitude towards the war, which also under the new government of Lvov and Co. unquestionably remains on Russia's part a predatory imperialist war owing to the capitalist nature of that government, not the slightest concession to "revolutionary defencism" is permissible.

The class-conscious proletariat can give its consent to a revolutionary war, which would really justify revolutionary defencism, only on condition: a) that the power pass to the proletariat and the poor sections of the peasantry bordering on the proletariat; b) that all annexations be renounced in actual fact and not in word; c) that a complete break be effected in actual fact with all capitalist interests.

In view of the undoubtedly honesty of the broad strata of the mass believers in revolutionary defencism, who accept the war as a necessity only, and not as a means of conquest, in view of the fact that they are being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary with particular thoroughness, persist-

FROM: Lenin, "On the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution" (the "April Theses," April 7 [20], 1917;* *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 2, pp. 13-17).

* Russian dates are old style, with new style in brackets, up to the calendar reform effective February 1[14], 1918; all new style thereafter—Ed.

ence and patience to explain their error to them, to explain the inseparable connection existing between capital and the imperialist war, and to prove that without overthrowing capital *it is impossible* to end the war by a truly democratic peace, a peace not imposed by violence.

The most widespread propaganda of this view in the army on active service must be organized.

Fraternization.

2. The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a *transition* from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed the power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the second stage, which must place the power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry.

This transition is characterized, on the one hand, by a maximum of legally recognized rights (Russia is *now* the freest of all the belligerent countries in the world); on the other, by the absence of violence in relation to the masses, and, finally, by the unreasoning confidence of the masses in the government of capitalists, the worst enemies of peace and Socialism.

This peculiar situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the *special* conditions of Party work among unprecedentedly large masses of proletarians who have just awokened to political life.

3. No support for the Provisional Government; the utter falsity of all its promises should be explained, particularly those relating to the renunciation of annexations. Exposure in place of the impermissible illusion-breeding “demand” that *this* government, a government of capitalists, should *cease* to be an imperialist government.

4. Recognition of the fact that in most of the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies our Party is in a minority, and so far in a small minority, as against *a bloc of all* the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements, who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and convey its influence to the proletariat, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries down

to the Organization Committee (Chkheidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov,* etc., etc.

It must be explained to the masses that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies are the *only possible* form of the revolutionary government, and that therefore our task is, as long as *this* government yields to the influence of the bourgeoisie, to present a patient, systematic, and persistent *explanation* of the errors of their tactics, an explanation especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses.

As long as we are in the minority we carry on the work of criticizing and exposing errors and at the same time we preach the necessity of transferring the entire power of state to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, so that the masses may by experience overcome their mistakes.

5. Not a parliamentary republic—to return to a parliamentary republic from the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would be a retrograde step—but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom.

Abolition of the police, the army and the bureaucracy.**

The salaries of all officials, all of whom are to be elected and to be subject to recall at any time, not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker.

6. In the agrarian program the most important part to be assigned to the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.

Confiscation of all landed estates.

Nationalization of *all* lands in the country, the disposal of the land to be put in the charge of the local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organization of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The creation of model farms on each of the large estates (varying from 100 to 300 dessiatins, in accordance with local and other conditions, by decisions of the local institutions) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies and for the public account.

* Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov: Menshevik leaders in the Petrograd Soviet—Ed.

** I.e., the standing army to be replaced by the arming of the whole people.

7. The immediate amalgamation of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

8. It isn't our *immediate* task to "introduce" Socialism, but only to bring social production and distribution of products at once under the *control* of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

9. Party tasks:

- a) Immediate convocation of a Party congress;
- b) Alteration of the Party program, mainly:
 - 1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war;
 - 2) On our attitude towards the state and *our* demand for a "commune state" (i.e., a state of which the Paris Commune was the prototype);
 - 3) Amendment of our antiquated minimum program.
- c) Change of the Party's name. Instead of "Social-Democracy," whose official leaders *throughout* the world have betrayed Socialism and deserted to the bourgeoisie (the "defencists" and the vacillating "Kautskyites"), we must call ourselves a *Communist Party*.

10. A new International.

We must take the initiative in creating a revolutionary International, an International against the *social-chauvinists* and against the "Centre". . . .

Lenin on the Soviets

Simultaneously with the establishment of the Provisional Government, the leaders of the Russian socialist parties—Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and Socialist-Revolutionaries ("SR's")—organized the so-called "soviets (Russian for "councils") of workers' and soldiers' deputies." The soviets, set up in every major city on the model of similar bodies that existed during the Revolution of 1905, began to exert a strong though informal political influence—hence Lenin's expression of "dual power" shared by the more moderate Provisional Government and the more radical soviets. Lenin saw in the soviets the ideal organs of revolution; it remained only for his Bolshe-

viks to win paramount influence in them, which they did on the eve of their seizure of power.

The basic question in any revolution is that of state power. Unless this question is understood, there can be no conscious participation in the revolution, not to speak of guidance of the revolution.

The highly remarkable specific feature of our revolution is that it has brought about a *dual power*. This fact must be grasped first and foremost: unless it is understood, we cannot advance. We must know how to supplement and amend old "formulas," for example, of Bolshevism, for as it has transpired, they were correct on the whole, but their concrete realization has *turned out to be* different. *Nobody* previously thought, or could have thought, of a dual power.

In what does this dual power consist? In the fact that side by side with the Provisional Government, the government of the *bourgeoisie*, there has arisen *another government*, weak and incipient as yet, but undoubtedly an actually existing and growing government—the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

What is the class composition of this other government? It consists of the proletariat and the peasantry (clad in soldier's uniforms). What is the political nature of this government? It is a revolutionary dictatorship, i.e., a power directly based on revolutionary seizure, on the direct initiative of the masses from below, and *not on a law* enacted by a centralized state power. It is a power entirely different from that generally existing in the parliamentary bourgeois-democratic republics of the usual type still prevailing in the advanced countries of Europe and America. This circumstance is often forgotten, often not reflected on, yet it is the crux of the matter. *This power is of the same type* as the Paris Commune of 1871. The fundamental characteristics of this type are: 1) the source of power is not a law previously discussed and enacted by parliament, but the direct initiative of the people's masses from below, in their localities—

FROM: Lenin, "On the Dual Power" (April 9 [22], 1917; *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 1, pp. 20-23).

direct "seizure" to use a current expression; 2) the replacement of the police and the army, which are institutions separated from the people and set against the people, by the direct arming of the whole people; order in the state under such a power is maintained by the armed workers and peasants *themselves*, by the armed people *themselves*; 3) officialdom, the bureaucracy are either similarly replaced by the direct rule of the people themselves or at least placed under special control; they not only become elected officials, but are also *subject to recall* at the first demand of the people; they are reduced to the position of simple agents; from a privileged stratum holding "jobs" remunerated on a high, bourgeois scale, they become workers of a special "branch," whose remuneration *does not exceed* the ordinary pay of a competent worker.

This, and this *alone*, constitutes the *essence* of the Paris Commune as a special type of state. This essence has been forgotten or perverted by the Plekhanovs (out-and-out chauvinists who have betrayed Marxism), the Kautsky's (the men of the "Centre," i.e., those who vacillate between chauvinism and Marxism), and generally by all those Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., etc., who now hold sway.

They are trying to get away with phrases, evasions, subterfuges; they congratulate each other a thousand times upon the revolution, but they refuse to *ponder* over *what* the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies *are*. They refuse to recognize the obvious truth that inasmuch as these Soviets exist, *inasmuch as* they are a power, we have in Russia a state of the *type* of the Paris Commune.

I have underscored the words "inasmuch as," for it is only an incipient power. By direct agreement with the bourgeois Provisional Government and by a series of actual concessions, it has itself *surrendered and is surrendering* its positions to the bourgeoisie.

Why? Is it because Chkhheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov, and Co. are making a "mistake"? Nonsense. Only a philistine can think so—not a Marxist. The reason is *insufficient class-consciousness* and organization of the proletarians and peas-

ants. The "mistake" of the leaders I have named lies in their petty-bourgeois position, in the fact that instead of enlightening the minds of the workers, they are *befogging* them; instead of dispersing petty-bourgeois illusions, they are *instilling* them; instead of freeing the masses from bourgeois influence, they are *strengthening* that influence.

It should be clear from this why our comrades too commit so many mistakes when putting the question "simply": should the Provisional Government be overthrown immediately?

My answer is: 1) it should be overthrown, for it is an oligarchic, bourgeois, and not a people's government, and is *unable* to provide peace, or bread, or full freedom; 2) it cannot be overthrown just now, for it is being maintained by a direct and indirect, a formal and actual *agreement* with the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and primarily with the chief Soviet, the Petrograd Soviet; 3) generally, it cannot be "overthrown" in the ordinary way, for it rests on the "*support*" given to the bourgeoisie by the *second* government—the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, and that government is the only possible revolutionary government, which directly expresses the mind and will of the majority of the workers and peasants. Humanity has not yet evolved and we do not as yet know a type of government superior to and better than the Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies.

In order to become a power the class-conscious workers must win the majority to their side. As long as no violence is used against the masses there is no other road to power. We are not Blanquists,* we do not stand for the seizure of power by a minority. We are Marxists, we stand for proletarian class struggle against petty-bourgeois intoxication, against chauvinism-defencism, phrasemongering and dependence on the bourgeoisie.

Let us create a proletarian Communist Party; its elements have already been created by the best adherents of Bolshevism; let us rally our ranks for proletarian class work; then, from among the proletarians, from among the poor

* Blanquists: adherents of the conspiratorial doctrine of the French Revolutionary L. A. Blanqui—Ed.

peasants, ever greater numbers will range themselves on our side. For *actual experience* will from day to day shatter the petty-bourgeois illusions of the "Social-Democrats"—the Chkheidzes, Tseretelis, Steklovs et al.—of the "Socialist-Revolutionaries," petty bourgeois of a still purer water, and so on and so forth.

The bourgeoisie stands for the undivided power of the bourgeoisie.

The class-conscious workers stand for the undivided power of the Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies—for undivided power made possible not by dubious ventures, but by the *enlightenment* of the proletarian minds, by their *emancipation* from the influence of the bourgeoisie.

The petty bourgeoisie—"Social-Democrats," Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., etc.—vacillates and *hinders* this enlightenment and emancipation.

Such is the actual, the *class* alignment of forces that determines our tasks.

Bukharin and Stalin on the Prospects of International Revolution

In August, 1917, while Lenin was in hiding and the party had been theoretically outlawed by the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks nonetheless managed to hold their first party congress since 1907. The most significant part of the debate turned on the prospects for immediate revolutionary action in Russia and the relation of this to the anticipated international upheaval. The cleavage between the utopian internationalists and the more practical Russia-oriented people was already apparent.

a) [Bukharin is reporting on the War and the International Situation]

. . . History is working for us. History is moving on the path which leads inevitably to the uprising of the proletariat and the triumph of socialism.

FROM: *Protocols*, 6th Congress, Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks), August 1917 (Moscow, Party Press, 1934, pp. 100-01, 192, 233-34; editor's translation).

The continuing progress of the war is sharpening those tendencies which were observed at the very beginning of the war. The intermediate strata and small producers are disappearing. In the first year of the war the petty bourgeoisie decreased 40%. All the means of production are being concentrated in the hands of the capitalist state. State capitalism is growing—rule by a bunch of oligarchs—the last conceivable form of capitalism. On the other hand we see the terrible sharpening of social contradictions. We can speak of the absolute impoverishment of the working class in the economic respect, of their semislave condition thanks to being bound to the factories. Now the worker in Western Europe is a serf in a government factory. And this social antagonism, on the one hand, and on the other the greatest readiness of capitalism for the transition to a socialist economy, tell us that the socialist revolution is being prepared at both ends. . . .

We are going to have a great new upsurge of the revolutionary wave. Then there can be two possibilities: either our peasant-proletarian revolution will be victorious before the revolution breaks out in Western Europe or other countries, or in some one of the West-European countries the revolution will be victorious before it is in ours. In the first case, the next thing for the victorious workers' and peasants' revolution is the declaration of a revolutionary war, i.e., armed help for proletarians who are still not victorious. This war can assume various characters. If we succeed in repairing our disrupted economic organism, we will go over to the offensive. But if we cannot muster the strength to carry on an offensive revolutionary war, then we will conduct a defensive revolutionary war. Then we will have the right to declare to the proletariat of the whole world that we will wage a holy war in the name of the interests of all the proletariat, and this will sound like a comradely appeal. By such a revolutionary war we will light the fire of world socialist revolution. The only really democratic exit from the blind alley into which the West-European and American countries have gone is the international proletarian revolution, however many

victims it may cost us. There is no other solution of the problem. . . .

b) [Bukharin is reading his draft resolution on the Current Moment and the War]

9. The liquidation of imperialist rule sets before the working class of that country which first realizes the dictatorship of the proletarians and semiproletarians, the task of supporting by any means (even armed force) the struggling proletariat of other countries. In particular such a task stands before Russia, if, as is very probable, the new unavoidable upsurge of the Russian revolution places the workers and poorest peasants in power before an overturn in the capitalist countries of the West.

Preobrazhensky: . . . I am not satisfied with the edited version of the point. I would prefer to restore the original version, which spoke definitely about revolutionary war in the event of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Bukharin: . . . In the committee on the resolution the question arose realistically—will we have the strength to wage a revolutionary war?—and we adopted a less strong formulation, since we cannot irrevocably assert that we will command the strength to wage a revolutionary war. On the basis of these considerations I am against Comrade Preobrazhensky's amendment.

The amendment is rejected.

c) [Stalin is reading his draft resolution on the Political Situation]

9. The task of these revolutionary classes is then to exert every effort to seize governmental power and to direct it, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the progressive countries, toward peace and toward the socialist reconstruction of society.

Preobrazhensky: I propose another version of the end of the resolution: "to direct it toward peace and, in the event of a proletarian revolution in the West, toward socialism."

If we adopt the committee's version, we will have a dis-

agreement with Comrade Bukharin's resolution that we have already adopted.

Stalin: I am against such an ending of the resolution. The possibility is not excluded that Russia itself may be the country which lays down the road to socialism. No country up to now has enjoyed such freedom as there has been in Russia, or has tried to establish workers' control over production. Besides, the base of our revolution is broader than in Western Europe, where the proletariat stands face to face with the bourgeoisie in complete isolation. Here the workers are supported by the poorest strata of the peasantry. Finally, in Germany the apparatus of governmental power works incomparably better than the imperfect apparatus of our bourgeoisie, which itself is a tributary of European capital. We must reject the worn-out assertion that only Europe can show us the way. There exist dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the basis of the latter.

Chairman: I put Comrade Preobrazhensky's amendment to a vote. It is rejected. . . .

Lenin's Vision of the Revolutionary State

While hiding in Finland in the fall of 1917 Lenin composed what is usually taken to be his main contribution to political theory, a commentary on the political program of Marx and Engels which he published under the title *State and Revolution*. The essence of the argument, in which Lenin was strongly influenced by Bukharin's ideas, was that the "bourgeois" state had to be completely destroyed and replaced by an entirely new revolutionary state on the model of the Paris Commune of 1871 (which the soviets were to provide in Russia). The new state would exclude all bureaucracy and inequality, and eventually "wither away" after the resistance of the old propertied classes was overcome.

Although this view of the revolutionary process has been fully incorporated into official Communist theory, it is obvious that it had very little relationship to Soviet practice after the revolution. How seriously Lenin took the vision when he was writing is difficult to say, but it should be noted that the anti-authoritarian emphasis expressed here offers a sharp con-

trast to his more characteristic disciplinarian bent both before and after 1917. On the other hand, many of Lenin's supporters, particularly in the left wing of the party, took the anti-authoritarian ideal very seriously indeed; they eventually had to be curbed or purged.

. . . The state is the product and the manifestation of the *irreconcilability* of class antagonisms. The state arises when, where and to the extent that class antagonisms objectively *cannot* be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable.

. . . The teaching of Marx and Engels concerning the inevitability of a violent revolution refers to the bourgeois state. The latter *cannot* be superseded by the proletarian state (the dictatorship of the proletariat) through the process of "withering away," but, as a general rule, only through a violent revolution. The panegyric Engels sang in its honour, and which fully corresponds to Marx's repeated declarations (recall the concluding passages of *The Poverty of Philosophy* and the *Communist Manifesto*, with their proud and open proclamation of the inevitability of a violent revolution; recall what Marx wrote nearly thirty years later, in criticizing the Gotha Program of 1875, when he mercilessly castigated the opportunist character of that program)—this panegyric is by no means a mere "impulse," a mere declamation or a polemical sally. The necessity of systematically imbuing the masses with *this* and precisely *this* view of violent revolution lies at the root of *all* the teachings of Marx and Engels. The betrayal of their teaching by the now predominant social-chauvinist and Kautskyite trends is expressed in striking relief by the neglect of *such* propaganda and agitation by both these trends.

The supersession of the bourgeois state by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, i.e., of the state in general, is impossible except through the process of "withering away."

. . . The overthrow of bourgeois rule can be accomplished

FROM: Lenin, "The State and Revolution" (August-September, 1917; *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 1, pp. 204, 219-20, 223-24, 243-44, 291-94, 297-98, 304-06, 313-14).

only by the proletariat, as the particular class whose economic conditions of existence prepare it for this task and provide it with the possibility and the power to perform it. While the bourgeoisie breaks up and disintegrates the peasantry and all the petty-bourgeois strata, it welds together, unites and organizes the proletariat. Only the proletariat—by virtue of the economic role it plays in large-scale production—is capable of being the leader of *all* the toiling and exploited masses, whom the bourgeoisie exploits, oppresses and crushes often not less, but more, than it does the proletarians, but who are incapable of waging an *independent* struggle for their emancipation.

The teaching on the class struggle, when applied by Marx to the question of the state and of the socialist revolution, leads of necessity to the recognition of the *political rule* of the proletariat, of its dictatorship, i.e., of power shared with none and relying directly upon the armed force of the masses. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie can be achieved only by the proletariat becoming transformed into the *ruling class*, capable of crushing the inevitable and desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie, and of organizing *all* the toiling and exploited masses for the new economic order.

The proletariat needs state power, the centralized organization of force, the organization of violence, both to crush the resistance of the exploiters and to *lead* the enormous mass of the population—the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the semiproletarians—in the work of organizing socialist economy.

By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat which is capable of assuming power and of *leading the whole people* to Socialism, of directing and organizing the new order, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader of all the toilers and exploited in the task of building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie. . . .

. . . Capitalist culture has *created* large-scale production, factories, railways, the postal service, telephones, etc., and on this basis the great majority of the functions of the

old "state power" have become so simplified and can be reduced to such exceedingly simple operations of registration, filing and checking that they can be easily performed by every literate person, can quite easily be performed for ordinary "workmen's wages," and that these functions can (and must) be stripped of every shadow of privilege, of every semblance of "official grandeur."

All officials, without exception, elected and subject to recall *at any time*, their salaries reduced to the level of ordinary, "workmen's wages"—these simple and "self-evident" democratic measures, while completely uniting the interests of the workers and the majority of the peasants, at the same time serve as a bridge leading from capitalism to Socialism. These measures concern the reconstruction of the state, the purely political reconstruction of society; but, of course, they acquire their full meaning and significance only in connection with the "expropriation of the expropriators" either being accomplished or in preparation, i.e., with the transformation of capitalist private ownership of the means of production into social ownership. . . .

. . . Forward development, i.e., towards Communism, proceeds through the dictatorship of the proletariat, and cannot do otherwise, for the *resistance* of the capitalist exploiters cannot be *broken* by anyone else or in any other way.

And the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the organization of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of suppressing the oppressors, cannot result merely in an expansion of democracy. *Simultaneously* with an immense expansion of democracy, which for the first time becomes democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the moneybags, the dictatorship of the proletariat imposes a series of restrictions on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists. We must suppress them in order to free humanity from wage slavery, their resistance must be crushed by force; it is clear that where there is suppression, where there is violence, there is no freedom and no democracy. . . .

Only in communist society, when the resistance of the capitalists has been completely crushed, when the capitalists

have disappeared, when there are no classes (i.e., when there is no difference between the members of society as regards their relation to the social means of production), *only* then "the state . . . ceases to exist," and it "*becomes possible to speak of freedom.*" Only then will there become possible and be realized a truly complete democracy, democracy without any exceptions whatever. And only then will democracy begin to *wither away*, owing to the simple fact that, freed from capitalist slavery, from the untold horrors, savagery, absurdities and infamies of capitalist exploitation, people will gradually *become accustomed* to observing the elementary rules of social intercourse that have been known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years in all copybook maxims; they will become accustomed to observing them without force, without compulsion, without subordination, *without the special apparatus* for compulsion which is called the state. . . .

. . . Only Communism makes the state absolutely unnecessary, for there is *nobody* to be suppressed—"nobody" in the sense of a *class*, in the sense of a systematic struggle against a definite section of the population. We are not utopians, and do not in the least deny the possibility and inevitability of excesses on the part of *individual persons*, or the need to suppress *such* excesses. But, in the first place, no special machine, no special apparatus of suppression is needed for this; this will be done by the armed people itself, as simply and as readily as any crowd of civilized people, even in modern society, interferes to put a stop to a scuffle or to prevent a woman from being assaulted. And, secondly, we know that the fundamental social cause of excesses, which consist in the violation of the rules of social intercourse, is the exploitation of the masses, their want and their poverty. With the removal of this chief cause, excesses will inevitably begin to "*wither away*." We do not know how quickly and in what succession, but we know that they will wither away. With their withering away the state will also *wither away*. . . .

. . . In the first phase of communist society (usually called Socialism) "*bourgeois right*" is *not* abolished in its

entirety, but only in part, only in proportion to the economic revolution so far attained, i.e., only in respect of the means of production. "Bourgeois right" recognizes them as the private property of individuals. Socialism converts them into *common* property. *To that extent*—and to that extent alone—"bourgeois right" disappears.

However, it continues to exist as far as its other part is concerned; it continues to exist in the capacity of regulator (determining factor) in the distribution of products and the allotment of labour among the members of society. The socialist principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat," is *already* realized; the other socialist principle: "An equal amount of products for an equal amount of labour," is also *already* realized. But this is not yet Communism, and it does not yet abolish "bourgeois right," which gives to unequal individuals, in return for unequal (really unequal) amounts of labour, equal amounts of products.

This is a "defect," says Marx, but it is unavoidable in the first phase of Communism; for if we are not to indulge in utopianism, we must not think that having overthrown capitalism people will at once learn to work for society *without any standard of right*; and indeed the abolition of capitalism *does not immediately* create the economic premises for such a change.

And there is no other standard than that of "bourgeois right." To this extent, therefore, there still remains the need for a state, which, while safeguarding the public ownership of the means of production, would safeguard equality in labour and equality in the distribution of products.

The state withers away in so far as there are no longer any capitalists, any classes, and, consequently, no *class* can be suppressed.

But the state has not yet completely withered away, since there still remains the safeguarding of "bourgeois right," which sanctifies actual inequality. For the state to wither away completely, complete Communism is necessary. . . .

. . . The development of capitalism . . . itself creates the premises that enable really "all" to take part in the administration of the state. Some of these premises are: universal

literacy, which has already been achieved in a number of the most advanced capitalist countries, then the "training and disciplining" of millions of workers by the huge, complex, socialized apparatus of the postal service, railways, big factories, large-scale commerce, banking, etc., etc.

Given these *economic* premises it is quite possible, after the overthrow of the capitalists and the bureaucrats, to proceed immediately, overnight, to supersede them in the *control* of production and distribution, in the work of *keeping account* of labour and products by the armed workers, by the whole of the armed population. (The question of control and accounting should not be confused with the question of the scientifically trained staff of engineers, agronomists and so on. These gentlemen are working today in obedience to the wishes of the capitalists; they will work even better tomorrow in obedience to the wishes of the armed workers.)

Accounting and control—that is the *main* thing required for "arranging" the smooth working, the correct functioning of the *first phase* of communist society. All citizens are transformed here into hired employees of the state, which consists of the armed workers. All citizens become employees and workers of a *single* nationwide state "syndicate." All that is required is that they should work equally, do their proper share of work, and get equally paid. The accounting and control necessary for this have been *simplified* by capitalism to the extreme and reduced to the extraordinary simple operations—which any literate person can perform—of supervising and recording, knowledge of the four rules of arithmetic, and issuing appropriate receipts.

When the *majority* of the people begin independently and everywhere to keep such accounts and maintain such control over the capitalists (now converted into employees) and over the intellectual gentry who preserve their capitalist habits, this control will really become universal, general, popular; and there will be no way of getting away from it, there will be "nowhere to go."

The whole of society will have become a single office and a single factory, with equality of labour and equality of pay.

But this "factory" discipline, which the proletariat, after defeating the capitalists, after overthrowing the exploiters, will extend to the whole of society is by no means our ideal, or our ultimate goal. It is but a necessary *step* for the purpose of thoroughly purging society of all the infamies and abominations of capitalist exploitation, *and for further progress.*

From the moment all members of society, or even only the vast majority, have learned to administer the state *themselves*, have taken this work into their own hands, have "set going" control over the insignificant minority of capitalists, over the gentry who wish to preserve their capitalist habits and over the workers who have been profoundly corrupted by capitalism—from this moment the need for government of any kind begins to disappear altogether. The more complete the democracy, the nearer the moment approaches when it becomes unnecessary. The more democratic the "state" which consists of the armed workers, and which is "no longer a state in the proper sense of the word," the more rapidly does *every form* of state begin to wither away.

For when *all* have learned to administer and actually do independently administer social production, independently keep accounts and exercise control over the idlers, the gentlefolk, the swindlers and suchlike "guardians of capitalist traditions," the escape from this popular accounting and control will inevitably become so incredibly difficult, such a rare exception, and will probably be accompanied by such swift and severe punishment (for the armed workers are practical men and not sentimental intellectuals, and they will scarcely allow anyone to trifle with them), that the *necessity* of observing the simple, fundamental rules of human intercourse will very soon become a *habit*.

And then the door will be wide open for the transition from the first phase of communist society to its higher phase, and with it to the complete withering away of the state. . . .

As far as the supposedly necessary "bureaucratic" organization is concerned, there is no difference whatever between railways and any other enterprise in large-scale machine industry, any factory, large store, or large-scale capitalist

agricultural enterprise. The technique of all such enterprises makes absolutely imperative the strictest discipline, the utmost precision on the part of everyone in carrying out his allotted task, for otherwise the whole enterprise may come to a stop, or machinery or the finished product may be damaged. In all such enterprises the workers will, of course, "elect delegates who will form *a sort of parliament*."

But the whole point is that this "sort of parliament" will *not* be a parliament in the sense in which we understand bourgeois-parliamentary institutions. The whole point is that this "sort of parliament" will *not* merely "draw up the working regulations and supervise the management of the bureaucratic apparatus," as Kautsky, whose ideas do not go beyond the bounds of bourgeois parliamentarism, imagines. In socialist society the "sort of parliament" consisting of workers' deputies will, of course, "draw up the working regulations and supervise the management" of the "apparatus"—but this apparatus will *not* be "bureaucratic." The workers, having conquered political power, will smash the old bureaucratic apparatus, they will shatter it to its very foundations, they will destroy it to the very roots; and they will replace it by a new one, consisting of the very same workers and office employees, *against* whose transformation into bureaucrats the measures will at once be taken which were specified in detail by Marx and Engels: 1) not only election, but also recall at any time; 2) pay not exceeding that of a workman; 3) immediate introduction of control and supervision by *all*, so that *all* shall become "bureaucrats" for a time and that, therefore, *nobody* may be able to become a "bureaucrat". . . .

Lenin's Call for an Uprising

By September, 1917, it was clear that mass sentiment among the workers, soldiers and peasants was shifting to the left. The Bolsheviks won control of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets. Lenin thereupon called upon the Bolshevik Party to prepare to overthrow the Provisional Government by violence.

. . . Marxists are accused of Blanquism for treating insurrection as an art! Can there be a more flagrant perversion of the truth, when not a single Marxist will deny that it was Marx who expressed himself on this score in the most definite, precise and categorical manner, referring to insurrection precisely as an *art*, and saying that it must be treated as an art, that one must *win* the first success and then proceed from success to success, never ceasing the *offensive* against the enemy, taking advantage of his confusion, etc., etc.?

To be successful, insurrection must rely not upon conspiracy and not upon a party, but upon the advanced class. That is the first point. Insurrection must rely upon a *revolutionary upsurge of the people*. That is the second point. Insurrection must rely upon such a *crucial moment* in the history of the growing revolution when the activity of the advanced ranks of the people is at its height, and when the *vacillations* in the ranks of the enemy and *in the ranks of the weak, halfhearted and irresolute friends of the revolution* are strongest. That is the third point. And these three conditions for raising the question of insurrection distinguish *Marxism from Blanquism*.

But once these conditions are present, to refuse to treat insurrection as an *art* is a betrayal of Marxism and a betrayal of the revolution. . . .

All the objective conditions for a successful insurrection exist. We have the exceptional advantage of a situation in which *only* our victory in the insurrection can put an end to that most painful thing on earth, vacillation, which has worn the people out; a situation in which *only our* victory in the insurrection can *foil* the game of a separate peace directed against the revolution by publicly proposing a fuller, juster and earlier peace, a peace that will *benefit* the revolution. . . .

We must draw up a brief declaration of the Bolsheviks,

FROM: Lenin, "Marxism and Insurrection: A Letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.W.P." (Sept. 13-14 [26-27], 1917; *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 1, 167-68, 170-73).

emphasizing in the most trenchant manner the irrelevance of long speeches and of "speeches" in general, the necessity for immediate action to save the revolution, the absolute necessity for a complete break with the bourgeoisie, for the removal of the whole present government, for a complete rupture with the Anglo-French imperialists, who are preparing a "separate" partition of Russia, and for the immediate transfer of the whole power *to the revolutionary democracy headed by the revolutionary proletariat.*

Our declaration must consist of the briefest and most trenchant formulation of this conclusion in connection with the proposals of the program: peace for the peoples, land for the peasants, confiscation of outrageous profits, and a check on the outrageous sabotage of production by the capitalists.

The briefer and more trenchant the declaration the better. Only two other highly important points must be clearly indicated in it, namely, that the people are worn out by the vacillations, that they are tormented by the irresolution of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks; and that we are definitely breaking with these *parties* because they have betrayed the revolution.

And another thing. By immediately proposing a peace without annexations, by immediately breaking with the Allied imperialists and with all imperialists, either we shall at once obtain an armistice, or the entire revolutionary proletariat will rally to the defence of the country, and a really just, really revolutionary war will then be waged by the revolutionary democracy under the leadership of the proletariat.

Having read this declaration, and having appealed for *decisions* and not talk, for *action* and not resolution-writing, we must *dispatch* our whole group to the *factories and the barracks*. Their place is there, the pulse of life is there, the source of salvation of the revolution is there, and there is the motive force of the Democratic Conference.*

There, in ardent and impassioned speeches, we must

* Democratic Conference: a semi-official meeting of various Russian political leaders, convoked by the Provisional-Government in September, 1917—Ed.

explain our program and put the alternative: either the Conference adopts it *in its entirety*, or else insurrection. There is no middle course. Delay is impossible. The revolution is perishing.

By putting the question thus, by concentrating our entire group in the factories and barracks, *we shall be able to determine the right moment for launching the insurrection.*

And in order to treat insurrection in a Marxist way, i.e., as an art, we must at the same time, without losing a single moment, organize a *headquarter staff* of the insurgent detachments, distribute our forces, move the reliable regiments to the most important points, surround the Alexandrinsky Theatre, occupy the Peter and Paul Fortress, arrest the general staff and the government, and move against the cadets and the Savage Division such detachments as will rather die than allow the enemy to approach the centres of the city; we must mobilize the armed workers and call them to fight the last desperate fight, occupy the telegraph and the telephone exchange at once, place *our* headquarter staff of the insurrection at the central telephone exchange and connect it by telephone with all the factories, all the regiments, all the points of armed fighting, etc.

Of course, this is all by way of example, only to illustrate the fact that at the present moment it is impossible to remain loyal to Marxism, to remain loyal to the revolution, *without treating insurrection as an art.*

The Declaration of Revolutionary Intent—Trotsky

The Bolsheviks' hope of seizing power was hardly secret; bold defiance of the Provisional Government was one of their major propaganda appeals. Some three weeks before the insurrection they decided to stage a demonstrative walkout from the advisory assembly (the Council of the Republic or "Pre-Parliament") which the provisional Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky had summoned. When the walkout was staged, Trotsky (a Bolshevik only since August, 1917, but already the party's most articulate spokesman) denounced the

Provisional Government for its alleged counterrevolutionary intentions and called on the masses to support the Bolsheviks.

The officially proclaimed aims of the Democratic Conference summoned by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies consisted of the abolition of the irresponsible personal regime that nourished the Kornilov movement and the creation of a responsible power able to liquidate the war and guarantee the convening of the Constituent Assembly after the designated interval.

Meanwhile, behind the back of the Democratic Conference and by means of backstage deals between Kerensky, the Kadets* and the leaders of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, results were arrived at which were directly opposed to the officially proclaimed aims.

A power was created in which and around which avowed and secret Kornilovists** play a leading role. The irresponsibility of this power is now confirmed and officially proclaimed. . . .

. . . The bourgeois classes which are directing the policy of the political government have set themselves the goal of *undermining* the Constituent Assembly. This is now the basic task of the privileged elements, to which their whole policy, domestic and foreign, is subordinated.

In the industrial, agrarian, and food-supply fields, the policy of the government and the propertied classes aggravates the natural disruption engendered by the war. The privileged classes, having provoked a peasant uprising, now move to suppress it, and openly hold a course towards the "bony hand of famine," which is to smother the revolution and above all the Constituent Assembly.

FROM: Trotsky, "Declaration of the Bolshevik Fraction to the Council of the Republic" ("Pre-Parliament"), October 7 [20], 1917 (Trotsky, *Works*, Moscow, State Press [1924], Vol. III, book 1, pp. 321-23; editor's translation).

* "Kadets": the Constitutional Democratic Party, from its Russian initials—Ed.

** Kornilovists: followers of General Kornilov, who attempted to overthrow Kerensky in August, 1917—Ed.

No less criminal is the foreign policy of the bourgeoisie and its government.

After forty months of war mortal danger threatens the capital. In answer to this a plan is proposed to transfer the government to Moscow. The idea of surrendering the revolutionary capital to the German troops does not evoke the least indignation among the bourgeois classes; on the contrary, it is accepted by them as a natural link in the general policy, which is to facilitate their counterrevolutionary plot.

Instead of recognizing that the salvation of the country lies in the conclusion of peace; instead of openly throwing out the proposal of immediate peace, over the heads of all the imperialist governments and diplomatic offices, to all the exhausted nations and in this way making further waging of the war actually impossible—the Provisional Government, taking its cue from the Kadet counterrevolutionaries and the Allied imperialists, without meaning, without strength, without a plan, toils along in the murderous harness of war, dooming to pointless destruction ever new hundreds of thousands of soldiers and sailors, and preparing the surrender of Petrograd and the smothering of the revolution. At a time when the soldier and sailor Bolsheviks are perishing together with the other sailors and soldiers as a result of others' mistakes and crimes, the so-called Supreme Commander-in-Chief continues to ruin the Bolshevik press. . . .

The leading parties of the Provisional Council serve as a voluntary cover for this whole policy.

We, the fraction of Bolshevik Social-Democrats, declare: with this government of national betrayal and with this council that tolerates counterrevolution we have nothing in common. We do not wish either directly or obliquely to conceal even for a single day, that work, fatal to the people, which is being accomplished behind the official curtain.

The revolution is in danger! At a time when the troops of [Kaiser] Wilhelm are threatening Petrograd, the government of Kerensky-Konovalov* is preparing to flee from

* Konovalov: a minister in Kerensky's government and acting premier at the time of the Bolshevik revolution—Ed.

Petrograd, in order to transform Moscow into a stronghold of counterrevolution.

We appeal to the vigilance of the Moscow workers and soldiers!

Quitting the Provisional Council, we appeal to the vigilance and courage of the workers, soldiers and peasants of all Russia.

Petrograd is in danger! The revolution is in danger! The nation is in danger!

The government aggravates this danger. The ruling parties help it.

Only the people themselves can save themselves and the country. We turn to the people.

All power to the Soviets!

All the land to the people!

Long live an immediate, honorable, democratic peace!

Long live the Constituent Assembly!

The Decision to Seize Power

On October 10 [23], 1917, Lenin came secretly to Petrograd to overcome hesitations among the Bolshevik leadership over his demand for armed insurrection. Against the opposition of two of Lenin's long-time lieutenants, Zinoviev and Kamenev, the Central Committee adopted Lenin's resolution which formally instructed the party organizations to prepare for the seizure of power.

The Central Committee recognizes that the international position of the Russian revolution (the revolt in the German navy which is an extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution; the threat of peace between the imperialists with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia) as well as the military situation (the indubitable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petrograd to the Germans), and the fact that the proletarian party

FROM: Lenin, Resolution "On the Armed Uprising," adopted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.W.P., October 10 [23], 1917 (*Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 1, pp. 189-90).

has gained a majority in the Soviets—all this, taken in conjunction with the peasant revolt and the swing of popular confidence towards our Party (the elections in Moscow), and, finally, the obvious preparations being made for a second Kornilov affair (the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the dispatch of Cossacks to Petrograd, the surrounding of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.)—all this places the armed uprising on the order of the day.

Considering therefore that an armed uprising is inevitable, and that the time for it is fully ripe, the Central Committee instructs all Party organizations to be guided accordingly, and to discuss and decide all practical questions (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the action of our people in Moscow and Minsk, etc.) from this point of view.

Bolshevik Opposition to the Insurrection

Fearful on Marxist grounds that the Bolsheviks did not have the mass support or the international backing to assure them success, Zinoviev and Kamenev published a statement in which they endeavored to dissuade the party from following Lenin's lead. Lenin denounced them for "strike-breaking," and the uprising went ahead as scheduled.

. . . In labour circles there is developing and growing a current of thought which sees the only outcome in the immediate declaration of an armed uprising. The interaction of all the conditions at present is such that if we are to speak of such an uprising a definite date must be set for it, and that within the next few days. In one or another form this question is already being discussed by the entire press and at workers' meetings, and is occupying the minds of a substantial group of party workers. We on our part consider it our duty and

FROM: Zinoviev and Kamenev, Statement to the Principal Bolshevik Party Organizations, Oct. 11 [24], 1917 (English translation in Lenin, *Collected Works*, New York, International Publishers, 1929, Vol. XXI, book 2, pp. 328-31; reprinted by permission of the publisher).

our right to express ourselves on this question with complete frankness.

We are deeply convinced that to call at present for an armed uprising means to stake on one card not only the fate of our party, but also the fate of the Russian and international revolution.

There is no doubt that there are historical situations when an oppressed class must recognise that it is better to go forward to defeat than to give up without a battle. Does the Russian working class find itself at present in such a situation? *No, and a thousand times no!!!!*

As a result of the immense growth of the influence of our party in the cities, and particularly in the army, there has come about at present a situation such that it is becoming more and more impossible for the bourgeoisie to obstruct the Constituent Assembly. Through the army, through the workers, we hold a revolver at the temple of the bourgeoisie: the bourgeoisie is put in such a position that if it should undertake now to attempt to obstruct the Constituent Assembly, it would again push the petty-bourgeois parties to one side, and the revolver would go off.

The chances of our party in the elections to the Constituent Assembly are excellent. The talk that the influence of Bolshevism is beginning to wane, etc., we consider to have absolutely no foundation. In the mouths of our political opponents this assertion is simply a move in the political game, having as its purpose this very thing, to provoke an uprising of the Bolsheviks under conditions favourable to our enemies. The influence of the Bolsheviks is increasing. Whole strata of the labouring population are only now beginning to be drawn in by it. With correct tactics we can get a third and even more of the seats in the Constituent Assembly. The attitude of the petty-bourgeois parties in the Constituent Assembly cannot possibly be the same then as it is now. In the first place their slogan: "For land, for freedom, wait for the Constituent Assembly" will drop out. And aggravation of want, hunger, and the peasant movement, will exert more and more pressure on them and will compel them to seek an

alliance with the proletarian party against the landowners and capitalists represented by the Cadet Party.

The Constituent Assembly, by itself, cannot of course abolish the present camouflaging of these interrelations. The Soviets, which have become rooted in life, can not be destroyed. The Constituent Assembly will be able to find support for its revolutionary work only in the Soviets. The Constituent Assembly plus the Soviets—this is that combined type of state institutions towards which we are going. It is on this political basis that our party is acquiring enormous chances for a real victory.

We have never said that the Russian working class *alone*, by its own forces, would be able to bring the present revolution to a victorious conclusion. We have not forgotten, must not forget even now, that between us and the bourgeoisie there stands a huge third camp: the petty bourgeoisie. This camp joined us during the days of the Kornilov affair and gave us victory. It will join us many times more. We must not permit ourselves to be hypnotised by what is the case at the present moment. Undoubtedly, at present this camp is much nearer to the bourgeoisie than to us. But the present situation is not eternal, nor even durable. And only by a careless step, by some hasty action which will make the whole fate of the revolution dependent upon an immediate uprising, will the proletarian party push the petty bourgeoisie into the arms of Milyukov* *for a long time*.

We are told: (1) that the majority of the people of Russia is already with us, and (2) that the majority of the international proletariat is with us. Alas!—neither the one nor the other is true, and this is the crux of the entire situation.

In Russia a majority of the workers and a substantial part of the soldiers are with us. But all the rest is dubious. We are all convinced, for instance, that if elections to the Constituent Assembly were to take place now, a majority of the peasants would vote for the S.-R.'s. What is this, an

* Milyukov: leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party and Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government, March-April, 1917—Ed.

accident? The masses of the soldiers support us not because of the slogan of war, but because of the slogan of peace. This is an extremely important circumstance and unless we take it into consideration we would be risking building on sand. If, having taken power at present by ourselves, we should come to the conclusion (in view of the whole world situation) that it is necessary to wage a revolutionary war, the masses of the soldiers will rush away from us. . . .

Having taken power, the workers' party thereby undoubtedly deals a blow to Wilhelm. It will be harder for him to carry on a war against revolutionary Russia, offering an immediate democratic peace. This is so. But will this blow under present conditions, after [the fall of] Riga, etc., be sufficiently powerful to turn away the hand of German imperialism from Russia? . . . Where then are the data which indicate that the proletarian party alone, and while the petty-bourgeois democracy is resisting, must take the responsibility for such a state of affairs and its inevitable consequences upon itself and upon itself alone?

And here we come to the second assertion—that the majority of the international proletariat allegedly is already with us. Unfortunately this is not so. The mutiny in the German navy has an immense symptomatic significance. There are portents of a serious movement in Italy. But from that to any sort of active support of the proletarian revolution in Russia which is declaring war on the entire bourgeois world is still very far. It is extremely harmful to overestimate forces. Undoubtedly much is given to us and much will be demanded from us. But if we now, having staked the entire game upon one card, suffer defeat, we shall deal a cruel blow to the international proletarian revolution, which is developing extremely slowly, but which is nevertheless developing. Moreover, the development of the revolution in Europe will make it obligatory for us, without any hesitation whatever, immediately to take power into our own hands. This is also the only guarantee of the victory of an uprising of the proletariat in Russia. It will come, but it is not yet here. . . .

Before history, before the international proletariat, before

the Russian Revolution and the Russian working class, we have no right to stake the whole future on the card of an armed uprising. It would be a mistake to think that such action now would, if it were unsuccessful, lead only to such consequences as did July 16-18. Now it is a question of something more. It is a question of decisive battle, and defeat in *that* battle would spell defeat to the revolution. . . .

The Bolshevik Seizure of Power

On October 25 [November 7], 1917, through the agency of the Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet—headed by Trotsky—the Bolsheviks and their allies, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, forcibly overthrew Kerensky's government and assumed power in the name of the soviets. A new cabinet, designated the "Council of People's Commissars," was set up, with Lenin as chairman and Trotsky as Commissar of Foreign Affairs. Endorsement of the coup was secured from the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which was concurrently in session. This was the "October Revolution."

To the Citizens of Russia!

The Provisional Government has been overthrown. The power of state has passed into the hands of the organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Revolutionary Military Committee, which stands at the head of the Petrograd proletariat and garrison.

The cause for which the people have fought—the immediate proposal of a democratic peace, the abolition of landed proprietorship, workers' control over production and the creation of a Soviet government—is assured.

Long live the revolution of the soldiers, workers, and peasants!

Revolutionary Military Committee of Petrograd
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

FROM: Proclamation of the Soviet Government, October 25 [November 7], 1917 (English translation in Lenin and Stalin, *The Russian Revolution*, New York, International Publishers, 1938, p. 234; reprinted by permission of the publisher).

Bolshevik Revolutionary Legislation

In a quick series of decrees, the new "soviet" government instituted a number of sweeping reforms, some long overdue and some quite revolutionary. They ranged from "democratic" reforms like the disestablishment of the church and equality for the national minorities, to the recognition of the peasants' land seizures and to openly socialist steps such as the nationalization of the banks. The Provisional Government's commitment to the war effort was repudiated. This was followed by the ominous gesture of suppressing the "bourgeois" press.

a) Decree on Peace

The workers' and peasants' government created by the revolution of October 24-25 and relying on the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies calls upon all the belligerent peoples and their governments to start immediate negotiations for a just, democratic peace.

By a just or democratic peace, for which the overwhelming majority of the working and toiling classes of all the belligerent countries, exhausted, tormented and racked by the war, are craving—a peace that has been most definitely and insistently demanded by the Russian workers and peasants ever since the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy—by such a peace the government means an immediate peace without annexations (i.e., without the seizure of foreign lands, without the forcible incorporation of foreign nations) and without indemnities.

This is the kind of peace the government of Russia proposes to all the belligerent nations to conclude immediately, and expresses its readiness to take all the resolute measures immediately, without the least delay, pending the final ratification of all the terms of such a peace by authoritative assemblies of the people's representatives of all countries and all nations.

FROM: Decree on Peace, October 26 [November 8], 1917 (written by Lenin); *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 1, pp. 328-30, 332-33.

In accordance with the sense of justice of the democracy in general, and of the toiling classes in particular, the government conceives the annexation or seizure of foreign lands to mean every incorporation into a large or powerful state of a small or weak nation without the precisely, clearly and voluntarily expressed consent and wish of that nation, irrespective of the time when such forcible incorporation took place, irrespective also of the degree of development or backwardness of the nation forcibly annexed to, or forcibly retained within, the borders of the given state, and irrespective, finally, of whether this nation resides in Europe or in distant, overseas countries.

If any nation whatsoever is forcibly retained within the borders of a given state, if, in spite of its expressed desire —no matter whether expressed in the press, at public meetings, in the decisions of parties, or in protests and uprisings against national oppression—it is not accorded the right to decide the forms of its state existence by a free vote, taken after the complete evacuation of the troops of the incorporating or, generally, of the stronger nation and without the least pressure being brought to bear, such incorporation is annexation, i.e., seizure and violence.

The government considers it the greatest of crimes against humanity to continue this war over the issue of how to divide among the strong and rich nations the weak nationalities they have conquered, and solemnly announces its determination immediately to sign terms of peace to stop this war on the conditions indicated, which are equally just for all nationalities without exception.

At the same time the government declares that it does not regard the above-mentioned terms of peace as an ultimatum; in other words, it is prepared to consider any other terms of peace, but only insists that they be advanced by any of the belligerent nations as speedily as possible, and that in the proposals of peace there should be absolute clarity and the complete absence of all ambiguity and secrecy.

The government abolishes secret diplomacy, and, for its part, announces its firm intention to conduct all negotia-

tions quite openly under the eyes of the whole people. It will immediately proceed to the full publication of the secret treaties endorsed or concluded by the government of landlords and capitalists from February to October 25, 1917. The government proclaims the absolute and immediate annulment of everything contained in these secret treaties in so far as it is aimed, as is mostly the case, at securing advantages and privileges for the Russian landlords and capitalists and at the retention, or extension, of the annexations made by the Great Russians. . . .

In proposing an immediate armistice, we appeal to the class-conscious workers of the countries that have done so much for the development of the proletarian movement. We appeal to the workers of England, where there was the Chartist movement, to the workers of France, who have in repeated uprisings displayed the strength of their class consciousness, and to the workers of Germany, who waged the fight against the Anti-Socialist Law and have created powerful organizations.

In the manifesto of March 14, we called for the overthrow of the bankers, but, far from overthrowing our own bankers, we entered into an alliance with them. Now we have overthrown the government of the bankers.

That government and the bourgeoisie will make every effort to unite their forces and drown the workers' and peasants' revolution in blood. But the three years of war have been a good lesson to the masses: the Soviet movement in other countries and the mutiny in the German navy, which was crushed by the junkers of Wilhelm the hangman. Finally, we must remember that we are not living in the wilds of Africa, but in Europe, where news can spread quickly.

The workers' movement will triumph and will pave the way to peace and Socialism.

b) Decree on the Land

1. Landlord ownership of land is abolished forthwith without any compensation.

2. The landed estates, as also all crown, monasterial and church lands, with all their livestock, implements, buildings and everything pertaining thereto, shall be placed at the disposal of the volost [township] Land Committees and the uyezd [county] Soviets of Peasants' Deputies pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. . . .

4. The following peasant Mandate, compiled by the *Izvestia of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies* from 242 local peasant mandates and published in No. 88 of the *Izvestia* (Petrograd, No. 88, August 19, 1917), shall serve everywhere to guide the implementation of the great land reforms until a final decision on the latter is taken by the Constituent Assembly.

5. The land of ordinary peasants and ordinary Cossacks shall not be confiscated.

PEASANT MANDATE ON THE LAND

"The land question in its full scope can be settled only by the popular Constituent Assembly.

"The most equitable settlement of the land question is to be as follows:

"1) *Private ownership of land shall be abolished forever; land shall not be sold, purchased, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise alienated.*

"All land, whether *state, appanage, crown, monasterial, church, factory, primogenitary, private, public, peasant, etc., shall be alienated without compensation* and become the property of the whole people, and pass into the use of all those who cultivate it.

"Persons who suffer by this property revolution shall be deemed to be entitled to public support only for the period necessary for adaptation to the new conditions of life.

"2) All mineral wealth, e.g., ore, oil, coal, salt, etc., as well as all forests and waters of state importance, shall pass into the exclusive use of the state. All the small streams,

FROM: Decree on the Land, October 26 [November 8], 1917
(written by Lenin); *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 1, pp. 339-41.

lakes, woods, etc., shall pass into the use of the communities, to be administered by the local self-government bodies.

"3) Lands on which *high-level scientific* farming is practised, e.g., orchards, plantations, seed plots, nurseries, hot-houses, etc. *shall not be divided up, but shall be converted into model farms*, to be turned over for exclusive use to the state or to the communities, depending on the size and importance of such lands.

"Household land in towns and villages, with orchards and vegetable gardens shall be reserved for the use of their present owners, the size of the holdings, and the size of tax levied for the use thereof, to be determined by law. . . .

"6) The right to use the land shall be accorded to all citizens of the Russian state (without distinction of sex) desiring to cultivate it by their own labour, with the help of their families, or in partnership, but only as long as they are able to cultivate it. The employment of hired labour is not permitted. . . .

"7) Land tenure shall be on an equality basis, i.e., the land shall be distributed among the toilers in conformity with a labour standard or a consumption standard, depending on local conditions.

"There shall be absolutely no restriction on the forms of land tenure: household, farm, communal, or cooperative, as shall be decided in each individual village and settlement.

"8) All land, when alienated, shall become part of the national land fund. Its distribution among the toilers shall be in charge of the local and central self-government bodies, from democratically organized village and city communities, in which there are no distinctions of social rank, to central regional government bodies.

"The land fund shall be subject to periodical redistribution, depending on the growth of population and the increase in the productivity and the scientific level of farming. . . .

c) *Decree on Suppression of Hostile Newspapers*

In the serious decisive hour of the revolution and the days immediately following it the Provisional Revolutionary Com-

mittee was compelled to adopt a whole series of measures against the counterrevolutionary press of all shades.

Immediately on all sides cries arose that the new socialistic authority was violating in this way the essential principles of its program by an attempt against the freedom of the press.

The Workers' and Soldiers' Government draws the attention of the population to the fact that in our country behind this liberal shield there is practically hidden the liberty for the richer class to seize into their hands the lion's share of the whole press and by this means to poison the minds and bring confusion into the consciousness of the masses.

Everyone knows that the bourgeois press is one of the most powerful weapons of the bourgeoisie. Especially in this critical moment when the new authority, that of the workers and peasants, is in process of consolidation, it was impossible to leave this weapon in the hands of the enemy at a time when it is not less dangerous than bombs and machine guns. This is why temporary and extraordinary measures have been adopted for the purpose of cutting off the stream of mire and calumny in which the yellow and green press would be glad to drown the young victory of the people.

As soon as the new order will be consolidated, all administrative measures against the press will be suspended; full liberty will be given it within the limits of responsibility before the laws, in accordance with the broadest and most progressive regulations in this respect.

Bearing in mind, however, the fact that any restrictions of the freedom of the press, even in critical moments, are admissible only within the bounds of necessity, the Council of People's Commissaries decrees as follows:

General rules on the press.

1. The following organs of the press shall be subject to

FROM: Decree on Suppression of Hostile Newspapers, October 27 [November 9], 1917 (English translation in *Bolshevik Propaganda: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate, 65th Congress, 3rd Session, Feb. 11, 1919 to Mar. 10, 1919*, Washington, Government Printing Office, p. 1243).

be closed: (a) those inciting to open resistance or disobedience towards the Workers' and Peasants' Government; (b) those sowing confusion by means of an obviously calumniatory perversion of facts; (c) those inciting to acts of a criminal character punishable by the penal laws.

2. The temporary or permanent closing of any organ of the press shall be carried out only by a resolution of the Council of People's Commissaries.

3. The present decree is of a temporary nature and will be revoked by special *ukaz* when the normal conditions of public life will be reestablished.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars,
Vladimir Ulianov (Lenin).

d) Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia

The October revolution of the workmen and peasants began under the common banner of emancipation.

The peasants are being emancipated from the power of the landowners, for there is no longer the landowner's property right in the land—it has been abolished. The soldiers and sailors are being emancipated from the power of autocratic generals, for generals will henceforth be elective and subject to recall. The workingmen are being emancipated from the whims and arbitrary will of the capitalists, for henceforth there will be established the control of the workers over mills and factories. Everything living and capable of life is being emancipated from the hateful shackles.

There remain only the peoples of Russia, who have suffered and are suffering oppression and arbitrariness, and whose emancipation must immediately be begun, whose liberation must be effected resolutely and definitely.

During the period of czarism the peoples of Russia were systematically incited against one another. The results of such a policy are known: massacres and pogroms on the one hand, slavery of peoples on the other.

FROM: Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, November 2 [15], 1917 (English translation in *The Nation* December 28, 1919).

There can be and there must be no return to this disgraceful policy of instigation. Henceforth the policy of a voluntary and honest union of the peoples of Russia must be substituted.

In the period of imperialism, after the February revolution, when the power was transferred to the hands of the Cadet bourgeoisie, the naked policy of instigation gave way to one of cowardly distrust of the peoples of Russia, to a policy of fault-finding and provocation, of "freedom" and "equality" of peoples. The results of such a policy are known: the growth of national enmity, the impairment of mutual trust.

An end must be put to this unworthy policy of falsehood and distrust, of fault-finding and provocation. Henceforth it must be replaced by an open and honest policy which leads to complete mutual trust of the people of Russia. Only as the result of such a trust can there be formed an honest and lasting union of the peoples of Russia. Only as the result of such a union can the workmen and peasants of the peoples of Russia be cemented into one revolutionary force able to resist all attempts on the part of the imperialist-annexationist bourgeoisie.

Starting with these assumptions, the first Congress of Soviets, in June of this year, proclaimed the right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination.

The second Congress of Soviets, in October of this year, reaffirmed this inalienable right of the peoples of Russia more decisively and definitely.

The united will of these Congresses, the Council of the People's Commissaries, resolved to base their activity upon the question of the nationalities of Russia, as expressed in the following principles:

1. The equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.
2. The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to the point of separation and the formation of an independent state.
3. The abolition of any and all national and national-religious privileges and disabilities.

4. The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.

The concrete decrees that follow from these principles will be immediately elaborated after the setting up of a Commission on Nationality Affairs. . . .

In the name of the Russian Republic,

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars,
V. Ulianov (Lenin).

People's Commissar on Nationality Affairs,
Iozef Dzhugashvili (Stalin).

The Issue of a Coalition Government

Immediately after the overthrow of the Provisional Government, many Bolsheviks, together with most members of the other socialist parties, hoped that a multi-party coalition government, based on the soviets, could be agreed upon. The Mensheviks and Right Socialist Revolutionaries, however, would not accept Lenin as head of the government, while Lenin was in no mood to make any concessions at all. Nonetheless, the cautious wing of the Bolshevik leadership—again headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev, together with the future premier Rykov—were so alarmed at the risky prospect of a one-party government that they threatened to resign in protest. Lenin's reply was to have the Central Committee condemn the supporters of the coalition as traitorous deviators, and the latter in turn resigned as they had threatened from the Bolshevik Central Committee and from the Council of People's Commissars. A few weeks later a coalition was actually arrived at between the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, and representatives of the latter party received three posts in the Council of People's Commissars.

By early 1918 the Bolshevik critics individually made their peace with Lenin, and were accepted back into the party and governmental leadership. At the same time, the Left SR's, incensed over the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, resigned from the cabinet in disgust, and the Soviet administration thus acquired the exclusively Communist character which it has had ever since. The Left SR's, like the Right SR's and the Mensheviks, continued to function in the soviets as a more or less legal opposition until

the outbreak of large-scale civil war in the middle of 1918. At that point the opposition parties took positions which were either equivocal or openly anti-Bolshevik, and one after another they were suppressed.

*a) Resolution of the Central Committee
on the Opposition*

The Central Committee recognizes that the present session has historic importance and that it is therefore essential to define the two positions which have been revealed here.

1) The Central Committee recognizes that the opposition within the Central Committee who are resigning have completely departed from all the fundamental positions of Bolshevism and the proletarian class struggle in general; they are repeating profoundly un-Marxist remarks about the impossibility of a socialist revolution in Russia, about the necessity of giving in to the ultimatums and threats which come from a conscious minority in the soviet organization; in this manner they are undermining the will and decision of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets; in this manner they are sabotaging the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry just after it has begun.

2) The Central Committee charges this opposition with full responsibility for slowing down revolutionary work and for the vacillation which at the present moment is criminal; it invites it to shift its controversy and its skepticism to the press, away from the practical work in which it does not believe. In this opposition there is nothing, except for the fright of the bourgeoisie and the reflection of tendencies of the backward (but nonrevolutionary) part of the population.

3) The Central Committee asserts that it is impossible to refuse a purely Bolshevik government without treason to the slogan of the power of the Soviets, since a majority at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, without excluding

FROM: Resolution of the Central Committee of the RSDWP (Bolsheviks), November 2 [15], 1917, "On the Question of the Opposition within the Central Committee" (CPSU in Resolutions, I, 401-02; editor's translation).

anyone from the congress, handed power over to this government.

4) The Central Committee asserts that it is impossible, without betraying the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, to turn to petty bargaining and join to the Soviets organizations of a nonsoviet type, i.e., organizations which are not voluntary unions of the masses' revolutionary vanguard which is struggling to overthrow the landlords and the capitalists.

5) The Central Committee asserts that concessions in the face of the ultimatums and threats by the minority in the Soviets is equivalent to full renunciation not only of the power of the Soviets, but also of democratism, for such concessions are equivalent to the majority's fear of using its majority, are equivalent to submitting to anarchy and to the repetition of ultimatums on the part of any minority.

6) The Central Committee asserts that without excluding anyone from the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, it is now quite ready to restore those who walked out and to accept a coalition with these people within the framework of the Soviets; it is accordingly absolutely false to speak as though the Bolsheviks do not want to share power with anyone. . . .

9) The Central Committee asserts, finally, that the victory of communism both in Russia and in Europe is guaranteed in spite of all difficulties, but only if the policy of the present government is continued undeviatingly. The Central Committee expresses full confidence in the victory of this socialist revolution and calls on all skeptics and vacillators to throw off all their hesitation and support the activity of this government with all their souls and the utmost energy.

b) Bolshevik Statements of Resignation

On November 1 the Central Committee of the RSDWP

FROM: Kamenev, Rykov, Miliutin, Zinoviev, and Nogin, Declaration to the Central Committee of the RSDWP (Bolsheviks), November 4 [17], 1917 (*Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDWP, 1917-1918*, Moscow, State Press, 1929, pp. 167-68; editor's translation).

(Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution which in actuality rejects agreement with the parties making up the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies for the formation of a socialist soviet government.

We consider that only immediate agreement on the conditions indicated by us would make it possible for the proletariat and the revolutionary army to consolidate the conquests of the October Revolution, to consolidate themselves in their new positions and gather their forces for the further struggle for socialism.

We consider that the creation of such a government is essential to avert further bloodshed, the imminent famine, and the destruction of the revolution by the Kaledinities, and also to guarantee the summoning of the Constituent Assembly at the appointed time and the real execution of the program of peace adopted by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

By incredible effort we have succeeded in winning reconsideration of the decision of the Central Committee and of the new resolution, which could become the basis for creating a soviet government.

However, this new decision evoked on the part of the leading group in the Central Committee a series of actions which clearly show that it has firmly decided not to allow the formation of a government of the soviet parties but to fight for a purely Bolshevik government however it can and whatever the sacrifices this costs the workers and soldiers.

We cannot assume responsibility for this ruinous policy of the Central Committee, carried out against the will of a large part of the proletariat and soldiers, who crave the earliest cessation of bloodshed between the separate parts of the democratic forces.

We resign, therefore, from the posts of members of the Central Committee, so that we will have the right to speak our minds openly to the mass of workers and soldiers and to call on them to support our slogan! Long live the Government of the Soviet Parties! Immediate agreement on this condition!

We leave the Central Committee at the moment of victory,

at the moment of our party's domination; we leave because we cannot watch quietly as the policy of the leading group in the Central Committee leads to the workers' parties' losing the fruits of this victory, to the destruction of the proletariat.

Remaining in the ranks of the proletarian party, we hope that the proletariat will overcome all obstacles and will recognize that our step was compelled by our consciousness of our burden of responsibility to the socialist proletariat.

c) Resignation of the Opposition from the Council of People's Commissars

We take the point of view of the necessity of forming a socialist government of all the soviet parties. We consider that only the formation of such a government would make it possible to consolidate the fruits of the heroic struggle of the working class and the revolutionary army in the October and November days.

We assert that other than this there is only one path: the preservation of a purely Bolshevik government by means of political terror. We cannot and will not accept this. We see that this will lead to the displacement of mass proletarian organizations from the leadership of political life, to the establishment of an irresponsible regime, and to the ruin of the revolution and the country. We cannot assume responsibility for this policy, and therefore, we renounce before the Central Executive Committee our titles as People's Commissars.

FROM: Declaration of a Group of People's Commissars to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, November 5 [18], 1917 (*Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDWP*, p. 169; editor's translation).

Industrial Democracy

The ideal which commanded the loyalty of most Russian workers at the time of the October Revolution was that of direct administration of industry by elected committees of workers. Such control was often put into effect by direct seizures, just as the peasants were seizing landlords' property.

For the moment, the Bolshevik party acknowledged the practice of workers' control, though Lenin was soon to change his attitude. The ideal continued to animate the ultra-left groups among the Communists, and was revived again in Yugoslavia after Tito's break with Stalin in 1948.

1. In the interests of a systematic regulation of national economy, Workers' Control is introduced in all industrial, commercial, agricultural (and similar) enterprises which are hiring people to work for them in their shops or which are giving them work to take home. This control is to extend over the production, storing, buying and selling of raw materials and finished products as well as over the finances of the enterprise.

2. The workers will exercise this control through their elected organizations, such as factory and shop committees, soviets of elders, etc. The office employees and the technical personnel are also to have representation in these committees.

3. Every large city, province and industrial area is to have its own Soviet of Workers' Control, which, being an organ of the S(oviet) of W(orkers'), S(oldiers'), and P(easants') D(eputies), must be composed of representatives of trade-unions, factory, shop and other workers' committees and workers' co-operatives. . . .

6. The organs of Workers' Control have the right to supervise production, fix the minimum of output, and determine the cost of production.

7. The organs of Workers' Control have the right to control all the business correspondence of an enterprise. Owners of enterprises are legally responsible for all correspondence kept secret. Commercial secrets are abolished. The owners have to show to the organs of Workers' Control all their books and statements for the current year and for the past years.

FROM: Decree on Workers' Control, November 14 [27], 1917
(English translation in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918*, pp. 308-10; this and subsequent selections reprinted by permission of the publisher, Stanford University Press. Copyright 1934 by the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University).

8. The rulings of the organs of Workers' Control are binding on the owners of enterprises and can be annulled only by decisions of the higher organs of Workers' Control.

V. Ulianov (Lenin)—President of the Council of People's Commissars

A. Shliapnikov—People's Commissar of Labor.

The Secret Police

Police action by the Bolsheviks to combat political opposition commenced with the creation of the "Cheka" (so called from the Russian initials of the first two terms in its official name, "Extraordinary Commission to Fight Counter-Revolution"). Under the direction of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the Cheka became the prototype of totalitarian secret police systems, enjoying at critical times the right of unlimited arrest and summary execution of suspects and hostages. The principle of such police surveillance over the political leanings of the Soviet population has remained in effect ever since, despite the varying intensity of repression and the organizational metamorphoses of the police—from Cheka to GPU (1922, from the Russian initials for "State Political Administration") to NKVD (1934—the "People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs") to MVD and MGB (after World War II—"Ministry of Internal Affairs" and "Ministry of State Security," respectively) to KGB (since 1953—the "Committee for State Security").

The Commission is to be named the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission and is to be attached to the Council of People's Commissars. [This commission] is to make war on counter-revolution and sabotage. . . .

The duties of the Commission will be:

1. To persecute and break up all acts of counter-revolution and sabotage all over Russia, no matter what their origin.

2. To bring before the Revolutionary Tribunal all counter-

FROM: Decree on Establishment of the Extraordinary Commission to Fight Counter-Revolution [the "Cheka"], December 7 [20], 1917 (English translation in Bunyan and Fisher, pp. 297-98).

revolutionists and saboteurs and to work out a plan for fighting them.

3. To make preliminary investigation only—enough to break up [the counter-revolutionary act]. The Commission is to be divided into sections: (a) the information section, (b) the organization section (in charge of organizing the fight against counter-revolution all over Russia) with branches, and (c) the fighting section.

The Commission will be formed tomorrow (December 21). . . . The Commission is to watch the press, saboteurs, strikers, and the Socialist-Revolutionists of the Right. Measures [to be taken against these counter-revolutionists are] confiscation, confinement, deprivation of [food] cards, publication of the names of the enemies of the people, etc.

Council of People's Commissars.

The Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly

In December, 1917, the Bolsheviks permitted, as they had promised, the election of a Constituent Assembly. This was the only reasonably free and democratic general election which Russia has ever had. The Bolsheviks placed second with some nine million votes, but an overwhelming majority was won by the Right SR's with their peasant backing. Lenin permitted the Assembly to meet for only one day, and then forcibly banned its continuation on the ground that it was a counterrevolutionary threat to the soviets.

. . . The Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of lists drawn up prior to the October Revolution, was an expression of the old relation of political forces which existed when power was held by the compromisers and the Cadets. When the people at that time voted for the candidates of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, they were not in a position to choose between the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, the supporters of the bourgeoisie, and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, the supporters of Socialism. Thus the Constituent

FROM: Lenin, Draft Decree on the Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (January 6 [19], 1918; *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 1, pp. 382-84).

Assembly, which was to have been the crown of the bourgeois parliamentary republic, could not but become an obstacle in the path of the October Revolution and the Soviet power.

The October Revolution, by giving the power to the Soviets, and through the Soviets to the toiling and exploited classes, aroused the desperate resistance of the exploiters, and in the crushing of this resistance it fully revealed itself as the beginning of the socialist revolution. The toiling classes learnt by experience that the old bourgeois parliamentarism had outlived its purpose and was absolutely incompatible with the aim of achieving Socialism, and that not national institutions, but only class institutions (such as the Soviets), were capable of overcoming the resistance of the propertied classes and of laying the foundations of a socialist society. To relinquish the sovereign power of the Soviets, to relinquish the Soviet republic won by the people, for the sake of bourgeois parliamentarism and the Constituent Assembly, would now be a retrograde step and cause the collapse of the October workers' and peasants' revolution.

Owing to the circumstances mentioned above, the majority in the Constituent Assembly which met on January 5 was secured by the party of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, the party of Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov. Naturally, this party refused to discuss the absolutely clear, precise and unambiguous proposal of the supreme organ of Soviet power, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, to recognize the program of the Soviet power, to recognize the "Declaration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People," to recognize the October Revolution and the Soviet power. Thereby the Constituent Assembly severed all ties with the Soviet Republic of Russia. The withdrawal from such a Constituent Assembly of the groups of the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who now patently constitute the overwhelming majority in the Soviets and enjoy the confidence of the workers and the majority of the peasants, was inevitable.

The Right Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties are in fact waging outside the walls of the Constituent Assem-

bly a most desperate struggle against the Soviet power, calling openly in their press for its overthrow and characterizing as arbitrary and unlawful the crushing by force of the resistance of the exploiters by the toiling classes, which is essential in the interests of emancipation from exploitation. They are defending the saboteurs, the servitors of capital, and are going to the length of undisguised calls to terrorism, which certain "unidentified groups" have already begun to practise. It is obvious that under such circumstances the remaining part of the Constituent Assembly could only serve as a screen for the struggle of the counterrevolutionaries to overthrow the Soviet power.

Accordingly, the Central Executive Committee resolves: The Constituent Assembly is hereby dissolved.

Lenin's Call for Peace with Germany

The Eastern Front had been relatively quiet during 1917, and shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution a temporary armistice was agreed upon. Peace negotiations were then begun at the Polish town of Brest-Litovsk, behind the German lines. In conformity with their earlier anti-imperialist line, the Bolshevik negotiators, headed by Trotsky, used the talks as a forum for revolutionary propaganda, while most of the party expected the eventual resumption of war in the name of the revolution.

Lenin startled his followers in January, 1918, by bluntly demanding that the Soviet Republic meet the German conditions and conclude a formal peace in order to win what he regarded as an indispensable "breathing spell," instead of vainly risking the future of the revolution.

1. The position of the Russian revolution at the present moment is that nearly all the workers and the vast majority of the peasants undoubtedly side with the Soviet power and the socialist revolution which it has started. To that extent the socialist revolution in Russia is assured.

2. At the same time, the civil war, provoked by the frantic

FROM: Lenin, "Theses on the Question of Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace" (January 7 [20], 1918; *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 1, pp. 385-87, 390-92).

resistance of the wealthy classes, who perfectly realize that they stand before the last and decisive fight for the preservation of private ownership of the land and means of production, has not yet reached its climax. The victory of the Soviet power in this war is assured, but some time must inevitably elapse, no little exertion of effort will inevitably be required, a certain period of acute economic dislocation and chaos, such as attend all wars, and civil war in particular, is inevitable, before the resistance of the bourgeoisie is crushed.

3. Furthermore, this resistance, in its less active and non-military forms—sabotage, hiring of the declassed elements and of agents of the bourgeoisie, who worm their way into the ranks of the Socialists in order to ruin their cause, and so on and so forth—has proved so stubborn and capable of assuming such diversified forms, that the fight against it will inevitably require some more time, and, in its main forms, is scarcely likely to end before several months. And unless this passive and covert resistance of the bourgeoisie and its supporters is definitely crushed the socialist revolution cannot succeed.

4. Lastly, the organizational problems of the socialist transformation of Russia are so immense and difficult that their solution—in view of the abundance of petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers of the socialist proletariat, and of the latter's low cultural level—will also require a fairly long time.

5. All these circumstances taken together are such as to make it perfectly clear that for the success of Socialism in Russia a certain amount of time, several months at least, will be necessary, during which the hands of the socialist government must be absolutely free for achieving victory over the bourgeoisie in our own country first, and for launching on a wide scale far-reaching mass organizational work.

6. . . . That the socialist revolution in Europe must come, and will come, is beyond doubt. All our hopes for the *final* victory of Socialism are founded on this certainty and on this scientific prognosis. Our propagandist activities in general, and the organization of fraternization in particular, must be intensified and extended. But it would be a

mistake to base the tactics of the Russian socialist government on attempts to determine whether the European, and especially the German, socialist revolution will take place in the next six months (or some such brief period), or not. Inasmuch as it is quite impossible to determine this, all such attempts, objectively speaking, would be nothing but a blind gamble.

7. The peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk have by this date—January 7, 1918—made it perfectly clear that the upper hand in the German government . . . has undoubtedly been gained by the military party, which has virtually already presented Russia with an ultimatum . . . : either the continuation of the war, or an annexationist peace, i.e., peace on condition that we surrender all the territory we have occupied, while the Germans retain *all* the territory they have occupied and impose upon us an indemnity (outwardly disguised as payment for the maintenance of prisoners)—an indemnity of about three thousand million rubles, payable over a period of several years.

8. The socialist government of Russia is faced with the question—a question which brooks no postponement—of whether to accept this annexationist peace now, or at once to wage a revolutionary war. Actually speaking, no middle course is possible. No further postponement can now be achieved, for we have *already* done everything possible and impossible to protract the negotiations artificially. . . .

12. It is said that in a number of party statements we bluntly “promised” a revolutionary war, and that by concluding a separate peace we would be going back on our word.

That is not true. We said that in the era of imperialism it was *necessary* for a socialist government to “*prepare for and wage*” a revolutionary war; we said this in order to combat abstract pacifism and the theory that “defence of the fatherland” must be completely rejected in the era of imperialism, and, lastly, to combat the purely selfish instincts of a part of the soldiers, but we never gave any pledge to start a revolutionary war without considering how far it is possible to wage it at a given moment. . . .

13. Summing up the arguments in favour of an immediate revolutionary war, we have to conclude that such a policy might perhaps answer the human yearning for the beautiful, dramatic and striking, but that it would totally disregard the objective relation of class forces and material factors at the present stage of the socialist revolution which has begun.

14. There can be no doubt that our army is absolutely in no condition at the present moment, and will not be for the next few weeks (and probably for the next few months), to beat back a German offensive successfully. . . .

17. Consequently, the situation at present in regard to a revolutionary war is as follows:

If the German revolution were to break out and triumph in the coming three or four months, the tactics of an immediate revolutionary war might perhaps not ruin our socialist revolution.

If, however, the German revolution does not eventuate in the next few months, the course of events, if the war is continued, will inevitably be such that grave defeats will compel Russia to conclude a still more disadvantageous separate peace, a peace, moreover, which would be concluded, not by a socialist government, but by some other (for example, a bloc of the bourgeois Rada* and the Chernovites,** or something similar). For the peasant army, which is unbearably exhausted by the war, will after the very first defeats—and very likely within a matter of weeks, and not of months—overthrow the socialist workers' government.

18. Such being the state of affairs, it would be absolutely impermissible tactics to stake the fate of the socialist revolution which has already begun in Russia merely on the chance that the German revolution may begin in the immediate future, within a period measurable in weeks. Such tactics would be a reckless gamble. We have no right to take such risks.

19. And the German revolution will by no means be made

* Rada [“council”]: the Ukrainian nationalist regime in Kiev, 1917-1918—Ed.

** Chernovites: the Right SR's, led by V. M. Chernov—Ed.

more difficult of accomplishment as far as its objective premises are concerned, if we conclude a separate peace. . . .

Lenin's Defense of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

The issue of peace split the Bolshevik Party nearly in two, between the doctrinaire adherents of "revolutionary war," led by Bukharin and (somewhat less unequivocally) Trotsky, and the more cautious and practical-minded people like Zinoviev and Stalin who followed Lenin's lead. On February 23, 1918, the Central Committee finally voted to accept the German terms—loss of Poland, the Ukraine, and the Baltic region, and the cessation of all revolutionary propaganda abroad—by a scant five to four margin, with the middle group headed by Trotsky abstaining. The treaty was thereupon signed, on March 3. Ratification depended on approval by the Seventh Party Congress, to which Lenin appealed with the argument that peace was necessary so that the Soviet Republic could hold out until the onset of world revolution.

. . . International imperialism, with the entire might of its capital, with its highly organized military technique, which is a real force, a real fortress of international capital, could not under any circumstances, on any conditions, live side by side with the Soviet Republic, both because of its objective position and because of the economic interests of the capitalist class which are embodied in it—it could not do so because of commercial connections, of international financial relations. In this sphere a conflict is inevitable. Therein lies the greatest difficulty of the Russian revolution, its greatest historical problem: the necessity of solving international problems, the necessity of calling forth an international revolution, of effecting this transition from our strictly national revolution to the world revolution. . . .

. . . History has now placed us in an extraordinarily difficult position; in the midst of organizational work of un-

FROM: Lenin, Report on War and Peace, delivered to the Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), March 7, 1918 (*Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 1, pp. 422, 425, 429-30).

paralleled difficulty we shall have to experience a number of painful defeats. If we consider the situation on a world-historical scale, there would doubtlessly be no hope of the ultimate victory of our revolution, if it were to remain alone, if there were no revolutionary movements in other countries. When the Bolshevik Party tackled the job alone, took it entirely into its own hands, we did so being convinced that the revolution was maturing in all countries and that in the end—but not at the very beginning—no matter what difficulties we experienced, no matter what defeats were in store for us, the international socialist revolution would come—because it is coming; would ripen—because it is ripening and will grow ripe. I repeat, our salvation from all these difficulties is an all-European revolution. . . . The German revolution is growing, but not in the way we would like it, not as fast as Russian intellectuals would have it, not at the rate our history developed in October—when we entered any town we liked, proclaimed the Soviet power, and within a few days nine-tenths of the workers came over to our side. The German revolution has the misfortune of not moving so fast. What do you think: must we reckon with the revolution, or must the revolution reckon with us? You wanted the revolution to reckon with you. But history has taught you a lesson. It is a lesson, because it is the absolute truth that without a German revolution we are doomed—perhaps not in Petrograd, not in Moscow, but in Vladivostok, in more remote places to which perhaps we shall have to retreat, and the distance to which is perhaps greater than the distance from Petrograd to Moscow. At all events, under all conceivable vicissitudes, if the German revolution does not come, we are doomed. Nevertheless, this does not in the least shake our conviction that we must be able to bear the most difficult position without blustering.

The revolution will not come as quickly as we expected. History has proved this, and we must be able to take this as a fact, to reckon with the fact that the world socialist revolution cannot begin so easily in the advanced countries as the revolution began in Russia—in the land of Nicholas and Rasputin, the land in which an enormous part of the popula-

tion was absolutely indifferent as to what peoples were living in the outlying regions, or what was happening there. In such a country it was quite easy to start a revolution, as easy as lifting a feather.

But to start without preparation a revolution in a country in which capitalism is developed, in which it has produced a democratic culture and organization, provided it to everybody, down to the last man—to do so would be wrong, absurd. There we are only just approaching the painful period of the beginning of socialist revolutions. This is a fact. We do not know, no one knows; perhaps—it is quite possible—it will triumph within a few weeks, even within a few days, but we cannot stake everything on that. We must be prepared for extraordinary difficulties, for extraordinarily severe defeats, which are inevitable, because the revolution in Europe has not yet begun, although it may begin tomorrow, and when it does begin then, of course, we shall not be tortured by doubts, there will be no question about a revolutionary war, but just one continuous triumphal march. That will be, it will inevitably be so, but it is not so yet. This is the simple fact that history has taught us, with which she has hit us quite painfully—and a man who has been thrashed is worth two that haven't. That is why I think that after history has given us a very painful thrashing, because of our hope that the Germans cannot attack and that we can get everything by shouting "hurrah!", this lesson, with the help of our Soviet organizations, will be very quickly brought home to the masses all over Soviet Russia. . . .

Bukharin's Attack on the Peace Treaty

Bukharin pleaded at the Seventh Party Congress for the rejection of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on the ground that it tarnished the revolutionary appeal of the Soviet Republic at a time when, as he saw it, survival depended on evoking international revolutionary support.

The treaty was nevertheless approved by the party congress and officially ratified by the Congress of Soviets. The Left SR's then quit the cabinet in protest, after some inconsequential negotiations with Bukharin's Left Communists

about the idea of forming a new coalition, removing Lenin as head of the government, and resuming the war. This became a count in the indictment of Bukharin when he was tried for treason in 1938.

Meanwhile, the Seventh Congress changed the official name of the party—from “Russian Social-Democratic Party (of Bolsheviks)” to “Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).”

. . . Among the conditions of the peace are . . . points which reduce to nothing the international significance of the Russian revolution. And certainly we have said and say again that in the end the whole business depends on whether the international revolution is victorious or not. In the final reckoning the international revolution—and it alone—is our salvation. Even Comrade Lenin agrees with this. If we refrain from international propaganda, we also give up the sharpest weapon that we have at our disposal. International propaganda is a bell resounding throughout the world; if we refrain from using this bell, we are cutting our tongue off. . . . Up to now all the greatest force of the Russian revolution, all its greatest significance for the international proletarian movement consists in the fact that it has set forth an entirely clear, precise, definite program of action, which it has carried out not only in its newspaper, not only in its press, has carried out not just in words but in deeds. It is precisely the actions of the Soviet Republic, the clarity and definiteness of the program which it is carrying out, that have become its greatest attractive force. But now, when it will be declared to the whole world, when it will be known to all oppressed nations and all the proletariat that it [the Soviet Republic] is refraining from propaganda, that we have taken upon ourselves the holy mission of protecting German interests against English capital in colonial countries [Persia and Afghanistan] whose right to independence we had asserted as a slogan of struggle—excuse me, but I assert that this one point deals us such a blow, so undermines our

FROM: Bukharin's Minority Report to the Seventh Party Congress, March 7, 1918 (*Seventh Congress of the RCP: Stenographic Report*, Moscow, State Press, 1923, pp. 40-44, 50; editor's translation).

Soviet power on all fronts, within and without—that we cannot buy at such a price, such a price, a two-day breathing spell which gives us nothing; it is inexpedient because here we not only make a compromise with capital, here we destroy our own socialist essence. . . .

. . . We do have a way out. This way out, which Lenin rejects but which from our point of view is the only one—this way out is revolutionary war against German imperialism.

. . . Opportunists do not take account of the most important fact that the organization of a struggle grows in the very process of struggle. . . .

It is not necessary to point out that it is the greatest illusion to think that we could in the course of a few days utilize a breathing spell to create a formidable army, and fix the railroads, production and provisioning. There is no such prospect; we must reject it. Before us stands the prospect of steadily drawing broad circles of the population into the struggle during the process of this struggle. . . .

Before us we have a very real prospect which we must accept, because it is the only prospect, the only one in the sense of possibility and necessity—the prospect of war against international capital, which will bear the character of a civil war with this capital. . . .

. . . We say now that our task—in this we join you [i.e., Lenin and his supporters]—is for the workers really to dedicate themselves all the time to preparing for the coming inevitable moment, preparing for the terrible clash. On this depends the fate not only of the Russian revolution but of the international revolution as well. . . .

Therefore we propose breaking away from the policy which has been pursued up to now, annulling the peace treaty which gives us nothing and signifies our capitulation, and undertaking the proper preparations, the creation of a combat-ready Red Army. . . .

Trotsky on the Red Army

Trotsky resigned as Foreign Commissar during the Brest-Litovsk crisis, but he was immediately appointed Com-

missar of Military Affairs and entrusted with the creation of a new Red Army to replace the old Russian army which had dissolved during the revolution. Many Communists wanted the new military force to be built up on strictly revolutionary principles, with guerrilla tactics, the election of officers, and the abolition of traditional discipline. Trotsky set himself emphatically against this attitude and demanded an army organized in the conventional way and employing "military specialists"—experienced officers from the old army.

. . . As regards politics and direct fighting, the October Revolution has come about with unexpected and incomparable successfulness. There has been no case in history of such a powerful offensive of an oppressed class which with such deliberateness and speed overthrew the rule of the propertied ruling classes in all parts of the country and extended its own rule from Petrograd and Moscow to every far-flung corner of Russia.

This successfulness of the October uprising has shown the political weakness of the bourgeois classes, which is rooted in the peculiarities of the development of Russian capitalism. . . .

If, as the working class, following what Marx said, we cannot simply take over mechanically the old apparatus of state power, this does not at all mean that we can do without all of those elements which helped make up the old apparatus of state power.

The misfortune of the working class is that it has always been in the position of an oppressed class. This is reflected in everything: both in its level of education, and in the fact that it does not have those habits of rule which the dominant class has and which it bequeaths to its heirs through its schools, universities, etc. The working class has none of this, but must acquire it.

Having come to power, it has had to view the old state

FROM: Trotsky, "Labor, Discipline, Order" (Speech to a Moscow City Conference of the Russian Communist Party, March 27, 1918; Works, Vol. 17, part 1, Moscow, 1926, pp. 157-58, 161-62, 170-71; editor's translation).

apparatus as an apparatus of class oppression. But at the same time it must draw from this apparatus all the worthwhile skilled elements which are technically necessary, put them where they belong, and heighten its proletarian class power by using these elements. This, Comrades, is the task which now stands before us for our overall growth. . . .

Here I turn to a ticklish point which to a familiar degree has now assumed major importance in our party life. This is one of the questions of the organization of the army, specifically the question of recruiting military specialists—i.e., to speak plainly, former officers and generals—to create the army and to run it. All basic, guiding institutions of the army are now set up so that they consist of one military specialist and two political commissars. Such is the present basic type of the leading organs of the army.

I have more than once had to say at open meetings that in the area of command, operations and fighting we will place full responsibility on the military specialists, and therefore will grant them the necessary rights. Many among us are afraid of this, and their misgivings find expression in the resolutions of certain party organizations. . . . Here again the task of the party is to handle such phenomena in our own midst with complete mercilessness, for they ruin the country and disgrace and disrupt our party. . . .

There is still another question in the area of the organization of the army: the so-called elective principle. In general, all it means is to struggle against the old officers' corps, to control the commanding staff.

As long as power was in the hands of a class that was hostile to us, when the commanding staff was an instrument in the hands of this power, we were obliged to strive to smash the class resistance of the commanding personnel by way of the elective principle. But now political power is in the hands of that same working class from whose ranks the army is recruited.

Under the present regime in the army—I tell you this in all frankness—the elective principle is politically pointless and technically inexpedient, and has in fact already been set aside by decree. . . .

The question of creating the army is now a question of life and death for us. You yourselves understand this as well as I. But we cannot create the army only by means of the administrative mechanism which we have as long as it is so very poor. If we have a powerful mechanism, it is an ideological mechanism—this mechanism is our party. It will create the army, Comrades, and do everything to uproot the prejudices of which I spoke; it will help us fill up the cadres of the revolutionary army with militant and devoted workers and peasants, it will apply itself in conducting obligatory military training in the mills, factories and villages, and in this way will create the military apparatus for the defense of the Soviet Republic.

Lenin on Economic Expediency

Once firmly established in power, Lenin began to reconsider the utopianism which characterized the Bolsheviks in 1917 as regards both internal and international revolution. After the conclusion of peace he prepared an extensive statement on the transitional forms which he felt the Soviet economic order would have to adopt, with emphasis on the principal features of large-scale capitalistic industry—individual managerial authority, labor discipline and piecework incentives, and the employment of “bourgeois” managers and technical experts.

Thanks to the peace which has been achieved—notwithstanding its extremely onerous character and extreme instability—the Russian Soviet Republic has received an opportunity for a certain period of time to concentrate its efforts on the most important and most difficult aspect of the socialist revolution, namely, the organizational task. . . .

. . . In every socialist revolution—and consequently in the socialist revolution in Russia which we began on October

FROM: Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government: The International Position of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Fundamental Tasks of the Socialist Revolution” (April, 1918; *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 1, pp. 448, 450, 458-59, 468-71, 475-77, 481-82, 488).

25, 1917—the principal task of the proletariat, and of the poor peasantry which it leads, is the positive or constructive work of setting up an extremely intricate and delicate system of new organizational relationships extending to the planned production and distribution of the goods required for the existence of tens of millions of people. Such a revolution can be successfully carried out only if the majority of the population, and primarily the majority of the toilers, engage in independent creative work as makers of history. Only if the proletariat and the poor peasantry display sufficient class consciousness, devotion to principles, self-sacrifice and perseverance will the victory of the socialist revolution be assured. By creating a new, Soviet type of state, which gives the opportunity to the toiling and oppressed masses to take an active part in the independent building up of a new society, we solved only a small part of this difficult problem. The principal difficulty lies in the economic sphere, viz., the introduction of the strictest and universal accounting and control of the production and distribution of goods, raising the productivity of labour and *socializing* production *in actual practice*. . . .

This is a peculiar epoch, or rather stage of development, and in order to utterly defeat capital, we must be able to adapt the forms of our struggle to the peculiar conditions of this stage.

Without the guidance of specialists in the various fields of knowledge, technology and experience, the transition to Socialism will be impossible, because Socialism calls for a conscious mass advance to greater productivity of labour compared with capitalism, and on the basis achieved by capitalism. Socialism must achieve this advance *in its own way*, by its own methods—or, to put it more concretely, by *Soviet* methods. And the specialists, because of the entire environment of the social life which made them specialists, are, in the main, unavoidably bourgeois. Had our proletariat, after capturing power, quickly solved the problem of accounting, control and organization on a national scale (which was impossible owing to the war and the backwardness of Russia),

then we, after breaking the sabotage, would have also completely subordinated these bourgeois specialists to ourselves by means of universal accounting and control. . . .

Now we have to resort to the old bourgeois method and to agree to pay a very high price for the "services" of the biggest bourgeois specialists. All those who are familiar with the subject appreciate this, but not all ponder over the significance of this measure being adopted by the proletarian state. Clearly, such a measure is a compromise, a departure from the principles of the Paris Commune and of every proletarian power, which call for the reduction of all salaries to the level of the wages of the average worker, which call for fighting careerism, not with words, but with deeds.

Moreover, it is clear that such a measure not only implies the cessation—in a certain field and to a certain degree—of the offensive against capital (for capital is not a sum of money, but a definite social relation); it is also *a step backward* on the part of our socialist Soviet state power, which from the very outset proclaimed and pursued the policy of reducing high salaries to the level of the wages of the average worker. . . .

. . . It becomes immediately clear that while it is possible to capture the central government in a few days, while it is possible to suppress the military resistance (and sabotage) of the exploiters even in different parts of a great country in a few weeks, the capital solution of the problem of raising the productivity of labour requires, at all events (particularly after a most terrible and devastating war), several years. The protracted nature of the work is certainly dictated by objective circumstances. . . .

. . . We must raise the question of piecework and apply and test it in practice; we must raise the question of applying much of what is scientific and progressive in the Taylor system, we must make wages correspond to the total amount of goods turned out, or to the amount of work done by the railways, the water transport system, etc., etc.

The Russian is a bad worker compared with the advanced peoples. Nor could it be otherwise under the tsarist regime and in view of the tenacity of the remnants of serf-

dom. The task that the Soviet government must set the people in all its scope is—learn to work. The Taylor system, the last word of capitalism in this respect, like all capitalist progress, is a combination of the refined brutality of bourgeois exploitation and a number of greatest scientific achievements in the field of analyzing mechanical motions during work, the elimination of superfluous and awkward motions, the elaboration of correct methods of work, the introduction of the best system of accounting and control, etc. The Soviet Republic must at all costs adopt all that is valuable in the achievements of science and technology in this field. The possibility of building Socialism is conditioned precisely upon our success in combining the Soviet power and the Soviet organization of administration with the up-to-date achievements of capitalism. We must organize in Russia the study and teaching of the Taylor system and systematically try it out and adapt it to our purposes. . . .

. . . It would be extremely stupid and absurdly utopian to assume that the transition from capitalism to Socialism is possible without coercion and without dictatorship. Marx's theory very definitely opposed this petty-bourgeois-democratic and anarchist absurdity long ago. And Russia of 1917-18 confirms the correctness of Marx's theory in this respect so strikingly, palpably and imposingly that only those who are hopelessly dull or who have obstinately decided to turn their backs on the truth can be under any misapprehension concerning this. Either the dictatorship of Kornilov (if we take him as the Russian type of bourgeois Cavaignac*), or the dictatorship of the proletariat—any other choice is *out of the question* for a country which has gone through an extremely rapid development with extremely sharp turns and amidst desperate ruin created by one of the most horrible wars in history. . . .

. . . Firstly, capitalism cannot be defeated and eradicated without the ruthless suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, who cannot at once be deprived of their wealth, of their advantages of organization and knowledge, and

* Cavaignac: general who put down the uprising of the Paris working class in June, 1848—Ed.

consequently for a fairly long period will inevitably try to overthrow the hated rule of the poor; secondly, every great revolution, and a socialist revolution in particular, even if there were no external war, is inconceivable without internal war, i.e., civil war, which is even more devastating than external war, and involves thousands and millions of cases of wavering and desertion from one side to another, implies a state of extreme indefiniteness, lack of equilibrium and chaos. And of course, all the elements of disintegration of the old society, which are inevitably very numerous and connected mainly with the petty bourgeoisie (because it is the petty bourgeoisie that every war and every crisis ruins and destroys first) cannot but "reveal themselves" during such a profound revolution. And these elements of disintegration *cannot* "reveal themselves" otherwise than in the increase of crime, hooliganism, corruption, profiteering and outrages of every kind. To put these down requires time and *requires an iron hand*. . . .

. . . There is absolutely *no* contradiction in principle between Soviet (*that is*, socialist) democracy and the exercise of dictatorial powers by individuals. The difference between proletarian dictatorship and bourgeois dictatorship is that the former strikes at the exploiting minority in the interests of the exploited majority, and that it is exercised—*also through individuals*—not only by the toiling and exploited masses, but also by organizations which are built in such a way as to rouse these masses to the work of history-making. (The Soviet organizations are organizations of this kind.)

In regard to the second question concerning the significance of precisely individual dictatorial powers from the point of view of the specific tasks of the present moment, it must be said that large-scale machine industry—which is precisely the material source, the productive source, the foundation of Socialism—calls for absolute and strict *unity of will*, which directs the joint labours of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people. The technical, economic and historical necessity of this is obvious, and all those who have thought about Socialism have always regarded it as one of the conditions of Socialism. But how can strict unity of will

be ensured?—by thousands subordinating their will to the will of one.

Given ideal class consciousness and discipline on the part of those taking part in the common work, this subordination would rather remind one of the mild leadership of a conductor of an orchestra. It may assume the sharp forms of a dictatorship if ideal discipline and class consciousness are lacking. But be that as it may, *unquestioning subordination* to a single will is absolutely necessary for the success of processes organized on the pattern of large-scale machine industry. On the railways it is twice and three times as necessary. In this transition from one political task to another, which *on the surface* is totally dissimilar to the first, consists the peculiar nature of the present situation. The revolution has only just smashed the oldest, strongest and heaviest fetters to which the masses submitted under duress. That was yesterday. But today the same revolution demands—precisely in the interests of its development and consolidation, precisely in the interests of Socialism—that the masses *unquestioningly obey the single will* of the leaders of the labour process. Of course, such a transition cannot be made at one step. Clearly, it can be achieved only as a result of tremendous jolts, shocks, reverions to old ways, the enormous exertion of effort on the part of the proletarian vanguard, which is leading the people to the new ways. . . .

The fight against the bureaucratic distortion of the Soviet form of organization is assured by the firmness of the connection between the Soviets and the “people,” meaning by that the toilers and exploited, and by the flexibility and elasticity of this connection. Even in the most democratic capitalist republics in the world, the poor never regard the bourgeois parliament as “their own” institution. But the Soviets are “their own” and not alien institutions to the masses of workers and peasants. . . .

The Left Communists on a Proletarian Economic Policy

Lenin's espousal of the forms of capitalist industry was a rude shock to the anarchistic hopes of the Communist left

wing. The Left Communist opposition which had fought the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk now organized to resist, in the name of the working class, the "petty-bourgeois" policy of "state capitalism" as a menace to the ideals of the revolution.

. . . 8. The economic situation and the grouping of classes in Russia have changed since the conclusion of peace. A situation has arisen which provides the foundation for two opposite tendencies (toward the weakening and toward the growth of revolutionary forces), of which the first was immediately strengthened by the conclusion of the peace and for the time being may prevail. . . .

9. . . . In spite of the temporary weakening of the forces of the revolution, in spite of the serious international position of the Soviet Republic, there is no serious support within the limits of the present Soviet state for the restoration either of the monarchy or of the power of the compromiser parties. . . .

On the contrary, there is a basis for the strengthening and development of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasants, and for the socialist reform of society which they have begun. . . . Above all, the preliminary smashing of the bourgeois-compromiser governmental system, of the old relations of production, and of the material class forces of the bourgeoisie and its allies is almost complete. Further, the class education of the proletariat in the course of civil war will give it a great supply of class solidarity, energy and consciousness. Also, the real conquests which it has made have strengthened these revolutionary forces and energy in resisting the enemy who threatens the conquests of the proletariat. The energetic organization of production on socialist lines will on the one hand strengthen the economic base of the proletariat as a revolutionary force, and on the other will be a new school of class organization and activity for it. Finally, the preservation of a link with the international and all-Russian proletarian movement will also increase the

FROM: "Theses on the Present Moment," presented by the faction of Left Communists to a conference of party leaders, April 4, 1918 (*Kommunist*, No. 1, April, 1918; editor's translation).

class activity of the proletariat and protect it from disruption and tiring.

But in connection with the most imminent, immediate consequences of the peace: the reduction of class activeness and the increasing de-classing of the proletariat in the main revolutionary centers, in connection with the increasing class fusion of the proletariat and poorest peasants (which since the signing of the peace must, under the pressure of their demands and influence, become a bulwark of the soviet power), it is quite possible for a tendency to arise toward a deviation by the majority of the Communist Party and the soviet power directed by it into the channel of a petty-bourgeois policy of a new form.

In the event that this tendency becomes a reality, the working class will cease to be the director, the exerciser of hegemony over the socialist revolution, leading the poorest peasantry toward the destruction of the rule of finance capital and the landlords; it will show itself to be a force sprinkled into the ranks of the semiproletarian-petty-bourgeois masses, a force which sets itself the task not of the proletarian struggle in union with the West-European proletariat for the overthrow of the imperialist system, but the defense of the farmers' fatherland from the oppression of imperialism, which is possible to achieve by means of compromise with it. In the event of the rejection of an actively proletarian policy, the conquests of the workers' and peasants' revolution would begin to freeze into a system of state capitalism and petty-bourgeois economic relations.

10. Before the party of the proletariat two paths stand open. One of these paths is to guard and strengthen the intact part of the Soviet state, which now with respect to the economic process—since the revolution is not complete—is only an organization for the transition to socialism (with incomplete nationalization of the banks, with capitalistic forms of financing enterprises, with the partial nationalization of enterprises, with the predominance of small-scale farming and small property-holding in the village, with the effort of the peasants to solve the agrarian question by dividing the land; and in the political respect can be transformed from

the framework of the dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the poorest peasantry, into an instrument for the political domination of the semiproletarian-petty-bourgeois masses, and become merely a transition stage to the full domination of finance capital.

This path can be justified—verbally—as an effort to preserve for the international revolution, in any way at all, the revolutionary forces and soviet power even if in “Great Russia” alone.* In this case every effort will be directed toward the strengthening and development of the forces of the revolution, toward “organic construction,” with the rejection of further smashing of capitalistic production relations and even with the partial restoration of them. . . .

11. . . . The economic policy which corresponds to such a course will have to develop in the direction of agreements with capitalistic businessmen, both the “patriotic” ones and the international ones who stand behind them. . . .

With the policy of administering enterprises on the basis of broad participation by capitalists and semibureaucratic centralization it is natural to combine a labor policy directed toward the installation among the workers of discipline under the banner of “self-discipline,” toward the introduction of obligatory labor for workers (such a program was proposed by the rightist Bolsheviks), piecework payment, lengthening of the working day, etc.

The form of governmental administration will have to develop in the direction of bureaucratic centralization, the rule of various commissars, the deprivation of local soviets of their independence, and in practice the rejection of the type of “commune state” administered from below. . . .

12. The path described above, taken as a whole, as well as the tendency to deviate along this path, is dangerous in the highest degree to the interests of the Russian and international proletariat. This path strengthens the separation begun by the Brest peace between the “Great-Russian” Soviet Republic and the all-Russian and international revolutionary movement, locking up the Soviet Republic in the frame of a national

* I.e., in Russia minus its non-Russian-speaking western regions
—Ed.

state with a transitional economy and a petty-bourgeois political order. . . .

The line of policy sketched above may strengthen the influence of foreign and domestic counterrevolutionary forces in Russia, break down the revolutionary might of the working class, and, by cutting the Russian revolution off from the international revolution, have a ruinous effect on the interests of both.

13. Proletarian Communists consider another course of policy essential: not the course of preserving a soviet oasis in the north of Russia with the help of concessions that transform it into a petty-bourgeois state; not the transition to "organic internal work," fortified by the consideration that the "acute period" of the civil war is over.

The acute period of civil war is over only in the sense of the absence of an objective necessity to apply predominantly the sharpest physical measures of revolutionary violence. Once the bourgeoisie is beaten and is no longer capable of open fighting, "military" methods for the most part subside. But the sharpness of the class contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie cannot diminish; as before, the position of the proletariat in relation to the bourgeoisie reduces to the complete negation of it, the annihilation of it as a class. The end of the acute period of the civil war cannot signify that deals are possible with the remaining forces of the bourgeoisie, and the "organic construction" of socialism, which is undoubtedly the key task of the moment, can be accomplished only by the efforts of the proletariat itself, with the participation of skilled technicians and administrators, and not with some form or other of collaboration with the "privileged elements" as such.

The Russian workers' revolution cannot "save itself" by leaving the international revolutionary path, steadily avoiding a fight, retreating in the face of the pressure of international capital, and making concessions to "patriotic capital." . . .

The administration of enterprises must be placed in the hands of mixed collegia of workers and technical personnel, under the control and direction of the local economic councils. All economic life must be subordinated to the organized in-

fluence of these councils, which are chosen by the workers without the participation of the "privileged elements," but with the participation of the unions of the technical and service personnel of the enterprises.

No capitulation to the bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois intellectual henchmen, but the finishing off of the bourgeoisie and the final smashing of sabotage. Final liquidation of the counterrevolutionary press and counterrevolutionary bourgeois organizations. Introduction of labor duty for skilled specialists and intellectuals; organization of consumption communes; limitation of consumption by the well-to-do classes and confiscation of their surplus possessions. In the village, organization of pressure by the poorest peasants on the rich ones, the development of large-scale social agriculture, and the support of forms of working the land by the poorest peasants in the transition to social farming . . .

15. The proletarian Communists define their attitude toward the majority of the party as the position of the left wing of the party and the vanguard of the Russian proletariat, which preserves full unity with the party insofar as the policy of the majority does not create an unavoidable split in the ranks of the proletariat itself. They define their attitude toward the Soviet power as the position of unqualified support of this power at a time of necessity, by way of participating in it insofar as the confirmation of the peace has removed from the agenda the question of responsibility for this decision and has created a new objective situation. This participation is possible only on the basis of a definite political program which would prevent the deviation of the Soviet power and the majority of the party on the ruinous path of petty-bourgeois policies. In the event of such a deviation the left wing of the party will have to stand in the position of an effective and responsible proletarian opposition.

One-Party Dictatorship

With the rapid spread of armed resistance to the Communists in the spring of 1918 and the organization of the "White"

armies, the relatively moderate phase of Soviet rule came to an end. The anti-Communist socialist parties were ousted from the soviets and in effect outlawed. In July, 1918, the Left SR's abandoned the role of a loyal opposition and tried to overthrow the Communists in the hope of forcing a resumption of the war. With their defeat, the Soviet government became a completely one-party affair. Political terror commenced in the summer of 1918, with widespread summary executions by both "Reds" and "Whites." Revolutionary emotion and violence swelled to a climax as bitter civil war raged from 1918 to 1920. Most Communists were filled with a fanaticism that combined utopian hopes for socialism with dictatorial violence against all who stood in their way.

Taking into consideration that:

1. The Soviet Government is living through its most difficult period, having to withstand at the same time the attacks of international imperialism . . . and those of its allies within the Russian Republic, who spare no means, from the most shameless calumny to conspiracy and armed uprisings, in the struggle against the Workers' and Peasants' Government.
2. The presence in Soviet organizations of representatives of parties which are obviously endeavoring to discredit and overthrow the Soviet Government is absolutely intolerable.
3. From previously published documents, as well as from those cited at the present meeting, it is clear that representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionists (of the Right and Center) and the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party (Menshevik) . . . are guilty of organizing armed attacks against the workers and peasants, in association with notorious counter-revolutionists. . . .

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets

FROM: Decree on the Expulsion of the Right Socialist Parties from the Soviets, June 14, 1918 (English translation in James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia, April-December, 1918*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1936, p. 191; this and following selection reprinted by permission of the publisher).

resolves: To exclude from its membership the representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionists (of the Right and Center) and the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party (Menshevik), and to urge all Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies to remove representatives of these parties from their ranks.

Y. Sverdlov
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee.

War Communism

Upon the outbreak of civil war, radical changes were introduced in Soviet economic policy. Class strife was encouraged among the peasants, and food supplies were forcibly "requisitioned" to keep the cities fed. Industry, up to this point under private ownership with "workers' control," was nationalized without compensation in a series of sweeping decrees, and placed under a highly centralized bureaucratic administration. With the breakdown of transportation and the monetary system, Russia approached a "natural economy" based on the equalization of poverty through rationing.

For the purpose of combating decisively the economic disorganization and the breakdown of the food supply, and of establishing more firmly the dictatorship of the working class and the village poor, the Soviet of People's Commissars has resolved:

1. To declare all of the following industrial and commercial enterprises which are located in the Soviet Republic, with all their capital and property, whatever they may consist of, the property of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. [At this point there is given a long list of the most important mines, mills, factories, etc.]

2. The administration of the nationalized industries shall be organized . . . by the different departments of the Supreme Council of National Economy. . . .

FROM: Decree on Nationalization of Large-Scale Industry, June 28, 1918 (English translation in Bunyan, pp. 397-99).

3. Until the Supreme Council of National Economy issues special rulings for each enterprise, the enterprises which have been declared the property of the R.S.F.S.R. by this decree shall be considered as leased rent-free to their former owners; the boards of directors and the former owners shall continue to finance the enterprises . . . and also to receive the income from them. . . .

4. Beginning with the promulgation of this decree, the members of the administration, the directors, and other responsible officers of the nationalized industries will be held responsible to the Soviet Republic both for the intactness and upkeep of the business and for its proper functioning. Those who leave their posts without the permission of the . . . Supreme Council of National Economy, or are found guilty of negligence in the management of the business, are liable both civilly and criminally to the Republic.

5. The entire personnel of every enterprise—technicians, workers, members of the board of directors, and foremen—shall be considered employees of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic; their wages shall be fixed in accordance with the scales existing at the time of nationalization and shall be paid out of the funds of the respective enterprises. Those who leave their posts . . . are liable to the Revolutionary Tribunal and to the full penalty of the law.

6. All private capital belonging to members of the boards of directors, stockholders, and owners of the nationalized enterprises will be attached pending the determination of the relation of such capital to the turnover capital and resources of the enterprises in question.

7. All boards of directors of the nationalized enterprises must prepare at once a financial statement of their respective businesses as of July 1, 1918.

8. The Supreme Council of National Economy is authorized to formulate at once and send to all nationalized plants detailed instructions on the organization connected with the carrying out of the present decree.

9. Enterprises belonging to consumers' cooperative societies . . . are not to be nationalized.

10. The present decree becomes effective on the day it is signed.

V. Ulianov (Lenin)

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars

Tsiurupa, Nogin, Rykov

People's Commissars.

Rosa Luxemburg—A Western Radical's Response to the Communists

At the time of the Russian Revolution Rosa Luxemburg was in jail in Germany for her activity in the antiwar wing of the German Social-Democratic Party. She wrote a remarkably objective pamphlet appraising the new Soviet regime and prophetically indicating its fundamental defects.

The Russian Revolution is the mightiest event of the World War. Its outbreak, its unexampled radicalism, its enduring consequences, constitute the clearest condemnation of the lying phrases which official Social-Democracy so zealously supplied at the beginning of the war as an ideological cover for German imperialism's campaign of conquest. . . .

Moreover, for every thinking observer, these developments are a decisive refutation of the doctrinaire theory which Kautsky shared with the Government Social-Democrats,* according to which Russia, as an economically backward and predominantly agrarian land, was supposed not to be ripe for social revolution and proletarian dictatorship. This theory, which regards only a *bourgeois* revolution as feasible in Russia, is also the theory of the opportunist wing of the Russian labor movement, of the so-called Mensheviks. . . .

. . . According to this view, if the revolution has gone beyond that point and has set as its task the dictatorship of

FROM: Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution* (1918; English translation by Bertram D. Wolfe, New York, Workers Age Publishers, 1940, pp. 1-4, 11-12, 44-48, 53-54, 56).

* I.e., the wing of the German Social-Democratic Party which supported the government's war effort—Ed.

the proletariat, this is simply a mistake of the radical wing of the Russian labor movement, the Bolsheviks. And all difficulties which the revolution has met with in its further course, and all disorders it has suffered, are pictured as purely a result of this fateful error. . . .

The fate of the revolution in Russia depended fully upon international events. That the Bolsheviks have based their policy entirely upon the world proletarian revolution is the clearest proof of their political farsightedness and firmness of principle and of the bold scope of their policies. . . .

The real situation in which the Russian Revolution found itself, narrowed down in a few months to the alternative: victory of the counter-revolution or dictatorship of the proletariat—Kaledin* or Lenin. . . . The Russian Revolution has but confirmed the basic lesson of every great revolution, the law of its being, which decrees: either the revolution must advance at a rapid, stormy and resolute tempo, break down all barriers with an iron hand and place its goals ever farther ahead, or it is quite soon thrown backward behind its feeble point of departure and suppressed by counter-revolution. To stand still, to mark time on one spot, to be contented with the first goal it happens to reach, is never possible in revolution. . . .

Lenin says: the bourgeois state is an instrument of oppression of the working class; the socialist state, of the bourgeoisie. To a certain extent, he says, it is only the capitalist state stood on its head. This simplified view misses the most essential thing: bourgeois class rule has no need of the political training and education of the entire mass of the people, at least not beyond certain narrow limits. But for the proletarian dictatorship that is the life element, the very air without which it is not able to exist. . . .

. . . The very giant tasks which the Bolsheviks have undertaken with courage and determination . . . demand the most intensive political training of the masses and the accumulation of experience.

Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only

* Kaledin: Cossack general who organized the first White resistance to the Bolsheviks—Ed.

for the members of one party—however numerous they may be—is no freedom at all. Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently. Not because of any fanatical concept of “justice” but because all that is instructive, wholesome and purifying in political freedom depends on this essential characteristic, and its effectiveness vanishes when “freedom” becomes a special privilege. . . .

The tacit assumption underlying the Lenin-Trotsky theory of the dictatorship is this: that the socialist transformation is something for which a ready-made formula lies completed in the pocket of the revolutionary party, which needs only to be carried out energetically in practice. This is, unfortunately—or perhaps fortunately—not the case. Far from being a sum of ready-made prescriptions which have only to be applied, the practical realization of socialism as an economic, social and juridical system is something which lies completely hidden in the mists of the future. . . .

. . . Socialism by its very nature cannot be decreed or introduced by *ukaz*. It has as its prerequisite a number of measures of force—against property, etc. The negative, the tearing down, can be decreed; the building up, the positive, cannot. New territory. A thousand problems. Only experience is capable of correcting and opening new ways. Only unobstructed, effervescent life falls into a thousand new forms and improvisations, brings to light creative force, itself corrects all mistaken attempts. The public life of countries with limited freedom is so poverty-stricken, so miserable, so rigid, so unfruitful, precisely because, through the exclusion of democracy, it cuts off the living sources of all spiritual riches and progress. . . .

. . . Socialism in life demands a complete spiritual transformation in the masses degraded by centuries of bourgeois class rule. Social instincts in place of egotistical ones, mass initiative in place of inertia, idealism which conquers all suffering, etc., etc. No one knows this better, describes it more penetratingly, repeats it more stubbornly than Lenin. But he is completely mistaken in the means he employs. Decree, dictatorial force of the factory overseer, draconic penalties, rule by terror—all these things are but palliatives. The only

way to a rebirth is the school of public life itself, the most unlimited, the broadest democracy and public opinion. It is rule by terror which demoralizes.

When all this is eliminated, what really remains? In place of the representative bodies created by general, popular elections, Lenin and Trotsky have laid down the soviets as the only true representation of the laboring masses. But with the repression of political life in the land as a whole, life in the soviets must also become more and more crippled. Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element. Public life gradually falls asleep, a few dozen party leaders of inexhaustible energy and boundless experience direct and rule. Among them, in reality only a dozen outstanding heads do the leading and an elite of the working class is invited from time to time to meetings where they are to applaud the speeches of the leaders, and to approve proposed resolutions unanimously—at bottom, then, a clique affair—a dictatorship, to be sure, not the dictatorship of the proletariat, however, but only the dictatorship of a handful of politicians, that is a dictatorship in the bourgeois sense, in the sense of the rule of the Jacobins. . . . Yes, we can go even further: such conditions must inevitably cause a brutalization of public life: attempted assassinations, shooting of hostages, etc. . . .

“As Marxists,” writes Trotsky, “we have never been idol worshippers of formal democracy.” . . . All that that really means is: We have always distinguished the social kernel from the political form of *bourgeois* democracy; we have always revealed the hard kernel of social inequality and lack of freedom hidden under the sweet shell of formal equality and freedom—not in order to reject the latter but to spur the working class into not being satisfied with the shell, but rather, by conquering political power, to create a socialist democracy to replace bourgeois democracy—not to eliminate democracy altogether. . . .

Yes, dictatorship! But this dictatorship consists in the

manner of applying democracy, not in its *elimination*, in energetic, resolute attacks upon the well-entrenched rights and economic relationships of bourgeois society, without which a socialist transformation cannot be accomplished. But this dictatorship must be the work of the *class* and not of a little leading minority in the name of the class—that is, it must proceed step by step out of the active participation of the masses; it must be under their direct influence, subjected to the control of complete public activity; it must arise out of the growing political training of the mass of the people. . . .

What is in order is to distinguish the essential from the non-essential, the kernel from the accidental excrescences in the policies of the Bolsheviks. In the present period, when we face decisive final struggles in all the world, the most important problem of socialism was and is the burning question of our time. It is not a matter of this or that secondary question of tactics, but of the capacity for action of the proletariat, the strength to act, the will to power of socialism as such. In this, Lenin and Trotsky and their friends were the *first*, those who went ahead as an example to the proletariat of the world; they are still the *only ones* up to now who can cry with Hutten:^{*} “I have dared!”

This is the essential and *enduring* in Bolshevik policy. In *this* sense theirs is the immortal historical service of having marched at the head of the international proletariat with the conquest of political power and the practical placing of the problem of the realization of socialism, and of having advanced mightily the settlement of the score between capital and labor in the entire world. In Russia the problem could only be posed. It could not be solved in Russia. And in *this* sense, the future everywhere belongs to “Bolshevism.”

The Party Program of 1919

An official statement of the aims and principles of the Communist Party was issued by the Eighth Party Congress

* Ulrich von Hutten: German humanist and early follower of Luther—Ed.

in 1919. It is noteworthy for its stress on the superior "democratic" character of the Soviet state, the importance of education and anti-religious propaganda, and the economic role of the trade unions, together with the necessary expedients of economic incentives and "bourgeois" experts.

. . . 2. In contrast to bourgeois democracy, which concealed the class character of the state, the Soviet authority openly acknowledges that every state must inevitably bear a class character until the division of society into classes has been abolished and all government authority disappears. By its very nature, the Soviet state directs itself to the suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, and the Soviet constitution does not stop short of depriving the exploiters of their political rights, bearing in mind that any kind of freedom is a deception if it is opposed to the emancipation of labor from the yoke of capital. The aim of the Party of the proletariat consists in carrying on a determined suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, in struggling against the deeply rooted prejudices concerning the absolute character of bourgeois rights and freedom, and at the same time explaining that deprivation of political rights and any kind of limitation of freedom are necessary as temporary measures in order to defeat the attempts of the exploiters to retain or to reestablish their privileges. With the disappearance of the possibility of the exploitation of one human being by another, the necessity for these measures will also gradually disappear and the Party will aim to reduce and completely abolish them. . . .

8. The proletarian revolution, owing to the Soviet organization of the state, was able at one stroke finally to destroy the old bourgeois, official and judicial state apparatus. The comparatively low standard of culture of the masses, the absence of necessary experience in state administration on the part of responsible workers who are elected by the masses, the pressing necessity, owing to the critical situation of engag-

FROM: *The Program of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)* (1919; English translation, Moscow, Communist Library [1920], reprinted in James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera, *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System*, Ann Arbor, Mich., Wahr, 1950, pp. 105, 107-8, 110-15).

ing specialists of the old school, and the calling up to military service of the more advanced section of city workmen, all this led to the partial revival of bureaucratic practices within the Soviet system.

The All-Russian Communist Party, carrying on a resolute struggle with bureaucratism, suggests the following measures for overcoming this evil:

(1) Every member of the Soviet is obliged to perform a certain duty in state administration.

(2) These duties must change in rotation, so as gradually to embrace all the branches of administrative work.

(3) All the working masses without exception must be gradually induced to take part in the work of state administration.

The complete realization of these measures will carry us in advance of the Paris Commune, and [the simplification of the work of administration, together with the raising of the level of culture of the masses, will eventually lead to the abolition of state authority. . . .]

Jurisprudence

11. Proletarian democracy, taking power into its own hands and finally abolishing the organs of domination of the bourgeoisie—the former courts of justice—has replaced the formula of bourgeois democracy: “judges elected by the people” by the class watchword: “judges elected from the working masses and only by the working masses,” and has applied the latter in the organization of law courts, having extended equal rights to both sexes, both in the election of judges and in the exercise of the functions of judges.

In order to induce the broad masses of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry to take part in the administration of justice, a bench of jury-judges sitting in rotation under guidance of a permanent judge is introduced and various labor organizations and trade unions must impanel their delegates. . . .

Public Education

12. The All-Russian Communist Party in the field of education sets itself the task of bringing to fulfillment the work begun by the October Revolution of 1917, of transforming the school from an instrument of class domination of the bourgeoisie into an instrument for the abolition of the class divisions of society, into an instrument for a communist regeneration of society.

In the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., in the period of preparation of conditions suitable for the realization of communism, the school must be not only the conductor of communist principles, but it must become the conductor of the intellectual, organizational and educational influences of the proletariat, to the semi-proletariat and non-proletarian sections of the toiling masses, in order to educate a generation capable of establishing communism. . . .

Religion

13. With reference to religion, the All-Russian Communist Party does not content itself with the already decreed separation of church from state, i.e., measures which are one of the items of the programs of bourgeois democracy, which was, however, never fulfilled owing to many and various ties binding capital with religious propaganda.

The All-Russian Communist Party is guided by the conviction that only the realization of conscious and systematic social and economic activity of the masses will lead to the disappearance of religious prejudices. The aim of the Party is finally to destroy the ties between the exploiting classes and the organization of religious propaganda, at the same time helping the toiling masses actually to liberate their minds from religious superstitions, and organizing on a wide scale scientific-educational and anti-religious propaganda. It is, however, necessary carefully to avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of believers, which leads only to the strengthening of religious fanaticism.

Economics

1. Undeviatingly to continue and finally to realize the expropriation of the bourgeoisie which was begun and which has already been largely completed, the transforming of all means of production and exchange into the property of the Soviet republic, i.e., the common property of all toilers.

2. All possible increase of the productive forces of the country must be considered the fundamental and principal point upon which the economic policy of the Soviet Government is based. In view of the disorganization of the country, everything in other spheres of life must be subordinated to the practical aim immediately and at all costs to increase the quantity of products required by the population. The successful functioning of every Soviet institution connected with public economy must be gauged by the practical results in this direction.

At the same time it is necessary in the first place to pay attention to the following:

3. The decaying imperialist system of economy left to the Soviet state a heritage of chaos in the organization and management of production, which hampered it in the first period of construction. The more imperative therefore becomes the fundamental task of concentrating all the economic activity of the country according to a general state plan; the greatest concentration of production for the purpose of amalgamating it into various branches and groups of branches, and centralizing it in the most productive units, and for the purpose of rapidity in carrying out economic achievements; the most efficient arrangement of the productive apparatus and a rational and economical utilization of all material resources of the country. . . .

5. The organizing apparatus of socialized industry must first of all rest upon the trade unions. The latter must free themselves from their narrow guild outlook and transform themselves into large productive combinations which will unite the majority, and finally all the workmen of a given branch of production.

Trade unions, being already, according to the laws of the Soviet Republic and established practice, participants in all local and central organs for managing industry, must actually concentrate in their hands the management of the whole system of public economy as an economic unit. The trade unions, thus securing an indissoluble union between the central state administration, the public system of economy and the masses of toilers must induce the latter to take part in the immediate management of production. The participation of trade unions in the management of production and the attraction by them of the broad masses are, moreover, the principal means to carry on a struggle against bureaucracy in the economic apparatus of the Soviet state, and afford the opportunity of establishing a really democratic control over the results of production.

6. A maximum utilization of all labor power existing in the state, its regular distribution and redistribution among various territorial regions as well as among various branches of production, is necessary for the systematic development of public economy, and must be the immediate aim in the economic policy of the Soviet Government. This aim can be attained in closest co-operation with the trade unions. For the purpose of performing certain social duties, a general mobilization of all capable of work must be carried out by the Soviet Government, aided by the trade unions, on a much wider scale and more systematically than has been done hitherto.

7. In the state of the complete disorganization of the capitalist system of labor, the productive forces of the country can be restored and developed, and a socialist system of production strengthened, only on the basis of the comradely discipline of toilers, maximum activity on their part, responsibility and the strictest mutual control over the productivity of labor.

Persistent systematic effort directed to the re-education of the masses is necessary to attain this aim. This work is now made easier as the masses in reality see the abolition of capitalists, landowners, and merchants, and from their own

experience draw the conclusion that the level of their prosperity depends entirely upon the productivity of their own labor.

The trade unions play the principal part in the work of establishing a new socialist discipline. Breaking with old conventions, they must put into practice and try various measures, such as the establishment of control, standards of production, the introduction of responsibility of the workmen before special labor tribunals, etc., for the realization of this aim.

8. Moreover, for the development of the productive forces the immediate, wide and full utilization of all specialists in science and technology left to us by capitalism, is necessary, in spite of the fact that the majority of the latter are inevitably imbued with bourgeois ideas and habits. The Party considers that the period of sharp struggle with this group, owing to organized sabotage on their part, is ended as the sabotage is in the main subdued. The Party, in closest contact with the trade unions, will follow its former line of action, i.e., on the one hand it will make no political concessions to this bourgeois section and mercilessly suppress any counter-revolutionary moves on its part, and on the other hand it will carry on a merciless struggle against the pseudo-radical, but in reality, ignorant and conceited opinion that the working class can overcome capitalism and the bourgeois order without the aid of bourgeois specialists or taking advantage of their knowledge, without passing, together with them, through a thorough schooling of hard work.

While striving toward equal remuneration of labor and to realize communism, the Soviet Government does not regard the immediate realization of such equality possible at the moment, when only the first steps are being taken towards replacing capitalism by communism. It is therefore necessary to maintain a higher remuneration for specialists in order that they should work not worse but better than before, and for that purpose it is not possible to abandon the system of bonuses for the most successful, particularly for work of organization.

To the same degree, it is necessary to place the bourgeois

experts in a setting of comradely common effort, working hand in hand with the mass of average workers, led by class-conscious Communists, and thus to assist the mutual understanding and unity between manual and intellectual workers formerly separated by capitalism. . . .

Centralization of the Communist Party

Under the stress of civil war the Communist leaders had to put a premium on swift decision-making and on the development of a disciplined body of party secretaries to carry out decisions. The Eighth Party Congress accordingly approved the creation of new executive organs for the party—the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat—and gave these central bodies full authority over the membership (including Communists in nominally separate countries like the Ukraine). With this step the Communist Party began to approximate the organizational ideal laid down by Lenin in 1902.

. . . 1. The Growth of the Party:

The numerical growth of the party is progressive only insofar as healthy proletarian elements of town and country flow into the ranks of the party. The doors of the party should be wide open to workers and to worker and peasant youth. But the party must always follow attentively the progressive changes in its social composition. . . . It is important to handle the admission into the party of non-worker and non-peasant elements by careful selection. . . .

2. The Link with the Masses:

The Russian Communist Party, since it is in power and holds in its hands the whole apparatus of the soviets, has naturally had to turn tens of thousands of its members over to the work of administering the country. One of the party's most important tasks at the present moment is to place new thousands of its best functionaries in the network of the gov-

FROM: Resolution of the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, March, 1919, "On the Organizational Question," (CPSU in Resolutions, I, 441-44; editor's translation).

ernmental administration (the railroads, provisioning, control, the army, the courts, etc.).

However, in connection with the fulfillment of this substantial task a serious danger has arisen. Many members of the party who have been placed in this governmental work are divorcing themselves from the masses and becoming infected with bureaucratism, which very often applies to many workers who are members of the soviets. It is necessary to begin the most determined struggle against this evil immediately. . . .

4. The Internal Structure of the Central Committee:

The Central Committee has no less than two plenary sessions a month on previously arranged days. All the most important political and organizational questions which do not demand the most hasty decision are considered at these plenary meetings of the Central Committee.

The Central Committee organizes firstly a *Political Bureau*, secondly an *Organizational Bureau*, and thirdly a *Secretariat*.

The Political Bureau consists of five members of the Central Committee. All the other members of the Central Committee who find it possible to participate in one or another of the sessions of the Political Bureau enjoy a consultative voice at the sessions of the Political Bureau. The Political Bureau makes decisions on questions which do not permit delay, and it gives a report on all its work in the two weeks' period to the following meeting of the Central Committee.

The Organizational Bureau consists of five members of the Central Committee. Each of the members of the Organizational Bureau conducts his respective branch of the work. The Organizational Bureau assembles not less than three times a week. The Organizational Bureau directs all the organizational work of the party. The Organizational Bureau reports to the Plenum of the Central Committee every two weeks.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee is composed of one responsible secretary, a member of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee, and five technical secretaries from among the experienced party functionaries. The Secretariat organizes a series of departments. The Secretariat

reports to the Plenum of the Central Committee every two weeks.

5. Nationality Organizations:

At the present time the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Byelorussia exist as special Soviet republics. Thus, the question of their forms of *governmental* existence is decided at the present moment.

But this does not at all mean that the Russian Communist Party in its turn should be organized on the basis of a federation of independent Communist parties.

The Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party decides that the existence of a *unitary* centralized Communist Party with a unitary Central Committee directing all the work of the party in all parts of the RSFSR is essential. All decisions of the Russian Communist Party and its leading institutions are unconditionally binding on all parts of the party, regardless of their nationality composition. The Central Committees of the Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Communists enjoy the rights of regional committees of the party and are wholly subordinated to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. . . .

7. Centralism and Discipline:

The party finds itself in a position where the strictest centralism and the most rigorous discipline are absolute necessities. All decisions of a higher jurisdiction are absolutely binding for lower ones. Each decision must above all be fulfilled, and only after this is an appeal to the respective party organ permissible. In this sense outright military discipline is essential for the party at the present time. . . .

8. The Assignment of Party Forces:

At the present time the correct assignment of party forces is the main guarantee of success and one of the most important tasks. The whole matter of the assignment of party functionaries is in the hands of the Central Committee of the party. Its decision is binding for everyone. In each province the forces are assigned by the provincial committee of the

party; in the capitals, by the city committees under the general direction of the Central Committee. The Central Committee is commissioned to wage the most determined struggle against any local privilege or separatism in these questions.

The Central Committee is commissioned to transfer party functionaries systematically from one branch of work to another and from one region to another with the aim of utilizing them the most productively. . . .

The Civil War

Hostilities between the Communists and the Whites reached a decisive climax in 1919. Intervention by the Allied powers on the side of the Whites almost brought them victory. Facing the most serious White threat led by General Denikin in Southern Russia, Lenin appealed to his followers for a supreme effort, and threatened ruthless repression of any opposition behind the lines. By early 1920 the principal White forces were defeated.

Comrades,

This is one of the most critical, probably even the most critical moment for the socialist revolution. The defenders of the exploiters, of the landlords and capitalists, Russian and foreign (and in the first instance the British and French), are making a desperate effort to restore the power of the robbers of the people's labour, the landlords and exploiters, in Russia, in order to bolster up their declining power all over the world. The British and French capitalists have failed in their plan to conquer the Ukraine with their own troops; they have failed in their support of Kolchak* in Siberia; the Red Army, heroically advancing in the Urals with the help of the Urals workers, who are

FROM: Lenin, "All Out for the Fight Against Denikin!" (Letter of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the Party Organizations, July, 1919; *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 2, pp. 240-41, 257, 259-60).

* Admiral Kolchak: leader of the White forces in Siberia, and a military dictator, until his capture and execution in 1920—Ed.

rising to a man, is nearing Siberia with the purpose of liberating it from the incredible tyranny and brutality of the overlords there, the capitalists. Lastly, the British and French imperialists have failed in their plan to seize Petrograd by means of a counterrevolutionary conspiracy, in which there took part Russian monarchists, Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, not even excluding Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The foreign capitalists are now making a desperate effort to restore the yoke of capital with the help of an onslaught by Denikin, whom they have helped, as they once had helped Kolchak, with officers, supplies, shells, tanks, etc., etc.

All the forces of the workers and peasants, all the forces of the Soviet Republic, must be harnessed to repulse Denikin's onslaught and to defeat him, without suspending the Red Army's victorious advance into the Urals and Siberia. That is the

Main Task of the Moment

All Communists first and foremost, all sympathizers with them, all honest workers and peasants, all Soviet officials, must *display military efficiency* and concentrate *to the maximum their work*, their efforts and their concern *directly on the tasks of war*, on the speedy repulse of Denikin's onslaught, curtailing and rearranging all their other activities in subordination to this task.

The Soviet Republic is besieged by the enemy. It must become *a single military camp*, not in word but in deed.

. . . Counterrevolution is raising its head in our rear, in our midst.

Counterrevolution has been vanquished, but it is far from having been destroyed, and it is naturally taking advantage of Denikin's victories and of the aggravation of the food shortage. And, as always, in the wake of direct and open counterrevolution, in the wake of the Black Hundreds and the Cadets, whose strength lies in their capital, their direct connections with Entente imperialism, and their understanding of the inevitability of dictatorship and their ability to

exercise it (on Kolchak lines), follow the wavering, spineless Mensheviks, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who embellish their deeds with words. . . .

Our task is to put the question bluntly. What is better? To ferret out, to imprison, sometimes even to shoot hundreds of traitors from among the Cadets, nonparty people, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who "come out" (some with arms in hand, others with conspiracies, others still with agitation against mobilization, like the Menshevik printers and railwaymen, etc.) *against* the Soviet power, *in other words, in favour of Denikin?* Or to allow matters to reach a pass enabling Kolchak and Denikin to slaughter, shoot and flog to death tens of thousands of workers and peasants? The choice is not difficult to make. . . .

The Soviet Republic is a fortress besieged by world capital. We can concede the right to use it as a refuge from Kolchak, and the right to live in it generally, only to those who take an active part in the war and help us in every way. Hence our right and our duty to mobilize the whole population for the war to a man, some for military duties in the direct meaning of the term, others for subsidiary activities of every kind in aid of the war

Bukharin's Apology for War Communism

Bukharin took it upon himself to justify in Marxist terms the collapse of the Russian economy which occurred during the period of War Communism, and the utilization of the "technical intelligentsia" and the conventional hierarchical organization of industry. The key, for him, was the possession of power by the allegedly "proletarian" state, under which no expedients could possibly harm the interests of the workers.

It is absolutely clear that the disintegration and revolutionary loosening of the links of the system as essential characteristics of the breakdown means a collapse of the "technical

FROM: Bukharin, *The Economics of the Transformation Period* (1920; German edition, Hamburg, Hoym, 1922, pp. 55-56, 71-72, 76, 78-80, 85; editor's translation).

apparatus" of society, insofar as we are considering the technical organization of the people of this society.

But from this it follows that one cannot simply "take possession" of the old economic apparatus. Anarchy in production, or . . . the "revolutionary disintegration of industry" is a historically inevitable stage, which cannot be escaped by lamentations. Certainly, from the absolute standpoint it would be fine if the revolution and the breakdown of the old production relationships were not accompanied by any collapse of the technical relations of production. But the considered judgment of the actual processes, the scientific analysis of them, tells us that the period of this collapse is historically inevitable and historically necessary.

The collapse of the *technical hierarchy*, which appears at a certain stage of the process of broadened negative reproduction,* exerts pressure in turn on the condition of the forces of production. The forces of production are fused with the relationships of production in a definite system of the social organization of labor. Consequently, the collapse of the "apparatus" must inevitably be followed by a further decline in the forces of production. In this way the process of further negative reproduction is extraordinarily accelerated.

From the above analysis it follows that the "restoration of industry" which capitalistic Utopians dream about is impossible on the basis of the old capitalistic relationships, which are flying apart. The only remedy is for the lower links of the system, the basic productive force of capitalist society, the working class, to assume a dominant position in the organization of social labor. In other words, the establishment of communism is the prerequisite for a re-birth of society. . . .

We have seen that that which for society as a whole constitutes a condition of its further existence represents for the proletariat an organizational problem which it must solve in practice. In this period the proletariat must *actively build* socialism and at the same time, in the process of this building, educate itself anew. This task can be met only with

* Reproduction: Marx's concept of the maintenance and expansion of capital; "negative reproduction" would be to allow the industrial plant to wear out—Ed.

the help of specific methods, with methods of *organized* labor. But these methods have already been prepared in the development of capitalism. . . .

Socialism as an organized system must be built by the proletariat as the organized collective subject. Whereas the process of the growth of capitalism was elemental nature, the process of building communism is to a high degree a conscious, i.e., organized process. For communism will be created by a class which in the womb of capitalism has grown up into that "revolutionary association" of which Marx spoke. The epoch of building communism will therefore inevitably be the epoch of planned and organized labor; the proletariat will fulfill its tasks as social-technical tasks of building a new society, tasks which are consciously posed and consciously fulfilled. . . .

In this period the proletariat educates itself, closes ranks, and organizes itself as a class with tremendous intensity and swiftness. The proletariat as the totality of production relations accordingly builds the scaffolding of the whole structure. But the problem of the social organization of production consists of *new combinations of the old elements*. And indeed what elements? . . .

The ex-bourgeois group of organizers and the *technical intelligentsia* which stands beneath it are material which is obviously necessary for the reconstruction period: it is the social deposit of organizational and technical-scientific experience. It is indeed apparent that both these categories must be regrouped. How and under what circumstances is this possible?

We wish to point out above all that this is the decisive—one could say basic—question for our structure. It is no accident that in the mature period of the Russian socialist revolution the problem of the "specialists" played so important a role.

We know that earlier types of social ties survive in the heads of the people in these categories, in the form of an ideological and physiological residue. "Healthy capitalism" hovers before them with the persistency of a fixed idea. The prerequisite for the possibility of a new social combination of production

is therefore to dissolve the earlier types of associations in the heads of this technical intelligentsia. . . .

How, in general, is another combination of personal and technical elements of production possible if the logic of the production process itself requires associations of a completely determined kind? Must an engineer or technician indeed give orders to the workers and consequently stand *over* them? In just the same way the former officers in the Red Army must stand over the common soldiers. Here we pose an inner, purely technical, factual logic, which must be observed in any social order whatsoever. How can this contradiction be solved?

Here a whole series of circumstances must be considered, and we will now attack their study.

Above all: Under the proletarian state power and with the proletarian nationalization of production the process of creating surplus value, a specific feature of bourgeois society, ceases. . . . With the dialectical transformation of the bourgeois dictatorship into the proletarian, the technical function of the intelligentsia changes from a capitalistic to a social function of labor, and the creation of surplus value changes (under the conditions of expanded reproduction) into the creation of surplus product, which is applied to the expansion of the reproduction fund. Paralleling this, the *basic type of association changes, although in the hierarchical scheme the intelligentsia occupies the same "middle" place.* For the highest authority in the state economy is the concentrated social power of the proletariat. Here the technical intelligentsia on the one hand stands above the great mass of the working class, but on the other is in the last analysis *subordinated* to its collective will, the expression of which is found in the proletariat's organization of the state economy. The transformation of the process of producing surplus value into a process of planned satisfaction of social needs finds expression in the regrouping of production relations, notwithstanding the formal retention of the same place in the hierarchical system of production, which in principle assumes as a whole a different character, the character of the dialectic negation of the structure of capitalism and which, insofar as it destroys

the social-caste character of the hierarchy, leads toward the abolition of the hierarchy altogether. . . .

We must now pose the question of the general principle of the system of organization of the proletarian apparatus, i.e., the interrelations between the various forms of proletarian organization. It is indeed clear that formally the same method is necessary for the working class as for the bourgeoisie of the era of state capitalism. This organizational method consists of the coördination of all proletarian organizations by means of the most all-embracing organization possible, i.e., by means of the state organization of the working class, by means of the *proletarian Soviet state*. The "governmentalization" of the trade unions and in practice the governmentalization of all the mass organizations of the proletariat result from the inner logic of the transformation process itself. The smallest germ cell of the labor apparatus must become a support for the general process of organization, which is planfully led and conducted by the collective reason of the working class, which has its material embodiment in the highest, all-embracing organization, its state power. Thus the system of state capitalism is dialectically transformed into its own opposite, into the governmental form of workers' socialism. . . .

Trotsky on Terror and Militarization

During the Civil War years Trotsky was surpassed by none in his advocacy of dictatorial ruthlessness and authoritarianism. He frankly defended every means of violence and intimidation for the compelling end of revolutionary victory, and insisted that tight control and strict discipline of the entire population were essential for the success of the socialist economy. Trotsky was the earliest articulate exponent of the all-embracing totalitarian approach to economic development which Stalin made his own in 1929.

. . . The problem of revolution, as of war, consists in breaking the will of the foe, forcing him to capitulate and to accept the conditions of the conqueror. The will, of course, is

a fact of the physical world, but in contradistinction to a meeting, a dispute, or a congress, the revolution carries out its object by means of the employment of material resources —though to a less degree than war. The bourgeoisie itself conquered power by means of revolts, and consolidated it by the civil war. In the peaceful period, it retains power by means of a system of repression. As long as class society, founded on the most deep-rooted antagonisms, continues to exist, repression remains a necessary means of breaking the will of the opposing side.

Even if, in one country or another, the dictatorship of the proletariat grew up within the external framework of democracy, this would by no means avert the civil war. The question as to who is to rule the country, *i.e.*, of the life or death of the bourgeoisie, will be decided on either side, not by references to the paragraphs of the constitution, but by the employment of all forms of violence. . . .

The revolution “logically” does not demand terrorism, just as “logically” it does not demand an armed insurrection. What a profound commonplace! But the revolution does require of the revolutionary class that it should attain its end by all methods at its disposal—if necessary, by an armed rising: if required, by terrorism. A revolutionary class which has conquered power with arms in its hands is bound to, and will, suppress, rifle in hand, all attempts to tear the power out of its hands. Where it has against it a hostile army, it will oppose to it its own army. Where it is confronted with armed conspiracy, attempt at murder, or rising, it will hurl at the heads of its enemies an unsparing penalty. Perhaps Kautsky has invented other methods? Or does he reduce the whole question to the *degree* of repression, and recommend in all circumstances imprisonment instead of execution?

The question of the form of repression, or of its degree, of course, is not one of “principle.” It is a question of expediency. . . .

. . . Terror can be very efficient against a reactionary class

FROM: Trotsky, *Terrorism and Communism* (1920; English translation, *Dictatorship vs. Democracy: A Reply to Karl Kautsky*, New York, Workers' Party of America, 1922, pp. 54, 57-59, 106-7, 136-37, 141-43).

which does not want to leave the scene of operations. *Intimidation* is a powerful weapon of policy, both internationally and internally. War, like revolution, is founded upon intimidation. A victorious war, generally speaking, destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will. The revolution works in the same way: it kills individuals, and intimidates thousands. In this sense, the Red Terror is not distinguishable from the armed insurrection, the direct continuation of which it represents. The State terror of a revolutionary class can be condemned "morally" only by a man who, as a principle, rejects (in words) every form of violence whatsoever—consequently, every war and every rising. For this one has to be merely and simply a hypocritical Quaker.

"But, in that case, in what do your tactics differ from the tactics of Tsarism?" we are asked, by the high priests of Liberalism and Kautskianism.

You do not understand this, holy men? We shall explain to you. The terror of Tsarism was directed against the proletariat. The gendarmerie of Tsarism throttled the workers who were fighting for the Socialist order. Our Extraordinary Commissions shoot landlords, capitalists, and generals who are striving to restore the capitalist order. Do you grasp this—distinction? Yes? For us Communists it is quite sufficient. . . .

The Soviets are the organization of the proletarian revolution, and have purpose either as an organ of the struggle for power or as the apparatus of power of the working class. . . .

The very reason why the Soviets are an absolutely irreplaceable apparatus in the proletarian State is that their framework is elastic and yielding, with the result that not only social but political changes in the relationship of classes and sections can immediately find their expression in the Soviet apparatus. Beginning with the largest factories and works, the Soviets then draw into their organization the workers of private workshops and shop-assistants, proceed to enter the village, organize the peasants against the landowners, and

finally the lower and middle-class sections of the peasantry against the richest.

The Labor State collects numerous staffs of employees, to a considerable extent from the ranks of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois educated classes. To the extent that they become disciplined under the Soviet regime, they find representation in the Soviet system. Expanding—and at certain moments contracting—in harmony with the expansion and contraction of the social positions conquered by the proletariat, the Soviet system remains the State apparatus of the social revolution, in its internal dynamics, its ebbs and flows, its mistakes and successes. With the final triumph of the social revolution, the Soviet system will expand and include the whole population, in order thereby to lose the characteristics of a form of State, and melt away into a mighty system of producing and consuming co-operation.

If the party and the trade unions were organizations of preparation for the revolution, the Soviets are the weapon of the revolution itself. After its victory, the Soviets become the organs of power. The role of the party and the unions, without decreasing, is nevertheless essentially altered.

In the hands of the party is concentrated the general control. It does not immediately administer, since its apparatus is not adapted for this purpose. But it has the final word in all fundamental questions. Further, our practice has led to the result that, in all moot questions, generally—conflicts between departments and personal conflicts within departments—the last word belongs to the Central Committee of the party. This affords extreme economy of time and energy, and in the most difficult and complicated circumstances gives a guarantee for the necessary unity of action. Such a regime is possible only in the presence of the unquestioned authority of the party, and the faultlessness of its discipline. Happily for the revolution, our party does possess in an equal measure both of these qualities. Whether in other countries which have not received from their past a strong revolutionary organization, with a great hardening in conflict, there will be created just as authoritative a Communist Party

by the time of the proletarian revolution, it is difficult to foretell; but it is quite obvious that on this question, to a very large extent, depends the progress of the Socialist revolution in each country. . . .

If the organization of the new society can be reduced fundamentally to the reorganization of labor, the organization of labor signifies in its turn the correct introduction of general labor service. This problem is in no way met by measures of a purely departmental and administrative character. It touches the very foundations of economic life and the social structure. It finds itself in conflict with the most powerful psychological habits and prejudices. The introduction of compulsory labor service pre-supposes, on the one hand, a colossal work of education, and, on the other, the greatest possible care in the practical method adopted. . . .

The introduction of compulsory labor service is unthinkable without the application, to a greater or less degree, of the methods of militarization of labor. This term at once brings us into the region of the greatest possible superstitions and outcries from the opposition. . . .

The foundations of the militarization of labor are those forms of State compulsion without which the replacement of capitalist economy by the Socialist will forever remain an empty sound. Why do we speak of *militarization*? Of course, this is only an analogy—but an analogy very rich in content. No social organization except the army has ever considered itself justified in subordinating citizens to itself in such a measure, and to control them by its will on all sides to such a degree, as the State of the proletarian dictatorship considers itself justified in doing, and does. Only the army—just because in its way it used to decide questions of the life or death of nations, States, and ruling classes—was endowed with powers of demanding from each and all complete submission to its problems, aims, regulations, and orders. And it achieved this to the greater degree, the more the problems of military organization coincided with the requirements of social development.

The question of the life or death of Soviet Russia is at present being settled on the labor front; our economic, and

together with them our professional and productive organizations, have the right to demand from their members all that devotion, discipline, and executive thoroughness, which hitherto only the army required. . . .

. . . We can have no way to Socialism except by the authoritative regulation of the economic forces and resources of the country, and the centralized distribution of labor-power in harmony with the general State plan. The Labor State considers itself empowered to send every worker to the place where his work is necessary. And not one serious Socialist will begin to deny to the Labor State the right to lay its hand upon the worker who refuses to execute his labor duty. But the whole point is that the Menshevik path of transition to "Socialism" is a milky way, without the bread monopoly, without the abolition of the market, without the revolutionary dictatorship, and without the militarization of labor.

Without general labor service, without the right to order and demand fulfilment of orders, the trade unions will be transformed into a mere form without a reality; for the young Socialist State requires trade unions, not for a struggle for better conditions of labor—that is the task of the social and State organizations as a whole—but to organize the working class for the ends of production, to educate, discipline, distribute, group, retain certain categories and certain workers at their posts for fixed periods—in a word, hand in hand with the State to exercise their authority in order to lead the workers into the framework of a single economic plan. To defend, under such conditions, the "freedom" of labor means to defend fruitless, helpless, absolutely unregulated searches for better conditions, unsystematic, chaotic changes from factory to factory, in a hungry country, in conditions of terrible disorganization of the transport and food apparatus. — What except the complete collapse of the working-class and complete economic anarchy could be the result of the stupid attempt to reconcile bourgeois freedom of labor with proletarian socialization of the means of production?

Consequently, comrades, militarization of labor, in the

root sense indicated by me, is not the invention of individual politicians or an invention of our War Department, but represents the inevitable method of organization and disciplining of labor-power during the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism. . . .

The “Democratic Centralists” in Opposition to Centralization

The “Democratic Centralist” group, led by V. V. Osinsky, was an offshoot of the Left Communist movement of early 1918 which held to the original anti-bureaucratic line. They were significant as a group dedicated to the observance of revolutionary principle, in opposition to the expedients promoted by Lenin and Trotsky; they spoke out on many occasions to protest the trend toward centralization and hierarchical authority in the party, the government, the army, and industry. Their ideals were local autonomy and administration of every sort of activity by elected boards or “collegia.” At the Ninth Party Congress in 1920, Osinsky spoke against Trotsky’s scheme of militarization as a violation of basic revolutionary principles of democracy and collective decision-making.

I propose to make a series of amendments and additions to Comrade Trotsky’s theses. . . . First of all I want to give the basis for the amendment which we are introducing on the question of militarization.

What is happening now at the congress is the clash of several cultures, for our setup has given birth to different cultures. We have created a military-Soviet culture, a civil Soviet culture, and, finally, the trade-union movement has created its own sphere of culture. Each of these forms of our movement has its own approach to things, has created its own practices. Comrade Trotsky has posed the question from the point of view of a man coming from the sphere of military culture; we approach it from the point of view of

FROM: Osinsky, Minority Report on Building the Economy, Ninth Party Congress, March, 1920 (*Protocols of the Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party [of Bolsheviks]*, Moscow, Party Press, 1934, pp. 123-26, 128, 130-33; editor’s translation).

the civil sphere, and, finally, the trade-union comrades have posed it in their own way. They have posed it the most poorly, insofar as they have for a long time been considering only the need to protect the workers from militarization and to keep labor free, etc.

I want first of all to establish the fact that we approached the question of militarization earlier than the people from the other cultures, and from the other side. . . . I radically reject the proposition that we oppose militarization *per se*. . . . We are against the excessive extension of the concept of militarization, we are against the blind imitation of military models. . . .

The collegium is not the only means for drawing the broad working masses into administration. There are many other ways, such as, for example, the appointment of probationary workers and participation in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. But there is no doubt that the collegium is an essential higher-level school of administration, given final preparation and the broadest outlook. The collegium is the proper means to prepare workers for the most responsible work and for completely taking over the state apparatus. . . .

Comrade Lenin reproaches here on the grounds that we approach the question of individual authority vs. the collegial principle not in a practical way but purely "in principle." . . . In the developed socialist system, when the division of labor and skills has been abolished, the collegial principle will be essential for people to be able to replace each other continuously in the organs of administration. . . .

We must not put the question of the collegial principle vs. individual authority on a purely technical plane and seek the absolute technical advantages of one form or another of administration. . . . We must approach the matter from the social-political side. Then we can reach concrete conclusions, including some less favorable to individual authority. . . .

Comrade Lenin has revealed here today a very original understanding of democratic centralism. . . . Comrade Lenin says that all democratic centralism consists of is that the congress elects the Central Committee, and the Central Committee governs. . . . With such an original definition we

cannot agree. We consider that democratic centralism—a very old concept, a concept clear to every Bolshevik and fixed in our rules—consists of carrying out the directives of the Central Committee through local organizations; the autonomy of the latter; and their responsibility for individual spheres of work. If party work is broken down into several branches with special departments, and if these departments are under the general direction of the local organization, just as the soviets' departments are under the power and direction of the provincial executive committee—this is democratic centralism, *i.e.*, the execution of the decisions of the center through local organs which are responsible for all the particular spheres of work in the provinces. This is the definition of democratic centralism, a system of administration preserved from bureaucratism and closely connected with the principle of collegia. . . .

If you reduce the collegial principle to nothing in our institutions, bear in mind that this signifies the downfall of the whole system of democratic centralism. I advise careful thought about this, although the speakers following me may try to "smear" this argument. Bearing this in mind, we will conduct an unyielding struggle against the principle of individual authority. . . .

In the unpublished part of his theses Comrade Trotsky raised the question, what to do with democratic centralism in the area of the party, and the answer was—replace the party organizations with political departments, not only on the railroads, but in all the basic branches of industry. Comrade Stalin, whom I deeply respect, but with whom I do not go along on this question, has already surpassed Comrade Trotsky's idea, and has established a political department for coal in the Donets coal industry. In general we need to take all this into account as a manifestation of familiar tendencies. We will also recall how Comrade Lenin, speaking of democratic centralism the first day of the congress, called everyone who spoke of democratic centralism an idiot, and called democratic centralism itself antediluvian and obsolete, etc. If the separate facts are connected, the tendency for me is clear. The ultimate tendency leads to

setting up individual administration in every link of the soviet apparatus. We ask ourselves a serious question, what does this mean? This means that once we take this path and go far enough on it, we will collapse under the weight of bureaucracy, which will emasculate all our work, for the basic slogan which we should proclaim at the present time is the unification of military work, military forms of organization and methods of administration, with the creative initiative of the conscious workers. If, under the banner of military work, you in fact begin to implant bureaucratism, we will disperse our own forces and fail to fulfill our tasks.

The unrestrained application of complete formal militarization can also lead to this. To apply it generally is enticing—under the banner of militarization it is all the easier to implant individual bureaucratic authority. Meanwhile, what character does our economic work have to assume? It has to assume a shock-work character, and we can apply complete militarization only in certain branches. Complete militarization is bound up with the limitation of the civil and political rights of man, with his complete bondage in production, etc. Complete militarization means that man is removed to a situation where they tell him: for the moment you are not a citizen, you are only a functionary, you must fulfill your civic duty not at meetings but in the workshop. . . .

Lenin on Revolutionary Purism

Stung by criticisms directed against his policies of centralization and expediency by Communist critics both in Russia and in the newly-founded Communist International, Lenin delivered a diatribe against the “petty-bourgeois childishness” of people who objected to compromises. In his characteristic manner he denounced opponents of party discipline as virtual agents of capitalism.

Certainly, almost everyone now realizes that the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power for two

FROM: Lenin, “‘Left-Wing’ Communism: An Infantile Disorder” (April, 1920; *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 2, pp. 344, 359-60, 366-67).

and a half months, let alone two and a half years, unless the strictest, truly iron discipline had prevailed in our Party, and unless the latter had been rendered the fullest and unreserved support of the whole mass of the working class, that is, of all its thinking, honest, self-sacrificing and influential elements who are capable of leading or of carrying with them the backward strata.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is a most determined and most ruthless war waged by the new class against a *more powerful* enemy, the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased *tenfold* by its overthrow (even if only in one country), and whose power lies not only in the strength of international capital, in the strength and durability of the international connections of the bourgeoisie, but also in the *force of habit*, in the strength of *small production*. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and small production *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale. For all these reasons [the dictatorship of the proletariat is essential, and victory over the bourgeoisie is impossible, without a long, stubborn and desperate war of life and death, a war demanding perseverance, discipline, firmness, indomitableness and unity of will.

I repeat, the experience of the victorious dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia has clearly shown even to those who are unable to think, or who have not had occasion to ponder over this question, that absolute centralization and the strictest discipline of the proletariat constitute one of the fundamental conditions for victory over the bourgeoisie. . . .

. . . To reject compromises "on principle," to reject the admissibility of compromises in general, no matter of what kind, is childishness, which it is difficult even to take seriously. A political leader who desires to be useful to the revolutionary proletariat must know how to single out *concrete* cases when such compromises are inadmissible, when they are an expression of opportunism and *treachery*, and direct all the force of criticism, the full edge of merciless exposure and relentless war, against *those concrete* compromises. . . .

There are compromises and compromises. One must be able to analyze the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who gave the bandits money and firearms in order to lessen the damage they can do and facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives bandits money and firearms in order to share in the loot. In politics this is by no means always as easy as in this childishly simple example. But anyone who set out to invent a recipe for the workers that would provide in advance ready-made solutions for all cases in life, or who promised that the policy of the revolutionary proletariat would never encounter difficult or intricate situations, would simply be a charlatan. . . .

Repudiation of the party principle and of party discipline . . . is tantamount to completely disarming the proletariat *in the interest of the bourgeoisie*. It is tantamount to that petty-bourgeois diffuseness, instability, incapacity for sustained effort, unity and organized action, which, if indulged in, must inevitably destroy every proletarian revolutionary movement. From the standpoint of Communism, the repudiation of the party principle means trying to leap from the eve of the collapse of capitalism (in Germany), not to the lower, or the intermediate, but to the higher phase of Communism. We in Russia (in the third year since the overthrow of the bourgeoisie) are going through the first steps in the transition from capitalism to Socialism, or the lower stage of Communism. Classes have remained, and will remain everywhere *for years after* the conquest of power by the proletariat. Perhaps in England, where there is no peasantry (but where there are small owners!), this period may be shorter. The abolition of classes means not only driving out the landlords and capitalists—that we accomplished with comparative ease—it also means *abolishing the small commodity producers*, and they *cannot be driven out*, or crushed; we *must live in harmony* with them; they can (and must) be remoulded and re-educated only by very prolonged, slow, cautious organizational work. They encircle the proletariat on every side with a petty-bourgeois atmosphere, which permeates and corrupts

the proletariat and causes constant relapses among the proletariat into petty-bourgeois spinelessness, disunity, individualism, and alternate moods of exaltation and dejection. The strictest centralization and discipline are required within the political party of the proletariat in order to counteract this, in order that the *organizational* role of the proletariat (and this is its *principal* role) may be exercised correctly, successfully, victoriously. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a persistent struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force. Without an iron party tempered in the struggle, without a party enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given class, without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully. It is a thousand times easier to vanquish the centralized big bourgeoisie than to “vanquish” the millions and millions of small owners; yet they, by their ordinary, everyday, imperceptible, elusive, demoralizing activity, achieve the *very* results which the bourgeoisie need and which tend to *restore* the bourgeoisie. Whoever weakens ever so little the iron discipline of the party of the proletariat (especially during the time of its dictatorship), actually aids the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. . . .

The Reaction against Bureaucracy

By the fall of 1920 the Communists had crushed most of the White opposition and the Soviet regime was fairly secure. Within the Communist Party there was an upsurge of feeling against the extremes of hierarchical centralization and discipline which had become the rule for the organization

FROM: Resolution of the Ninth Conference of the Russian Communist Party, September, 1920, “On the Coming Tasks of Building the Party” (CPSU in Resolutions, I, 507, 509, 511-12; editor’s translation).

of the party during the Civil War. At the Ninth Party Conference the leadership felt it necessary to acknowledge this sentiment by accepting a resolution on the need for more equality and democracy in the party.

The unprecedentedly difficult position of the Soviet Republic in the first years of its existence, extreme devastation, and the greatest military danger have made it essential to separate "shock" (and therefore actually privileged) offices and groups of functionaries. This was essential, for it was impossible to save the ruined country without concentrating forces and means in such offices and in such groups of functionaries, without which the combined imperialists of the whole world certainly would have crushed us and would not have let our Soviet Republic even begin economic construction. This circumstance, together with the heritage of capitalistic and private-property habits and tendencies which we are enduring with difficulty, explains the necessity of directing the attention of the whole party again and again toward putting more equality into practice, firstly within the party, secondly within the proletariat and among all the toiling masses, and thirdly for the various offices and various groups of functionaries especially the "spetsy" [specialists] and responsible functionaries, in relation to the masses. Distinguishing members of the party only by the degree of their consciousness, devotion, endurance, political vision, revolutionary experience, readiness for self-sacrifice—the party struggles with any attempts to make distinctions among members of the party on any other lines: higher-ups and rank-and-file, intellectuals and workers, on nationality lines, etc. . . .

It is essential to realize in the internal life of the party broader criticism of the central as well as local institutions of the party; to commission the Central Committee to point out by circulars the means for broadening intra-party criticism at general meetings; to create publications which are capable of realizing broader and more systematic criticism of the mistakes of the party and general criticism within the party (discussion sheets, etc.). . . .

Recognizing in principle the necessity of appointment to responsible offices in exceptional cases, it is necessary to

propose to the Central Committee that in the assignment of functionaries in general it replace appointment with recommendation.

[It is necessary] to point out that in the mobilization of comrades it is not permissible for party organs and individual comrades to be guided by any considerations except business ones. Any repression whatsoever against comrades because they dissent about some question or another decided by the party is not permissible. . . .

[It is necessary] to work out fully effective practical measures to eliminate inequality (in conditions of life, the wage scale, etc.) between the "spetsy" and the responsible functionaries on the one hand and the toiling masses on the other. . . . This inequality violates democratism and is the source of disruption in the party and of reduction in the authority of Communists. . . .

It is essential to create a Control Commission alongside the Central Committee; this must consist of comrades who have the highest party preparation, who are the most experienced, impartial, and capable of realizing strict party control. The Control Commission, elected by the party congress, must have the right to receive any complaints and examine them. . . .

Bureaucratism, which rules in many of our head offices and centers, often strikes painfully at the entirely legal interests of the mass of the people and serves as one of the most important sources of dissatisfaction within the party, for which the head offices and centers bear the responsibility.

The Central Committee of the party must take the most serious measures against this. The local organizations must help the Central Committee in this struggle, above all by communicating the pertinent facts to it.

The Communist Ideal in Family Life

While the world was shocked by rumors of the "nationalization of women," much Communist thought exhibited a glowing idealism about the future free and equal relationship of the sexes after the abolition of the "slavery" of the "bourgeois" family. The most famous exponent of this ideal—in

practice as well as theory—was Alexandra Kollontai, a paragon of revolutionary idealism and the first Commissar of Social Welfare. She was a leader in the ultra-left “Workers’ Opposition” movement of 1920-1921, but later made her peace with Stalin and enjoyed a long career as a Soviet diplomat.

. . . There is no escaping the fact: the old type of family has seen its day. It is not the fault of the communist State, it is the result of the changed conditions of life. *The family is ceasing to be a necessity of the State, as it was in the past;* on the contrary, it is worse than useless, since it needlessly holds back the female workers from more productive and far more serious work. Nor is it any longer necessary to the members of the family themselves, since the task of bringing up the children, which was formerly that of the family, is passing more and more into the hands of the collectivity. But on the ruins of the former family we shall soon see a new form rising which will involve altogether different relations between men and women, and which will be *a union of affection and comradeship, a union of two equal members of the communist society, both of them free, both of them independent, both of them workers.* No more domestic “servitude” of women. No more inequality within the family. No more fear on the part of the woman lest she remain without support or aid with little ones in her arms if her husband should desert her. The woman in the communist city no longer depends on her husband but on her work. It is not her husband but her robust arms which will support her. There will be no more anxiety as to the fate of her children. The State of the Workers will assume responsibility for these. Marriage will be purified of all its material elements, of all money calculations, which constitute a hideous blemish on family life in our days. Marriage is henceforth to be transformed into a sublime union of two souls in love with each other, each having faith in the other;

FROM: Kollontai, *Communism and the Family* (1920; excerpts translated in Rudolf Schlesinger, ed., *The Family in the USSR*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949, pp. 67-69; reprinted by permission of the publisher).

this union promises to each working man and to each working woman, simultaneously, the most complete happiness, the maximum of satisfaction which can be the lot of creatures who are conscious of themselves and of the life which surrounds them. *This free union*, which is strong in the comradeship with which it is inspired, *instead of the conjugal slavery of the past—that is what the communist society of to-morrow offers to both men and women.* Once the conditions of labour have been transformed, and the material security of working women has been increased, and after marriage such as was performed by the Church—that so-called indissoluble marriage which was at bottom merely a fraud—after this marriage has given place to the free and honest union of men and women who are lovers and comrades, another shameful scourge will also be seen to disappear, another frightful evil which is a stain on humanity and which falls with all its weight on the hungry working woman: prostitution.

This evil we owe to the economic system now in force, to the institution of private property. Once the latter has been abolished, the trade in women will automatically disappear.

Therefore let the women of the working class cease to worry over the fact that the family as at present constituted is doomed to disappear. They will do much better to hail with joy the dawn of a new society which will liberate woman from domestic servitude, which will lighten the burden of motherhood for woman, and in which, finally, we shall see the disappearance of the most terrible of the curses weighing upon women, prostitution.

The woman who is called upon to struggle in the great cause of the liberation of the workers—such a woman should know that in the new State there will be no more room for such petty divisions as were formerly understood: “These are my own children; to them I owe all my maternal solicitude, all my affection; those are your children, my neighbour’s children; I am not concerned with them. I have enough to do with my own.” Henceforth the worker-mother, who is conscious of her social function, will rise to a point where she no longer differentiates between *yours* and *mine*; she must remember that there are henceforth only *our* children,

those of the communist State, the common possession of all the workers.

The Workers' State has need of a new form of relation between the sexes. The narrow and exclusive affection of the mother for her own children must expand until it embraces all the children of the great proletarian family. In place of the indissoluble marriage based on the servitude of woman, we shall see rise the free union, fortified by the love and mutual respect of the two members of the Workers' State, equal in their rights and in their obligations. In place of the individual and egotistic family, there will arise a great universal family of workers, in which all the workers, men and women, will be, above all, workers, comrades. Such will be the relation between men and women in the communist society of to-morrow. This new relation will assure to humanity all the joys of so-called free love ennobled by a true social equality of the mates, joys which were unknown to the commercial society of the capitalist regime.

Make way for healthy blossoming children: make way for a vigorous youth that clings to life and to its joys, which is free in its sentiments and in its affections. Such is the watch-word of the communist society. In the name of equality, of liberty, and of love, we call upon the working women and the working men, peasant women and peasants, courageously and with faith to take up the work of the reconstruction of human society with the object of rendering it more perfect, more just, and more capable of assuring to the individual the happiness which he deserves. The red flag of the social revolution which will shelter, after Russia, other countries of the world also, already proclaims to us the approach of the heaven on earth to which humanity has been aspiring for centuries. . . .

The Trade Union Controversy and the Workers' Opposition

In the fall of 1920 sharp controversy broke out in the Communist Party over the role of the trade unions and their relation to the party and the government. Trotsky, with

Bukharin's support, pressed his plan for militarizing or "governmentalizing" the unions as agencies of industrial administration. Lenin and the cautious wing of the party, including Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, and Stalin, decided to eliminate the unions from administration altogether and relegate them to a social-service and educational role. At the other extreme, the left-wing enthusiasts in the trade unions, organized into the "Workers' Opposition," demanded that industrial administration be made the independent responsibility of the unions themselves. One of the most fervent spokesmen for the Workers' Opposition was Alexandra Kollontai, who bewailed the trend to bureaucracy and pleaded for trust in the "class instinct" of the proletariat.

. . . the Workers' Opposition is composed of the most advanced part of our class-organized proletarian-Communists. The opposition consists almost exclusively of members of the trade unions, and this fact is attested by the signatures of those who side with the opposition under the theses on the role of industrial unions. Who are these members of the trade unions? Workers—that part of the advanced guard of the Russian proletariat which has borne on its shoulders all the difficulties of the revolutionary struggle, and did not dissolve itself into the soviet institutions by losing contact with the laboring masses, but on the contrary, remained closely connected with them. . . .

Through their class instinct, these comrades standing at the head of the Workers' Opposition became conscious of the fact that there was something wrong: they understood that even though during these three years we have created the soviet institutions and reaffirmed the principles of the workers' republic, yet the working class, *as a class*, as a self-contained social unit with identical class aspirations, tasks, interests, and, hence, *with a uniform, consistent, clear-cut policy*, becomes an ever less important factor in the affairs of the Soviet republic. . . .

Why was it that none but the unions stubbornly defended

FROM: Kollontai, *The Workers' Opposition* (1921; English translation, Chicago, Industrial Workers of the World, 1921, pp. 3-4, 7, 11, 20, 22-23, 32-33, 37-41, 44).

the principle of collective management, even without being able to adduce scientific arguments in favor of it; and why was it that the specialists' supporters at the same time defended the "one man management"? The reason is that in this controversy, though both sides emphatically denied that there was a question of principle involved, two historically irreconcilable points of view had clashed. The "one-man management" is a product of the individualist conception of the bourgeois class. The "one man management" is in principle an unrestricted, isolated, free will of one man, disconnected from the collective.

This idea finds its reflection in all spheres of human endeavor—beginning with the appointment of a sovereign for the state and ending with a sovereign director of the factory. This is the supreme wisdom of bourgeois thought. The bourgeoisie do not believe in the power of a collective body. They like only to whip the masses into an obedient flock, and drive them wherever their unrestricted will desires. . . .

Rejection of a principle—the principle of collective management in the control of industry—was a tactical compromise on behalf of our party, an act of adaptation; it was, moreover, an act of deviation from that class policy which we so zealously cultivated and defended during the first phase of the revolution.

Why did this happen? How did it happen that our party, matured and tempered in the struggle of the revolution, was permitted to be carried away from the direct road in order to journey along the round-about path of adaptation, formerly condemned severely and branded as "opportunism"? . . .

Beside peasant-owners in the villages and burgher elements in the cities, our party in its soviet state policy is forced to reckon with the influence exerted by the representatives of wealthy bourgeoisie now appearing in the form of specialists, technicians, engineers, and former managers of financial and industrial affairs, who by all their past experience are bound to the capitalist system of production. They can not even imagine any other mode of production but only that one which lies *within the traditional bounds of capitalist economics*.

The more Soviet Russia finds itself in need of specialists in the sphere of technique and management of production, the stronger becomes the influence of these elements, foreign to the working class elements, on the development of our economy. Having been thrown aside during the first period of the revolution, and being compelled to take up an attitude of watchful waiting or sometimes even open hostility toward the soviet authorities, particularly during the most trying months (the historical sabotage by the intellectuals), this social group of brains in capitalist production, of servile, hired, well-paid servants of capital, acquire more and more influence and importance in politics with every day that passes. . . .

The basis of the controversy is namely this: whether we shall realize communism through workers or over their heads, by the hands of soviet officials. And let us, comrades, ponder whether it is possible to attain and build a communist economy by the hands and creative abilities of the scions from the other class, who are imbued with their *routine of the past*? If we begin to think as Marxians, as men of science, we shall answer categorically and explicitly—no. . . .

The solution of this problem as it is proposed by the industrial unions, consists in giving complete freedom to the workers as regards experimenting, class training, adjusting and feeling out the new forms of production, as well as expression and development of their creative abilities, that is, to that class which alone can be the creator of communism. This is the way the Workers' Opposition handles the solution of this difficult problem from which follows the most essential point of their theses. "Organization of control over the social economy is a prerogative of the All-Russian Congress of Producers, who are united in the trade and industrial unions which elect the central body directing the whole economic life of the republic" (Theses of the Workers' Opposition). This point secures freedom for the manifestation of class creative abilities, not restricted and crippled by the bureaucratic machine which is saturated with the spirit of routine of the bourgeois capitalist system of production and control.

The Workers' Opposition relies on the creative powers of its own class—the workers. From this premise is deduced the rest of the program.

But right at this point there begins the deviation of the Workers' Opposition from the line that is followed by the party leaders. Distrust toward the working class (not in the sphere of politics, but in the sphere of economic creative abilities) is the whole essence of the theses signed by our party leaders. They do not believe that by the rough hands of workers, untrained technically, can be created those basic outlines of the economic forms from which in the course of time shall develop a harmonious system of communist production. . . .

The cardinal point of controversy that is taking place between the party leaders and the Workers' Opposition is this: In whom will our party place the trust of building up the communist economy—in the Supreme Council of National Economy with all its bureaucratic branches or in the Industrial Unions? Comrade Trotsky wants "to join" the trade unions to the Supreme Council of National Economy so that with the assistance of the latter it might be possible to swallow the first. Comrades Lenin and Zinoviev, on the other hand, want to "bring up" the masses to such a level of communist understanding that they could be painlessly absorbed into the same soviet institutions. Bukharin and the rest of the factions express essentially the same view, and the variation consists only in the way they put it, the essence is the same. Only the Workers' Opposition expresses something entirely different, defends the class proletarian viewpoint in the very process of creation and realization of its tasks.

The administrative economic body in the labor republic during the present transitory period must be a body directly elected by the producers themselves. All the rest of the administrative economic soviet institutions shall serve only as executive centers of the economic policy of that all-important economic body of the labor republic. All else is a goose-stepping that manifests distrust toward all creative abilities of workers, distrust which is not compatible with the pro-

fessed ideals of our party whose very strength depends on the perennial revolutionary creative spirit of the proletariat. . . .

There can be no self-activity without freedom of thought and opinion, for self-activity manifests itself not only in initiative, action, and work, but in *independent thought* as well. We are afraid of mass-activity. We are afraid to give freedom to the class activity, we are afraid of criticism, we have ceased to rely on the masses, hence, *we have bureaucracy with us*. That is why the Workers' Opposition considers that bureaucracy is our enemy, our scourge, and the greatest danger for the future existence of the Communist Party itself.

In order to do away with the bureaucracy that is finding its shelter in the soviet institutions, *we must first of all get rid of all bureaucracy in the party itself*. . . .

The Workers' Opposition, together with a group of responsible workers in Moscow, in the name of party regeneration and elimination of bureaucracy from the soviet institutions, demands complete realization of all democratic principles, not only for the present period of respite, but also for times of internal and external tension. This is the first and basic condition of the party regeneration, of its return to the principles of the program, from which in practice it is more and more deviating under the pressure of elements that are foreign to it.

The second condition, fulfillment of which with all determination is insisted upon by the Workers' Opposition, is the *expulsion from the party* of all non-proletarian elements. . . .

The third decisive step toward democratization of the party is the elimination of all non-workers' elements from all the administrative positions; in other words, the central, provincial, and county committees of the party must be composed so that workers closely connected with the working masses would have the preponderant majority therein. . . .

The fourth basic demand of the Workers' Opposition is this: *the party must reverse its policy to the elective principle*.

Appointments must be permissible only as exceptions, but lately they began to prevail as a rule. Appointments are very

characteristic of bureaucracy, and yet at present they are a general, legalized and well recognized daily occurrence. The procedure of appointments produces a very unhealthy atmosphere in the party, and disrupts the relationship of equality among the members by rewarding friends and punishing enemies as well as by other no less harmful practices in our party and soviet life. . . .

Wide publicity, freedom of opinion and discussion, right to criticize within the party and among the members of the trade unions—such is the decisive step that can put an end to the prevailing system of bureaucracy. Freedom of criticism, right of different factions to freely present their views at party meetings, freedom of discussion—are no longer the demands of the Workers' Opposition alone. Under the growing pressure from the masses a whole series of measures that were demanded by the rank and file long before the All-Russian conference* was held, are recognized and promulgated officially at present. . . . However, we must not overestimate this "leftism," for it is only a declaration of principles to the congress. It may happen, as it has happened many a time with the decisions of our party leaders during these years, that this radical declaration will be forgotten for, as a rule, they are accepted by our party centres only just as the mass impetus is felt, and as soon as life again swings into normal channels the decisions are forgotten. . . .

The Workers' Opposition has said what has long ago been printed in "The Communist Manifesto" by Marx and Engels, viz.: "Creation of communism can and will be the work of the toiling masses themselves. Creation of communism belongs to the workers." . . .

The Kronstadt Revolt

By early 1921 it was becoming clear to the Communist leaders that the system of "War Communism" had reached an impasse of economic breakdown and mass discontent. The seriousness of the situation was brought home to them by

* The Ninth Party Conference, September, 1920—Ed.

the outbreak of armed defiance of the Soviet government at the Baltic naval base of Kronstadt, a stronghold of anarchistic radicalism. For a few days Kronstadt appealed to the Russian populace to carry out a "third revolution" against the bureaucratic dictatorship of the Communists, in the name of the original ideals of the October Revolution. No effective response was forthcoming, and the rebels were soon overwhelmed by government troops.

After carrying out the October Revolution, the working class hoped to achieve emancipation. The result has been to create even greater enslavement of the individual man.

The power of the police-gendarme monarchy has gone into the hands of the Communist-usurpers, who instead of freedom offer the toilers the constant fear of falling into the torture-chambers of the Cheka, which in their horrors surpass many times the gendarme administration of the czarist regime.

Bayonets, bullets, and the harsh shouts of the *oprichniki** of the Cheka, are what the working man of Soviet Russia has got after a multitude of struggles and sufferings. The glorious arms of labor's state—the sickle and hammer—have actually been replaced by the Communist authorities with the bayonet and the barred window, for the sake of preserving the calm, carefree life of the new bureaucracy of Communist commissars and officials.

But the most hateful and criminal thing which the Communists have created is moral servitude: they laid their hands even on the inner life of the toilers and compelled them to think only in the Communist way.

With the aid of militarized trade unions they have bound the workers to their benches, and have made labor not into a joy but into a new slavery. To the protests of the peasants, expressed in spontaneous uprisings, and of the workers, who

FROM: "What We Are Fighting For," *News of the Kronstadt Temporary Revolutionary Committee*, March 8, 1921 (reprinted in *The Truth about Kronstadt*, Prague, Volia Rossii, 1921, pp. 82-83; editor's translation).

* "Oprichniki": originally, members of the sixteenth-century police force of Czar Ivan the Terrible—Ed.

are compelled to strike by the circumstances of their life, they answer with mass executions and bloodthirstiness, in which they are not surpassed by the czarist generals.

Labor's Russia, the first country to raise the banner of the liberation of labor, has been continuously covered with the blood of the people who have been tortured for the glory of Communist domination. In this sea of blood the Communists are drowning all the great and glowing pledges and slogans of labor's revolution.

It has been sketched out more and more sharply, and now has become obvious, that the Russian Communist Party is not the defender of the toilers which it represents itself to be; the interests of the working nation are alien to it; having attained power, it is afraid only of losing it, and therefore all means are allowed: slander, violence, deceit, murder, vengeance on the families of rebels.

The enduring patience of the toilers has reached its end.

Here and there the glow of insurrection has illuminated the country in its struggle against oppression and violence. Strikes by the workers have flared up, but the Bolshevik *okhrana** has not slept and has taken every measure to forestall and suppress the unavoidable third revolution. . . .

There can be no middle ground. Victory or death!

Red Kronstadt gives this example, threatening the counter-revolutionaries of the right and of the left.

The new revolutionary upheaval has been accomplished here. Here the banner of insurrection has been raised for liberation from the three-year violence and oppression of Communist domination, which has overshadowed the three-century yoke of monarchism. Here at Kronstadt the first stone of the third revolution has been laid, to break off the last fetters on the toiling masses and open a new broad road for socialist creativity.

This new revolution will rouse the laboring masses of the East and of the West, since it shows an example of the new socialist construction as opposed to the Communists' barrack-room "creativity" and directly convinces the laboring masses

* "Okhrana": originally, the Czarist secret police—Ed.

abroad that everything created here up to now by the will of the workers and peasants was not socialism.

The first step has been completed without a single shot, without a drop of blood. The toilers do not need blood. They will shed it only at a moment of self-defense. Firmness is enough for us, in spite of the outrageous actions of the Communists, to confine ourselves to isolating them from social life, so that their evil false agitation will not interfere with revolutionary work.

The workers and peasants unreservedly go forward, abandoning behind them the Constituent Assembly with its bourgeois stratum and the dictatorship of the party of the Communists with its Cheka men, its state capitalism, its hangman's noose encircling the neck of the masses and threatening to strangle them for good.

The present overturn at last makes it possible for the toilers to have their freely elected soviets, working without any violent party pressure, and remake the state trade unions into free associations of workers, peasants and the laboring intelligentsia. At last the policeman's club of the Communist autocracy has been broken.

Institution of the Monolithic Party

Lenin's response to the Kronstadt rebellion was to change his course drastically, in two respects. For the country at large, he ordered a "strategic retreat" to the much more moderate "New Economic Policy." For the Communist Party he demanded a much more rigorous system of discipline, and the Tenth Party Congress in March, 1921, accepted the resolutions which he proposed to this effect—prohibition of organized factions within the party, and condemnation of the ultra-Left Workers' Opposition as an un-Communist deviation. As Alexandra Kollontai had predicted, the democratic concessions of 1920 were abruptly retracted. To enforce the new line of discipline, the personnel of the party Secretariat was shaken up; the old secretaries, who had supported Trotsky, were replaced by a new group including Molotov and influenced by Stalin as the leading figure in the Orgbureau.

a) On Party Unity

1. The Congress calls the attention of all members of the Party to the fact that the unity and solidarity of the ranks of the Party, ensuring complete mutual confidence among Party members and genuine team work, genuinely embodying the unanimity of will of the vanguard of the proletariat, are particularly essential at the present juncture when a number of circumstances are increasing the vacillation among the petty-bourgeois population of the country.

2. Notwithstanding this, even before the general Party discussion on the trade unions, certain signs of factionalism had been apparent in the Party, viz., the formation of groups with separate platforms, striving to a certain degree to segregate and create their own group discipline. Such symptoms of factionalism were manifested, for example, at a Party conference in Moscow (November 1920) and in Kharkov, both by the so-called "Workers' Opposition" group, and partly by the so-called "Democratic-Centralism" group.

All class-conscious workers must clearly realize the perniciousness and impermissibility of factionalism of any kind, for no matter how the representatives of individual groups may desire to safeguard Party unity, in practice factionalism inevitably leads to the weakening of team work and to intensified and repeated attempts by the enemies of the Party, who have fastened themselves onto it because it is the governing Party, to widen the cleavage and to use it for counter-revolutionary purposes.

The way the enemies of the proletariat take advantage of every deviation from the thoroughly consistent Communist line was perhaps most strikingly shown in the case of the Kronstadt mutiny, when the bourgeois counterrevolutionaries and Whiteguards* in all countries of the world immediately expressed their readiness to accept even the slogans

FROM: Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, "On Party Unity," March, 1921 (Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 2, pp. 497-501).

* Whiteguards: anti-Bolshevik units in the Civil War; applied to anti-Communists anywhere—Ed.

of the Soviet system, if only they might thereby secure the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, and when the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the bourgeois counterrevolutionaries in general resorted in Kronstadt to slogans calling for an insurrection against the Soviet government of Russia ostensibly in the interest of Soviet power. These facts fully prove that the Whiteguards strive, and are able, to disguise themselves as Communists, and even as the most Left Communists, solely for the purpose of weakening and overthrowing the bulwark of the proletarian revolution in Russia. . . .

4. In the practical struggle against factionalism, every organization of the Party must take strict measures to prevent any factional actions whatsoever. Criticism of the Party's shortcomings, which is absolutely necessary, must be conducted in such a way that every practical proposal shall be submitted immediately, without any delay, in the most precise form possible, for consideration and decision to the leading local and central bodies of the Party. Moreover, everyone who criticizes must see to it that the form of his criticism takes into account the position of the Party, surrounded as it is by a ring of enemies, and that the content of his criticism is such that, by directly participating in Soviet and Party work, he can test the rectification of the errors of the Party or of individual Party members in practice. . . .

5. . . . While ruthlessly rejecting unpractical and factional pseudo-criticisms, the Party will unceasingly continue—trying out new methods—to fight with all the means at its disposal against bureaucracy, for the extension of democracy and initiative, for detecting, exposing and expelling from the Party elements that have wormed their way into its ranks, etc.

6. The Congress therefore hereby declares dissolved and orders the immediate dissolution of all groups without exception that have been formed on the basis of one platform or another (such as the "workers' opposition" group, the "democratic-centralism" group, etc.). Nonobservance of this

decision of the Congress shall involve absolute and immediate expulsion from the Party.

7. In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet work and to secure the maximum unanimity in removing all factionalism, the Congress authorizes the Central Committee, in cases of breach of discipline or of a revival or toleration of factionalism, to apply all Party penalties, including expulsion, and in regard to members of the Central Committee to reduce them to the status of alternate members and even, as an extreme measure, to expel them from the Party. A necessary condition for the application of such an extreme measure to members of the Central Committee, alternate members of the Central Committee and members of the Control Commission is the convocation of a plenum of the Central Committee, to which all alternate members of the Central Committee and all members of the Control Commission shall be invited. If such a general assembly of the most responsible leaders of the Party, by a two-thirds majority, deems it necessary to reduce a member of the Central Committee to the status of alternate member, or to expel him from the Party, this measure shall be put into effect immediately.

*b) On the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation
in Our Party*

1. In the past few months a syndicalist and anarchist deviation has been definitely revealed in our Party, and calls for the most resolute measures of ideological struggle and also for purging and restoring the health of the Party.

2. The said deviation is due partly to the influx into the Party of former Mensheviks and also of workers and peasants who have not yet fully assimilated the Communist world outlook; mainly, however, this deviation is due to the in-

FROM: Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, "On the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party," March, 1921 (*Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. II, book 2, pp. 502-06*).

fluence exercised upon the proletariat and on the Russian Communist Party by the petty-bourgeois element, which is exceptionally strong in our country, and which inevitably engenders vacillation towards anarchism, particularly at a time when the conditions of the masses have sharply deteriorated as a consequence of the crop failure and the devastating effects of war, and when the demobilization of the army numbering millions releases hundreds and hundreds of thousands of peasants and workers unable immediately to find regular means of livelihood.

3. The most theoretically complete and formulated expression of this deviation (*or*: one of the most complete, etc., expressions of this deviation) are the theses and other literary productions of the so-called "workers' opposition" group. Sufficiently illustrative of this is, for example, the following thesis propounded by this group: "The organization of the administration of the national economy is the function of an All-Russian Producers' Congress organized in industrial trade unions, which elect a central organ for the administration of the entire national economy of the Republic."

The ideas at the bottom of this and numerous analogous statements are radically wrong in theory, and represent a complete rupture with Marxism and Communism as well as with the practical experience of all semiproletarian revolutions and of the present proletarian revolution. . . .

Marxism teaches—and this tenet has not only been formally endorsed by the whole of the Communist International in the decisions of the Second (1920) Congress of the Comintern on the role of the political party of the proletariat, but has also been confirmed in practice by our revolution—that only the political party of the working class, i.e., the Communist Party, is capable of uniting, training and organizing a vanguard of the proletariat and of the whole mass of the working people that alone will be capable of withstanding the inevitable petty-bourgeois vacillations of this mass and the inevitable traditions and relapses of narrow craft unionism or craft prejudices among the proletariat, and of guiding all the united activities of the whole of the proletariat, i.e., of leading it politically, and through it, the whole mass

of the working people. Without this the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible.

The wrong understanding of the role of the Communist Party in relation to the non-Party proletariat, and in the relation of the first and second factor to the whole mass of working people, is a radical theoretical departure from Communism and a deviation towards syndicalism and anarchism, and this deviation permeates all the views of the "workers' opposition" group.

4. The Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party declares that it also regards as radically wrong all attempts on the part of the said group and of other persons to defend their fallacious views by referring to point 5 of the economic section of the program of the Russian Communist Party which deals with the role of the trade unions. This point says that "the trade unions must eventually actually concentrate in their hands the entire administration of the whole of national economy as a single economic unit" and that they will "ensure in this way indissoluble ties between the central state administration, the national economy and the broad masses of the working people," "drawing" these masses "into the direct work of managing economy." . . .

Instead of studying the practical experience of participation in administration, and instead of developing this experience further, strictly in conformity with successes achieved and rectified mistakes, the syndicalists and anarchists advance as an immediate slogan "congresses or a Congress of Producers" "which elect" the organs of administration of economy. Thus, the leading, educational and organizing role of the Party in relation to the trade unions of the proletariat, and of the latter to the semi-petty-bourgeois and even wholly petty-bourgeois masses of working people, is utterly evaded and eliminated, and instead of continuing and correcting the practical work of building new forms of economy already begun by the Soviet state, we get petty-bourgeois-anarchist disruption of this work, which can only lead to the triumph of the bourgeois counterrevolution.

5. In addition to theoretical fallacies and a radically wrong attitude towards the practical experience of economic

construction already begun by the Soviet government, the Congress of the Russian Communist Party discerns in the views of these and analogous groups and persons a gross political mistake and a direct political danger to the very existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In a country like Russia, the overwhelming preponderance of the petty-bourgeois element and the devastation, impoverishment, epidemics, crop failures, extreme want and hardship inevitably resulting from the war, engender particularly sharp vacillations in the moods of the petty-bourgeois and semiproletarian masses. At one moment the wavering is in the direction of strengthening the alliance between these masses and the proletariat, and at another moment in the direction of bourgeois restoration. The whole experience of all revolutions in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries shows with utmost and absolute clarity and conviction that the only possible result of these vacillations—if the unity, strength and influence of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat is weakened in the slightest degree—can be the restoration of the power and property of the capitalists and landlords.

Hence, the views of the “workers’ opposition” and of like-minded elements are not only wrong in theory, but in practice are an expression of petty-bourgeois and anarchist wavering, in practice weaken the consistency of the leading line of the Communist Party, and in practice help the class enemies of the proletarian revolution.

6. In view of all this, the Congress of the Russian Communist Party, emphatically rejecting the said ideas which express a syndicalist and anarchist deviation, deems it necessary

Firstly, to wage an unswerving and systematic ideological struggle against these ideas;

Secondly, the Congress regards the propaganda of these ideas as being incompatible with membership of the Russian Communist Party.

Instructing the Central Committee of the Party strictly to enforce these decisions, the Congress at the same time points out that space can and should be devoted in special

publications, symposiums, etc., for a most comprehensive interchange of opinion among Party members on all the questions herein indicated.

The New Economic Policy

To allay the dangers of popular hostility, particularly among the peasants, Lenin suspended the War Communism policy of requisitioning food, substituted a definite tax system, and began the restoration of a normal money economy qualified only by state ownership of the "commanding heights" of large-scale industry, transportation, communications, etc. He justified the broad use of capitalistic methods—"state capitalism"—as the only way to restore production. Thus, in 1921, the period of utopian revolutionary fervor came to an end.

. . . The most urgent thing at the present time is to take measures that will immediately increase the productive forces of peasant farming. Only in *this way* will it be possible to improve the conditions of the workers and strengthen the alliance between the workers and peasants, to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletarian or representative of the proletariat who *refused* to improve the conditions of the workers in *this way* would *in fact* prove himself to be an accomplice of the Whiteguards and the capitalists; because to refuse to do it in this way would mean putting the craft interests of the workers above their class interests, would mean sacrificing the interests of the whole of the working class, of its dictatorship, its alliance with the peasantry against the landlords and capitalists, its leading role in the struggle for the emancipation of labour from the yoke of capital, for the sake of the immediate, momentary and partial gain of the workers.

Thus, the first thing required is immediate and serious measures to raise the productive forces of the peasantry.

This cannot be done without a serious modification of our food policy. Such a modification was the substitution of the surplus-appropriation system by the tax in kind, which

FROM: Lenin, "The Tax In Kind" (April, 1921; *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 2, pp. 540-44; 565-66).

implies free trade, at least in local economic exchange, after the tax has been paid.

What, in essence, is the substitution of the surplus-appropriation system by the tax in kind? . . .

The tax in kind is one of the forms of transition from that peculiar "War Communism," which we were forced to resort to by extreme want, ruin and war, to the proper socialist exchange of products. The latter, in its turn, is one of the forms of transition from Socialism, with the peculiar features created by the predominance of the small peasantry among the population, to Communism.

The essence of this peculiar "War Communism" was that we actually took from the peasant all the surplus grain—and sometimes even not only surplus grain, but part of the grain the peasant required for food—to meet the requirements of the army and sustain the workers. . . . We were forced to resort to "War Communism" by war and ruin. It was not, nor could it be, a policy that corresponded to the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a temporary measure. The correct policy of the proletariat which is exercising its dictatorship in a small-peasant country is to obtain grain in exchange for the manufactured goods the peasant requires. Only such a food policy corresponds to the tasks of the proletariat; only such a policy can strengthen the foundations of Socialism and lead to its complete victory. . . .

The effect will be the revival of the petty bourgeoisie and of capitalism on the basis of a certain amount of free trade (if only local). This is beyond doubt. It would be ridiculous to shut our eyes to it.

The question arises: Is it necessary? Can it be justified? Is it not dangerous? . . .

. . . What is to be done? Either to try to prohibit entirely, to put the lock on, all development of private, nonstate exchange, i.e., trade, i.e., capitalism, which is inevitable amidst millions of small producers. But such a policy would be foolish and suicidal for the party that tried to apply it. It would be foolish because such a policy is economically impossible. It would be suicidal because the party that tried to apply such a policy would meet with inevitable disaster.

We need not conceal from ourselves the fact that some Communists sinned "in thought, word and deed" in this respect and dropped precisely into *such* a policy. We shall try to rectify these mistakes. They must be rectified without fail, otherwise things will come to a very sorry state.

Or (and this is the last *possible* and the only sensible policy) not to try to prohibit, or put the lock on the development of capitalism, but to try to direct it into the channels of *state capitalism*. This is economically possible, for state capitalism—in one form or another, to some degree or other—exists wherever the elements of free trade and capitalism in general exist.

Can the Soviet state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, be combined, united with state capitalism? Are they compatible? Of course they are. . . .

Our Communists still do not sufficiently understand their real duties of administration: they should not strive to do "everything themselves," wearing themselves out and failing to cope with everything, undertaking twenty jobs and finishing none. They should check up on the work of scores and hundreds of assistants, arrange to have their work checked up from below, i.e., by the real masses. They should *direct* the work and *learn* from those who have knowledge (the experts) and experience in organizing large-scale production (the capitalists). A wise Communist will not be afraid of learning from a military expert, although nine-tenths of the military experts are capable of treachery at every opportunity. A wise Communist will not be afraid of learning from a capitalist (no matter whether that capitalist is a big capitalist concessionaire, or a commission agent, or a little capitalist cooperator, etc.), although the capitalist is no better than the military expert. Did we not in the Red Army learn to catch treacherous military experts, to single out the honest and conscientious, and, on the whole, to utilize thousands and tens of thousands of military experts? We are learning to do the same (in an unconventional way) with engineers and teachers, although we are doing it much worse than we did it in the Red Army (there Denikin and Kolchak spurred us on, compelled us to learn more quickly, more diligently and

more intelligently). We shall learn to do the same (again in an unconventional way) with the commission agents, with the buyers who are working for the state, with the little cooperator-capitalists, with the entrepreneur concessionaires, etc. . . .

Chapter Three: Soviet Communism: The Era of Controversy, 1922-1929

For nearly a decade after the consolidation of Communist power Soviet Russia was ruled by a collective dictatorship of the top party leaders. At the top level individuals still spoke for themselves, and considerable freedom for factional controversy remained despite the principles of unity laid down in 1921.

The scope of political difference among the Communists was restricted, however, by certain severe limiting conditions. Under the New Economic Policy ("NEP"), the party was in power in a situation of postrevolutionary compromise, where reality made the serious application of its theory very difficult. The party was, however, dogmatically committed to the theoretical premises of the "proletarian revolution" and the "workers' state." Finally, the Civil War had bequeathed a military form of party organization, which put decisive political power in the hands of Stalin's Secretariat. While controversy raged between Right, Center, Left, and Ultra-Left groups about the proper way to advance toward the socialist ideal, the course of events was really dictated by the realities of economic backwardness and organizational power.

The uncertainties of the era of controversy came to an end with the successive victories of Stalin's party machine over Trotsky's Left Opposition and Bukharin's Right Opposition. By this time, the most important enduring features of the Soviet regime were laid down—a new system of personal power resting on total party control; a new use of doctrine as unchallengeable justification for the expediencies of government; and a new attack on the problems of backwardness,

to accomplish economic development through dictatorial compulsion and violence.

Protests against the New Economic Policy

The 1921 ban on factions did not immediately check the complaints of leftwing Communists that the NEP was a betrayal of the proletariat. The Workers' Opposition made their last stand in appealing to the Communist International (the "Declaration of the Twenty-Two") against bureaucratic muzzling of working-class sentiment in Russia. Another group, styling itself the "Workers' Truth," formed around Lenin's one-time second-in-command Alexander Bogdanov, and attacked the Communist Party for its "state capitalism" under which the workers were exploited for the benefit of the "organizers." Groups such as the "Workers' Truth," with their tone reminiscent of the old revolutionary protest against czarism, were naturally intolerable to the Soviet leaders and were quickly suppressed by the G.P.U.

a) *The Declaration of the Twenty-Two*

Dear Comrades:

We have learned from our newspapers that the International Conference of the Communist International is considering the question of the "united Workers' front," and we consider it our Communist duty to make it known to you that in our country things stand unfavorably with the united front, not only in the broad sense of the term, but even in applying it to the ranks of our party.

At a time when the forces of the bourgeois element press on us from all sides, when they even penetrate into our party, whose social content (40% workers and 60% nonproletarians) favors this, our leading centers are conducting an unrelenting, disruptive struggle against all, especially proletarians, who allow themselves to have their own judgment, and against the

FROM: Declaration of Twenty-Two Members of the Russian Communist Party to the International Conference of the Communist International (February, 1922; in the *News of the Central Committee*, March, 1922, pp. 69-70; editor's translation).

expression of this within the party they take all kinds of repressive measures.

The effort to draw the proletarian masses closer to the state is declared to be "anarcho-syndicalism," and its adherents are subjected to persecution and discredit.

In the area of the trade-union movement there is the very same picture of suppression of the workers' independence and initiative, and a struggle using every means against heterodoxy. The combined forces of the party and trade-union bureaucracies, taking advantage of their position and power, are ignoring the decisions of our congresses about carrying out the principles of workers' democracy. Our [Communist] fractions in the unions, even the fractions of entire [trade-union] congresses, are deprived of the right to express their will in the matter of electing their centers. Tutelage and pressure by the bureaucracy lead to the members of the party being constrained by the threat of expulsion and other repressive measures to elect not whom these Communists themselves want, but those whom the higher-ups, ignoring them, want. Such methods of work lead to careerism, intrigue, and toadying, and the workers answer this by quitting the party.

Sharing the idea of a united workers' front . . . we turn to you in the sincere hope of ending all the abnormalities which stand in the way of the unity of this front, above all within our Russian Communist Party. . . .

b) Appeal of the "Workers' Truth" Group

"The liberation of the workers can only
be the deed of the working class itself." [Marx]

Message to the Revolutionary Proletariat and to All Revolutionary Elements Who Remain Faithful to the Struggling Working Class:

. . . The working class of Russia, small in numbers, un-

FROM: Appeal of the "Workers' Truth" Group (1922; in *The Socialist Herald*, Berlin, Jan. 31, 1923, pp. 12-14; editor's translation).

prepared, in a peasant country, accomplished in October, 1917, the historically necessary October Revolution. Led by the Russian Communist Party, it has overthrown and destroyed the power of the ruling classes; during long years of revolution and civil war it has firmly contained the pressure of international and Russian reaction.

In spite of the unprecedentedly heavy losses sustained by the working class, the October Revolution remains a decisive and heroic event in the history of the struggle of the Russian proletariat. The Russian October Revolution has given the struggling international proletariat an experience of tremendous value for its struggle against capital.

As a result of the October Revolution all the barriers in the path of the economic development were eliminated; there is no longer any oppression by the landlords, the parasitic czarist bureaucracy, and the bourgeoisie, which relied on reactionary groups of European capitalists. After the successful revolution and civil war, broad perspectives opened before Russia, of rapid transformation into a country of progressive capitalism. In this lies the undoubted and tremendous achievement of the revolution in October.

But what has changed in the position of the working class? The working class of Russia is disorganized; confusion reigns in the minds of the workers: are they in a country of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," as the Communist Party untiringly reiterates by word of mouth and in the press? Or are they in a country of arbitrary rule and exploitation, as life tells them at every step? The working class is leading a miserable existence at a time when the new bourgeoisie (i.e., the responsible functionaries, plant directors, heads of trusts, chairmen of executive committees, etc.) and the Nepmen* live in luxury and recall in our memory the picture of the life of the bourgeoisie of all times. And again long and difficult years of the struggle for existence lie ahead. But the more complicated the circumstances, the more clarity and organization are necessary for the struggling proletariat. To introduce class clarity into the ranks of the

* Nepmen: private traders allowed to operate under the NEP—Ed.

working class of Russia, to aid in every way the organization of the revolutionary powers of the struggling proletariat—this is our task. . . .

The Communist Party, which during the years of the revolution was a party of the working class, has become the ruling party, the party of the organizers and directors of the governmental apparatus and economic life on capitalistic lines, with the general backwardness and lack of organization of the working class. The party has more and more lost its tie and community with the proletariat. The soviet, party, and trade-union bureaucracies and organizers find themselves with material conditions which are sharply distinguished from the conditions of existence of the working class. Their very well-being and the stability of their general position depend on the degree to which the toiling masses are exploited and subordinated to them. All this makes a contradiction between their interests and a break between the Communist Party and the working class inevitable.

The social existence of the Communist Party itself inevitably determines the corresponding social consciousness, interests and ideals, which contradict the interests of the struggling proletariat.

The Russian Communist Party has become the party of the organizer intelligentsia. The abyss between the Russian Communist Party and the working class is getting deeper and deeper, and this fact cannot be glossed over by any resolutions or decisions of the Communist congresses and conferences, etc. . . .

The NEP, i.e., the rebirth of normal capitalistic relations and intensive economic differentiation among the peasantry, intensified by the famine of 1920-21, has contributed to the pronounced growth of the big kulak stratum in the Russian village. The small-scale, unorganized character of peasant farming, together with the disruption of the means of communication, makes it definite that commercial capital will have a dominant role in the immediate future. At the same time the state is growing in influence as the representative of the nation-wide interests of capital and as the mere directing apparatus of political administration and economic

regulation by the organizer intelligentsia. The proletariat—broken up in consequence of the destruction of industry; weakened by losses, the detaching (by bourgeois captivation) of part of the most active elements, and ideological confusion; and lacking a proletarian party and revolutionary workers' organizations of its own—is incapable of playing any sort of influential role. . . .

In spite of the catastrophic contraction of industry, the material position of the workers who are working is, although significantly below the subsistence minimum, nevertheless steadily improving. Partly freed from the quest for a piece of bread, the workers are again showing class energy; among the progressive workers a protest is again growing, though still voiceless and confused, against the prospective capitalistic system. The revolutionary element is still small in numbers; its ideology is weakly formed; Communist fetishes are still strong; but the growth of class activity among the progressive nonparty workers and class-minded elements within the Russian Communist Party creates the necessary prerequisite for the creation of a party of the Russian proletariat. . . .

The central "Workers' Truth" group addresses itself to all revolutionary workers and active class-minded elements who have joined the proletariat's struggle, with a burning proletarian appeal to wake up from the class inactivity and confusion produced by Communist illusions, and to begin vigorous work to organize the revolutionary elements and to explain to the working masses the actual threatening state of affairs.

Once a progressive proletarian unit, the Russian Working Class has now been thrown almost a decade back.

Our work will be long and persistent, and first of all ideological. Everywhere in the mills and factories, in the trade-union organizations, the workers' faculties, the Soviet and party schools, the Communist Union of Youth, and the party organizations, propaganda circles must be created in solidarity with the "Workers' Truth."

Organize propaganda circles and do not forget the basic conditions for the development of *Revolutionary* organizations

in countries where capital is on the offensive—the careful selection of comrades and strict conspiratorial secrecy.

For our work, Comrades!

Lenin's "Testament"

Lenin began to suffer strokes in May, 1922, and relinquished active leadership of the Soviet state. His lieutenants, particularly Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin, banded together to prevent Trotsky from assuming power. Stalin had meanwhile been appointed to the new post of General Secretary of the Communist Party in April, 1922, and was working to get effective control over the party into his own hands. Toward the end of 1922 Lenin recovered sufficiently to make certain acute observations on the Soviet political scene. His comments on the successor leadership were embodied in notes which became known abroad in 1926 as his "testament," and which were finally published in the USSR after Khrushchev's attack on Stalin's record in 1956.

By the stability of the Central Committee of which I spoke before, I mean measures to prevent a split, so far as such measures can be taken. For, of course, the White Guard in *Russkaya Mysl** (I think it was S. E. Oldenburg) was right when, in the first place, in his play against Soviet Russia he banked on the hope of a split in our party, and when, in the second place, he banked for that split on serious disagreements in our party.

Our party rests upon two classes, and for that reason its instability is possible, and if there cannot exist agreement between those classes its fall is inevitable. In such an event it would be useless to take any measures or in general to discuss the stability of our Central Committee. In such an event no measures would prove capable of preventing a split. But I trust that is too remote a future, and too improbable an event, to talk about.

FROM: Lenin, Continuation of Notes, December 24, 1922 (in Lenin, *Letter to the Congress*, Moscow, State Press for Political Literature, 1956; English translation by Max Eastman, *The New York Times*, November 19, 1926).

* "Russian Thought": an emigré journal—Ed.

I have in mind stability as a guarantee against a split in the near future, and I intend to examine here a series of considerations of a purely personal character.

I think that the fundamental factor in the matter of stability—from this point of view—is such members of the Central Committee as Stalin and Trotsky. The relation between them constitutes, in my opinion, a big half of the danger of that split, which might be avoided, and the avoidance of which might be promoted, in my opinion, by raising the number of members of the Central Committee to fifty or one hundred.

Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated an enormous power in his hand; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution. On the other hand Comrade Trotsky, as was proved by his struggle against the Central Committee in connection with the question of the People's Commissariat of Ways of Communication,* is distinguished not only by his exceptional abilities—personally he is, to be sure, the most able man in the present Central Committee—but also by his too far-reaching self-confidence and a disposition to be too much attracted by the purely administrative side of affairs.

These two qualities of the two most able leaders of the present Central Committee might, quite innocently, lead to a split; if our party does not take measures to prevent it, a split might arise unexpectedly.

I will not further characterize the other members of the Central Committee as to their personal qualities. I will only remind you that the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev was not, of course, accidental, but that it ought as little to be used against them personally as the non-bolshevism of Trotsky.

Of the younger members of the Central Committee I want to say a few words about Bukharin and Piatakov. They are, in my opinion, the most able forces (among the youngest), and in regard to them it is necessary to bear in mind the

* Lenin is referring to a controversy of 1920, when Trotsky tried to shake up the administration of transport in a particularly high-handed manner—Ed.

following: Bukharin is not only the most valuable and biggest theoretician of the party, but also may legitimately be considered the favorite of the whole party, but his theoretical views can only with the very greatest doubt be regarded as fully Marxist, for there is something scholastic in him (he never has learned, and I think never has fully understood, the dialectic).

And then Piatakov—a man undoubtedly distinguished in will and ability, but too much given over to administration and the administrative side of things to be relied on in a serious political question.*

Of course, both these remarks are made by me merely with a view in the present time, in the assumption that these two able and loyal workers may not find an occasion to supplement their knowledge and correct their one-sidedness.

Postscript, January 4, 1923:

Stalin is too rude, and this fault, entirely supportable in relations among us Communists, becomes insupportable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore, I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and appoint to it another man who in all respects differs from Stalin only in superiority—namely, more patient, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less capriciousness, etc. This circumstance may seem an insignificant trifle, but I think that from the point of view of preventing a split and from the point of view of the relation between Stalin and Trotsky which I discussed above, it is not a trifle, or it is such a trifle as may acquire a decisive significance.

Lenin

Lenin on Nationality Policy

The issue which had most to do with turning Lenin against Stalin was the nationality question, particularly as it arose in the Soviet Republic of Georgia. Lenin was extremely cautious about observing the forms of national autonomy; he

* Piatakov sided with Trotsky in the controversies of the twenties, and was tried and shot in 1937—Ed.

reacted against Stalin's excessively centralist handling of the plan for a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as the "Great-Russian chauvinism" of the "Russified non-Russian."

. . . We call our own an apparatus which is still completely alien to us and represents a bourgeois and czarist jumble. To overcome this in five years, in the absence of the help of other countries and with the prevalence of military "take-overs" and the struggle with hunger, was in no way possible.

Under such conditions it is quite natural that "the freedom to secede from the Union," by which we justify ourselves, should prove to be an empty scrap of paper, incapable of defending the other nationalities of Russia from the aggression of that truly Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist, in reality a scoundrel and man of violence, which the typical Russian bureaucrat reveals himself to be. There is no doubt that an insignificant percentage of Soviet and Sovietized workers will sink in this sea of chauvinistic Great-Russian filth, like flies in milk.

They say in defense of this measure [the formation of the Union] that they have divided up the People's Commissariats which touch immediately on national psychology, national education. But here appears a question: is it possible to divide up these commissariats completely? and a second question: have we taken measures with sufficient care really to defend the other nationalities from the truly Russian Derzhimorda?* I think we have not taken these measures, although they can and must be taken.

I think that here Stalin's haste and administrative enthusiasm have played a fatal role, and also his anger against the notorious "social-nationalism." Anger in general plays the very worst role in politics.

I fear also that Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who went to the

FROM: Lenin, "On the Question of the Nationalities or of 'Autonomization'" (December 30-31, 1922; in Lenin, *Letter to the Congress*, pp. 22-25, 27-28; editor's translation).

* "Derzhimorda": a policeman in Gogol's play, *The Inspector General*—Ed.

Caucasus to investigate the matter of the "crimes" of these "social-nationalists," was also distinguished here only by his truly Russian tendency (it is known, that the russified non-Russian always overdoes things in the truly Russian direction), and that the impartiality of his whole commission is sufficiently illustrated by Ordzhonikidze's resort to force, and that Comrade Dzerzhinsky is unforgivably guilty for approaching this resort to force light-mindedly. . . .

. . . Internationalism on the part of the oppressor or so-called "great" nation (although great only in its violence, great only as the great Derzhimorda) must consist not only in the observance of the formal equality of nations, but also in the inequality which offsets on the part of the oppressor nation, the large nation, that inequality which actually is built up in life. Whoever has not understood this has really not understood the proletarian attitude toward the national question; essentially he retains the petty-bourgeois point of view and therefore cannot but slide continually toward the bourgeois point of view.

What is important for the proletariat? For the proletariat it is not only important, but essentially necessary, to guarantee the maximum confidence in the proletarian class struggle on the part of the other nationalities. What is necessary for this? For this we need not only formal equality. For this it is necessary to compensate, in one way or another by our treatment or concessions in regard to the non-Russian, for that distrust, that suspiciousness, those wrongs, which in the historical past were inflicted upon him by the ruling "great-power" nation.

I think that for the Bolsheviks, for the Communists, it is not necessary to explain this further and in detail. I think that in the present case regarding the Georgian nation we have a typical example of what extreme care, foresight and conciliation are required on our part for a truly proletarian approach to the matter. . . .

We should, of course, make Stalin and Dzerzhinsky politically responsible for this whole truly Great-Russian nationalist campaign. . . .

The harm for our state which can rise from the absence of

national commissariats united with the Russian apparatus is immeasurably less, infinitely less, than the harm which can develop not only for us but for the whole International, for the hundreds of millions of the peoples of Asia, who are ready to make their appearance on the historical stage in the very near future, following us. It would be unforgiveable opportunism if, on the eve of this appearance of the East and at the beginning of its awakening, we undermined our prestige among the peoples of the East by even the slightest rudeness and injustice in regard to our own minorities. The necessity for solidarity of the forces against the imperialists of the West, who defend the capitalist world, is one thing. Here there can be no doubt, and it is superfluous for me to say that I approve of these measures unconditionally. It is another matter when we ourselves fall, even on a small scale, into an imperialistic relationship toward the oppressed nationalities. But tomorrow, in world history, will be the very day when the aroused peoples, oppressed by imperialism, will finally awake, and when the long, severe, decisive battle for their liberation will begin.

Lenin on the Prerequisites for Socialism

Lenin was prepared to admit, as he did in commenting on the memoirs of the Menshevik Sukhanov, that Russia lacked the conditions for socialism, but he saw no reason why the Communist government could not proceed to create them. Here again he revealed his real philosophy, hardly compatible with Marxism, that political power determined all else.

. . . "Russia has not attained the level of development of productive forces that makes Socialism possible." Of this proposition, all the heroes of the Second International, including, of course, Sukhanov, are as proud as a peacock. They keep repeating this incontrovertible proposition over

FROM: Lenin, "Our Revolution: Apropos of the Notes of N. Sukhanov" (January, 1923; *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 2, pp. 726-27).

and over again in a thousand different keys, and imagine that it is the decisive criterion of our revolution.

But what if peculiar circumstances drew Russia, first, into the world imperialist war in which every more or less influential West-European country was involved, and brought her development to the verge of the revolutions that were maturing and had partly already begun in the East, in conditions which enabled us to achieve precisely that union of a "peasant war" with the working-class movement which no less a "Marxist" than Marx himself had in 1856 suggested as a possible prospect for Prussia?

What if the complete hopelessness of the situation, by stimulating the efforts of the workers and peasants tenfold, offered us the possibility of creating the fundamental requisites of civilization in a different way from that of the West-European countries? Has that altered the general line of development of world history? Has that altered the basic relations between the basic classes of all the countries that are, or have been, drawn into the general course of world history?

If a definite level of culture is required for the building of Socialism (although nobody can say just what that definite "level of culture" is, for it differs in every West-European country), why cannot we begin by first achieving the prerequisites for that definite level of culture in a revolutionary way, and *then*, with the aid of the workers' and peasants' government and the Soviet system, proceed to overtake the other nations?

You say that civilization is necessary for the building of Socialism. Very good. But why could we not first create such prerequisites of civilization in our country as the expulsion of the landlords and the Russian capitalists, and then start moving towards Socialism? Where, in what books, have you read that such variations of the customary historical order of events are impermissible or impossible?

Napoleon, one recalls, wrote: *On s'engage et puis—on voit.* Rendered freely this means: One must first join a serious battle and then see what happens. Well, we did

first join serious battle in October 1917, and then we saw such details of development (from the standpoint of world history they were certainly details) as the Brest-Litovsk Peace, the New Economic Policy, and so forth. And now there can be no doubt that in the main we have been victorious. . . .

Lenin on Administrative Reform

In his last articles, early in 1923, Lenin turned his attention to the quality of the Soviet governmental administration, which he found sorely lacking. He proposed various schemes of reform to meet the expectations of the nation and enable the Soviet regime to hold power firmly until the next international revolutionary upsurge. The latter, significantly, Lenin now expected to come from the nations of Asia.

. . . The situation as regards our machinery of state is so deplorable, not to say disgusting, that we must first of all think very carefully how to eliminate its defects, bearing in mind that the roots of these defects lie in the past, which, although it has been overturned, has not yet been overcome, does not yet belong to the culture of the dim and distant past. I say culture deliberately, because in these matters we can regard as achievements only what have become part and parcel of our culture, of our social life, our habits. We can say that what is good in the social system of our country has not been properly studied, understood, felt; it has been hastily grasped at; it has not been tested, tried by experience, made durable, etc. Of course, it could not be otherwise in a revolutionary epoch, when development proceeded at such breakneck speed that we passed from tsarism to the Soviet system in a matter of five years.

We must come to our senses in time. We must be extremely sceptical of too rapid progress, of boastfulness, etc. We must think of testing the steps forward which we proclaim to the world every hour, which we take every minute, and which later on we find, every second, to be flimsy,

FROM: Lenin, "Better Fewer, But Better" (March, 1923; *Selected Works*, Vol. II, book 2, pp. 735-39, 746, 748-51).

superficial and not understood. The most harmful thing here would be haste. The most harmful thing would be to rest on the assumption that we know anything, or on the assumption that we possess to any degree the elements necessary for building a really new state machine that would really deserve to be called socialist, Soviet, etc.

No, the machine of this kind, and even the elements of it that we do possess, are ridiculously small; we must remember that we must not stint time on building this machine, and that it will take many, many years to build.

What elements have we for building this machine? Only two. First, the workers who are absorbed in the struggle for Socialism. These elements are not sufficiently educated. They would like to build a better machine for us, but they do not know how. They cannot build one. They have not yet developed the culture which is required for this; and it is precisely culture that is required. Here nothing will be achieved by doing things in a rush, by assault, by being smart or vigorous, or by any other of the best human qualities in general. Secondly, we have the element of knowledge, education and training, but to a ridiculously low degree compared with all other countries.

Here, too, we must not forget that we are too prone to compensate (or imagine that we can compensate) our lack of knowledge by zeal, haste, etc. . . .

. . . Let us say frankly that the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection does not enjoy the slightest prestige at present. Everybody knows that a more badly organized institution than our Workers' and Peasants' Inspection does not exist, and that under present conditions nothing can be expected from this People's Commissariat. We must have this firmly fixed in our minds if we really want to set out to create within a few years an institution that will, firstly, be an exemplary institution, secondly, win everybody's absolute confidence, and, thirdly, prove to all and sundry that we have really justified the work of such a high institution as the Central Control Commission. In my opinion, we must utterly and irrevocably reject all general numerical standards for office staffs. We must make a particularly careful

selection of the employees of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and put them to the strictest test. Indeed, what is the use of establishing a People's Commissariat which carries on anyhow, which does not enjoy the slightest confidence, and whose word carries scarcely any weight? I think that our main object in launching the work of reconstruction we now have in mind is to change all this. . . .

In all spheres of social, economic and political relationships we are "frightfully" revolutionary. But as regards precedence, the observation of the forms and rites of office routine, our "revolutionariness" often gives way to the mustiest routine. Here, on more than one occasion, we have witnessed the very interesting phenomenon of a great leap forward in social life being accompanied by amazing timidity whenever the slightest changes are proposed.

This is natural, for the boldest steps forward were taken in a field which has long been reserved for theoretical study, which has been cultivated mainly, and even almost exclusively, theoretically. The Russian found solace from the bleak bureaucratic realities at home in unusually bold theoretical constructions, and that is why in our country these unusually bold theoretical constructions assumed an unusually lopsided character. Theoretical audacity in general constructions went hand in hand with amazing timidity as regards certain very minor reforms in office routine. A great universal agrarian revolution was worked out with an audacity unexampled in any other country, and at the same time, the imagination was lacking to work out a tenth-rate reform in office routine; the imagination, or patience, was lacking to apply to this reform the general propositions that produced such "brilliant" results when applied to general problems. . . .

. . . At the present time we are confronted with the question: Shall we be able to hold on with our small and very small peasant production, and in our present state of ruin, while the West-European capitalist countries are consummating their development towards Socialism? But they are consummating it not as we formerly expected. They are

not consummating it by the gradual "maturing" of Socialism, but by the exploitation of some countries by others, by the exploitation of the first of the countries to be vanquished in the imperialist war combined with the exploitation of the whole of the East. On the other hand, precisely as a result of the first imperialist war, the East has been definitely drawn into the revolutionary movement, has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement.

What tactics does this situation prescribe for our country? Obviously the following: We must display extreme caution so as to preserve our workers' government and enable it to retain its leadership and authority over our small and very small peasantry. We have the advantage in that the whole world is now passing into a movement that must give rise to a world socialist revolution. . . .

. . . The outcome of the struggle as a whole can be foreseen only because we know that in the long run capitalism itself is educating and training the vast majority of the population of the globe for the struggle.

In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And it is precisely this majority that, during the past few years, has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest shadow of doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be. In this sense, the complete victory of Socialism is fully and absolutely assured.

But what interests us is not the inevitability of this complete victory of Socialism, but the tactics which we, the Russian Communist Party, we, the Russian Soviet government, should pursue to prevent the West-European counter-revolutionary states from crushing us. To ensure our existence until the next military conflict between the counterrevolutionary imperialist West and the revolutionary and nationalist East, between the most civilized countries of the world and the Orientally backward countries, which, however, account for the majority, this majority must

become civilized. We, too, lack sufficient civilization to enable us to pass straight on to Socialism, although we have the political requisites for this. We must adopt the following tactics, or pursue the following policy to save ourselves.

We must strive to build up a state in which the workers retain their leadership in relation to the peasants, in which they retain the confidence of the peasants, and, by exercising the greatest economy, remove every trace of extravagance from our social relations.

We must reduce our state apparatus to the utmost degree of economy. We must remove from it all traces of extravagance, of which so much has been left over from tsarist Russia, from its bureaucratic capitalist apparatus.

Will not this be the reign of peasant narrowness?

No. If we see to it that the working class retains its leadership of the peasantry, we shall be able, by exercising the greatest possible economy in the economic life of our state, to use every kopek we save to develop our large-scale machine industry, to develop electrification, the hydraulic extraction of peat, to finish the construction of Volkhovstroï, etc.

In this, and this alone, lies our hope. Only when we have done this will we, speaking figuratively, be able to change horses, to change from the peasant, muzhik horse of poverty, from the horse of economy fit for a ruined peasant country, to the horse which the proletariat is seeking and cannot but seek—the horse of large-scale machine industry, or electrification, of Volkhovstroï, etc.

That is how I link up in my mind the general plan of our work, of our policy, of our tactics, of our strategy, with the functions of the reorganized Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. . . .

Trotsky on Industrialization

In the early years of the NEP Trotsky devoted himself to problems of economic planning, and urged systematic efforts by the Soviet government to build and improve

industry on the basis of a clear hierarchy of authority, ostensibly as the foundation for the "proletarian" dictatorship.

The interrelationship which we have between the working class and the peasantry rests in the last analysis on the interrelationship between industry and agriculture. In the last analysis the working class can maintain and strengthen its guiding position not through the apparatus of government, not through the army, but through industry, which reproduces the proletariat itself. The party, the trade unions, the youth league, our schools, etc., have their tasks of educating and preparing new generations of the working class. But all this work would prove to be built on sand if it did not have a growing industrial base under it. Only the development of industry creates an unshakable foundation for the proletarian dictatorship. . . .

. . . The preparation of our budget, the state's credit policy, the system of measures for the military security of the state, all state activity in general, must give primary concern to the planned development of state industry.

The regeneration of state industry, in the general economic structure of our country, will necessarily be closely dependent on the development of agriculture; the necessary means of exchange must be formed in agriculture, by way of the excess of the agricultural product over the consumption of the village, before industry can take a decisive step forward. But it is just as important for state industry not to lag behind agriculture; otherwise, on the foundation of the latter private industry would be created, which, in the last analysis, would swallow up state industry or suck it dry.

Only such industry can be victorious which gives more than it swallows up. Industry which lives off the budget, i.e., off agriculture,* could not create a firm and lasting support for the proletarian dictatorship. The question of

FROM: Trotsky, "Theses on Industry," March 6, 1923 (editor's translation from copy in the Trotsky Archive, Houghton Library, Harvard University).

* I.e., financed by taxing the peasants—Ed.

creating surplus value within state industry is the question of the fate of the Soviet power, that is, the fate of the proletariat.

The expanded reproduction of state industry, which is unthinkable without the accumulation of surplus value by the state, is in turn the condition for the development of our agriculture in the socialistic rather than the capitalistic direction.

Thus, through state industry lies the road to the socialist social order. . . .

The interrelationship between light and heavy industry cannot be decided through the market alone, for this would actually threaten heavy industry with destruction in the next few years, with the prospect of its restoration afterward on the basis of private property, as a result of the spontaneous work of the market.

Thus, in contrast to capitalist countries, the area of the planning principle is not limited here to the framework of individual trusts or syndicates, but extends to all industry as a whole. Not only that: the state must embrace the interrelationship of industry on the one hand and of agriculture, finance, transport, domestic and foreign trade, on the other.

In other words: Insofar as the state is not only the proprietor but also an economic subject in relation to the majority of productive forces of industry and transport, and in relation to the means of credit, to that extent the planning principle under the NEP is not much different in content from the planning principle in the period of War Communism. But it is most radically different in methods. Arbitrary administration by bureaucratic agencies is replaced by economic maneuvering.

In their administrative application, methods of planning must be extended with extraordinary caution, by way of carefully feeling out the ground. . . .

It is quite obvious that the basic planning of industry cannot be accomplished within industry itself, i.e., by the efforts of its leading administrative organ (the Supreme Economic Council) alone, but must become the task of a special planning organ, standing over the organization of industry and

linking the latter with finance, transport, etc. The State Planning Commission, by virtue of its position, appears to be such an organ. However, it is necessary to give the State Planning Commission a more definite position, a firmer organization, clearer and more undisputed rights and (especially) obligations. . . .

The system of actual one-man management must be applied in the organization of industry from top to bottom. For the leading economic organs really to direct industry and to be able to bear responsibility for its fate, it is essential for them to have authority over the selection of functionaries and their transfer and removal. Recommendations and attestations by the trade-union organs must be considered with full attention, but this can in no case remove responsibility from the corresponding economic organs, which in actual practice have full freedom of selection and appointment.

The weak side of state industry and trade is their ponderousness, immobility, lack of enterprise. The cause of this, above all, is still the inadequate selection of business executives, in their lack of experience, in their lack of incentives to succeed in their own work. We need correct systematic measures in all these directions. In particular, the payment of the directors of enterprises must be made to depend on their balance sheets, like wages depend on output. . . .

Formation of the Trotskyist Opposition

In the fall of 1923, after a variety of issues and personal frictions had accumulated, Trotsky launched a behind-the-scenes attack on his colleagues in the party leadership, with particular stress on the abuses being committed by Stalin's Secretariat. This was followed by a collective statement, signed by various former oppositionists, which took the leadership severely to task for their failures in economic policy as well as their violation of party democracy.

a) Trotsky Protests Bureaucratization

One of the proposals of Comrade Dzerzhinsky's commission declares that we must make it obligatory for party mem-

bers knowing about groupings in the party to communicate the fact to the GPU, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. It would seem that to inform the party organizations of the fact that its branches are being used by elements hostile to the party, is an obligation of party members so elementary that it ought not to be necessary to introduce a special resolution to that effect six years after the October Revolution. The very demand for such a resolution is an extremely startling symptom alongside of others no less clear. . . . The demand for such a resolution means: a) that illegal oppositional groups have been formed in the party, which may become dangerous to the revolution; b) that there exist such states of mind in the party as to permit comrades knowing about such groups not to inform the party organizations. Both these facts testify to an extraordinary deterioration of the situation within the party from the time of the Twelfth Congress [April, 1923]. . . .

In the fiercest moment of War Communism, the system of appointment within the party did not have one-tenth of the extent that it has now. Appointment of the secretaries of provincial committees is now the rule. That creates for the secretary a position essentially independent of the local organization. . . .

The Twelfth Congress of the party was conducted under the sign of democracy. Many of the speeches at that time spoken in defense of workers' democracy seemed to me exaggerated, and to a considerable extent demagoguish, in view of the incompatibility of a fully developed workers' democracy with the regime of dictatorship. But it was perfectly clear that the pressure of the period of War Communism ought to give place to a more lively and broader party responsibility. However, this present regime, which began to form itself before the Twelfth Congress, and which subsequently received its final reinforcement and formulation—is much farther from workers' democracy than the regime of the

FROM: Trotsky, Letter to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, October 8, 1923 (Excerpts [translated by Max Shachtman] in Trotsky, *The New Course*, New York, New International, 1943, pp. 153-56).

fiercest period of War Communism. The bureaucratization of the party apparatus has developed to unheard-of proportions by means of the method of secretarial selection. There has been created a very broad stratum of party workers, entering into the apparatus of the government of the party, who completely renounce their own party opinion, at least the open expression of it, as though assuming that the secretarial hierarchy is the apparatus which creates party opinion and party decisions. Beneath this stratum, abstaining from their own opinions, there lies the broad mass of the party, before whom every decision stands in the form of a summons or a command. In this foundation-mass of the party there is an unusual amount of dissatisfaction. . . . This dissatisfaction does not dissipate itself by way of influence of the mass upon the party organization (election of party committees, secretaries, etc.), but accumulates in secret and thus leads to interior strains. . . .

It is known to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission that while fighting with all decisiveness and definiteness within the Central Committee against a false policy, I decisively declined to bring the struggle within the Central Committee to the judgment even of a very narrow circle of comrades, in particular those who in the event of a reasonably proper party course ought to occupy prominent places in the Central Committee. I must state that my efforts of a year and a half have given no results. This threatens us with the danger that the party may be taken unawares by a crisis of exceptional severity. . . . In view of the situation created, I consider it not only my right, but my duty to make known the true state of affairs to every member of the party whom I consider sufficiently prepared, matured and self-restrained, and consequently able to help the party out of this blind alley without factional convulsions. . . .

b) *Declaration of the Forty-Six*

To the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party—Secret:

The extreme seriousness of the situation compels us (in the interests of our party, in the interests of the working class) to tell you openly that the continuation of the policy of the majority of the Politbureau threatens serious harm for the whole party. The economic and financial crisis which began at the end of July of this year, together with all the political (including intra-party) consequences which have stemmed from it, has unmercifully uncovered the unsatisfactoriness of the party leadership, in the area of the economy and especially in the area of intra-party relations.

The casualness, thoughtlessness, lack of system in the decisions of the Central Committee, not making ends meet in the area of the economy, has led to this, that with undoubtedly large successes in the area of industry, agriculture, finance and transport, successes achieved by the country's economy essentially not thanks to, but in spite of the unsatisfactory leadership, or rather, in the absence of any leadership—we face the prospect not only of the cessation of this success, but of a serious general economic crisis. . . .

If broad, considered, planned and energetic measures are not taken quickly, if the present absence of direction continues, we will face the possibility of an unusually sharp economic shock, unavoidably linked with internal political complications and with complete paralysis of our external activity and strength. And the latter, as anyone understands, we need now more than ever; on it depends the fate of the world revolution and of the working class of all countries.

Similarly, in the area of intraparty relations, we see the incorrectness of direction, paralyzing and disrupting the party, which has appeared with special clarity during the recent crisis.

We explain this not by the political incompetence of the present directors of the party; on the contrary, however we may differ with them in evaluating the situation and in the choice of measures to change it—we consider that the present leadership under any conditions cannot but be kept by the party in the leading posts of the workers' dictatorship. But

FROM: The Declaration of the Forty-Six, October 15, 1923 (editor's translation from copy in the Trotsky Archive).

we explain the crisis thus: that under the external form of official unity we actually have a selection of people and a guiding of action which are one-sided and adapted to the views and sympathies of a narrow circle. As a result of the party leadership being distorted by such narrow considerations, the party is to a significant degree ceasing to be the living, self-acting collective, which really embraces living activity, being linked by thousands of threads with this activity. Instead of this we observe a more and more progressive division of the party, no longer concealed by hardly anyone, into the secretarial hierarchy and the "laymen," into the professional party functionaries, selected from above, and the simple party masses, who do not participate in its group life.

This is a fact which every member of the party knows. Members of the party who are dissatisfied by this or that decision of the Central Committee or even of a provincial committee, who have in mind certain doubts, who have noticed "by themselves" certain mistakes, confusions and disorders, are afraid to speak of these at party meetings; further, they are afraid to converse with each other, unless their conversants appear to be completely reliable men in the sense of keeping quiet. Free discussion within the party has in fact disappeared; the party's social mind has been choked off. In these times the broad masses of the party do not nominate and elect the provincial committees and the Central Committee of the RCP. On the contrary, the secretarial hierarchy of the party to an ever greater degree selects the membership of conferences and congresses, which to an ever greater degree are becoming executive consultations of this hierarchy.

The regime which has been set up within the party is absolutely intolerable; it kills initiative in the party, subjects the party to an apparatus of appointed officials, which undeniably functions in normal times, but which unavoidably misfires in moments of crisis, and which threatens to reveal itself as completely bankrupt in the face of the serious events which are approaching.

The existing situation is explained thus, that the regime of factional dictatorship within the party, which was objectively

set up after the Tenth Congress, has outlived its usefulness. Many of us consciously undertook not to resist such a regime. The turn of events of 1921, and later the illness of comrade Lenin demanded, in the opinion of many of us, temporary measures in the nature of a dictatorship within the party. Other comrades from the very beginning reacted to this skeptically or negatively. However that may be, at the Twelfth Congress of the party this regime overdid itself. It began to show its reverse side. Intraparty bonds began to weaken. The party began to sink. Extreme oppositionist tendencies within the party, which were already clearly unhealthy, began to acquire an antiparty character, for there was no intraparty, comradely discussion of painful questions. And such a discussion would with no trouble have revealed the unhealthy character of these tendencies, to the majority of their participants as well as to the party masses. As a result—illegal groupings which are leading members of the party beyond the last limits, and the cutting of the party off from the working masses.

The economic crisis in Soviet Russia and the crisis of the factional dictatorship within the party will, if the existing situation is not radically changed in the very near future, inflict grave blows upon the worker's dictatorship in Russia and the Russian Communist Party. With such a burden on its shoulders, the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, and its executive, the RCP, cannot enter the zone of impending new world stresses without the prospect of failure on all fronts of the proletarian struggle. . . .

The impending test demands the single-minded, brotherly, completely conscious, exceptionally active, exceptionally firm action of all members of our party. The factional regime must be eliminated, and this must be done in the first instance with its perpetrators; it must be replaced by a regime of comradely unity and intraparty democracy. . . .

The "New Course" Controversy of December, 1923

The first and most decisive public debate between the Trotskyists and the adherents of the party leadership took

place in December, 1923, after some months of behind-the-scenes maneuver. The Politbureau had passed a resolution—largely drafted by Trotsky—promising broad reform in the direction of democracy within the party, and Trotsky then published an open letter warning that the party bureaucracy would try to sabotage the reform. This was the signal for a month-long press and agitational campaign against Trotsky's "factionalism."

The resolution of the Political Bureau on the party organization bears an exceptional significance. It indicates that the party has arrived at an important turning point in its historical road. At turning points, as has been rightly pointed out at many meetings, prudence is required; but firmness and resoluteness are required too. Hesitancy, amorphousness would be the worst forms of imprudence in this case.

Inclined to overestimate the role of the apparatus and to underestimate the initiative of the party, some conservative-minded comrades criticize the resolution of the Political Bureau. The Central Committee, they say, is assuming impossible obligations; the resolution will only engender illusions and produce negative results. It is clear that such an approach reveals a profound bureaucratic distrust of the party. The center of gravity which was mistakenly placed in the apparatus by the old course, has now been transferred by the new course, proclaimed in the resolution of the Central Committee, to the activity, the initiative and the critical spirit of all the party members, as the organized vanguard of the proletariat. The new course does not at all signify that the party apparatus is charged with decreeing, creating, or establishing a democratic regime at such and such a date. No. This regime will be realized by the party itself. To put it briefly: *the party must subordinate to itself its own apparatus* without for a moment ceasing to be a centralized organization.

In the debates and articles of recent times, it has been underlined that "pure," "complete," "ideal" democracy is

FROM: Trotsky, "The New Course" (Open letter to a party meeting, December 8, 1923; English translation by Max Shachtman in Trotsky, *The New Course*, pp. 89-95).

not realizable and that in general for us it is not an end in itself. That is incontestable. But it can be stated with just as much reason that pure, absolute centralism is unrealizable and incompatible with the nature of a mass party, and that it can no more be an end in itself than can the party apparatus. Democracy and centralism are two faces of party organization. The question is to harmonize them in the most correct manner, that is, the manner best corresponding to the situation. During the last period there was no such equilibrium. The center of gravity wrongly centered in the apparatus. The initiative of the party was reduced to the minimum. Thence, the habits and the procedures of leadership, fundamentally contradicting the spirit of revolutionary proletarian organization. The excessive centralization of the apparatus at the expense of initiative engendered a feeling of *uneasiness*, an uneasiness which, at the extremities of the party, assumed an exceedingly morbid form and was translated, among other things, in the appearance of illegal groupings directed by elements indubitably hostile to communism. At the same time, the whole of the party disapproved more and more of apparatus-methods of solving questions. The idea, or at the very least the feeling, that bureaucratism threatened to get the party into a blind alley, had become pretty general. Voices were raised to point out the danger. The resolution on the new course is the first official expression of the change that has taken place in the party. It will be realized to the degree that the party, that is, its four hundred thousand members, will want to realize it and will succeed in doing so. . . .

Bureaucratism kills initiative and thus prevents the elevation of the general level of the party. That is its cardinal defect. As the apparatus is made up inevitably of the most experienced and most meritorious comrades, it is upon the political training of the young Communist generations that bureaucratism has its most grievous repercussions. Also, it is the youth, the most reliable barometer of the party, that reacts most vigorously against party bureaucratism. . . .

. . . We, the "elders," we ought to say to ourselves plainly that our generation, which naturally enjoys the leading role

in the party, is not *absolutely* guaranteed against the gradual and imperceptible weakening of the revolutionary and proletarian spirit in its ranks if the party were to tolerate the further growth and stabilization of bureaucratic methods which transform the youth into the passive material of education and inevitably create an estrangement between the apparatus and the mass, the old and the young. The party has no other means to employ against this indubitable danger than a serious, profound, radical change of course toward party democracy and the increasingly large flow into its midst of working-class elements. . . .

Before the publication of the decision of the Central Committee on the "new course," the mere pointing out of the need of modifying the internal party regime was regarded by bureaucratic apparatus functionaries as heresy, as factionalism, as an infraction of discipline. And now the bureaucrats are ready formally to "take note" of the "new course," that is, to *nullify it bureaucratically*. The renovation of the party apparatus—naturally within the clear-cut framework of the statutes—must aim at replacing the mummified bureaucrats with fresh elements closely linked with the life of the collectivity, or capable of assuring such a link. And before anything else, the leading posts must be cleared out of those who, at the first word of criticism, of objection, or of protest, brandish the thunderbolts of penalties before the critic. The "new course" must begin by making everyone feel that from now on nobody will dare terrorize the party.

It is entirely insufficient for our youth to repeat our formulae. It must conquer the revolutionary formulae, it must assimilate them, work out its own opinions, its own physiognomy; it must be capable of fighting for its views with the courage which arises out of the depths of conviction and independence of character. Out of the party with passive obedience, with mechanical levelling by the authorities, with suppression of personality, with servility, with careerism! A Bolshevik is not merely a disciplined man; he is a man who in each case and on each question forges a firm opinion of his own and defends it courageously and independently, not only against his enemies, but inside his own party. Today,

perhaps, he will be in the minority in his organization. He will submit, because it is his party. But this does not always signify that he is in the wrong. Perhaps he saw or understood before the others did a new task or the necessity of a turn. He will persistently raise the question a second, a third, a tenth time, if need be. Thereby he will render his party a service, helping it meet the new task fully armed or carry out the necessary turn without organic upheavals, without factional convulsions.

Yes, our party would be unable to discharge its historic mission if it were chopped up into factions. That should not and will not happen. It will not decompose in this way because, autonomous collectivity that it is, its organism resists it. But it will combat successfully the dangers of factionalism only by developing and consolidating the new course toward workers' democracy. *Bureaucratism of the apparatus is precisely one of the principal sources of factionalism.* It ruthlessly represses criticism and drives the discontentment back into the depths of the organization. It tends to put the label of factionalism upon any criticism, any warning. Mechanical centralism is necessarily complemented by factionalism, which is at once a malicious caricature of democracy and a potential political danger. . . .

The Condemnation of the Trotskyist Opposition

By organizational pressure and some rigging of elections the party leadership scored an overwhelming success against the Opposition. At the Thirteenth Party Conference in January, 1924, this was registered in a resolution denouncing the Opposition's defiance of party authority as a Menshevik-like deviation. This was the end of the Trotsky movement as a serious organizational threat to the leadership, though top-level controversy continued.

. . . The opposition, headed by Trotsky, came forth with the slogan of smashing the party apparatus, and tried to shift

FROM: Resolution of the Thirteenth Conference of the Russian Communist Party, January, 1924, "On the Results of the Controversy and on the Petty-Bourgeois Deviation in the Party" (CPSU in Resolutions, I, 780-782; editor's translation).

the center of gravity of the struggle against bureaucratism in the governmental apparatus to "bureaucratism" in the apparatus of the party. Such wholesale criticism and attempts at directly discrediting the party apparatus cannot objectively lead to anything else than the emancipation of the governmental apparatus from influence upon it on the part of the party, to the divorce of the governmental organs from the party. . . .

Trotsky came out with vague insinuations about the degeneration of the basic cadres of our party and thereby tried to undermine the authority of the Central Committee, which between congresses is the only representative of the whole party. Trotsky not only tried to counterpose himself to all the rest of the Central Committee, but also permitted accusations which could not but evoke unrest in broad circles of the working class and a stormy protest in the ranks of our party. . . .

The opposition in all its shades has revealed a completely un-Bolshevik view on the significance of party discipline. The moves of a whole series of representatives of the opposition represent a crying violation of party discipline, and recall the times when Lenin had to struggle against the "anarchism of the intellectuals" in organizational questions and defend the foundations of proletarian discipline in the party.

The opposition clearly violated the decision of the Tenth Congress of the Russian Congress Party which prohibited the formation of factions within the party. The opposition has replaced the Bolshevik view of the party as a monolithic whole with the view of the party as the sum of all possible tendencies and factions. These tendencies, factions and groupings, according to the "new" view of the opposition, must have equal rights in the party, and the Central Committee of the party must not be so much the leader of the party as a simple registrar and intermediary between the tendencies and groupings. Such a view of the party has nothing in common with Leninism. The factional work of the opposition cannot but become a threat to the unity of the state apparatus. The factional moves of the opposition have en-

livened the hopes of all enemies of the party, including the West-European bourgeoisie, for a split in the ranks of the Russian Communist Party. These factional moves again pose before the party in all its sharpness the question whether the Russian Communist Party, since it is in power, can allow the formation of factional groupings within the party.

Adding up the sum of these differences and analyzing the whole character of the moves by the representatives of the opposition, the All-Union Party Conference comes to the conclusion that in the person of the present opposition we have before us not only an attempt at the revision of Bolshevism, not only a direct departure from Leninism, but also a clearly expressed *petty-bourgeois deviation*. There is no doubt that this 'opposition' objectively reflects the pressure of the petty bourgeoisie on the position of the proletarian party and its policy. The principle of intraparty democracy is already beginning to be interpreted broadly beyond the limits of the party, in the sense of weakening the dictatorship of the proletariat and extending political rights to the new bourgeoisie.

In the situation where the Russian Communist Party, embodying the dictatorship of the proletariat, enjoys a monopoly of legality in the country, it is unavoidable that the least stable groups of Communists should sometimes give in to nonproletarian influences. The party as a whole must see these dangers and watchfully guard the proletarian line of the party.

A systematic and energetic struggle of our whole party against this petty-bourgeois deviation is essential. . .

The Formation of the USSR

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics officially came into being in January, 1924, as a federal union of four states which had been nominally independent though controlled by the single Russian Communist Party: the Russian Republic, the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Transcaucasian Federation. The forms of national autonomy, complete with the right of secession, were carefully observed, but in point of

fact language was the only real distinction among the Soviet nationalities, who remain to the present under the strictly centralized control of the Communist Party.

Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

PART I: Declaration

Since the foundation of the Soviet Republics, the States of the world have been divided into two camps; the camp of Capitalism and the camp of Socialism.

There, in the camp of Capitalism: national hate and inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, national oppression and massacres, brutalities and imperialistic wars.

Here, in the camp of Socialism: reciprocal confidence and peace, national liberty and equality, the pacific co-existence and fraternal collaboration of peoples.

The attempts made by the capitalistic world during the past ten years to decide the question of nationalities by bringing together the principle of the free development of peoples with a system of exploitation of man by man have been fruitless. In addition, the number of national conflicts becomes more and more confusing, even menacing the capitalistic regime. The bourgeoisie has proven itself incapable of realizing a harmonious collaboration of the peoples.

It is only in the camp of the Soviets; it is only under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat that has grouped around itself the majority of the people, that it has been possible to eliminate the oppression of nationalities, to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence and to establish the basis of a fraternal collaboration of peoples. . . .

. . . National economic reestablishment is impossible as long as the Republics remain separated.

On the other hand, the instability of the international situation and the danger of new attacks make inevitable the creation of a united front of the Soviet Republics in the presence of capitalistic surroundings.

FROM: Constitution of the USSR, Ratified by the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR, January 13, 1924 (English translation in Milton H. Andrew, *Twelve Leading Constitutions*, Compton, Cal., American University Series, 1931, pp. 327 ff.).

Finally, the very structure of Soviet power, international by nature of class, pushes the masses of workers of the Soviet Republics to unite in one socialist family.

All these considerations insistently demand the union of the Soviet Republics into one federated State capable of guaranteeing security against the exterior, economic prosperity internally, and the free national development of peoples.

The will of the peoples of the Soviet Republics recently assembled in Congress, where they decided unanimously to form the "Union of Socialist Soviet Republics," is a sure guarantee that this Union is a free federation of peoples equal in rights, that the right to freely withdraw from the Union is assured to each Republic, that access to the Union is open to all Republics already existing, as well as those that may be born in the future, that the new federal state will be the worthy crowning of the principles laid down as early as October 1917, of the pacific co-existence and fraternal collaboration of peoples, that it will serve as a bulwark against the capitalistic world and mark a new decisive step towards the union of workers of all countries in one World-Wide Socialist Soviet Republic.

PART II: Treaty

The Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine, the Socialist Soviet Republic of White Russia, and the Socialist Soviet Republic of Transcaucasia (including the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia, and the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia) unite themselves in one federal State—"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." . . .

Chapter II: Sovereign Rights of the Member Republics
Article 3. The Sovereignty of the member Republics is limited only in the matters indicated in the present Constitution, as coming within the competence of the Union. Outside of those limits, each member Republic exerts its public powers independently; the Union of S.S.R. protects the rights of member Republics.

Article 4. Each one of the member Republics retains the right to freely withdraw from the union. . . .

Stalin on Leninism and the Party

Lenin died on January 21, 1924. He was succeeded as Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR by Alexei Rykov, but the real leadership of the Communist Party was temporarily shared by Stalin and Zinoviev. Stalin had the decisive advantage with his control of the party Secretariat, and in the spring of 1924 began to assert himself in the theoretical field with a series of lectures on "Leninism." Stalin proved to be Lenin's most adept pupil in both the theory and practice of the disciplined party organization.

. . . The Party is not only the *vanguard* detachment of the working class. If it desires really to direct the struggle of the class it must at the same time be the *organized* detachment of its class. The Party's tasks under the conditions of capitalism are immense and extremely varied. The Party must direct the struggle of the proletariat under the exceptionally difficult conditions of internal and external development; it must lead the proletariat in the offensive when the situation calls for an offensive; it must lead the proletariat in retreat when the situation calls for retreat in order to ward off the blows of a powerful enemy; it must imbue the millions of unorganized non-Party workers with the spirit of discipline and system in the struggle, with the spirit of organization and endurance. But the Party can fulfil these tasks only if it is itself the embodiment of *discipline* and organization, if it is itself the *organized* detachment of the proletariat. Without these conditions there can be no talk of the Party really leading the proletarian millions. . . .

. . . The Party is the organized detachment of the working class. But the Party is not the only organization of the working class. The proletariat has also a number of other

FROM: Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism" (April, 1924; English translation in J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953, pp. 100, 102-12).

organizations, without which it cannot properly wage the struggle against capital: trade unions, cooperative societies, factory organizations, parliamentary groups, non-Party women's associations, the press, cultural and educational organizations, youth leagues, revolutionary fighting organizations (in times of open revolutionary action), Soviets of deputies as the form of state organization (if the proletariat is in power), etc. The overwhelming majority of these organizations are non-Party, and only some of them adhere directly to the Party, or represent its offshoots. All of these organizations, under certain conditions, are absolutely necessary for the working class, for without them it would be impossible to consolidate the class positions of the proletariat in the diverse spheres of struggle; for without them it would be impossible to steel the proletariat as the force whose mission it is to replace the bourgeois order by the socialist order. . . . The question then arises: who is to determine the line, the general direction, along which the work of all these organizations is to be conducted? Where is that central organization which is not only able, because it has the necessary experience, to work out such a general line, but, in addition, is in a position, because it has sufficient prestige, to induce all these organizations to carry out this line, so as to attain unity of leadership and to preclude the possibility of working at cross purposes?

This organization is the Party of the proletariat.

The Party possesses all the necessary qualifications for this because, in the first place, it is the rallying centre of the finest elements in the working class, who have direct connections with the non-Party organizations of the proletariat and very frequently lead them; because, secondly, the Party, as the rallying centre of the finest members of the working class, is the best school for training leaders of the working class, capable of directing every form of organization of their class; because, thirdly, the Party, as the best school for training leaders of the working class, is, by reason of its experience and prestige, the only organization capable of centralizing the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organization

of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class.

The Party is the highest form of class organization of the proletariat. . . .

. . . The Party is the principal guiding force within the class of the proletarians and among the organizations of that class. But it does not by any means follow from this that the Party can be regarded as an end in itself, as a self-sufficient force. The Party is not only the highest form of class association of the proletarians; it is at the same time an *instrument* in the hands of the proletariat *for* achieving the dictatorship when that has not yet been achieved and *for* consolidating and expanding the dictatorship when it has already been achieved. The Party could not have risen so high in importance and could not have overshadowed all other forms of organization of the proletariat, if the latter had not been confronted with the problem of power, if the conditions of imperialism, the inevitability of wars, and the existence of a crisis had not demanded the concentration of all the forces of the proletariat at one point, the gathering of all the threads of the revolutionary movement in one spot in order to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat. The proletariat needs the Party first of all as its General Staff, which it must have for the successful seizure of power. It need hardly be proved that without a Party capable of rallying around itself the mass organizations of the proletariat, and of centralizing the leadership of the entire movement during the progress of the struggle, the proletariat in Russia could never have established its revolutionary dictatorship.

But the proletariat needs the Party not only to achieve the dictatorship; it needs it still more to maintain the dictatorship, to consolidate and expand it in order to achieve the complete victory of socialism.

"Certainly, almost everyone now realizes," says Lenin, "that the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power for two-and-a-half months, let alone two-and-a-half years, unless the strictest, truly iron discipline had prevailed in our Party, and un-

less the latter had been rendered the fullest and unreserved support of the whole mass of the working class, that is, of all its thinking, honest, self-sacrificing and influential elements who are capable of leading or of carrying with them the backward strata."

Now, what does to "maintain" and "expand" the dictatorship mean? It means imbuing the millions of proletarians with the spirit of discipline and organization; it means creating among the proletarian masses a cementing force and a bulwark against the corrosive influences of the petty-bourgeois elements and petty-bourgeois habits; it means enhancing the organizing work of the proletarians in re-educating and remoulding the petty-bourgeois strata; it means helping the masses of the proletarians to educate themselves as a force capable of abolishing classes and of preparing the conditions for the organization of socialist production. But it is impossible to accomplish all this without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and discipline.

"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is a persistent struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force. Without an iron party tempered in the struggle, without a party enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given class, without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully."

The proletariat needs the Party *for* the purpose of achieving and maintaining the dictatorship. The Party is an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But from this it follows that when classes disappear and the dictatorship of the proletariat withers away, the Party will also wither away.

. . . The achievement and maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and iron discipline. But iron discipline in the Party is inconceivable without unity of will, without complete and absolute unity of action on the part of all members of the Party. This does not mean, of

course, that the possibility of contests of opinion within the Party is thereby precluded. On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes criticism and contest of opinion within the Party. Least of all does it mean that discipline must be "blind." On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes conscious and voluntary submission, for only conscious discipline can be truly iron discipline. But after a contest of opinion has been closed, after criticism has been exhausted and a decision has been arrived at, unity of will and unity of action of all Party members are the necessary conditions without which neither Party unity nor iron discipline in the Party is conceivable. . . .

. . . It follows that the existence of factions is incompatible either with the Party's unity or with its iron discipline. It need hardly be proved that the existence of factions leads to the existence of a number of centres, and the existence of a number of centres connotes the absence of one common centre in the Party, the breaking up of the unity of will, the weakening and disintegration of discipline, the weakening and disintegration of the dictatorship. . . .

. . . The source of factionalism in the Party is its opportunist elements. The proletariat is not an isolated class. It is constantly replenished by the influx of peasants, petty bourgeois and intellectuals proletarianized by the development of capitalism. . . .

In one way or another, all these petty-bourgeois groups penetrate into the Party and introduce into it the spirit of hesitancy and opportunism, the spirit of demoralization and uncertainty. It is they, principally, that constitute the source of factionalism and disintegration, the source of disorganization and disruption of the Party from within. To fight imperialism with such "allies" in one's rear means to expose oneself to the danger of being caught between two fires, from the front and from the rear. Therefore, ruthless struggle against such elements, their expulsion from the Party, is a prerequisite for the successful struggle against imperialism.

The theory of "mastering" opportunist elements by ideological struggle within the Party, the theory of "overcoming"

these elements within the confines of a single Party, is a rotten and dangerous theory, which threatens to condemn the Party to paralysis and chronic infirmity, threatens to make the Party a prey to opportunism, threatens to leave the proletariat without a revolutionary party, threatens to deprive the proletariat of its main weapon in the fight against imperialism. . . . Proletarian parties develop and become strong by purging themselves of opportunists and reformists, social-imperialists and social-chauvinists, social-patriots and social-pacifists.

The Party is strengthened by purging itself of opportunist elements. . . .

. . . Leninism is a school of theory and practice which trains a special type of Party and state worker, creates a special Leninist style in work.

What are the characteristic features of this style? What are its peculiarities?

It has two specific features:

- a) the Russian revolutionary sweep and
- b) American efficiency.

The style of Leninism is a combination of these two specific features in Party and state work.

The Russian revolutionary sweep is an antidote to inertness, routine, conservatism, mental stagnation and slavish submission to ancestral traditions. The Russian revolutionary sweep is the life-giving force which stimulates thought, impels things forward, breaks the past and opens up perspectives. Without it no progress is possible.

But Russian revolutionary sweep has every chance of degenerating in practice into empty "revolutionary" Manilovism if it is not combined with American efficiency in work. . . .

. . . American efficiency is that indomitable force which neither knows nor recognizes obstacles; which with its businesslike perseverance brushes aside all obstacles; which continues at a task once started until it is finished, even if it is a minor task; and without which serious constructive work is inconceivable.

But American efficiency has every chance of degenerating

into narrow and unprincipled commercialism if it is not combined with the Russian revolutionary sweep. . . .

The combination of the Russian revolutionary sweep with American efficiency is the essence of Leninism in Party and state work.

This combination alone produces the finished type of Leninist worker, the style of Leninism in work.

Stalin on Socialism in One Country

In the fall of 1924 some critical publications by Trotsky were taken as the signal for the party leaders to direct a series of scathing denunciations at him for his alleged ideological heresies. The "theory of permanent revolution" figured prominently as the basis for asserting a fundamental opposition between Trotsky and Lenin, although the more immediate reason for scotching the theory was its implication that the Soviet regime, unsupported by international revolution, was in danger of losing its socialist qualities. Stalin's contribution to the defense against Trotsky was the theory of "socialism in one country," which he contrived out of one distorted quotation from Lenin.

. . . According to Lenin, the revolution draws its strength primarily from among the workers and peasants of Russia itself. According to Trotsky, the necessary strength can be found *only* "in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."

But what if the world revolution is fated to arrive with some delay? Is there any ray of hope for our revolution? Trotsky offers no ray of hope, for "the contradictions in the position of a workers' government . . . can be solved *only* . . . in the arena of the world proletarian revolution." According to this plan, there is but one prospect left for our revolution: to vegetate in its own contradictions and rot away while waiting for the world revolution. . . .

FROM: Stalin, "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists" (December, 1924; *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 121-130).

. . . “Permanent revolution” is not a mere underestimation of the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement. “Permanent revolution” is an underestimation of the peasant movement which leads to the *repudiation* of Lenin’s theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Trotsky’s “permanent revolution” is a variety of Menshevism. . . .

The second peculiar feature of the October Revolution lies in the fact that this revolution represents a model of the practical application of Lenin’s theory of the proletarian revolution.

He who has not understood this peculiar feature of the October Revolution will never understand either the international nature of this revolution, or its colossal international might, or the specific features of its foreign policy.

“Uneven economic and political development,” says Lenin, “is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one separate capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized socialist production, would stand up *against* the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states.” For “the free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states.”

The opportunists of all countries assert that the proletarian revolution can begin—if it is to begin anywhere at all, according to their theory—only in industrially developed countries, and that the more highly developed these countries are industrially the more chances there are for the victory of socialism. Moreover, according to them, the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, and in a country little developed in the capitalist sense at that, is excluded as something absolutely improbable. As far back as the period of the war, Lenin, taking as his basis the law of the uneven development of the imperialist states, opposed to the opportunists his theory of the proletarian revolution on the victory of

socialism in one country, even if that country is less developed in the capitalist sense.

It is well known that the October Revolution fully confirmed the correctness of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.

How do matters stand with Trotsky's "permanent revolution" in the light of Lenin's theory of the victory of the proletarian revolution in one country?

Let us take Trotsky's pamphlet *Our Revolution* (1906).

Trotsky writes:

"Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant."

What does this quotation mean? It means that the victory of socialism in one country, in this case Russia, is impossible "without direct state support from the European proletariat," i.e., before the European proletariat has conquered power.

What is there in common between this "theory" and Lenin's thesis on the possibility of the victory of socialism "in one separate capitalist country"?

Clearly, there is nothing in common. . . .

It goes without saying that for the *complete* victory of socialism, for *complete* security against the restoration of the old order, the united efforts of the proletarians of several countries are necessary. It goes without saying that, without the support given to our revolution by the proletariat of Europe, the proletariat of Russia could not have held out against the general onslaught, just as without the support the revolution in Russia gave to the revolutionary movement in the West the latter could not have developed at the pace at which it has begun to develop since the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. It goes without saying that we need support. But what does support of our revolution by the West-European proletariat imply? Is not the sympathy of European workers for our revolution, their readiness to thwart the imperialists' plans of intervention—

is not all this support? Is this not real assistance? Unquestionably it is. . . .

. . . Let us take, for example, Trotsky's "Postscript," written in 1922, for the new edition of his pamphlet *Peace Program*. Here is what he says in this "Postscript":

"The assertion reiterated several times in the *Peace Program* that a proletarian revolution cannot culminate victoriously within national bounds may perhaps seem to some readers to have been refuted by the nearly five years' experience of our Soviet republic. But such a conclusion would be unwarranted. The fact that the workers' state has held out against the whole world in one country, and a backward country at that, only testifies to the colossal might of the proletariat, which in other, more advanced, more civilized countries will be truly capable of performing miracles. But while we have held our ground as a state politically and militarily, we have not arrived, or even begun to arrive, at the building of a socialist society. . . . As long as the bourgeoisie remains in power in the other European countries we will be compelled, in our struggle against economic isolation, to strive for agreement with the capitalist world, at the same time it may be said with certainty that these agreements may at best help us to mitigate some of our economic ills, to take one or another step forward, but real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible *only after the victory* of the proletariat in the major European countries." [Stalin's italics.]

Thus speaks Trotsky, plainly sinning against reality and stubbornly trying to save his "permanent revolution" from final shipwreck.

It appears, then, that, twist and turn as you like, we not only have "not arrived," but we have "not even begun to arrive" at the building of a socialist society. It appears that some people have been hoping for "agreements with the capitalist world," but it also appears that nothing will come of these agreements, for, twist and turn as you like, a "real progress of a socialist economy" will not be possible until the proletariat has been victorious in the "major European countries."

Well, then, since there is still no victory in the West, the only "choice" that remains for the revolution in Russia is: either to rot away or to degenerate into a bourgeois state.

It is no accident that Trotsky has been talking for two years now about the "degeneration" of our Party. . . .

. . . Trotsky's "permanent revolution" is the negation of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution; and conversely, Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution is the negation of the theory of "permanent revolution."

Lack of faith in the strength and capabilities of our revolution, lack of faith in the strength and capabilities of the Russian proletariat—that is what lies at the root of the theory of "permanent revolution."

Hitherto only *one* aspect of the theory of "permanent revolution" has usually been noted—lack of faith in the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement. Now, in fairness, this must be supplemented by *another* aspect—lack of faith in the strength and capabilities of the proletariat in Russia.

What difference is there between Trotsky's theory and the ordinary Menshevik theory that the victory of socialism in one country, and in a backward country at that, is impossible without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution "in the principal countries of Western Europe"?

As a matter of fact, there is no difference.

There can be no doubt at all. Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" is a variety of Menshevism. . . .

Bukharin on the Worker-Peasant Alliance

Bukharin's contribution to the anti-Trotsky argument was to stress the support which the "workers' state" in Russia commanded through its "alliance" with the peasantry—a line of reasoning which made him adhere closely to the circumspectful agricultural policies of the NEP. He went so far as to suggest that the worker-peasant alliance must serve as the model for the world revolution as a whole, considering the great peasant majority of the world's population.

For Comrade Trotsky the posing of the question was extremely simple: there can *only* be a proletarian revolution in Russia . . . , but *this proletarian revolution in a petty-bour-*

geois country is condemned to perish unless governmental aid on the part of the victorious proletariat of Western Europe is provided for it. . . .

Comrade Trotsky began by failing to understand the *peculiar* course of our revolution, which consists of the unique binding together of a *peasant war* against the landlord and the *proletarian revolution*. Comrade Trotsky did not understand the *peculiarity of the initial stage of this revolution*, the essence of which consists of liberation from feudal ways and the destruction of landlord property-holding. . . .

Comrade Trotsky furthermore did not see those special *international* conditions which—even without governmental aid from the victorious West-European proletariat—permit our socialist revolution to sit it out, become stronger, *grow*, in order that it may finally be victorious together with the victory of the working class of other countries.

Comrade Trotsky has here reasoned schematically: *either* a bourgeois revolution *or* a proletarian one; *either* the classical proletarian revolution—and a firm victory, *or* a half-breed proletarian revolution—and death. Either there is governmental aid from the Western proletariat—and salvation, *or* there is no such aid—and no such salvation.

But in fact life has completely refuted these schemes and has given altogether different answers. *Both* bourgeois *and* proletarian (one flows into the other); no state aid from the proletariat, but nevertheless aid on the part of the proletariat, and on the part of the colonies (and even aid on the part of the capitalists, who by their internecine fighting assist proletarian states); no classical proletarian revolution, but nevertheless not death but life, etc. Reality has proven to be much more varicolored than the dry schemes of the carefully drawn diagrams of “permanent revolution.”

Trotsky’s *political impotence* stems from the fact that he did not see reality. . . .

The disputes which we have been having can be reduced to a considerable degree, as we know, to the question of the

FROM: Bukharin, “The Theory of Permanent Revolution” (Speech of December 13, 1924, in the symposium *For Leninism*, Moscow—Leningrad, Party Press, 1925, pp. 347-51, 353, 367; editor’s translation.)

worker-peasant bloc, of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, and of the hegemony of the proletariat in this "alliance" or "bloc." . . . Only now has this question assumed its vast full magnitude. For, in essence, we are speaking here not only about the problem of the worker-peasant *smychka* ["bond"] in our Soviet republics, but also about a vast and in a certain sense decisive problem of the *international revolution*. For such a burning question of the present like the question of the *colonies*, which is a question of life and death for capitalism, is from the point of view of world revolution none other than the question of the *smychka* between the West-European and American industrial proletariat on the one hand and the colonial peasantry on the other. . . .

If we ask the question how things will be in the framework of the world economy when the workers conquer power, then just this question of the relation of the victorious proletariat to the colonial peasantry will come before us. Insofar as we ask why the European Social Democrats have completely failed to understand the significance of the peasant question, have paid it so little attention, and have failed to pose the problems which are so characteristic for us, the matter does not at all reduce to the fact that we have a peasant country and there the countries are industrialized. They also have had their "agrarian complement," but it is situated not in the metropolitan country but in the separate colonial periphery. And the fact that the European Social-Democrats have paid insufficient attention to the peasant question is unconditionally linked to the circumstance that they have a careless attitude toward the revolutionary posing of the question of the colonies. . . . When Comrade Trotsky, carried away by his "Europeanism," repeatedly underscored the Asiatic-peasant character of the ideology of the "immature" proletariat (and just thus did he evaluate the Bolsheviks), in this Europeanism there was something of the contemptuous attitude of the Social Democrats toward the peasant and colonial question, although Comrade Trotsky personally devoted rather much attention to the colonial question.

From this general context regarding classes, from this "European" evaluation of their role, stemmed Comrade Trotsky's quite concrete presentation of the idea that the revolution in Russia will inevitably perish if there is no governmental support on the part of the victorious proletariat. . . .

The classical proletarian revolution is one where the proletariat is the only "popular" class. In other words, only in a society where there is no peasantry could this ideal revolution occur.

However, this "ideal" presentation completely fails to conform to reality. If we take the *world economy*, we see that the proletariat in the real sense of the word constitutes an insignificant minority of the population. . . .

Before the seizure of power the working class must have the support of the peasants in the *struggle against the capitalists and landlords*. . . .

The proletariat after its victory must *get along* with the peasantry *no matter what*, for it is the majority of the population with great economic and social weight. . . . It is necessary, accordingly, to understand that the proletariat has *no choice here*; it is *compelled*, in building socialism, to get the peasantry behind it; it must *learn how* to accomplish this, for without this its regime will not last. . . .

If a conflict between the proletariat and the peasantry were unavoidable, inevitable, then it would be unavoidable and inevitable even with the *world* victory of the proletariat. Peasants are the overwhelming majority on our planet. If the proletariat does not have the means to get this majority *behind it*, then: *either* the international revolution is also doomed to collapse, *or* it must be postponed until the time when the proletariat becomes a majority on the earth. We cannot hope to burst our "terrestrial boundaries" and expect aid from purely proletarian *heavenly* forces, in "governmental form" besides! . . .

Trotsky's mistake is to consider the conflict between the proletariat and the peasantry inevitable, when it is only *possible*. And this is not one and the same thing. It is inevitable only in the event that the proletarian regime proves

to be less advantageous for the peasantry than a bourgeois regime, if the peasantry slips out from under the leadership of the proletariat. But this is not at all bound to happen, and will not, if the party of the victorious proletariat makes care for supporting and strengthening the worker-peasant bloc its main policy. . . .

. . . It is perfectly natural that when Comrade Trotsky insists on his errors we must say: if now when the country is again in a state of crisis they raise the question of the peasantry in its full scope, raising the question of the permanent revolution; when they continue to take the point of view of permanent revolution and want to turn the whole party onto this road—we cannot take this path, because we do not want to give up the Leninist position, because without this position we will destroy our cause. Therefore, we must ideologically liquidate Trotskyism and conquer the whole party under the Leninist banner no matter what, for the question of the worker-peasant bloc is the central question, it is the question of all questions.

Preobrazhensky on the Economics of Industrialization

While organizationally defeated, the Trotskyists remained intellectually active. Evgeny Preobrazhensky, the leading Opposition economist, worked out a penetrating analysis of the obstacles standing in the way of the industrial progress on which all the Communists set their hopes. In his view only a systematic exploitation of the peasant majority could support industrialization by the socialist state. Essentially this was the analysis on which Stalin later based the Five-Year Plans and the collectivization of the peasants.

. . . It will be no exaggeration to say that for all our theoreticians, and practitioners as well, the most interesting, vital, exciting question since the October coup of 1917 and the military victory of the revolution is the question of what

FROM: Preobrazhensky, *The New Economics: An Essay in the Theoretical Analysis of the Soviet Economy* (Second edition, Moscow, Communist Academy, 1926, pp. 86, 89-90, 92-94, 99, 136-37; editor's translation).

the Soviet system represents, in what direction it is developing, what the basic laws of this development are, and, finally, what relation this first experience of an economy whose main links go outside the limits of capitalism has to our old and habitual images of socialism. The last question could be correctly phrased thus: How after eight years of the dictatorship of the proletariat in a vast country, should we view our former images of socialism? . . .

. . . The complex of state socialist production can appear only as the result of breaking up the old system on all fronts, only as the result of social revolution. This fact has colossal significance for understanding not only the genesis of socialism but also the socialist construction that follows. On the other hand, insufficient understanding or neglect of the essence of what socialism is has more than once led and is leading a series of comrades to purely Philistine and sometimes outright reformist notions about the Soviet economy and the paths of its development. . . .

Primary socialist accumulation, as the period of creating the material prerequisites for socialist production in the proper sense of the word, can only begin with the seizure of power and nationalization. . . .

. . . On a private or limited scale socialist accumulation is not able to resolve the basic problem of the socialist organization of the economy. In particular, insofar as we are concerned with the economy of the Soviet Union, it is essential to have: 1) accumulation which makes it possible for the state economy to achieve the technical level of contemporary capitalism wherever it is not possible to move gradually on to the base of the new technology; 2) accumulation which makes possible the change in the technological base of the state economy, the scientific organization of labor, the planned direction of the whole complex of the state economy, everything that is not possible without large supplies for insurance and planned reserves; 3) accumulation which guarantees progress for the whole complex, not just its individual parts, since the chain of dependence in the movement of the whole complex makes progress on different levels, in the manner of capitalist "partisan warfare," in-

dividual initiative, and competition, completely impossible. . . .

We term *socialist* accumulation the assimilation to the functioning means of production of the surplus product which is created within the amalgamated socialist economy and which is not distributed as a supplement among the agents of socialist production and the socialist state, but contributes to expanded reproduction.* On the other hand, we term *primary socialist* accumulation the accumulation in the hands of the state of most or all of the material resources from sources lying outside the complex of the state economy. In a backward peasant country this accumulation must play a colossally important role, to a vast degree hastening the arrival of the moment when the technological and scientific reconstruction of the state economy can begin and when this economy can finally achieve purely economic predominance over capitalism. . . . The basic law of our Soviet economy, which at the present moment is coursing through this stage, is precisely the law of primary or preliminary socialist accumulation. To this law are subordinated all the basic processes of economic life in the sphere of the state economy. This law, on the other hand, changes and partly liquidates the law of value and all the laws of the commodity and commodity-capitalistic economy insofar as they manifest themselves or can manifest themselves in our system of economy. Consequently, *we can not only speak of primary socialist accumulation, we cannot even understand the essence of the Soviet economy unless we understand the central role which the law of primary socialist accumulation plays in this economy, how it determines, in the struggle with the law of value, the distribution of the means of production in the economy, the distribution of the working force, and the extent of alienation of the country's surplus product for the expansion of socialist reproduction.* . . .

In regard to alienation of part of the surplus product for the benefit of socialism, matters are entirely different from all pre-socialist economic forms. Exactions from the non-socialist forms must not only have a place inevitably in the period of

* I.e., an increased investment in industrial plant—Ed.

primary socialist accumulation—they must inevitably assume a vast, directly decisive role in peasant countries like the Soviet Union. . . .

In the period of primary socialist accumulation the state economy cannot do without alienating part of the surplus product of the village and of craft production, in sum, without deductions from capitalistic accumulation for the benefit of socialist accumulation. We do not know to what extent other countries will emerge devastated from the civil war in which the dictatorship of the proletariat triumphs. But a country like the U.S.S.R., with its devastated and in general rather backward economy, must go through the period of primary accumulation with very broad use of the sources of the presocialist forms of the economy. We should not forget that the period of primary socialist accumulation is the most critical period in the life of the socialist state after the termination of the civil war. In this period the socialist system is not yet in a condition to develop organically all its own advantages, while at the same time it inevitably liquidates a series of economic advantages which are characteristic of the developed capitalist system. To traverse this period rapidly, to reach quickly the moment when the socialist system will have developed all its natural advantages over capitalism—this is a question of life or death for the socialist state. At least this is how the question stands right now for the U.S.S.R., and perhaps it will stand thus for some time in a series of European countries where the proletariat is victorious. Under such conditions to rely only on accumulation within the socialist sphere means to risk the very existence of socialist economics, or to extend indefinitely the period of preliminary accumulation. . . .

. . . At the moment of its victory the working class changes from the object of exploitation into the subject of it. It cannot regard its own working power, health, labor and conditions as the capitalists regard them. This constitutes the definition of the limit to the tempo of socialist accumulation, a limit which capitalistic industry in the first period of its development did not know. . . .

. . . In this period the law of wages is subordinated to

the law of socialist accumulation, which finds its expression in conscious self-restraint by the working class. . . . Socialist accumulation is a necessity for the working class, but now it proceeds as a consciously understood necessity. . . .

Soviet Cultural Policy—the Liberal Period

While the Communists were firmly wedded to the Marxian proposition that all aspects of life are affected by the class struggle and must be considered in waging class war, the party leaders during the first decade after the revolution did not imagine that they had the competence to make commanding decisions in the artistic realm. They dealt severely with overtly anti-Communist political opinions, but otherwise they were content to give encouragement to "proletarian" cultural contributions, and, as the 1925 party statement on literature illustrates, allow a variety of aesthetic currents to exist.

. . . As the class war in general has not ended, neither has it ended on the literary front. In a class society there is not, nor can there be a neutral art, though the class nature of art generally and of literature in particular is expressed in forms which are infinitely more various than, for instance, in politics. . . .

It must be remembered, however, that this problem is infinitely more complicated than other problems being solved by the proletariat. Even within the limitations of a capitalist society the working class could prepare itself for a victorious revolution, build cadres of fighters and leaders and produce a magnificent ideological weapon for the political struggle. But it could work out neither the problems of natural science nor the tasks of technical development; and by the same token the proletariat, the class which was culturally deprived, was unable to develop its own literature, its own

FROM: Resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, "On the Policy of the Party in the Field of Literature," July 1, 1925 (English translation in Edward J. Brown, *The Proletarian Episode in Russian Literature, 1928-1932*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1952, pp. 235-40; reprinted by permission of the publisher).

characteristic artistic forms, its own style. Although the proletariat has ready infallible criteria regarding the socio-political content of any literary work, it does not have such definite answers to all questions of artistic form. . . .

With relation to the "fellow-travelers" we must bear in mind: (1) their differentiation, (2) the importance of many of them as qualified specialists of literary technique; and (3) the presence of vacillation in this group of writers. The general directive should be for tactful and careful relations with them, and for such an approach as will guarantee all the conditions for their earliest possible movement in the direction of Communist ideology. While discouraging anti-proletarian and antirevolutionary elements (now quite insignificant), and while fighting to expose the ideology of the new *bourgeoisie* which is taking form among a part of the fellow-travelers—those of the "change-of-landmarks" stripe—the Party should have a patient attitude toward intermediate ideological formations, patiently aiding those inevitably numerous formations to develop in the process of ever closer comradely coöperation with the cultural forces of communism. . . .

Communist criticism should fight mercilessly against counterrevolutionary phenomena in literature; and yet at the same time show the greatest tact, attention and patience toward all those groups which can and will join the proletariat. Communist criticism must drive out the tone of literary command. Such criticism can have deep educational significance only when it relies on its own ideological superiority. Marxist criticism should once and for all drive out of its midst all pretentious, half-literate, and self-satisfied Communist conceit. Marxist criticism should have as its slogan "to learn," and should resist every appearance of cheap judgment and ignorant arrogance in its own milieu.

While it has infallible criteria of judgment regarding the class content of literary tendencies, the Party as a whole must not bind itself to any one tendency in the field of literary form. Giving general leadership to literature, the Party cannot support any one faction in literature (classifying these factions according to their different views on form and

style), just as it cannot by resolutions settle questions of the form of the family, though in general it does and should lead in the development of new ways of life. Everything indicates that a style proper to the epoch will be created, but it will be created by different methods, and the solution of this problem has not yet been begun. In the present phase of cultural development any attempt to bind the Party in this direction must be repulsed.

Therefore the Party should declare itself in favor of the free competition of various groups and tendencies in this province. Any other solution of the problem would be an official, bureaucratic pseudo-solution. In the same way it is inadmissible to legalize by a decree the monopoly of the literary printing business by any one group or literary organization. While morally and materially supporting proletarian and proletarian-peasant literature, and aiding the fellow-travelers, the Party cannot offer a monopoly to any of these groups, even the one most proletarian in its ideology. For this would be to destroy proletarian literature itself. . . .

Soviet Educational Policy—the Revolutionary Period

The early Communist position on social problems held, according to Marxian logic, that individual development or defects were the product of social and economic conditions. The ideal was the spontaneous blossoming of the individual proletarian, freed from legal, family and educational restraints. (Industrial and political discipline would also have been eliminated had the early left-wing opposition groups had their way.) In education the authority of school and teacher was deemphasized in favor of letting the child develop freely amid the proper conditioning influences. This was closely akin to the "learning by doing" of American progressive education, as A. P. Pinkevich, one of the leading Soviet educational theorists, freely conceded.

FROM: Pinkevich, *Outlines of Pedagogy* (1927; translated as *The New Education in the Soviet Republic* by Mucia Perlmutter and edited by George S. Counts, New York, The John Day Co., 1929, pp. vi, 198-99, 202, 214, 288, 301-2; reprinted by permission of the editor).

. . . The mere enumeration of the names of Hall, Dewey, Russell, Monroe, Judd, Thorndike, Kilpatrick, and many others, known to every educator in our country, is a sufficient reminder of the tremendous influence which American education has exerted upon us. In spite of the undoubted differences in ideology which divide Soviet from western educational leaders, mutual understanding and recognition of scientific attainments are indispensable. . . .

In his volume entitled *Fundamental Questions of Social Education* Shulgin* has given an excellent exposition of the demands of the party. He presents the Communist conception of the role of labor in education and the role of the labor school in society as follows:

"To our mind labor is the best method of so introducing young children to the laboring class and of so merging them with the class-builder that they may not only understand the proletarian ideology, but may actually begin to live, to strive, and to build according to that ideology. But this is not all. Labor to us is a means of inducting children into the working world family in order that they may participate in and understand the struggle of the masses, follow the history of human society, acquire working, organizing, and collective habits, and come into possession of the discipline of work. To us labor, because of its superior integrating power, is the best method of teaching children how to live the contemporary life. The factory is the first and most sensitive place of modern society. Since labor, self-government, and contemporary life merge into an inseparable union, the march of economic events calls for schools which will train the warrior and builder of life. . . ."

In every school a distinction may be drawn between the teaching of the materials of instruction and the teaching of behavior. In our schools the latter could more properly be called the organization of the children's collective or the organization of behavior. The term behavior is used here in the sense in which it is employed by the psychologist.

At the beginning of our discussion of the question of the organization of conduct we wish to emphasize one guiding principle of Soviet pedagogy. We assign to the teacher the

* Shulgin: an early Soviet educational theorist—Ed.

role of organizer, assistant, instructor, and older comrade, but not the role of superior officer. In the old school the teacher was a dictator. In the liberal bourgeois school he is at best a leader. With us he is primarily an organizer. . . .

In our opinion the children should organize their own social life in school in order to develop those collectivistic traits which are indispensable for the creation of new forms of social life. Naturally they should not be left entirely to themselves. In order to make full pedagogical use of the efforts of children at self-organization the teacher should place certain limitations on their social activity. . . .

The most fundamental characteristic, however, which distinguishes our theory of self-government from that obtained in other countries is its communistic coloring, or at least its communistic foundation. We need organizers and builders of a new society, we need warriors for a new way of life. Self-government is our most effective educational instrument for producing such organizers, builders, and warriors. . . .

Our aim is to take the project method and put our own content into it. All forms of our community purposeful undertakings are as a matter of fact "projects." . . . The bourgeois American school fails to give to the method that community quality which is characteristic of our socialistic school. There is no doubt, however, that of all the contemporary attempts to reform the school, the project system with appropriate changes is best adapted to the nature and purposes of the Soviet school. It affords the children greater freedom of activity, encourages them to engage in practical work, demands of them independent planning, and trains them in the methods of investigation. . . .

The center of all the work of the school should be human labor. Every school activity is consequently closely related to this central aim. But an understanding of labor requires a penetrating study of the productive forces which man utilizes as well as those social relations which grow out of the particular organization of labor in a given society. These considerations have led us to adopt as a fundamental scheme for organizing the curriculum of the labor school the three-

fold concept of nature, labor, and society, or, to put it another way, productive energies, productive relations, and superstructure. And all teaching is unified through one central synthetic theme of colossal importance—*human labor*. Obviously this scheme is distinctly Marxian. Moreover, it is the first truly Marxian educational plan; and, regardless of the extent to which the program itself may change, we are confident that the basic scheme of the Soviet school will remain unshaken.

In complete harmony with the content of the new program are the methods of instruction which it suggests. First of all, it calls for a completely objective method of teaching, understanding the term in the light of our discussion above. This means that children are not to study verbal descriptions of phenomena and things but rather the phenomena and things themselves. In other words the program of the [State Scientific] Council calls for direct contact with the surrounding nature, labor, and society in which the child lives. This environment is the starting point of all the work of the school. . . .

The Zinoviev-Kamenev Opposition

In 1925 the party leadership split. Zinoviev and Kamenev, with the Leningrad party organization which Zinoviev controlled, went into opposition against the party majority led by Stalin, Bukharin and Rykov. At the Fourteenth Party Congress in December, 1925, the new opposition vainly attacked the leadership. Zinoviev raised again the theoretical problem of "state capitalism" and progress toward socialism, while Kamenev bluntly warned of the danger of Stalin's becoming a personal dictator. Stalin's dominance in the party organization decided the issue, and Zinoviev and Kamenev were overwhelmingly defeated.

a) Zinoviev on State Capitalism

What are the chief difficulties in our work? In my opinion there are three. They form, as it were, the background of the whole picture of our construction. *The first difficulty* is

the delay of the world revolution. At the beginning of the October Revolution we were convinced that the workers of other countries would provide us with direct support in a matter of months, or in any case within a few years. Now, unfortunately, it has been demonstrated that the delay of the world revolution is a fact, that the partial stabilization of capitalism characterizes a whole period, and that a new, more complicated set of difficulties is connected with this stabilization.

The second difficulty is well known—this is the building of socialism in a backward country with such an enormous predominance of the peasantry. This is a difficulty for which we gave ourselves the answer in the first days of the revolution and which we have been successfully overcoming.

The third difficulty is the creation of a collective leadership for our party after the death of Vladimir Ilich. Only now, it seems to me, is this being drawn in full clarity. This difficulty is not unimportant, because leading the party means at the same time directing the state. This is not only an organizational question—this is a political problem of the most profound importance. . . .

Recently a dispute about the question of *state capitalism* descended upon us quite unexpectedly, out of a clear blue . . . To take the bull by the horns, Comrades, I think it is first of all necessary to answer those who are now trying to represent the matter as though we have no state capitalism and practically nothing of capitalism in general. I feel that the thing here is really the attempt of certain comrades to declare that the NEP is socialism. (*Laughter, noise*) Such a point of view, such a position represents the idealization of the NEP, the idealization of capitalism. (*Voice: "Who thinks so?"*) It is indisputable that the NEP is the *road* to socialism, but the assertion that the NEP is not socialism also seems to me indisputable. (*Voice: "These are questions from political grammar school."*) So, Comrades, it appears to me that this is just what the dispute is about. Of course, he

FROM: Zinoviev, Minority Report to the Fourteenth Party Congress, December, 1925 (*Fourteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks]: Stenographic Report*, Moscow, Party Press, 1926, pp. 98, 101, 108-9; editor's translation).

who idealizes the NEP cannot but dispute Lenin's formulation on the question of state capitalism. . . .

Comrade Bukharin has said . . . that if we allow the idea that nationalized enterprises are state-capitalist enterprises, if we say this directly, then how can we conduct a campaign to raise the productivity of labor? The workers will not begin to raise the productivity in factories which are not purely socialist. This is actually real pessimism. . . .

The workers are not children, we don't need to offer the workers anything tinselied or gilded or lull them to sleep—they know perfectly well the strong and weak sides of our economy and in particular of our state industry. They know perfectly well that our Soviet factories and mills are basically enterprises of a type consistent with socialism. We are not arguing about this. They give themselves the answer that we have conquered these enterprises, that we have driven the exploiters out of them, that our factories and mills are working for the working class, that we have there the basic prerequisites for building socialism and completing it. But together with this they know perfectly well that their factories are connected with the market. They know all the shady sides, all the backwardness of our technology; they know the backwardness of our forms of wages, their relatively low level, and they take things as they are. They know well enough what circumstances surround us, so that we do not need to sweeten or sugar-coat the real state of affairs. Look the truth boldly in the face. And rest assured that the worker will understand that all our industry belongs to the working class, that in his own factory he ought to work as one needs to work for one's own class, as genuine builders of socialism need to work.

So, Comrades, I think it is indisputable . . . that our state industry consists of enterprises which are of a type consistent with socialism but are not yet fully socialist, as Bukharin admitted in the spring of 1922. Finally, it is indisputable that the simplest and clearest example of state capitalism in a country like ours is concessions and leases. But it must be just as indisputable for us that this does not exhaust state capitalism, that we cannot forget about

free trade and its forms, about planning and distribution, about the revival of capitalism in individual farms. We cannot forget that all this, insofar as it is subordinated to the control of the state—all this Vladimir Ilich called state capitalism, adding the qualification that this is a *unique* state capitalism, radically distinguished from the state capitalism of the bourgeois countries in that it is subordinated and limited by the working class, by the proletarian state. But at the same time Vladimir Ilich said that in order for the workers to see that we do have capitalism we must not idealize or gloss over reality.

b) Kamenev on Stalin

I turn to intraparty questions. To these questions I give three answers.

The first concerns the organizational forms of our intraparty life. Comrade Bukharin has said that we bought the controversy with Comrade Trotsky at the price, as he expressed it, of a convulsion in intraparty life. You must resolve this question in the sense that in the background of a general enlivening and heightening of the activity of all strata of the population, intraparty democracy is essential, its further development is essential. According to the testament of Lenin this has now become possible precisely because the de-classing of the proletariat has ceased.

In the contrary case with this background you will inevitably have a new convulsion in intraparty life. This will be a phenomenon on a catastrophic order. I appeal to you not to choose this path, but the other path.

The things you hear about that path at the congress—about defeatists, liquidators, Axelrodists, etc.—cannot be true; such things had not entered the party's head even after it assembled at the congress. *This must be avoided. This can be avoided only if the minority, which is not made up of newcomers, which you know about fully—if this minority*

FROM: Kamenev, Speech to the Fourteenth Party Congress, December, 1925 (Stenographic Report, pp. 273-75; editor's translation).

is given an opportunity to defend its views in the party, of course with the full responsibility which the party and the dictatorship impose upon us.

Second: Besides the invigoration of party discussion, besides granting the minority an opportunity to express its views to the whole party, as becomes Bolsheviks, within those limits which are set by the party statutes and the dictatorship of the party and the proletariat—it seems to me that you must *resist this new tendency in the party which I have tried to sketch out to you*. I am sure that if you find it impossible to do this now because of some organizational consideration or another—the facts of life, the course of the class struggle in our country, the growth of differentiation in the village will compel you to do this, and to say that the school which Bukharin has established is based on a departure from Lenin. What we need right now is in the slogan, back to Lenin! (Voice from a seat: "Why back?") Because this is going forward. Comrades, I know that in the first part of my speech you tried to attribute the matter to malice. We see that the matter is not one of malice, and I hope you will say this after a few months.

And finally, the third point: *We are against creating a theory of the "Duce,"* we are against establishing a "Duce."* We are against the Secretariat, which has in practice combined both policy and organization, standing over the political organ. *We are for our upper level being organized in such a fashion that there would be a really all-powerful Politbureau, bringing together all our party's policies, and at the same time the Secretariat would be subordinate to it and execute the technical aspects of its decisions.* (Noise) We cannot consider it normal but think it harmful to the party, if such a situation is continued where the Secretariat combines both policy and organization, and in fact predecides policy. (Noise) Here, Comrades, is what we need to do. Everyone who does not agree with me will draw his own conclusions. (Voice from a seat: "You should have begun with this.") The speaker has the right to begin with what he wants. You

* Russian *vozhd*—“leader,” in a then derogatory sense—Ed.

think I ought to have begun with what I have said, that personally I assert that our General Secretary is not the kind of figure that can unite the old Bolshevik staff around himself. I don't consider this a basic political question. I don't consider this question more important than the question of the theoretical line. I feel that if the party adopted (Noise) a definite political line which was clearly marked off from those deviations which part of the Central Committee is now supporting, this question would not now be on the agenda. But I must say this out to the end. Precisely because I more than once told Comrade Stalin this, precisely because I more than once told a group of Leninist comrades, I repeat it here at the congress: *I have arrived at the conviction that Comrade Stalin cannot fulfill the role of unifier of the Bolshevik staff.* (Voices from the audience: "Untrue!" "Nonsense!" "So that's what it is!" "He's shown his cards!" Noise. Applause by the Leningrad delegation. Shouts: "We won't surrender the commanding heights to you." "Stalin! Stalin!" The delegates stand and cheer Comrade Stalin. Stormy applause. Shouts: "Here's where the party has become united. Now the Bolshevik staff must be united.")

(Yevdokimov, from his seat) "Long live the Russian Communist Party! Hurrah! Hurrah!" (The delegates stand and shout "Hurrah!" Noise. Stormy, long-sustained applause)

(Yevdokimov, from his seat) "Long live the Central Committee of our party! Hurrah!" (The delegates shout "Hurrah!") "The party above all! Right!" (Applause and shouts, "Hurrah!")

(Voice from a seat) "Long live Comrade Stalin!" (Stormy, continued applause, shouts) "Hurrah!" (Noise)

(Chairman) "Comrades, I beg you to quiet down. Comrade Kamenev will now finish his speech."

I began this part of my speech with the words, "We are against the theory of individual preëminence, we are against creating a Duce!" With these same words I end my speech. (Applause by the Leningrad delegation)

(Voice from a seat) "And who do you propose?"

(Chairman) "I declare a ten minute recess." . . .

The United Opposition

In 1926, the two defeated opposition groups, Trotskyist and Zinovievist, merged and undertook a major appeal to the party rank-and-file against the leadership. They had to resort to conspiratorial organization, and when this activity was detected (the "Lashevich affair"), the leadership prepared a new condemnation of the Opposition's factionalism. In reply, the leaders of the Opposition drew up a detailed statement of their case which they vainly tried to present to the party membership.

. . . 1. Bureaucratism as the Source of Factionalism

The immediate cause of all of the sharpening crises in the party is in bureaucratism, which has grown amazingly in the period following the death of Lenin, and continues to grow.

The Central Committee of the ruling party has at its disposal for action upon the party not only ideological and organizational, i.e., not only party means, but also governmental and economic means. Lenin always took into account the danger that the concentration of administrative power in the hands of the party would lead to bureaucratic pressure on the Party. Precisely from this arose Vladimir Ilich's idea about organizing the Control Commission, which, while it had no administrative power in its hands, would have all the power essential for the struggle with bureaucratism, for the defense of the right of a party member to express his convictions freely and to vote according to his conscience without fearing any punitive consequences. . . .

Meanwhile, in fact—and this must be said here before anything else—the Central Control Commission itself has become a purely administrative organ, which assists the repression conducted by other bureaucratic organs, executing for them the punitive part of the work, prosecuting any independent thought in the party, any voice of criticism, any concern expressed aloud about the fate of the party, any critical remarks about certain leaders of the party. . . .

FROM: The Declaration of the Thirteen, July, 1926 (editor's translation from copy in the Trotsky Archive).

The resolution of December 5, 1923, adopted unanimously at that time, refers to the fact that bureaucratism, suppressing free discussion, striking down criticism, unavoidably pushes conscientious party members onto the road of reticence and factionalism. The correctness of this point has been fully and completely confirmed by the events of the recent period, especially by the affair of Comrades Lashevich, Belenki, Chernishov, et al. It would be criminal blindness to represent this affair as the result of the evil party will of an individual person or an individual group. Indeed, before us here is the obvious and indubitable consequence of the prevailing course, under which people talk only on top, while below they think and think to themselves under cover. (And what they think they keep to themselves.) Those who are dissatisfied, disagree, or doubt, are afraid to raise their voices in party meetings. The party mass always hears only the speech of the party command on the one and only "crib." The mutual tie and trust for the leadership are weakening.

An official show prevails in the meetings, together with the apathy which is unavoidably connected with it. Frequently only an insignificant minority remains at the time of voting; the participants in the meeting hasten to leave so that they will not be compelled to vote for decisions dictated earlier. No resolutions anywhere are ever adopted otherwise than "unanimously." All this is gravely reflected in the internal life of the Party organizations. Members of the Party are afraid openly to express aloud their most cherished thoughts, wishes and demands. This is what constitutes the cause of the "affair" of Comrade Lashevich et al.

2. The Cause of the Growth of Bureaucratism

It is completely obvious that the more difficult it is for the ruling centers to carry through their decisions by the methods of party democracy, the less the vanguard of the working class sees their policy as its own.

The divergence between the direction of economic policy and the direction of the feelings and thoughts of the proletarian vanguard inevitably strengthens the need for repression and gives all policy an administrative-bureaucratic character.

Any other explanation of the growth of bureaucratism is secondary and does not encompass the essence of the question.

The lag of industry behind the economic development of the country as a whole signifies, in spite of the growth in the number of workers, a lowering of the specific gravity of the proletariat in the society. The lag in the influence of industry on agriculture and the rapid growth of the *kulaks** lowers in the village the specific gravity of the hired workers and poor peasants and their trust in the state and in themselves. The lag of wage raises behind the rising living standard of the nonproletarian elements of the city and the upper groups of the village inevitably signifies the lowering of the political and cultural self-esteem of the proletariat as the ruling class. From this, in particular, comes the clear decrease in the activity of the workers and poor peasants in the elections to the soviets, which is a most serious warning for our Party. . . .

4. The Question of Industrialization

The present year again reveals with all clarity that state industry is lagging behind the development of the economy as a whole. The new harvest again catches us without supplies of goods. But movement toward socialism is assured only when the tempo of development of industry does not lag behind the general development of the economy, but leads it, systematically bringing the country closer to the technical level of the advanced capitalist countries. Everything must be subordinated to this task, equally vital both for the proletariat and for the peasantry. . . .

The question of the *smychka* is under present conditions above all a question of industrialization.

Meanwhile the party sees with alarm that the resolution of the Fourteenth Congress on industrialization in reality draws back more and more, following the example of what was not carried out in the party's resolution on democracy. In this fundamental question, on which the life and death of the

* *Kulak*: Russian "fist," colloquial expression for a prosperous peasant—Ed.

October Revolution depend, the party cannot and does not want to live with official "cribs," which are dictated, frequently, not by the interests of the matter but by the interests of factional struggle. The party wants to know, to think, to check, to decide. The present regime prevents this, and precisely from this stems the secret distribution of party documents on the "affair" of Lashevich, etc.

5. Policy in the Village

In questions of agricultural policy in the village the danger of shifts to the side of the upper groups in the village is all the more clearly defined. . . .

The fact is that under the guise of a union of the poor peasantry with the middle peasant, we observe steadily and regularly the political subordination of the poor peasantry to the middle peasants, and through them to the *kulaks*.

6. The Bureaucratic Perversion of the Workers' State

The number of workers in our state industry does not now reach two million; together with transport, it is less than three million. The soviet, trade-union, coöperative and all other employees certainly do not number less than that figure, and this comparison alone testifies to the colossal political and economic role of the bureaucracy; it is entirely obvious that the state apparatus, in its composition and level of life, is to an overwhelming degree bourgeois and petty-bourgeois, and inclines away from the proletariat and the village poor, on the one hand, toward the displaced intelligentsia, and on the other toward the land-leaser, the merchant, the *kulak*, the new bourgeois. How many times did Lenin remind us of the bureaucratic perversion of the state apparatus and about the frequent necessity for the trade unions to defend the workers from the state, while the party bureaucrat in just this region is infected with the most dangerous self-deception. . . .

7. The Bureaucratic Perversion of the Party Apparatus

In 1920 a party conference under Lenin's direction considered it essential to point out the impermissibility of the

fact that in the mobilization of the comrades, party organs and individual comrades were guided by some considerations other than business ones. Any repression whatever against comrades because they think differently about one or another question or party decision is impermissible. The whole present practice contradicts this decision at every step. Genuine discipline is shaken apart and replaced by subordination to the influential figures in the apparatus. The comrades on whom the party can rely in the most difficult days are pushed out of the staff in ever greater numbers, they are thrown around, exiled, persecuted, and replaced steadily and regularly by casual people, untested, but who are distinguished by silent obedience. Now these bureaucratic sins of the party regime are transferred to the accused comrades Lashevich and Belenki, whom the party has known in the course of more than two decades as devoted and disciplined members. The act of accusing them is therefore an act of accusing the bureaucratic perversion of the party apparatus.

The significance of a firmly welded, centralized apparatus in the Bolshevik Party needs no explanation. Without this skeleton the proletarian revolution would be impossible. The party apparatus in its majority is composed of devoted and irreproachable party members who have no stimulus other than the struggle of the working class. Under the correct regime and the proper distribution of forces the very same party workers could successfully help realize party democracy.

8. Bureaucratism and the Everyday Life of the Working Masses

. . . The bureaucratic regime has spread like rust into the life of every plant and workshop. If the members of the party are in fact deprived of the right to criticize by the district committee, the provincial committee, or the Central Committee, in the plant, they are deprived of the right to subject the immediate authorities to criticism. Party members are scared. The administrator who is able as a loyal person to guarantee himself the support of the secretary of the next higher organization thus insures himself against criticism

from below and not infrequently also from responsibility for mismanagement or actual stupidity.

In a socialist economy which is under construction, the fundamental condition for economic expenditure of the nation's resources is vigilant control by the masses, above all by the workers in the factories and plants. As long as they cannot move openly against disorders and abuses and expose their perpetrators by name, without the danger of being counted in the Opposition, among the "dissidents," among the troublemakers, or of being driven out of the cell and even from the plant, the struggle for a regime of economy as well as for the productivity of labor will inevitably be viewed on bureaucratic lines, i.e., they will most often strike at the vital interests of the workers. Precisely this is observed right now.

Clumsy or slovenly rate-setting work, harshly striking the workers, is in nine cases out of ten the direct result of bureaucratic inattention to the most elementary interests of the workers and even of production itself. It is to this that we must account the delayed payment of wages, i.e., relegating to the last consideration that which ought to constitute the prime concern.

The question of the so-called excesses at the top is fully linked to the repression of criticism. Many circulars are written against the excesses. Not a few cases against them are conducted in the Control Commissions. But the masses are suspicious of this kind of office-routine struggle with the excesses. There is one serious solution here—the masses must not be afraid to say what they think.

Where are these burning questions being discussed? Not in official party meetings but in corners and alleys, under cover, always in danger. From these intolerable conditions has stemmed the affair of Comrades Lashevich et al. The basic conclusion from this affair is: it is necessary to change conditions. . . .

10. The Comintern

Straightening out the class line of the Party means straightening out its international line. We must cast aside all doubting survivals of the innovation which represents

the matter as though the victory of socialist construction in our country is not linked indissolubly with the course and outcome of the struggle of the European and world proletariat for power. We are building socialism and will go on building it. The European proletariat will struggle for power. The colonial peoples are struggling for independence. This is the common front. Each unit in each sector must give the maximum that it can give without waiting for the initiative of the others. Socialism will be victorious in our country in direct connection with the revolution of the European and world proletariat and with the struggle of the East against the imperialist yoke. . . .

11. On Factionalism

. . . The idea that by mechanically settling with the so-called opposition, it is possible to broaden the frame of party democracy is a crude self-deception; on the basis of all its experience the party cannot believe these lullabies any more. The methods of mechanical adjudication are preparing new splits and cleavages, new removals, new expulsions, new pressure with respect to the party as a whole. This system inevitably constricts the leading summit, reduces its authority and compels it to replace its ideological authority with doubled and tripled pressure. Whatever it does, the party must put a stop to this pernicious process. Lenin showed that firm leadership of the party does not mean strangling it.

12. For Unity

There cannot be the slightest doubt that the Party is able to straighten out its difficulties. The idea that there is no way out for the Party on the path of unity would be the supreme nonsense. There is a way out—moreover, only on the path of unity. . . .

Only on the foundation of party democracy is healthy, collective leadership possible. There is no other path. In struggle and in work on this, the only correct path, our unrecriminating support is guaranteed to the Central Committee wholly and in full.

Bukharin on the Opposition

Bukharin was the main spokesman of the party leadership on matters of theory during the controversy of 1926-27. In the summer of 1926 he replied to the Opposition with a defense of the cautious economics of the NEP and a warning that Opposition challenges to the unity of the party endangered the Soviet regime as a whole. The latter argument prepared the ground for the expulsion of the Opposition in 1927.

. . . The first thesis advanced by the opposition is the assertion that our industry is retrogressing, and that the disproportion between agriculture and city industry is increasing, to the detriment of city industry. . . . The total balance is undoubtedly in favor of the growth of industry as compared with agriculture.

The second thesis advanced by the opposition in the sphere of economic policy in its relation to the industrialization of the country is the thesis that we must now carry on a greatly intensified industrial policy, this to be accomplished in the first place by increasing the prices of our industrial products. . . .

We believe this policy to be entirely *wrong*, and we cannot agree to its pursuance. . . .

Every *monopoly* runs a *certain danger of rusting*, of resting on its laurels. The private capitalist and private owner is constantly being spurred onward by competition. . . . But if we, who have practically all big industry in our hands, who have a state super-monopoly and own all essentials, do not stimulate the leading staff of our industry to cheapen production, and to produce on more rational lines, then indeed we have arrived at the prerequisite stage for the rusting of our industry on the basis of its monopoly. That which is accomplished by competition . . . in a capitalist state, we

FROM: Bukharin, "The Party and the Opposition Bloc" (Report to the Leningrad Party Organization, July 28, 1926; slightly adapted from English translation in *International Press Correspondence*, no. 58, August 26, 1926, pp. 978-81, 983-84, 986-87)

must attain by conscious pressure under the impetus of the needs of the masses: *produce better and cheaper, supply better goods, supply cheap goods!* . . .

It would be entirely wrong to say industry should develop solely upon what is produced within this industry itself. On the contrary, the whole question is; *How much* can we take away from the peasantry, *to what extent and by what methods* can we accomplish the pumping-over process, what are the limits of the pumping-over, and how shall we calculate in order to arrive at favorable results? This is the question. Here lies the difference between us and the opposition, a difference which may be defined by saying that the comrades of the opposition are in favor of an immoderate amount of pumping-over, and are desirous of putting so severe a pressure upon the peasantry that in our opinion the result would be economically irrational and politically unallowable. . . .

Now the character, the class character of our soviet power in our country is being questioned. This is another step in the development of the oppositional idea, another step away from the true Leninist standpoint.

Comrade Trotsky, in one of his speeches at the Plenum of the Central Committee, advanced the thesis of the "extremely non-proletarian character" of the soviet power existing in our country. When the peasant question came under discussion, in connection with the results of the elections, the opposition stated that we are threatened by a deviation in the direction of the rich peasantry, and demanded decisive intervention on the part of the party, in order to prevent any further shifting in a state already far from being proletarian. . . .

Our proletarian dictatorship, our workers' state, has the peculiarities of working in an agricultural country and of having its state apparatus burdened with various bureaucratic aberrations.

This is perfectly true. But what is the *class character* of the state? It is a *workers' state*. To state that our state is not a workers' state, that it is already semi-bourgeois, is to assert that our state is already in a condition of degenera-

tion, and to throw doubts upon the existence of the proletarian dictatorship in our country. . . . If this were really the case, it would be a very serious matter indeed. If we really had no proletarian dictatorship, then we should have to pursue a very different line, and our party, in so far as it is a proletarian party, would obviously place questions on the agenda aiming at a radical purging of the present Soviet power. . . .

This brings us to the thesis of the degeneration of our whole state apparatus, and of the deviation of our policy, and of the policy of the present Soviet state, from the interests of the broad proletarian masses. . . . The opposition has pointed out that the numerous bureaucratic groups in our state apparatus are complemented by the equally numerous bureaucratic groups in the economic organs, the co-operatives, the trade unions, etc. It would thus seem that the whole of the groups composing our apparatus have practically nothing in common with the interests of the broad masses.

We have been believing in our simplicity that our party is the vanguard of the proletariat; but now it turns out that it is a bureaucratic clique entirely detached from the masses. We believe the soviet power to represent a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but it appears that all we have is an extremely non-proletarian state, headed by a completely declassed caste. The logical continuance of this train of thought is bound to lead sooner or later to the idea of the overthrow of the soviet power—it can lead nowhere else. . . .

You are aware that up to now we Leninists have regarded the unity and coherence of our party as the first prerequisite for the maintenance and firmer establishment of the proletarian dictatorship. We Leninists have always imagined that the proletarian dictatorship can only be secure in our country if our party plays its role properly and when this party is in the first place the *sole* party in our country, that is, when the legal existence of other parties is made impossible, and in the second place the party is *unitary* in its structure, that is, represents a structure excluding any independent and au-

tonomous groups, factions, organized currents, etc. . . . Now this has all changed at one blow. Now the whole opposition, the whole oppositional bloc—Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Krupskaia,* etc.—demands freedom for factions within the party. . . .

It is to be observed that oppositional circles seem to like to dally with the idea of *two parties*. Ossovsky** prophesies that we shall have two parties in the immediate future, both of which will call themselves Communist at first: one party which will be in favor of withdrawal from the Anglo-Russian Committee and will stand for a very “international standpoint,” and another party which imagines that socialism can be built up in our country alone, a sort of “national-communist” party. This entertaining of the idea of two parties has already become extremely popular in oppositional circles. The standpoint taken by the opposition on the freedom to form groups and factions is one step on the road to this idea, which in its actual essence is the idea of the justification of a split in the Party. . . .

. . . The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission have been faced by the fact that a number of comrades, including some holding extremely responsible positions, had actually taken such steps as the convocation of an illegal meeting against the party and its leaders. *Were we to tolerate such actions, our party would cease to exist tomorrow as a Leninist party.* We cannot tolerate this. We say to these comrades: Defend your principles, declare your standpoint, *speak in the party meetings*; but if you take to the forest, if you will not reply to our questions, if you refuse to make statements before the Control Commission, if you choose the method of organizing a new party within our party, the method of illegal organization, then we shall fight you relentlessly. . . .

We must increase our activity in the work of strengthening the ideology of all party members, of closing the ranks of

* Nadezhda Krupskaia: Lenin's widow, who sided with the opposition in 1925 and 1926—Ed.

** Ossovsky: one of Zinoviev's supporters, who argued that factions were natural—Ed.

the party on the basis of a definite political standpoint. May every member of the party know and realize that the majority of the Central Committee has a clearly defined standpoint, one for which it stands, which it continues, and which serves as a rule for its guidance of the party. . . . We have our line of policy, and we follow it *consistently*. We shall continue to stand for this line, to fight for it, to lead the party unwaveringly by it, and we are firmly convinced that the whole party . . . will pursue this line in every respect. The most important point is: the struggle for the right political line; everything else depends upon this, everything else is determined by the struggle for the right political line. Our line is actually a *Leninist* political line, from which we never deviate, for which we fight without ceasing, and which will be the means of leading us to victory.

The Theoretical Debate on Socialism in One Country

At the Fifteenth Party Conference in November, 1926, the opposition leaders tried to expose the forced nature of Stalin's theoretical innovations. A battle of quotations and hair-splitting distinctions ensued, indicative of the new Communist scholasticism. Stalin had the last word, thanks to his control of the party organization, and the manipulation of scripture to fit the political needs of the moment became a permanent feature of communism.

a) Kamenev's Criticism of Stalin

. . . Our whole Party holds the standpoint that our revolution is a socialist revolution, that it represents the basis for the further development of international revolution, and that it forms the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. . . .

Why is it then necessary, comrades, to invent differences of opinion on the character of our revolution and its future, since we are able to agree wholly and entirely with everything expressed in this resolution as the point of departure of the

FROM: Kamenev, Speech at the Fifteenth Party Conference (English translation in *International Press Correspondence*, no. 79, November 25, 1926, pp. 1365-67).

Party in the question of the nature of our revolution? (A voice: "Can socialism be established?") Wait, comrades. I cannot say everything at once. Wait till I come to that. . . .

Yes, in the course of the transition period between capitalism and Communism the proletariat will be able to establish the completely socialist state of society, provided it pursues a correct policy in its relations with the peasantry. . . .

. . . But why did Comrade Rykov write, and why did you unanimously decide—we are in perfect agreement with this standpoint—that we must catch up to and pass the level of development in the advanced capitalist countries within a historically comparative minimum of time? . . .

The point is, comrades, that this speed is necessary, and we must ask why it is considered necessary. It is necessary because the Soviet Union, as the first country of Socialism, must prove to the millions of the working people, the workers and peasants, the real superiority of socialist economy. This means that this country must and can provide for the needs of the population much more completely and cheaply than capitalist economics are capable of doing. (Comrade: "Thank God for that!" Laughter.)

. . . It is not only military intervention which may prove an obstacle in the path of the realisation of the completely socialist state of society, but the failure to carry out the above instructions. For this reason we raise the question of the rate of development of our economics, and not only the question of military intervention. The rate of our economic development, as compared with the rate of capitalist development, the necessity of rapidly attaining and passing the level of capitalism, is as important a prerequisite for the final victory of Socialism in our country as the necessity of safeguarding against military intervention. . . .

Comrade Stalin has here given us a detailed analysis of Lenin's views on the possibility of the realisation of Socialism in one country. In this he referred to an article of Lenin published in 1915. He proved that the theory and practice of the establishment of Socialism in the Soviet Union arise, so to speak, from his quotations, and from this law of the inequality of capitalist development. I cannot deal with this in detail, as

the time is too short, and I must still speak of a number of other questions. But I cannot but observe that one must not refer to this quotation as indicating how Lenin conceived the tasks of the revolution in Russia at that time.

The simple duty of being perfectly accurate with respect to quotations from Lenin forces me to this explanation. This quotation, adduced correctly and completely by Comrade Stalin, was published in the "Social Democrat," the then central organ of our Party, on 25 August 1915. The article from which it is taken contains a general criticism of the standpoint of those social traitors who had said: We cannot begin the social revolution in Germany or in England or in Italy, we must begin everywhere at once. Lenin replied to them: You are traitors, for under the cloak of this theory, which compels one country to wait for another, you wish to avoid fulfilling your duty of kindling the proletarian revolution in every country. This was during the epoch of the imperialist war, in 1915. A month and a half later, in number 47 of the "Social Democrat," published on 13 October, exactly six weeks afterwards, Lenin wrote an article dealing specially with the tasks then confronting the Bolsheviks in Russia. Since Lenin stated in September that the victory of Socialism is possible in one country, even a backward country, and since he stated that it was the duty of every proletarian revolutionist to maintain this standpoint, we should naturally expect that he would apply the standpoint first of all to Russia.

But, comrades, this is not the case. We must not carelessly represent the true history of Lenin's views in order to score points in debate. Six weeks after the publication of the passage quoted by comrade Stalin, Lenin wrote in his famous article "Some Theses":

"While paying due regard to the demands made by our comrades from Russia, we formulate some theses on the actual questions of our present work."

A number of these are then enumerated, of which the fifth runs as follows:

"The social import of the next revolution in Russia can only be the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry."

The sixth thesis reads:

"It is the task of the proletariat of Russia to carry through the bourgeois democratic revolution to its end, in order to arouse socialist revolution in Europe. This second task is now following very closely upon the first, but it still continues to remain a special and second task."

(Voices: "What of it?" "We have read that for ourselves." "That will not do. Nothing can be made of that!") Comrades, I cannot help it if it is disagreeable for you to hear these sentences. (Voices: "We not only hear them, but we understand them as well!")

If you will accord a straightforward consideration to the declaration of Lenin, made six weeks after the appearance of the article correctly quoted by Comrade Stalin, you will be bound to admit that Lenin's words in 1915 on the establishment of Socialism in one country referred clearly to the West European States . . . (A voice: "Nothing of the sort!") and that at the same time he pointed out another urgent task for Russia. That which I have read to you is his definition of the social import of the impending revolution. . . .

We regard our State as a proletarian State, not only because it is a State ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat, but because the proletariat is utilising state power and state organisation as an instrument for raising up to Socialism the whole of the non-proletarian strata of the workers.

But, comrades, we must add—and it is our duty to do this—all that Lenin said on this question. Were we to state that we have a proletarian State and nothing more, then we should not be stating the truth, nor what Lenin said. For Lenin told us that we have a proletarian State in a double sense: the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the raising of the whole stratum of the workers to an ever higher level; but we have a proletarian State in a country with a preponderant peasant population and with bureaucratic deformations. . . .

But when a proletarian dictatorship is realised in a country

with a preponderantly peasant population, the inevitable practical result is that in ordinary daily work the lowest stories of the building of state power will not be found to be in the hands of the purely industrial proletariat, but in the hands of the peasantry. (Disturbance. Voices: "Where then is the proletariat?" "Should we send the proletariat into the village Soviets, instead of to work in the factories?") Permit me to ask, comrades, is this a fact or is it not? . . . If we have 100 million peasants, and if we pursue the correct line of Soviet democracy, the certain result is the fact which I have just stated. It is to redouble our efforts towards adapting the proletarian methods of leadership to those subordinate organs of the Soviet apparatus and the Soviet power which are unavoidably in the hands of the peasantry. (Voices: "What object do these facts serve?") As soon as we touch upon this necessary task, then you begin to say: You are exaggerating, that is not a fact at all. In this way we can come to no understanding, comrades.

And precisely as this fact is the inevitable consequence of the realisation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the proletarian State in an agrarian country, in the same manner the bureaucratic deformations of the state apparatus are an expression of class.

What does this mean? In my opinion it means that the state apparatus, viewed from the class standpoint, is endeavouring to oust the workers from immediate participation in the administration of the State. . . .

b) Stalin's Reply to Kamenev

. . . Engels said that the proletarian revolution . . . could not succeed in one single country alone. The facts, however, show that under the new conditions of imperialism, such a revolution in its most essential parts has already been carried through in one single country alone, for we have carried out nine tenths of this programme in our country.

Comrade Zinoviev may say that we have committed a

FROM: Stalin, Concluding Remarks at the Fifteenth Party Conference (English translation in *International Press Correspondence*, no. 78, November 25, 1926, pp. 1350, 1353-54).

mistake by carrying out the points of this programme (laughter). It is very easily possible that in carrying out these points we have shown a certain "national limitedness" (laughter). That is very easily possible. One thing is nevertheless true; that which Engels wrote in the forties of the last century under the conditions of pre-monopolistic capitalism and which was impossible for one country alone has become possible under the conditions of imperialism in our own country.

Naturally, if Engels were alive today, he would not cling to the old formula. On the contrary, he would welcome our revolution and say: To hell with all old formulas! Long live the victorious revolution in the Soviet Union! The gentlemen in the ranks of the Social Democracy, however, do not think like that. They cling to the old formulation of Engels in order to facilitate their struggle against the revolution, against the Bolsheviks. That is naturally their affair. It is only serious when Comrade Zinoviev attempts to imitate these gentlemen and in this matter to go the way of the Social Democracy. . . .

One must recognise, comrades, that it was Lenin and no other who first of all established the proof of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country alone. One may not deny Lenin that which is due to him. One must not be afraid of the truth, one must have the courage to speak the truth, one must have the courage to declare that Lenin was the first Marxist who formulated the question of the victory of socialism in one country alone in a new form and answered it in the affirmative.

I do not wish with this to say that Lenin as a thinker stood higher than Marx or Engels. I only wish to say two things: First of all, one must not demand of Marx and Engels, although they were tremendous thinkers and geniuses, that in the period of pre-monopolistic capital they could foresee all the possibilities of the proletarian class struggle and the proletarian revolution which developed half a century later in the period of developed monopolistic capitalism. Secondly, there is nothing particularly wonderful in the fact that Lenin, himself a genius and a follower of Engels and Marx, should have

understood the new possibilities of the proletarian revolution under the new conditions of capitalist development and thus establish the truth that the victory of socialism in one country alone is possible. . . .

. . . Comrade Kamenev took the "trouble" to prove that the basic article of Comrade Lenin (1915) which deals with the possibility of socialism in one country alone, allegedly did not refer to Russia, but that when Lenin spoke of such a possibility he was thinking not of Russia but of other capitalist countries. Comrade Kamenev took this doubtful "trouble" in order to clear the way for Comrade Trotsky whose "scheme" was refuted by the article of Lenin written in 1915.

To put it vulgarly, Comrade Kamenev has played the role of housemaid to Comrade Trotsky by cleaning the way for him (laughter). It is naturally a sad sight to observe the director of the Lenin Institute in the role of Housemaid to Comrade Trotsky. Not that there is anything undignified in the work of a housemaid, but because comrade Kamenev is without doubt a capable person who might very well concern himself with more qualified work. He adopted this role, however, perfectly voluntarily, as of course he was fully entitled to do, so that nothing is to be done in the matter. How has Comrade Kamenev carried out this peculiar role? Comrade Kamenev declared in his speech that the chief theses of Lenin in his article written in 1915, the theses which have determined the whole policy of our revolution and its work of reconstruction, the theses which speak of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country alone, do not refer to Russia and could not refer to Russia and that when Lenin spoke of the victory of socialism in one country alone, he was not thinking of Russia but of other capitalist countries. That is unbelievable and unheard of, that sounds like a direct slander against Comrade Lenin. But Comrade Kamenev evidently does not care what the party thinks about such a falsification of Lenin. He is only concerned to clear the way for Comrade Trotsky at any price.

How has he attempted to justify this peculiar contention? He said that two weeks after the publication of the article

mentioned, Comrade Lenin published his well-known theses concerning the character of the coming revolution in which he said that the task of Marxists would be exhausted with the efforts to achieve the victory of the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia and that Lenin, when he said this, spoke on the assumption that the Revolution in Russia would retain its bourgeois stage and not develop into a socialist revolution. As, however, the article of Lenin upon the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country alone deals not with the bourgeois revolution but with the socialist revolution, it is clear that Lenin in his article could not have been thinking of Russia.

According to Kamenev it turns out that Lenin interpreted the extent of the Russian revolution just as a left bourgeois revolutionary or a reformist of the social democratic type would have done, according to whose opinions a bourgeois revolution would not develop into a socialist revolution and that between a bourgeois and a socialist revolution a long historical interval, a long pause of at least several decades must intervene whilst capitalism develops and the proletariat vegetates.

According to Kamenev it turns out that in 1915 when he wrote his article, Lenin did not think and did not conceive of directly going on to the socialist revolution after the victory of the bourgeois revolution. You will say, this is unbelievable and unheard of. Yes, this contention of Comrade Kamenev is really unbelievable and unheard of. But Kamenev does not mind about that in the least.

Permit me to mention a few documents which prove that Comrade Kamenev has vulgarly falsified the opinions of Comrade Lenin in this question. . . .

. . . Where are we to fit in the theses of Lenin from 1915 to which Comrade Kamenev appealed in his speech and which deal with the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia? Do not these theses contradict the idea of the development of the bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution? No, they do not, on the contrary. The basis of these theses is just the idea of the development of the bourgeois revolution into the socialist revolution, the idea of the development of

the first stage of the Russian revolution into its second stage.

First of all Lenin by no means says in these theses that the extent of the Russian revolution and the tasks of the Marxists in Russia are exhausted with the fall of the Czar and the land-owners, by the fulfilment of the tasks set by the bourgeois democratic revolution. Secondly, Lenin in these theses limited himself to characterising the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution because he regarded this revolution as the first stage and as the immediate task of the Russian Marxists. Thirdly, Lenin proceeds from the assumption that the Russian Marxists must not commence their task with the second stage (as comrade Trotsky proposed with his slogan "down with the Czar, form a workers government") but with the first stage, with the stage of the bourgeois democratic revolution.

Is there any contradiction here? Is even the shadow of a contradiction with the idea of the development of the bourgeois revolution into the socialist revolution here? The opposite is the case.

We see that Comrade Kamenev has definitely falsified the standpoint of Lenin. . . .

Stalin on the Expulsion of the Left Opposition

Bitter controversy between the Opposition and the party leadership raged from the summer of 1926 to the fall of 1927, though Stalin's control of the party organization left no doubt as to the outcome of the contest. The Opposition leaders were removed from one post after another, and at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December, 1927, the active oppositionists were expelled from the party. Stalin justified this as the elimination of deviant individualists who refused to respect the principle of party discipline. Zinoviev and Kamenev with their followers thereupon recanted, and were temporarily reinstated in the party. The Trotskyists were exiled to remote points in Siberia and elsewhere. A year later, in February, 1929, Trotsky was ousted from the country altogether.

How could it happen that the entire Party, as a whole, and following it the working class too, so thoroughly isolated the opposition? After all, the opposition are headed by

well-known people with well-known names, people who know how to advertise themselves (*voices*: "Quite right!"), people who are not afflicted with modesty (*applause*) and are able to blow their own trumpets.

It happened because the leading groups of the opposition proved to be a group of petty-bourgeois intellectuals divorced from life, divorced from the revolution, divorced from the Party, from the working class. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*). . . .

Have we the dictatorship of the proletariat or not? Rather a strange question. (*Laughter*) Nevertheless, the opposition raise it in every one of their statements. The opposition say that we are in a state of Thermidor degeneration. What does that mean? It means that we have not the dictatorship of the proletariat, that our economics and our politics are a failure, are going backwards, that we are not going towards Socialism, but towards capitalism. This, of course, is strange and foolish. But the opposition insist on it. . . .

. . . The opposition utterly break away from the Leninist principle of organization and take the path of organizing a second party, the path of organizing a new International. . . . On all these questions the opposition have slipped into Menshevism. Can these Menshevik views of the opposition be regarded as compatible with the Party's ideology, with our Party's program, with its tactics, with the tactics of the Comintern, with the organizational principles of Leninism?

Under no circumstances; not for a single moment!

You will ask: how could such an opposition come into being among us; where are their social roots? I think that the social roots of the opposition lie in the fact that the urban petty-bourgeois strata are being ruined under the conditions of our development, in the fact that these strata are discontented with the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the striving of these strata to change this regime, to "improve" it in the spirit of establishing bourgeois democracy.

I have already said that as a result of our progress, as a

FROM: Stalin, *Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* (December 3, 1927; English translation, Moscow Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950, pp. 92, 99, 105-6, 110-11).

result of the growth of the relative weight of the socialist forms of economy, a section of the petty-bourgeoisie, particularly the urban bourgeoisie, is being ruined and is going under. The opposition reflect the grumbling and discontent of these strata with the regime of the proletarian revolution.

Such are the social roots of the opposition. . . .

Why did the Party expel Trotsky and Zinoviev? Because they are the *organizers* of the entire anti-Party opposition (*voices*: "Quite right!"), because they set themselves the aim of breaking the laws of the Party, because they thought that nobody would dare to touch them, because they wanted to create for themselves the privileged position of nobles in the Party. . . .

If the opposition want to be in the Party let them submit to the will of the Party, to its laws, to its instructions, without reservations, without equivocation. If they refuse to do that, let them go wherever they please. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Applause*). We do not want new laws providing privileges for the opposition, and we will not create them. (*Applause*).

The question is raised about terms. We have only one set of terms: the opposition must disarm wholly and entirely, in ideological and organizational respects. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause*).

They must renounce their anti-Bolshevik views openly and honestly, before the whole world. (*Voices*: "Quite right!" *Prolonged applause*). . . .

Stalin on the Grain Crisis

In 1928, after disposing of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition, Stalin began to turn to a more vigorous policy of industrial development and exploitation of the peasants. While there is evidence that he was at least partly motivated in this by the desire to embarrass Bukharin and Rykov, Stalin nonetheless put his case effectively.

. . . The underlying cause of our grain difficulties is that the increase in the production of grain for the market is not keeping pace with the increase in the demand for grain.

Industry is growing. The number of workers is growing. Towns are growing. And, lastly, the regions producing industrial crops (cotton, flax, sugar beet, etc.) are growing, creating a demand for grain. All this leads to a rapid increase in our requirements as regards grain—grain available for the market. But the production of grain for the market is increasing at a disastrously slow rate. . . .

. . . Is it not a fact that the grain crop area has already reached the prewar mark? Yes, it is a fact. Is it not a fact that already last year the gross production of grain was equal to the prewar output, i.e., 5,000,000,000 *puds*?* Yes, it is a fact. How, then, is it to be explained that, in spite of these facts, the amount of grain we are producing for the market is only one-half, and the amount we are exporting is only about one-twentieth of what it was in prewar times?

The reason is primarily and chiefly the change in the structure of our agriculture brought about by the October Revolution, the change from large-scale landlord and large-scale kulak farming, which provided the largest proportion of marketed grain, to small- and middle-peasant farming, which provides the smallest proportion of marketed grain. The mere fact that before the war there were fifteen to sixteen million individual peasant farms, whereas at present there are 24,000,000 to 25,000,000 peasant farms, shows that now the basis of our agriculture is essentially small-peasant farming, which provides a minimum amount of grain for the market. . . .

. . . The abolition of landlord (large-scale) farming, the reduction of the kulak (large-scale) farming to less than one-third, and the change to small-peasant farming with only 11 per cent of its output available for the market, in the absence, in the sphere of grain growing, of any more or less developed large-scale socialized farming (collective farms and state farms), was bound to lead, and in fact has led, to a sharp reduction in the output of grain for the market as

FROM: Stalin, "On the Grain Front" (*Talk to Students of the Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy and the Sverdlov University, May 28, 1928; Problems of Leninism*, pp. 248-249, 251-59).

* One *pud* = approximately 36 lbs.—Ed.

compared with prewar times. It is a fact that the amount of marketed grain in our country is now half of what it was before the war, although the gross output of grain has reached the prewar level. . . .

What is the way out of this situation?

Some people see the way out of this situation in a return to kulak farming, in the development and extension of kulak farming. These people dare not advocate a return to landlord farming, for they realize, evidently, that such talk is dangerous in our times. All the more eagerly, therefore, do they urge the necessity of the utmost development of kulak farming in the interest of—the Soviet power. These people think that the Soviet power can simultaneously rely on two opposite classes—the class of the kulaks, whose economic principle is the exploitation of the working class, and the class of the workers, whose economic principle is the abolition of all exploitation. A trick worthy of reactionaries.

There is no need to prove that these reactionary "plans" have nothing in common with the interests of the working class, with the principles of Marxism, with the tasks of Leninism. . . .

What, then, is the way out of the situation?

1. The way out lies, firstly, in the transition from the small, backward and scattered peasant farms to amalgamated, large-scale socialized farms, equipped with machinery, armed with scientific knowledge and capable of producing a maximum of grain for the market. The solution lies in the transition from individual peasant farming to collective, socialized farming. . . .

2. The way out lies, secondly, in expanding and strengthening the old state farms, and in organizing and developing new, large state farms. . . .

3. Finally, the way out lies in systematically increasing the yield of the small and middle individual peasant farms. We cannot and should not lend any support to the individual large kulak farms. But we can and should assist the individual small- and middle-peasant farms, helping them to increase their crop yields and drawing them into the channel of co-operative organizations. . . .

Thus, if all these tasks are fulfilled, the state can in three or four years' time have at its disposal 250,000,000 to 300,000,000 additional *puds* of marketable grain—a supply more or less sufficient to enable us to manoeuvre within the country as well as abroad. . . .

Should not, in addition to these measures, a number of other measures be adopted—measures, say, to reduce the rate of development of our industry, the growth of which is causing a considerable increase in the demand for grain which at present is outstripping the increase in the production of grain for the market? No, not under any circumstances! To reduce the rate of development of industry would mean to weaken the working class; for every step forward in the development of industry, every new factory, every new works, is, as Lenin expressed it, "a new stronghold" of the working class, which strengthens its position in the fight against the petty-bourgeois element, in the fight against the capitalist elements in our economy. On the contrary, we must maintain the present rate of development of industry; we must at the first opportunity speed it up in order to pour goods into the rural districts and obtain from them more grain, in order to supply agriculture, primarily the collective farms and state farms, with machines, in order to industrialize agriculture and to increase the proportion of its output for the market.

Should we, perhaps, for the sake of greater "caution," retard the development of heavy industry and make light industry, which produces chiefly for the peasant market, the basis of our industry as a whole? Not under any circumstances! That would be suicidal; it would undermine our whole industry, including light industry. It would mean abandoning the slogan of industrializing our country, it would transform our country into an appendage of the world capitalist system of economy. . . .

How will the measures proposed affect the alliance between the workers and the peasants? I think that these measures can only help to strengthen the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

Indeed, if the collective farms and the state farms develop

at increased speed; if, as a result of direct assistance given to the small and middle peasants, the yield of their farms increases and the cooperative societies embrace wider and wider masses of the peasantry; if the state obtains the hundreds of millions of *puds* of additional marketable grain required for the purposes of manoeuvering; if, as a result of these and similar measures, the kulaks are curbed and gradually overcome—is it not clear that the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry within the alliance of workers and peasants will thereby be smoothed out more and more; that the need for emergency measures in the purchase of grain will disappear; that the large masses of peasantry will turn more and more to collective forms of farming and that the fight to overcome the capitalist elements in the rural districts will assume an increasingly mass and organized character?

Is it not clear that the cause of the alliance between the workers and the peasants can only benefit by these measures? . . .

. . . The alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat should not be regarded as an alliance with the whole of the peasantry. The alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry is an alliance of the working class with the labouring masses of the peasantry. Such an alliance cannot be effected without a struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry, against the kulaks. . . .

The Right Opposition

Stalin's political tactics and his desire for stepped-up industrialization and increased pressure on the peasants produced acute anxiety among many of his colleagues. Bukharin, together with Rykov and the trade-union chief Tomsky, formed a "Right Opposition" which endeavored to check Stalin in behind-the-scenes maneuvers. In July, 1928, Bukharin addressed the Central Committee with a vain plea for caution, and then turned to the broken Left Opposition to reveal his fears and seek help.

a) *Bukharin on Peasant Policy*

. . . If we want to catch up with Western Europe—and we want to do this—if we want to increase the tempo of accumulation for socialist industry—and we want to do this—if we take into account our general economic backwardness, our poverty, then it is perfectly clear that great difficulties for our building stem from all this. We want to solve a series of great tasks at once: the maximum accumulation in socialist industry, the maximum increase in agriculture, the maximum consumption for the working class and the toiling masses in general, their maximum uplift, etc. These tasks cannot be solved simultaneously. We solve them as we come to them, heeling over now to one side, now to the other, contradicting ourselves. We are moving all the time in contradictions. It stands to reason that difficulties of such a kind really lie in the nature of our reconstruction period. I call your attention, for example, to the curious fact that we complain of economic disproportions now from one end and now from the other.

Voroshilov: Give us your panacea.

Bukharin: I don't want to give a panacea, and you, please, don't make fun of me. I want to say that the reconstruction period quite naturally evokes a series of complications and difficulties, but at the same time there is no doubt in my mind that there are different kinds of difficulties. . . . When, taking Comrade Stalin's formulation, we say now, "We have a threat to the *smychka*," does this fit into the category of circumstances from which a split could issue? Of course it does. A threat to the *smychka* is a circumstance from which a split could issue. But Lenin wrote that the main task of our Central Committee and Central Control Commission, as of our party as a whole, consists of not allowing these disagreements to grow to the level of serious class disagreements. . . . To undertake the slightest campaign in the country reversing our election instruction means to mobilize

FROM: *Bukharin, Speech to the Central Committee, July 10, 1928* (editor's translation from partial copy of the minutes of the meeting in the Trotsky Archive).

against us to an ever greater degree the *kulak* element, the petty bourgeoisie of a whole series of cities, the middle bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeois strata, etc. The reserves of these forces remain very great, and the slightest vacillation on this question in the ranks of our party will have a disproportionately great political significance. . . . Should we correct the situation we now have as a result of the grain collections by making concessions in the direction of the *kulak*, by dropping the slogan of an intensified offensive against the *kulaks*? Absolutely not. The problem at the present time is to remove the threat to the alliance with the middle peasant which we now find. We are dropping the extraordinary measures,* and in no case do we identify the extraordinary measures with the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress. . . . Can we have such difficulties this year as we had last year? We can. How will we react to this? We will turn to the application of extraordinary measures if such difficulties are met within the coming year, but if we apply them, will we do so to the same extent or not? It seems to me that this is the most agonizing and important question that faces us. As a preliminary I would like to suggest a consideration or analogy which at first glance will appear wild or joking.

Imagine that you are the proletarian power in a petty-bourgeois country, but that you are forcibly driving the *muzhik* [peasant] into communes.

Voroshilov: As in 1918 and 1919, let's say.

Bukharin: Then you will get an uprising of the *muzhik*, of which the *kulak* is the driver; the *kulak* organizes and leads it.

The petty-bourgeois element rises against the proletariat, beats it on the head, and as the result of a cruel class war the proletarian dictatorship disappears. What do you get here?

Stalin: The Son is terrifying but God is gracious. (Laughter). . . .

Bukharin: We must in no case turn toward allowing the expanded reproduction of extraordinary measures.

Kossior: This is true.

Lozovsky: Right now this doesn't depend on us.

* I.e., the pressure applied to the peasants to get grain during the winter of 1928-29—Ed.

Bukharin: Right now a great deal still depends on us. Therefore, the center of our policy is the following: We must in no case allow a threat to the *smychka*. Otherwise we will not fulfill the basic testament of Lenin. . . .

b) *Bukharin on the Menace of Stalin*

Kamenev: Is the struggle really serious?

Bukharin: That's just what I wanted to talk about. We feel that Stalin's line is ruinous for the whole revolution. We could be overthrown on account of it. The disagreements between us and Stalin are many times more serious than the disagreements which we used to have with you. Rykov, Tomsky and I agree on formulating the situation thus: "It would be much better if Zinoviev and Kamenev were in the Politbureau instead of Stalin." I have spoken with Rykov and Tomsky about this quite frankly. I have not spoken with Stalin for several weeks. He is an unprincipled intriguer, who subordinates everything to the preservation of his own power. He changes his theory according to whom he needs to get rid of. In the "seven" * our arguing with him reached the point of saying, "false," "you lie," etc. Now he has made concessions, so that he can cut our throats. We understand this, but he maneuvers so as to make us appear to be the schismatics. . . . This is the line which he pronounced at the plenum: 1) Capitalism grew either on account of colonies, or loans, or the exploitation of the workers. We have no colonies, we can get no loans, therefore our basis is tribute from the peasantry. You understand that this is just what Preobrazhensky's theory is. 2) The more socialism grows, the greater will be the resistance [to it]. . . . This is idiotic illiteracy. 3) Since tribute is necessary and resistance will grow, we need firm leadership. Self-criticism must not apply to the leadership, but only to those who carry out orders. Self-criticism is in fact aimed at Tomsky and Uglanov. ** As

FROM: *Bukharin-Kamenev Talk, July 11, 1928* (Notes by Kamenev; editor's translation from copy in the Trotsky Archive).

* The informal leadership group, including most of the Politbureau—Ed.

** Uglanov: pro-Bukharin secretary of the Moscow party organization, removed in the fall of 1928—Ed.

a result we are getting a police regime. This is not a "cuckoo" matter, but will really decide the fate of the revolution. With this theory everything can perish. . . .

The Petersburg [Leningrad] people are in general with us, but they got scared when the talk got to the possibility of removing Stalin. . . . Our potential forces are vast, but 1) the middle-ranking Central Committee member still does not understand the depth of the disagreements, 2) there is a terrible fear of a split. Therefore, when Stalin conceded on the extraordinary measures, he made it difficult for us to attack him. We don't want to come forth as schismatics, for then they would slaughter us. But Tomsky in his latest speech showed clearly that Stalin is the schismatic. . . .

Kuibyshev on Industrialization

Stalin's chief spokesman on industrial development was Valerian V. Kuibyshev, head of the Supreme Economic Council. In September, 1928, Kuibyshev set forth the basic intention of developing heavy industry at the maximum possible rate, and dismissed all criticism of this course as a "petty-bourgeois" deviation.

The occurrence of a deficit in the coming year too forces us once more to return to the question of the rate of development of our industry. At any price we must absolutely accelerate the growth of our industry as far as possible. What are we likely to attain in the coming twelvemonth? We reckon with an increase of 20 per cent, i.e., 22 per cent in the case of the industry producing means of production, and 18 per cent in the case of the industry catering for direct consumption. The heavy industries manufacturing articles of production will be the object of particular attention in this connection.

FROM: Kuibyshev, "The Economic Situation of the Soviet Union" (Report to the Leningrad Party Organization, September 19, 1928; English translation in *International Press Correspondence*, no. 73, October 19, 1928, pp. 1337-38, and no. 75, October 26, 1928, p. 1383).

The question arises whether we are right in our programme. Is it right that we should particularly accelerate the rate of development of industry producing the means of production in regard both to the investment of funds and to an augmentation of the quantities produced, while the peasant question becomes more and more acute and there is an ever-increasing demand for mass-articles on the rural markets? I believe such a line of procedure to be absolutely correct. . . .

. . . Those assertions cannot be too energetically repudiated which speak of an "over-industrialisation" and accuse us of employing unduly great funds for the manufacture of means of production, i.e., for the metal industry, engineering, for hard coal, petroleum, and the like, also maintaining that the rate of development of our industry is exceeding our strength and must therefore be reduced. Such talk, which arises out of a feeling of panic in view of the difficulties with which we are faced and which can only be overcome by as great as possible an increase in the output capacity of our industry, is in direct opposition to the interests and requirements of our country. We are confronted with the immediate danger of a deficit in regard to metals. The Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council recently treated the question of an importation of cast iron. That suffices to show how disagreeable and anomalous is the position in which we are at present. It is altogether absurd to assert that part of the money we spend on great industrial constructions ought to be employed for the lighter industries. . . .

Our economic development cannot be expected to proceed quite without failure, disproportions, or anomalies. We shall constantly be involved in anomalies, seeing that we had not the possibility during the first years of the existence of the Soviet Union to live in peace and to proceed smoothly and uninterruptedly with all branches of our development. We were deprived of this possibility because a great number of contradictions existed even in former times in our industry and in all other branches of our economy, in which connection it must be borne in mind that the more successfully we progress in our socialist development, the greater will be the difficulties that will be laid in our path by our opponents

at home and abroad. The elimination of class differences, which is the final aim of our entire development, will and must be effected in the form of ever greater class struggle. Naturally we shall need more than a decade to eradicate these differences and to ensure a smooth and harmonious development of our economic organism without disproportions and anomalies. These differences and anomalies are inevitable and we shall be occupied with them for a long time to come. They will lead to new difficulties and complications in our economic life. But they will not hinder us, they must not be allowed to diminish the energy with which we carry on development along the lines laid down by our Party. The industrialisation of the country and the enhancement of the rate of industrialisation are both tasks continually confronting us. . . .

. . . We must be prepared to meet with discontent and active resistance in certain sections of the population, which will increase the difficulties with which we are faced in an economic respect. On the other hand, this same discontent penetrates through all sorts of channels even as far as certain parts of our Soviet apparatus, the result being doubts as to the possibility of executing such great tasks and as to the wisdom of aspiring to such difficult objectives as are involved in the industrialisation of agriculture and the industrialisation of our entire economy. By penetrating into our Soviet apparatus, such sentiments also find ingress in a small measure into our Party. The Party will have recourse to all available measures for the purpose of nipping in the bud such sentiments as pessimism or lack of confidence. The July plenum of the C[entral] C[ommittee] openly stated that, apart from its energetic struggle against pseudo-radical tendencies of the nature of Trotskyism, "left" tendencies which in reality hide a Social Democratic core, the Party must also combat such pessimistic currents as are occasioned by the existing difficulties and tend to diminish the energy and activity essential for the solution of the tremendous tasks with which we are faced. Seeing that the difficulties before us are very great and that the unity, discipline, and solidarity of our Party are our only guarantee of success, we must seek not only

to combat the pessimistic tendencies, which are to a great part no more than the reflection of the discontent of the petty-bourgeois chaos at our policy of industrialisation, but also to combat the attitude of tolerance observed with regard to these tendencies. . . .

. . . We are told we are "over-industrialising" and "biting off more than we can chew." History, however, will not permit us to proceed more slowly, otherwise the very next year may lead to a series of even more serious anomalies than are apparent to-day. Any careful student of our economy will, I am sure, agree with me that the most serious mis-proportion, which is most disadvantageous in its effect on our economy, is that between the output of the means of production and the requirements of the country. . . .

The difficulty of the economic tasks before us upon the one hand and the growth of the hostile forces arrayed against us (both by international capitalism and by the capitalistic elements within our country) upon the other, are naturally reflected in the attitude of the engineers and other technical staffs.

The process of differentiation among the technical staffs has greatly increased, dividing them into a very small group of outright enemies of the Soviet authority and underminers of our economy on the one side, and upon the other such of the engineers and technical operatives as are wholly devoted to the object of socialist development and inspired with the [sense] of the grand task before us. This process of differentiation not only deserves our closest attention, but must also furnish us with various valuable conclusions. While most energetically opposing the enemies of our economy, who are direct agents of the bourgeoisie, we must give all possible aid and encouragement to the honest and devoted technical operatives and see to it that the conditions of their activity are such as will facilitate the execution of the tasks with which they are charged. . . .

All organisations that are in touch with the technical staffs are beginning to understand that without a healthy relationship and without the honest co-operation of the technical staffs with the Soviet authorities, we shall not be able to

realise the gigantic plan of the reconstruction of our industry, which is not only completely indispensable to us but which is also the very best guarantee for our economy and for the development of socialism. Without technical staffs, the technical equipment of our industry is an impossibility. At the same time, however, all the necessary steps must naturally be taken to train new cadres of Red engineers. This side of the question deserves more attention than has ever been paid to it before. . . .

Bukharin on Equilibrium

In reply to the Stalinists' new industrialization emphasis, Bukharin published a plea for caution and balance in which he opposed sacrificing the standard of living of the population. This "consumptionist" attitude has recurred from time to time in the Communist movement, particularly in the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe.

. . . The relative *planlessness*—or *relative planfulness*—of the economy of the transition period has its basis in the existence of small enterprises, of market connections, i.e., significant elements of . . . spontaneity. . . . Hence the very plan has a special nature: it is by no means the more or less 'finished' plan of a developed socialist society. In this plan there are many elements of the forecasting of the spontaneous or incalculable (for example, estimate of the crop, the amount of grain coming to market, the amount of products of peasant production as a whole that will be offered on the market, and, consequently, also the estimate of prices, etc. etc.), and these forecasts become the starting point of one or another directive. It is just for this reason that with us there is no possibility of an "ideal" plan. And just for this reason there is room up to a *certain* point for errors. But the fact that an error can be explained and may even be *unavoidable* does not prevent it from being an *error*. This

FROM: Bukharin, "Notes of an Economist" (September 30, 1928; English translation by Bertram D. Wolfe in *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*, New York, Praeger, 1957, pp. 299-302, 304-6, 309-11, 314-15; reprinted by permission of the publisher).

is the first point. Secondly, the gravest violations of fundamental proportions (as was the case with us in the grain economy, of which more below), and the resultant miscalculations are *by no means unavoidable* errors. Thirdly, even if a good plan is not omnipotent, then a bad "plan" and bad economic maneuvering in general can ruin even a good cause. . . .

. . . For this reason, despite the relativism of our planning, its role is really *enormous*. Major errors in the directing of the economy which result in a violation of the basic economic proportions in the country, therefore, of themselves may engender a highly unfavorable change in the relations of the classes. The reverse side of such a violation of the necessary *economic* proportions would be a resultant upsetting of the *political* equilibrium in the country.

To avoid a "goods famine" and a "crisislike" violation of the basic economic proportions, which are by no means inevitable or absolute laws, it follows that:

In order to attain the most favorable possible march of social reproduction (the most crisis-free), and to attain the systematic growth of socialism, and, in consequence, to attain the most favorable possible situation for the proletariat in the relations of class forces in the country—it is necessary to achieve a coordination of the basic elements of the national economy, to 'balance' them, arrange them, arrange them in such fashion that they best fulfill their respective functions, and actively influence the course of economic life and the class struggle so as to attain the best possible balance or equilibrium. . . .

In their simplicity, the ideologists of Trotskyism assume that the maximum annual pumping out of resources from the peasant economy into industry will assure the maximum tempo of the development of industry. But that is clearly not so. The greatest *not temporary but continuous* tempo can be attained by such a coordination in which industry develops on the foundation of a *rapidly growing* agricultural economy. It is then that industry attains its own record-breaking figures in its development. . . .

. . . What the Trotskyites fail to comprehend is that the

development of industry is dependent on the development of agriculture. . . .

. . . Along with a stormy growth of industry, along with a significant growth in the population and a rise in the needs of the population, the quantity of grain has not grown in the country. Isn't it clear that a contemptuous attitude to the grain problem under such conditions would be a real crime? And is it not clear . . . that a Trotskyist "solution" would lead straight to a real, and not an imaginary collapse? . . .

. . . One thing is clear: if any branch of production systematically fails to receive in return for its products the costs of production, plus a certain addition corresponding to a part of the surplus labor which can serve as a source of expanding reproduction, then that branch of industry either stagnates or retrogresses. This law "applies" to grain growing as it does to any other branch of the economy. . . .

Those who believe that the growth of the planned economy brings with it the possibility—as a result of the dying out of the law of value—of doing whatever one pleases, simply do not understand the ABC of economics. These considerations are sufficient to define the limit of the process of "pumping over" resources from agriculture to *industry*. The opponents of industrialization come out against any alienation even of a part of the surplus product, i.e. against all "pumping over" whatsoever. But in that case the tempo of industrialization will be slowed up. The Trotskyists define the magnitude of the pumping over by the limits of the "technically achievable," i.e., they go even beyond the limits of the entire surplus product. It is clear that in that case there can be no thought of the *development* of agriculture or its grain section, which in turn is required for the development of industry itself. Here the truth lies somewhere in between. . . .

The center of all our plan calculations, of all our economic policy, must be concern for the steadily developing *industrialization of our country*. . . . From every point of view—development of the productive forces, development of agriculture, growth of the specific gravity of socialism in the total economy, strengthening of the class alliances within

the country, strengthening of our powers of self-defense, growth of mass consumption, etc. etc.—the industrialization of the country is for us a *law*.

But in carrying this out we must always remember that our socialist industrialization must differ from capitalist industrialization in that it is carried out *by the proletariat*, for the purposes of *socialism*, that its effect upon the peasant economy must be quite different and distinct in character, that its whole attitude towards the village economy must be different and distinct. Capitalism effected the *debasement* of agriculture. Socialist industrialization, however, is not a parasitic process in its relations with the village (under capitalism, despite the development of agriculture under the influence of industry, the elements of such a parasitism are present), but a means of its great *transformation and up-swing*. The industrialization of the country therefore signifies also the industrialization of agriculture and thereby it prepares the abolition of the antagonism between city and village. . . .

We should strive for the fastest possible tempo of industrialization. Does that mean that we ought to put everything into capital construction? The question is quite a meaningless one. But behind this meaningless question there is hidden another that is quite meaningful: namely, the question of the limits of accumulation, of the upper limit for the sum of capital investment.

Above all, when we are drawing up our program of capital construction we must keep in mind the directive of the party on reserves (of valuta, gold, grain, goods). Of late it has become the fashion to keep quiet about the question of reserves. . . . Though silence may be golden and we short of gold, still we cannot afford to play at silence in this. We not only have no reserves; but in meeting the current supply problem itself “waiting one’s turn” and “queuing up” have become our “way of life,” which to a significant degree also disorganizes our *productive* life. . . .

. . . I have the impression that the People’s Supreme Economic Council in drawing up its Five-Year Plan has forgotten the policy of reserves altogether . . . and that the

excessive demands put upon the budget make it 'unrealistic.' But 'lack of realism' is 'quite' an essential deficiency in a plan.

It's clear that the question of reserves is tied up with the question of consumption, both productive consumption (including capital construction) and personal consumption (the personal consumption of the masses). And we all know that in this the bow is already drawn at high tension. *To increase this tension still further, and increase still more the goods famine, is impossible. . . .*

We must mobilize and put in motion the maximum number and kind of economic factors which work in favor of socialism. This requires a most complicated combination of personal, group, mass, social and state initiative. We have *too much* overcentralized everything. We must ask ourselves: ought we not now to take some steps in the direction of the Leninist commune-state? This does not by any means signify "letting go of the reins." Quite the contrary. The fundamental leadership, the solving of the more important problems, are matters which must be dealt with more firmly, more severely—but for that reason more carefully thought out "at the center." But within the strict framework of these decisions the lower organs must act on their own initiative and be responsible for *their own* range of problems, etc. Supercentralization in a number of fields had led to our depriving ourselves of *additional forces, means, resources and possibilities*. And we are in no position to utilize the entire mass of these possibilities, thanks to a number of bureaucratic barriers. We could act with more elasticity, more maneuverability, more successfully, if, beginning with the individual state enterprises, we were in a position to adapt ourselves to the real, concrete conditions, and thereby avoid the thousand small and large stupidities we are committing. . . .

The Condemnation of the Right Opposition

The first overt move against Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky was made by the Politbureau in February, 1929, after a

series of unpublicized maneuvers and conflicts in the party organization. Disclosure of the Bukharin-Kamenev negotiations prompted a broadening series of attacks on the "Right deviation," which finally culminated in the public denunciation of the Right Opposition leaders in the summer of 1929. The latter were removed from their most important posts, though their abject recantation in the fall of 1929 saved them for the time being from being expelled from the party. Stalin's political victory was now complete; he was absolute master of the party and began to cultivate the personal adulation which characterized his rule.

. . . The joint session of the Politbureau of the CC and the Presidium of the CCC determines that the factional activity of Bukharin . . . unfortunately has still continued in one form or another up to the present time. Such facts as Bukharin's refusal to work in the Comintern; his refusal to work as editor of *Pravda*; the appearance in the press without the knowledge of the CC of Bukharin's "Notes of an Economist," which represents eclectic nonsense that is not permissible for a Marxist and creates the danger of controversy in the party; the submission of their resignations by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky to the November Plenum of the CC; Bukharin's declaration of January 30, 1929, confirming in basic content his conversations with Kamenev in July, 1928; Tomsky's submission of his resignation [as trade union chief] in December, 1928; Bukharin's and Tomsky's unwillingness to submit to the decision made by the Politbureau more than once that they withdrew their resignations—all this and similar facts show that Bukharin continues to nurse his grudge and to struggle against the CC.

To justify his factional activity Bukharin has resorted to a series of impermissible slanders of the CC, of its domestic and foreign policies, of its organizational leadership, with the aim of defaming the party and its CC. By thus defaming the party's policy Bukharin has slipped into the position of a

FROM: Resolution of the Joint Session of the Politbureau of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, *On Intra-Party Affairs*, February 9, 1929 (CPSU in Resolutions, II, 558-562; editor's translation).

diplomatic defense of the right elements in the CPSU (Frumkin* & Co.) which demand the unfettering of the capitalist elements in town and country, and of the conciliationist elements in the Comintern (Humbert-Droz** & Co.) who deny the precariousness of the stabilization of capitalism and revise the decisions of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the expulsion of the rightists from the German Communist Party.

In connection with these points the joint session of the Politbureau of the CC and the Presidium of the CCC determines the following facts:

1) Bukharin's declaration that the policy of the party after the July Plenum was determined by "the slogan of tribute, i.e., military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry," supposedly proclaimed by Comrade Stalin in his speech at the Plenum, is inherently deceitful and false through and through. The party as a whole, like Comrade Stalin, has always struggled and will continue to struggle against the Trotskyist theory of "military feudal exploitation of the peasantry." Bukharin knows this just as well as the whole party does. The party as a whole, like Comrade Stalin, proceeds from the fact that the peasantry is still paying excessively high prices for industrial products and receives excessively low prices for agricultural products, that this surtax ("tribute") cannot be eliminated now unless we want to abandon industrialization, that it has to be curtailed step by step in order to eliminate it altogether after a period of several years. . . .

. . . This is not the first time that Bukharin has resorted to slander against the party. The history of our party contains facts from the period of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, when Bukharin, himself sitting in the petty-bourgeois opportunist swamp, accused Lenin and his party of opportunism and petty-bourgeois tendencies, when in the theses of the "left" Communists submitted to the Seventh Congress of

* Frumkin: Commissar of Finance, 1926-28, and a strong advocate of concessions to the peasantry—Ed.

** J. Humbert-Droz: a Swiss Communist leader, advocate of co-operation with democratic socialists—Ed.

the party he wrote that "the policy of the leading institutions of the party has been a policy of vacillation and compromises," that "the social basis of such a policy is the process of the degeneration of our party from a purely proletarian one to a nation-wide one," that "the party, instead of lifting up the peasant masses, has itself slipped down to their level; from the vanguard of revolution it has turned into a middle peasant."

2) Bukharin's declaration that a "super-tax" imposition on the peasantry is a constituent part of the party's policy, that the party and the CC are not carrying out the decisions of the plenums of the CC on the stimulation of individual peasant farming and increasing its output, is incorrect and false. . . .

In the party there cannot be two lines. Either the party line is incorrect—and then Bukharin is right, marking himself off from the CC. Or the party line is correct—and then Bukharin's "new" line on the peasant question cannot be anything but an approach to Frumkin's line, which is calculated on the unfettering of the capitalist elements. It is impossible to dangle endlessly between the slogan "get rich" and the slogan "attack the *kulak*." In essence Bukharin is slipping into Frumkin's position.

3) Bukharin's declaration about the hopelessness of our foreign-exchange position, about his having "predicted" all this, and no one listening to him, etc., is entirely incorrect. This declaration of Bukharin's represents nothing but bragging. . . .

4) Bukharin's declaration that we have no intraparty democracy, that the party is becoming "bureaucratized," that "we are cultivating bureaucracy," that there are no elected secretaries in the party, that we have established as it were a system of political commissars at *Pravda*, in the Comintern, in the Central Trade Union Council, that the present regime in the party has become unbearable, etc., is entirely incorrect and false through and through. We cannot help noting that Bukharin has here slid into the position of Trotsky in his notorious letter of October 8, 1923. It is only necessary to compare Trotsky's words in this letter about the "intraparty

regime," about "secretarial bureaucratism," or to the effect that "the bureaucratization of the party apparatus has reached unheard of proportions by applying the methods of secretarial selection"—it is only necessary to compare these words of Trotsky's with Bukharin's declaration, to understand to what depths Bukharin has fallen. Only people who are dissatisfied with the presence of iron intraparty discipline, only people who are dissatisfied with the fact that the party's majority does not agree with their panicky "platforms" and "theses," only people who are dissatisfied with the present composition of the leading organs of our party—only such people are capable of accusing our party, with its methods of self-criticism, of bureaucratism and bureaucratization. Lenin was right when he called such comrades people who are overcome by "lordly anarchism." Lenin was right when he said in regard to such people, "It clearly appears that cries about notorious bureaucratism are simply to conceal dissatisfaction with the personal composition of the center—it is a fig leaf" ("One Step Forward"). . . .

In essence in his attacks on the "intraparty regime" Bukharin is slipping into the same position on the "freedom of ideological groupings" which the Trotskyist opposition held in the initial stage of its development. . . .

Bukharin's and Tomsky's declaration is completely without substance in saying that they are being "worked over" in the party, that an "organizational encirclement" has been created, in view of which they are compelled to insist on resigning. . . . Of what does intraparty democracy consist? No one can compel a party of a million and a half to hold their spit in their mouths and not ask questions about intraparty affairs for the sake of Bukharin's and Tomsky's tranquility. If the activity of the party masses and their wish to know the truth about Bukharin and Tomsky lead to justified criticism of these comrades' form of action, Bukharin and Tomsky are themselves guilty for committing incorrect actions which have made the party anxious and agitated. . . .

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